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ABSTRACT 
 
The judicial process is neither static nor uniform. In recent years, judicial control over 
the civil trial process has become increasingly apparent. Judges are now frequently 
involved in the provision (either directly or by referral) of alternative dispute 
resolution (‘ADR’) processes. The individual reforms which punctuate this increase 
are often referred to as ‘access to justice’ reforms, and respond to concerns regarding 
the cost and quality of adversarial litigation. One such reform, and the focus of this 
thesis, is a process described as ‘judicial mediation’. Judicial mediation falls within 
the ‘third-wave’ of the access to justice movement, and has the potential to improve 
the quality and efficiency of civil litigation.  
 
This thesis examines judicial mediation from a constitutional and jurisprudential 
perspective. More specifically, it asks whether Ch III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution limits the capacity of Australian judges to engage in judicial mediation 
and, if so, how this will affect the development of judicial mediation in practice. The 
idea of judges mediating can be controversial, and calls for a re-examination of 
certain underlying assumptions regarding the nature of the judicial process. Many of 
the issues raised by judicial mediation also reflect broader practical and 
jurisprudential questions common to other third-wave reforms, including case 
management (in particular prehearing conferences), court-connected ADR, and less 
adversarial trial procedures.  
 
It has been argued that judicial mediation will conflict with certain inviolable precepts 
and conditions of the common law judicial process; in particular the principles of 
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procedural fairness and the integrity of the judiciary. Certain of these requirements 
have been identified as implications of Ch III. On this basis, it has been suggested that 
federal judges cannot mediate, that judicial mediation is ‘incompatible’ with the 
‘status and role’ of State and territory courts as repositories of federal judicial power, 
and that private mediation by an active judge would be ‘incompatible’ with the 
performance of his/her judicial functions. This thesis demonstrates that, in practice, it 
is highly unlikely that judges will be prohibited from mediating by the requirements 
of Ch III in any of these contexts.  
 
Many of the concerns voiced in relation to judicial mediation are fuelled by the belief 
that mediation and adjudication are somehow dichotomous, and that the term ‘judicial 
mediation’ is therefore oxymoronic. These views reflect an early tendency to define 
mediation in contradistinction with litigation. The reality, demonstrated in this thesis, 
is that mediation and adjudication are more aptly described as theoretical constructs 
which occupy opposing ends of the same ‘procedural continuum’. The question is not 
whether judges can ‘mediate’, but how far towards the mediation end of this 
continuum judicial participation can travel before the boundaries of acceptable 
conduct are exceeded. In practice, simple strategies can be adopted to minimise any 
risk of apprehended bias arising, or of damage being sustained to the integrity of the 
judicial institution.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, this thesis demonstrates that the ultimate object of Ch III 
would not be served by the prohibition of judicial mediation. It is shown that the High 
Court’s approach to Ch III can be framed as an attempt to maintain and expand four 
essential jurisdictions; exclusive, inherent, appellate and supervisory. These 
iii 
 
 
 
jurisdictions serve the rule of law by insulating the judiciary and the judicial process 
from governmental interference (exclusive and inherent jurisdiction), by ensuring an 
avenue of appeal to the High Court from all Australian Courts (appellate jurisdiction), 
and by securing the judiciary’s overarching authority in all spheres of Australian 
dispute resolution (supervisory jurisdiction). This thesis demonstrates that judicial 
mediation poses no threat to any of these jurisdictions and that, on the contrary, 
judicial mediation has the potential to further the rule of law by increasing the 
efficiency and quality of dispute resolution in independent and impartial tribunals. 
iv 
 
 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................... I 
CONTENTS............................................................................................ IV 
TABLE OF FIGURES........................................................................... IX 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1 
WHAT IS ‘JUDICIAL MEDIATION’? ............................................................................... 1 
What is Mediation? ................................................................................................ 2 
What makes Mediation ‘Judicial’? ........................................................................ 5 
How might Judicial Mediation undermine the requirements of Ch III? ................ 9 
Variations in Mediation Practice ........................................................................ 10 
Mediation ‘Pressure Points’ ................................................................................ 14 
WHAT IS JUDICIAL MEDIATION INTENDED TO ACHIEVE? .......................................... 17 
Is there still a need to improve access? ............................................................... 23 
Is there a ‘crisis’ in civil justice? ......................................................................... 24 
WILL JUDICIAL MEDIATION ‘IMPROVE’ CIVIL JUSTICE? ........................................... 36 
Will judicial mediation undermine the quality of civil justice? ........................... 37 
Is Mediation Effective? ........................................................................................ 44 
Does mediation increase settlement rates?.......................................................... 44 
Does mediation reduce the cost and/or duration of litigation? ........................... 51 
Will judicial mediation be effective?.................................................................... 53 
SYNOPSIS OF THE THESIS .......................................................................................... 54 
CHAPTER 2  CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS ............................... 63 
THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION: INFLUENCES, ASSUMPTIONS AND 
ARRANGEMENTS........................................................................................................ 64 
The separation of powers ..................................................................................... 67 
The rule of law ..................................................................................................... 69 
The States and territories ..................................................................................... 71 
Private dispute resolution and supervisory jurisdiction ...................................... 74 
v 
 
 
 
THE ‘SEPARATION DOCTRINE’ .................................................................................. 81 
Only Chapter III Courts may exercise judicial power (the ‘first limb’) .............. 83 
Only judicial power or powers incidental thereto may be vested in Ch III Courts 
(the ‘second limb’) ............................................................................................. 101 
What is the object of the separation doctrine? .................................................. 108 
Does the ‘second limb’ still matter? .................................................................. 111 
Do the implications of the separation doctrine affect rules of court? ............... 116 
SUMMARY AND APPROACH TO SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS ........................................... 120 
CHAPTER 3  JUDICIAL POWER AND INCIDENTAL 
FUNCTIONS ......................................................................................... 122 
THE PRIMARY INDICIA ............................................................................................ 123 
IMPLIED INCIDENTAL FUNCTIONS ........................................................................... 127 
Innominate and Chameleon Functions .............................................................. 130 
Historical association between function and jurisdiction ................................. 134 
IS MEDIATION AN INCIDENTAL JUDICIAL FUNCTION? ............................................. 142 
An Existing Controversy .................................................................................... 142 
An Authoritative, Binding and Conclusive Determination ................................ 144 
Prehearing Functions? ...................................................................................... 145 
Pre-Existing Rights ............................................................................................ 148 
THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF LEGISLATIVE VALIDITY ...................................... 152 
CHAPTER 4  IMPLIED JUDICIAL PROCESS .............................. 159 
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE RULE OF LAW ............................................................ 161 
WHICH ‘RIGHTS’ ARE IMPLIED BY CH III? .............................................................. 170 
The Rule against Bias ........................................................................................ 177 
The Fair Hearing Rule ....................................................................................... 182 
Open Justice ....................................................................................................... 190 
Non-curial Due Process ..................................................................................... 194 
WHICH ‘CHARACTERISTICS’ ARE ESSENTIAL TO JUDICIAL ‘INTEGRITY’? ................. 197 
What is ‘inherent jurisdiction’? ......................................................................... 198 
vi 
 
 
 
Maintaining ‘Integrity’ ...................................................................................... 204 
‘READING DOWN’ DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS ..................................................... 214 
The ‘Direction Rule’ .......................................................................................... 215 
Procedural Discretions to be Performed Judicially .......................................... 221 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PROCEDURAL RULES IMPLIED BY CH III: ........................ 224 
CHAPTER 5  THE PERSONA DESIGNATA EXCEPTION ........... 227 
Incompatibility ................................................................................................... 229 
THE PERSONA DESIGNATA EXCEPTION ................................................................... 231 
Can federal judges mediate in their private capacity? ...................................... 250 
Does Grollo apply to State or territory legislation? .......................................... 258 
SHOULD AUSTRALIAN JUDGES ENGAGE IN JUDICIAL MEDIATION IN THEIR PRIVATE 
CAPACITY? .............................................................................................................. 261 
CHAPTER 6  CH III IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND 
TERRITORY COURTS....................................................................... 265 
THE KABLE DOCTRINE ............................................................................................ 267 
An integrated Australian judiciary .................................................................... 269 
WHICH COURTS DOES KABLE APPLY TO? ................................................................ 274 
The ‘integration’ principle ................................................................................. 277 
When will incompatibility arise under Kable? .................................................. 296 
What are the ‘criteria’ of incompatibility? ........................................................ 305 
‘READING DOWN’ KABLE ....................................................................................... 320 
Justice Kirby’s approach: ‘The character of the Law’ ...................................... 330 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 334 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: FEDERAL, STATE AND TERRITORY .................................... 337 
CHAPTER 7  MEDIATION AND ADJUDICATION:  A 
PROCEDURAL CONTINUUM .......................................................... 341 
THE INTEGRATION OF ADR AND THE FORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ............................ 343 
vii 
 
 
 
Court-Connected ADR ....................................................................................... 345 
INCREASED JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE CIVIL TRIAL PROCESS ................................. 348 
Theoretical approach to analysis: the American experience ............................ 350 
WHAT DO AUSTRALIAN JUDGES DO? ....................................................................... 357 
CASE MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................... 359 
What is case management? ................................................................................ 361 
Directions Hearings and Prehearing Conferences............................................ 364 
Settlement Conferences ...................................................................................... 370 
INQUISITORIALISM .................................................................................................. 373 
Less Adversarial Trials ...................................................................................... 381 
Concurrent Expert Evidence (‘Hot-Tubbing’) ................................................... 387 
THIRD-WAVE COMPARISONS ................................................................................... 389 
HAS THE AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL FUNCTION BEEN ‘TRANSFORMED’? ..................... 392 
A ‘PROCEDURAL CONTINUUM’ ............................................................................... 398 
Appellate Guidance in the Exercise of Discretion? ........................................... 401 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 411 
CHAPTER 8 IS JUDICIAL MEDIATION ‘JUDICIAL’? .............. 412 
HOW WILL JUDICIAL MEDIATION BE IMPLEMENTED? ............................................... 414 
Options for the implementation of judicial mediation ....................................... 415 
Existing judicial mediation processes ................................................................ 416 
Formal distinctions between prehearing processes? ......................................... 423 
What do Judicial Mediators do? ........................................................................ 431 
DOES JUDICIAL MEDIATION OFFEND THE RULE AGAINST BIAS? ............................. 434 
Judicial participation ......................................................................................... 436 
Privacy: separate meetings and private communications ................................. 444 
The confidentiality of proceedings ..................................................................... 453 
Can the risk of apprehended bias be mitigated? ............................................... 458 
WILL JUDICIAL MEDIATION UNDERMINE THE INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIARY? .......... 471 
Perceptions of impartiality ................................................................................ 475 
viii 
 
 
 
The application of the integrity concept ............................................................ 477 
The object of the integrity concept ..................................................................... 479 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 482 
JUDICIAL MEDIATION CAN BE IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY WITH CH III .............. 482 
CRITIQUE OF THE HIGH COURT’S INTERPRETIVE APPROACH ................................... 485 
THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL MEDIATION .................................................................... 487 
APPENDIX ............................................................................................ 489 
Letter from Judge Margaret Sidis to Iain Field, 20th August 2009 ................... 489 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 491 
Case Law ............................................................................................................ 522 
Primary and Delegated Legislation ................................................................... 533 
UK Primary and Delegated Legislation ............................................................ 537 
Miscellaneous International Materials .............................................................. 537 
Other Sources .................................................................................................... 538 
 
 
  
 
ix 
 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Applicable Ch III Implications .......................................................... 338 
Figure 2: Procedural Continuum ...................................................................... 400 
Figure 3: Likelihood of Judicial Mediation resulting in Apprehended Bias ..... 436 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this preliminary Chapter is to introduce certain of the key themes and 
concepts which underpin and direct the analysis undertaken in the following Chapters. 
The Chapter begins by developing a working definition of the term ‘judicial 
mediation’, and goes on to identify areas of potential conflict (pressure points) in the 
relationship between judicial mediation and the fundamental principles that govern 
the judicial function. The second part of this Chapter demonstrates that, appropriately 
implemented and monitored, judicial mediation has the potential to improve the 
efficiency and quality of civil litigation.  
 
What is ‘judicial mediation’? 
 
Some of the earliest references to judicial mediation appeared in the US during the 
mid-1980s,1 and commentary on the subject has increased steadily in Australia2 and 
overseas 3
                                                 
1 See, for example, Marc Galanter, ‘A settlement judge, not a trial judge: judicial mediation in the 
United States’ (1985) 12(1) Journal of Law and Society 1; Marc Galanter, ‘The Emergence of the 
Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’ (1986) 69 Judicature 257. 
2 See, for example: Sir Laurence Street, ‘The Courts and Mediation – A Warning’ (1991) 2 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 203; Chief Justice Michael Black; ‘ALJ Forum: Mediation’ (1993) 67 
Australian Law Journal 941; Tania Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Process Trends’ (1996) 14 Australian Bar Review 185; Sir Laurence Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial 
Institution’ (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 794; Phillip Tucker, ‘Judges as Mediators: A Chapter III 
Prohibition?’ (2000) 11 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 84; Justice Michael Moore ‘Judges as 
Mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition or Accommodation?’ (2003) 14 Australian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 188, David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Are they Constitutionally Valid?’ (2006) 9(4) ADR 
Bulletin 1; David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 1’ (2006) 17 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 130; David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 2’ (2006) 
17(4) Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 189. 
 in the years since. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that a number of 
3 See generally: Hiram Chodosh, ‘Judicial Mediation and Legal Culture’ (1999) 4(3) Issues of 
Democracy. (Electronic Journal of the USA Department of State) 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/1299/ijde/ijde1299.htm> at 5 October 2006; Hugh Landerkin and 
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Australian courts ostensibly engage in the practice,4
What is Mediation? 
 the precise definition of ‘judicial 
mediation’ remains uncertain. Uncertainty arises for two reasons in particular: 
because mediation, and the relationship between mediation and adjudication, is 
difficult to define, and because there are jurisdictional variations as to what makes 
judicial mediation ‘judicial’.  
 
 
The taxonomy of alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) processes is imprecise,5 and 
various definitional approaches can be identified in the literature. One methodology 
commonly adopted is to differentiate between broad procedural models or 
ideologies. 6
• Facilitative processes involve a third party, often with no advisory or 
determinative role, providing assistance in managing the process of dispute 
resolution. These processes include mediation and facilitation. 
 According to the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council (‘NADRAC’), for example, dispute resolution processes can be classified 
according to three overarching categories; facilitative, advisory/evaluative and 
determinative: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Andrew Pirie, ‘Judges as Mediators: What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?’ 
(2003) 82(2) Canadian Bar Review 249; Justice Louise Otis and Eric H. Reiter, ‘Judicial Mediation in 
Quebec’ in Nadja Alexander (ed), Global Trends in Mediation, (2nd ed 2006) 107, at 110-111; Alain 
Lacabarats, ‘The role of mediation in French judicial practice’ (Paper presented at the inaugural 
meeting of the European Commercial Judges Forum: New Approaches to the Efficient Management by 
the Courts of Commercial Litigation, Paris, 15 October 2003). 
4 The extent to which judicial mediation occurs in Australia is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.  
5 This proposition is widely acknowledged in the literature. See, for example: Tania Sourdin, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005), 26; David Spencer and Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and 
Practice (2006), 4; Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2005), 4-6; 
Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, (2nd ed, 2002), 135. 
6 Carrie Menkel-Meadow. ‘The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, 
Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices’ (1995) 11 Negotiation Journal 217, 228 – 230; Boulle, above n 5, 
43.  
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• Advisory processes involve a third party who investigates the dispute and 
provides advice on the facts and possible outcomes. These procedures 
include investigation, case appraisal and dispute counselling. 
 
• Determinative processes involve a third party investigating the dispute, 
which may include a formal hearing, and the making of a determination 
which is potentially enforceable. These processes include adjudication and 
arbitration and may be binding or non-binding.7
 
These overarching categories are referred to frequently throughout this thesis, as they 
provide a useful interface between constitutional and ADR theory. NADRAC has 
further defined mediation by identifying the core elements of that process. According 
to NADRAC, mediation is 
 
 
a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a neutral 
third party (the mediator), identify the disputed issues, develop options, 
consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The mediator has 
no advisory or determinative role in regard to the content of the dispute or 
the outcome of its resolution, but may advise on or determine the process of 
mediation whereby resolution is attempted. Mediation may be undertaken 
voluntarily, under a court order, or subject to an existing contractual 
agreement.8
                                                 
7 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) Dispute Resolution Terms 
(AGPS, Canberra, September 2003), 4. See also, Tania Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005), 
Ch 2. 
8 NADRAC, Alternative Dispute Resolution Definitions (1997) 5. 
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The model described by NADRAC reflects a ‘standard’9 or ‘classical’10 mediation 
model, which is purely facilitative in nature.11 There is some debate as to whether 
mediation might not, in certain circumstances, involve an advisory or evaluative 
function.12 The nature of mediation is examined in more detail below, at which point 
it is demonstrated that, in practice, mediation is often evaluative in nature. It is 
generally accepted, however, that a mediator should have no determinative function.13 
‘Self-determination’ is often identified as a core ‘value’ 14  or ‘philosophy’ 15  of 
mediation; in contrast with adjudication, which is characterised by the provision of a 
‘binding and authoritative decision’.16 This point is critical to the analysis undertaken 
in the following Chapters, and is worth repeating for the sake of clarity: mediators (or 
judge-mediators in the case of judicial mediation) do not determine disputes. For this 
reason, judicial mediation may be classified as a ‘prehearing’ function.17
Another central feature of mediation, commonly included in definitions of the concept, 
is that mediators should be neutral and unbiased.
 
 
18 This fact is significant because, as 
will be seen, impartiality is also a (arguably the) core feature of formal adjudication.19
                                                 
9 Boulle, above n 5, 171. 
10 Spencer and Brogan, above n 5, 49. 
11 Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 26 – 7. 
12 As Tania Sourdin has explained, for example, evaluative mediation, ‘or as it is also known in the 
United States, “muscle”, “rhino” or “rambo” mediation … may not offer the same empowerment 
opportunities’. Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 28. 
13 Simon Roberts, ‘Mediation in Family Disputes’ (1986) 46 Modern Law Review 537, 546; Boulle, 
above n 5, 65; Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 26 
14 Boulle, above n 5, 60-67; Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 28. 
15 Ruth Charlton identifies five ‘philosophies’ of mediation: ‘confidentiality’, ‘voluntariness’, 
‘empowerment’, ‘neutrality’, and ‘a unique solution’. Ruth Charlton, Dispute Resolution Guide Book 
(2000), 14-15. See also Spencer and Brogan, above n 5, 83-100. 
16 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead  (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ). The ‘primary 
indicia’ of judicial power are identified and discussed in Chapter 3.  
17 The term prehearing is adopted in preference to the term ‘pretrial’, as the latter is apt to suggest 
processes that take place prior to filing, as opposed to processes that take place between filing and the 
final hearing. 
18 Spencer and Brogan, above n 5, 91-99. 
19Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, [79] (Gaudron J). 
 
Tania Sourdin states that, ‘at its simplest, mediation involves the intervention of a 
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trained, impartial third party … who will assist the parties to reach their own 
solutions’.20 As noted above, neutrality is also central to the definition of mediation 
provided by NADRAC, and Hugh Landerkin and Andrew Pirie have expressed the 
view that a ‘neutral and unbiased third party with no authoritative decision-making 
power and a final say resting with the parties themselves are characteristics [of 
mediation] that survive in a wide variety of procedural milieus’.21
Thus, unless a process involves an impartial third party with no decision-making 
power – that power remaining with the disputants – it cannot be classified as 
‘mediation’.
 
 
22
What makes Mediation ‘Judicial’? 
 Although this negative definition fails to accommodate the variety of 
mediation processes that exist in practice, it provides a suitable starting point for 
analysis. Some of the subtleties of the mediation process are examined in more detail 
below. Before doing so, however, it is important to clarify why judicial mediation is 
described as ‘judicial’. Judicial mediation has never been authoritatively defined in an 
Australian context, but it has been defined in other jurisdictions, and it is necessary (in 
order to avoid any confusion) to distinguish the model that is developing in Australia 
from the models that have developed overseas. A few select examples suffice for this 
purpose. 
 
 
In France, judicial mediation involves the appointment of an independent mediator 
within the formal court system. The mediator in this model is not the judge him or 
herself, but a fourth party who mediates between the disputants in the presence of the 
                                                 
20 Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 26. 
21 Landerkin and Pirie, above n 3, 256.  
22 Boulle, above n 5, 13. 
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judge. The ‘judicial’ nature of the French model therefore derives from the integration 
of the mediation process within the formal court system, as opposed to the identity of 
the mediator. Free from the normal restrictions of adversarial practice, the 
independent mediator’s only procedural obligations under the revised French Civil 
Procedure are,23
to meet the time-limit that he has been set for carrying out his duties and to 
comply strictly with the rules of confidentiality which prohibit him, in 
particular, from informing the judge or third parties of any compromise 
proposals that the parties have put forward to him.
  
 
24
The French system of judicial mediation is designed to ensure the maintenance of 
judicial impartiality, and the judge’s role in the mediation is limited to deciding 
whether the dispute is suitable for mediation (barring matters concerning ‘public 
policy’ which cannot be mediated), the length of the mediation (within legislative 
limits), the identity of the mediator, and the enforceability of the final decision.
 
 
25
In contrast with the French model, it is a common (and defining) feature of most 
models of judicial mediation that the judge fulfils the role of mediator him/herself. 
The Quebec Civil Code of Civil Procedure, for example, provides judges at ‘every 
level and in virtually every area of law’
 
 
26 with the power to preside over a ‘settlement 
conference’ at the request of the parties.27
                                                 
23 French Code of Civil Procedure, Articles 131-1 – 131-15. 
24 Lacabarats, above n 3, 2-3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Justice Louise Otis and Eric H. Reiter, ‘Judicial Mediation: A New Phenomenon in the 
Transformation of Justice’ (2005) (Unpublished), 3. 
27 Quebec Civil Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ 2009 c-25. 
 According to Louise Otis and Eric Reiter, 
‘judicial mediation’ in the Quebec Court of Appeal occurs, ‘within the framework of 
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the traditional adversarial system … [with] … a judge … conducting the mediation’.28 
Justice Otis has argued that the Quebec Civil Code of Civil Procedure implements the 
purest example of ‘judicial mediation’ yet developed.29
In common-law jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada (excluding Quebec) and the 
US, the judicial nature of judicial mediation would also appear to derive from the 
identity of the mediator. In the US, however, the term may be used to refer to all 
forms of judge-led mediation whether integrated or not and whether conducted by an 
active or retired judge. According to Hiram Chodosh, judicial mediation refers to ‘a 
confidential, consensual form of dispute resolution facilitated by a sitting or retired 
judge who is trained in conflict resolution’.
  
 
30
mediating judges [in Canada] are not members of the increasing ranks of “rent-
a-judges” in North America who have left the bench to pursue rewarding 
second or third careers as private sector arbitrators and mediators. The judges 
we are referring to will be sitting s. 96 superior court judges appointed by the 
 On this definition, judicial mediation is 
‘judicial’ first and foremost because of the identity of the mediator, and does not 
hinge upon whether that process is integrated with the court system.  
 
Hugh Landerkin and Andrew Pirie argue that the Canadian model of judicial 
mediation is narrower than the US model, because  
 
                                                 
28 Justice Louise Otis and Eric H. Reiter, ‘Judicial Mediation in Quebec’ in Nadja Alexander (ed), 
Global Trends in Mediation, (2nd ed 2006) 107, at 110-111. Justice Otis has previously defined 
mediation as occurring ‘where sitting judges themselves act as mediators in programs closely 
integrated with the traditional adjudicative system’. (Justice Louise Otis and Eric H. Reiter, above n 
26). For an earlier analysis of Quebec’s judicial mediation/conciliation program see also, Louise Otis, 
‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Judicial Mediation’ (Paper prepared for the European Conference of 
Judges: Early Settlement of Disputes and the Role of Judges, 2003, Strasbourg) 5.  
29 Otis and Reiter, ‘Judicial Mediation in Quebec’, above n 28. Whether settlement conferences may be 
classified as a form of judicial mediation is considered in Chapters 7 and 8. 
30 Chodosh, above n 3.   
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Governor-in-Council, at the trial and appellate levels, and sitting s. 92 
Provincial or Territorial Court judges appointed by a Province or Territory.31
The same is true in Australia, where a number of the country’s most established and 
high-profile private mediators are retired judges,
  
 
32  and where the majority of 
literature consequently pre-supposes that judicial mediators are active judges. 33 
According to David Spencer, for example, judicial ‘mediators [in Australia] are 
appointed judges of the respective court but assigned the task of mediating as 
opposed to adjudicating cases before the court’.34 This definition corresponds with 
the judicial mediation programs introduced in certain State courts over the past few 
years, including the Supreme Court of South Australia, the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia, 35  and the District Court of New South Wales. 36
The preceding analysis can be condensed to reveal the following working definition 
of judicial mediation: judicial mediation is a prehearing process in which an active 
 These programs are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 8. For the reasons provided at that stage, 
however, it is debatable whether judge-mediators must be excluded from 
subsequently adjudicating the same case. At this stage no assumption is made as to 
whether judge-mediators are excluded from subsequent adjudication by Ch III, and 
the following Chapters countenance either possibility. 
 
                                                 
31 Landerkin and Pirie, above n 3, 251. 
32 There are a number of practical implications of this including the danger that judges may retire in 
order to ‘seek more a more lucrative career in the private dispute resolution’. Hiram Chodosh, above n 
3. 
33 See above n 2. 
34 Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: are they constitutionally valid?’, above n 2, 61. 
35 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Supreme Court Mediation Programme (Practice Direction No 
2 of 2008), now contained in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice 
Directions (22nd January 2009), PD 4.2.1. 
36 Judge Margaret Sidis, ‘Judicial Mediation in the District Court’ (2006) 18(9) Judicial Officers 
Bulletin 74; Letter from Judge Margaret Sidis to Iain Field, 20th August 2009. See Appendix. 
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judge (the ‘judge-mediator’) attempts to guide opposing parties towards an outcome 
to which they can both assent. The judicial mediation process takes place as part of 
the formal court process, but does not involve the provision of a binding 
determination by the judge-mediator.  
 
How might Judicial Mediation undermine the requirements of Ch III? 
 
How, then, might judicial mediation conflict with the requirements of Ch III? By 
sketching the outer boundaries of mediation practice, three overlapping ‘pressure 
points’ can be identified in the relationship between mediation and the judicial 
function; the participation of the judge-mediator, 37
                                                 
37 It is common for lawyers and judges to describe judicial involvement in the legal process as an 
‘intervention’. See, for example: Justice David Ipp, ‘Judicial Intervention in the Trial Process’ (1995) 
69 Australian Law Journal 36; Justice Andrew Rogers, ‘The managerial or interventionist judge’ (1993) 
3 Journal of Judicial Administration 97. The same term has been adopted by ADR theorists to 
categorise the techniques adopted by mediators. For example, Laurence Boulle adopts the term 
intervention to refer to ‘the actions or responses which mediators make to particular situations, 
problems or crises in the interactions between the disputing parties’. See above n 5, 36. However, in 
constitutional discourse the term ‘interventionism’ is synonymous with judicial activism and legal 
realism, and in ADR circles there has been ‘considerable debate as to the appropriate and legitimate 
degree to which mediators can “intervene” in the process of conducting mediations’. See, for example 
Simon Roberts, ‘Toward a Minimal Form of Alternative Intervention’ (1986) 11 Mediation Quarterly 
25; Russell Thirgood ‘Mediator Intervention to Ensure Fair and Just Outcomes (1999) 10 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 142; Henry Brown and Arthur Marriot, ADR Principles and Practice (2nd 
ed, 1999) 138-140. In short, the word ‘intervention’ has particular, disparate and often negative 
connotations in both disciplines. These connotations have the potential to detract from what is intended 
to be a neutral analysis of mediation vis-à-vis the rule against bias. For this reason the term 
‘participation’ is adopted to describe the role of judges during mediation. This term is also considered 
preferable as it avoids the suggestion (implicit in the term ‘intervention’) that the role of the mediator is 
somehow external to the dispute resolution process. 
 the privacy of the mediation 
process, and the confidentiality of proceedings. These pressure points serve as 
waypoints by which to navigate and chart the streams of Ch III jurisprudence that will 
control the development of judicial mediation.  
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Variations in Mediation Practice 
 
The classical (facilitative) model of mediation described above is a useful analytical 
archetype, but it does not reflect the wide variety of forms that mediation may take in 
practice, and which will vary depending upon ‘the purpose for which mediation is 
used and the theoretical, or operational, perspective of the mediator’.38 The Australian 
National Mediator Standards developed by NADRAC acknowledge this fact, but 
continue to define mediation as a purely facilitative process.39
The Standards also explain that ‘blended processes’, ie processes that blend 
mediation with an ‘advisory’ component like expert information or advice, 
are more properly defined as ‘conciliation’ ‘advisory mediation’ or 
‘evaluative mediation’. It is hoped that over time the Standards will 
encourage greater consistency in how the term mediation is used.
 In a recent Issues Paper, 
NADRAC stated that:  
 
40
It is unclear why, precisely, NADRAC consider greater consistency to be important. 
For some commentators, maintaining a robust distinction between the classical 
 
 
                                                 
38 Boulle, above n 5, 48. Ruth Charlton and Michelene Dewdney open their text by stating that there ‘is 
no universally accepted model of mediation’. The Mediator’s Handbook: Skills and Strategies for 
Practitioners (2nd ed 2004), 3. Spencer and Brogan, above n 5, 459, similarly state that, while 
‘mediation purists, schooled in classical mediation processes, decry any move away from the effective 
but restrictive classical model of mediation – where opening statements are delivered like an over-
rehearsed Shakespearean soliloquy and separate sessions are conducted in as ritualistic a manner as 
Catholic Mass – the mediation realists mourn the opportunities lost through a rigid adherence to a 
process valued for its flexibility. The hybrid forms of mediation are as many and varied as the 
individuals and organisations that have benefited from them’. NADRAC acknowledges that in 
‘practice … the term mediation is often used in instances where the dispute resolution practitioner 
gives advice on the substance of the dispute’. See also Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Many Ways of 
Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices’, above n 6. 
39 ‘Some mediators may also use a “blended” process that involves mediation and incorporates an 
“advisory” component, or a process that involves the provision of expert information and advice, where 
it enhances the decision-making of the participants provided that the participants agree that such advice 
can be provided. Such processes may be defined as “conciliation” or “evaluative mediation.”’ 
Australian National Mediator Standards, Approval Standards (2008) 5. 
40 NADRAC, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Civil Justice System, NADRAC IP (2009), 6 [2.20]. 
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mediation model and other forms of dispute resolution is necessary for ethical reasons; 
in order to keep disputants fully informed as to the nature of the process undertaken.41 
Whatever the motivation, this goal is likely to prove illusory. Most academic 
commentaries on the ‘evaluative/facilitative debate’ 42  conclude that ideological 
distinctions between dispute resolution processes are often facile in practice, and that 
the classical mediation model ‘has begun to unravel ... as mediation has grown up in 
popularity, and especially as the practice has become increasingly intertwined with 
the legal system’.43
In some situations there will be an expectation that they [the mediator] 
perform some kind of evaluative function, for example, where parties select 
mediators with expertise in the substantive issues in dispute to provide a 
platform on which they can build a settlement. Thus an engineer mediator 
could be expected to express an opinion on the cause of a construction 
problem and a lawyer mediator a prediction of a court’s likely view on the 
liability question.
 In part, the erosion of the classical model may reflect the fact that: 
 
44
                                                 
41 Kimberlee Kovach and Lela Love, ‘Mapping Mediation: the Risks of Riskin’s Grid’ (1998) 3 
Harvard Negotiation Law Review 71. See also Kimberlee Kovach and Lela Love, ‘“Evaluative” 
Mediation is an Oxymoron’ (1996) 14 Alternatives to High Cost Litigation 31. The first article listed 
responds to an article by Leonard Riskin, who posits that the strategies and techniques employed by 
mediators can be represented on a ‘facilitative-evaluative’ continuum: Leonard Riskin, ‘Understanding 
Mediator’s Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed’ (1996) 1 Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review 7, 23-24. A similar approach is adopted in Chapter 7.  
42 Maureen Laflin,‘Preserving the Integrity of Mediation through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for 
Lawyer-Mediators’ (2000) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 479, 483. 
43 Ibid 484; Landerkin and Pirie, above n 3, 256, state that mediation ‘processes take many procedural 
forms. There is no singularly right method or way to do mediation. Even in cases of the same 
subject-matter, there can be caucuses or only face-to-face meetings, specific directions on how to speak 
or more open conversations, emotions capped or explored, time restraints or all day sessions. Mediation 
can be short or long, 12 steps or six stages, many parties present or conducted online, Internet based or 
highly charged, held inside or outside a courthouse’. See also Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
above n 5, 26. 
44 Boulle, above n 5, 221. See also Donald Weckstein ‘In Praise of Party Empowerment – and of 
Mediator Activism’ 33 (1997) Williamette Law Review 501, 526. 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow identifies eight overlapping categories of mediation: purely 
facilitative, evaluative, transformative, bureaucratic, open or closed, activist or 
accountable, community and pragmatic.45 According to Carrie Menkel-Meadow the 
formality of proceedings will vary greatly between models, from the extreme 
bureaucratic model ‘which occurs in courts or other institutional settings that can 
control and limit the process used’, to ‘“on the spot” [pragmatic] mediation that is 
highly instrumentalist and agreement oriented’. 46  A similar approach has been 
adopted in the Australian literature. For example, Laurence Boulle delineates four 
models of mediation (settlement, facilitative, evaluative and therapeutic). 47  It is 
possible for a mediator to select certain elements of each model, or to commence 
mediation using one model and later ‘transform’ into another.48 Whichever model is 
adopted, the extent to which the mediator actually participates in the mediation will 
vary according to ‘context, motivation and purpose’.49 Thus, in any single meeting, 
mediators may assist parties by encouraging positional bargaining and persuading the 
parties to reach compromise (the ‘settlement’ model); encouraging dialogue and 
enhancing negotiation efforts (the ‘facilitative’ model); evaluating the parties’ 
positions and predicting outcomes (the ‘evaluative’ model); or by using ‘professional 
therapeutic techniques’ to ‘treat relationship issues’ (the ‘transformative’ model).50
Different mediation techniques may be employed within these models, depending on 
the object of mediation and in accordance with the variable structural features agreed 
 
 
                                                 
45 Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, 
Paradigms and Practices’, above n 6, 228-30. 
46 Menkel-Meadow. ‘The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, 
Paradigms and Practices’, above n 6, 228-30. 
47 Boulle, above n 5, 43. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid 10. 
50 Ibid 43-45. See also Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 26. 
13 
 
 
 
upon by the parties or imposed by the mediator.51 For example, it is common for 
facilitative mediators to reframe or summarise the positions expressed by parties so as 
to create room for negotiation or to reduce the impact of potentially inflammatory 
statements.52 It is also common for mediators to engage in ‘reality testing’ or ‘doubt 
creation’; that is to say, challenging ‘parties to face the legal, factual, financial and 
personal realities of their situations, [and] to reflect more systematically on and 
practically on a position, behaviour or attitude’.53
Another technique commonly employed in mediation is the use of separate sessions 
(or ‘caucusing’).
 A mediator’s use of reality testing 
and doubt creation may range from being purely facilitative in nature (in that they do 
not, and are not intended to, reveal the mediators thoughts or opinions) to being 
unambiguously evaluative in nature (in that they do, and are intended to, 
communicate the mediators thoughts or opinions).  
 
54
                                                 
51 John Wade has identified eight ‘self-perceived’ practices adopted by experienced mediators: 
preparation and preparation meetings; whiteboards and visuals; reframing and summarizing; relacing 
and letting the process work; letting the clients speak more than the lawyers; where possible, sustaining 
the joint meeting; listening skills; and persistence and patience. John Wade, ‘What skills and attributes 
do experienced mediators possess?’ (1999) 5 Australian Dispute Resolution Bulletin 50. 
52 Wade ‘What skills and attributes do experienced mediators possess?’, above n 51. This technique is 
also referred to as an aspect of ‘active listening’. See Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 
5, 44; Charlton and Dewdney, above n 38,197-208. 
53 Boulle, above n 5, 220. See also Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 68-69; Charlton 
and Dewdney, above n 38, 81; Astor and Chinkin, above n 5, 144; Spencer and Brogan, above n 5, 66-
9. 
54 According to Tania Sourdin, the ‘private session is usually confidential and a practitioner will 
generally check confidentiality issues at the beginning and end of a private session’. Sourdin, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 5, 67. Charlton and Dewdney, above n 38, 93, identify 11 
‘useful purposes’ of private sessions’, including: ‘1. To ascertain what a party thinks of the mediation 
so far. 2. To expand on, raise new issues or complete unfinished business. 3. To allow parties to 
unwind and express their views in private. 4. To uncover the parties “bottom line”, that is, what their 
negotiation limits are. 5. To review the agenda, explore issues in more depth and explore new issues. 6. 
To reality test parties’ entrenched positions and identify underlying needs and interests. 7. To test 
opinions listed in joint session and to generate new ones and to respond to offers. 8. To act as an 
impasse breaker. 9. To foster a joint problem solving approach and re-affirm the parties’ ability to 
resolve their dispute. 10. To set the scene for final negotiations: exploring settlement options and 
rehearsing negotiations. 11. To proceed, as a last resort, with the mediation as a series of private 
sessions’. 
 Separate sessions are a core feature of the classic mediation 
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model,55 and ‘provide the mediator with a chance to speak with parties on their own 
and to allow a greater understanding of how the process might be profitably moved 
on’.56 It is debatable whether or not separate meetings are an essential feature of 
mediation, a point considered in detail in Chapter 8. Mediators may also engage in 
private discussions with disputants (often in the form of telephone conversations) 
prior to the mediation conference, in order to clarify the issues to be discussed.57
Mediation ‘Pressure Points’ 
  
 
 
The preceding analysis reveals a number of pressure points in the relationship 
between mediation and the judicial function. The first pressure point arises because of 
the manner in which mediators participate in the mediation process. Conflict may 
arise in a number of ways. Firstly, the use of mediation techniques such as reality 
testing or doubt creation, the provision of advice, the expression of opinions, or the 
holding of separate meetings or private communications, may undermine the rule 
against bias.58 The detailed relationship between the rule against bias and Ch III is 
examined in Chapter 4. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that a judge may be 
disqualified as a result of actual or apprehended bias,59 and that general adherence to 
this principle is an implicit requirement of Ch III.60
                                                 
55 Boulle, above n 5, 189 – 193. 
56 Spencer and Brogan, above n 5, 66. 
57 Boulle, above n 5, 178-179; Astor and Chinkin, above n 5, 140; Charlton and Dewdney, above n 38, 
3-8.  
58 Tucker, above n 2, 86. 
59 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 344 – 345 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
60 Ibid 362 [79] (Gaudron J). 
 Secondly, it has been suggested 
that judicial participation in the mediation process (and in particular the use of 
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separate meetings) will undermine the ‘integrity’ of the judiciary.61
The second pressure point arises by virtue of the inherent privacy of the mediation 
process. Firstly, if judges hold mediation conferences in private (to the exclusion of 
the general public), judicial mediation may undermine the principles of open justice, 
which is also an implied requirement of Ch III.
 The High Court’s 
approach to this concept is examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
62 Secondly, judicial mediation may 
limit the effectiveness of appellate review, as it may be ‘effectively impossible for ... 
appellants to adduce sufficient evidence to sustain their case’.63 It is also uncertain 
whether judge-mediators could be called upon by appellate courts to provide oral 
testimony as to the discussions held in mediations, or whether this information would 
be somehow protected.64 Were judges to provide evidence in such circumstances, this 
could further expose judges to allegations of improper conduct or bias, and may also 
undermine the integrity of the judiciary.65
                                                 
61 Sir Laurence Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’, above n 2, 796; Tucker, above n 2, 94. 
62 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (5th ed 2008), 274-5; Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23(2) Monash 
University Law Review 248, 261-2; Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Seen to be Done: the Principle of 
Open Justice – Part II’ (2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 378. Following Fardon v Attorney General 
(Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, open justice is unlikely to be an implied requirement in State courts. This 
case is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
63 Tucker, above n 2, 90. Similar concerns have been raised in relation to the expansion of prehearing 
processes in general. See, for example, Judith Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982-83) 96 Harvard Law 
Review 374, and Stephen Yeazell, who suggests that ‘operating on processes that produce numerous 
rulings that do not result in judgment...will decrease appellate control’. ‘The Misunderstood 
Consequences of Modern Civil Process’ (1994) Wisconsin Law Review 631, 661. 
64 Whether a judge mediator may be called as a witness will depend, inter alia, on the terms of the 
mediation agreement and any relevant statutory rules. See Boulle, above n 5, pp 359, 371, 450, 491, 
550. Gleeson CJ has stated that as a matter of policy mediators should not generally be called as 
witnesses. Gain v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) NSWLR 252, 256. But see Glenn v 
Delalite CC [2000] VCAT 505. 
65 Tucker, above n 2, 91. 
 The third way in which the privacy of the 
mediation process could conflict with the judicial function is by undermining the 
normative/law-making role the judiciary. The objectives of judicial mediation are 
opposed to the principle of stare decisis because, by transferring decision-making 
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power to disputants, a ‘successful’ judicial mediation programme will reduce the 
frequency of judicial decisions, ergo the body of judicial precedent.66
The final pressure point in the relationship between mediation and the judicial 
function arises because of the confidentiality of the mediation process. First of all, as 
mediation ‘does not oblige parties to reveal information that might be imparted 
unavoidably in a court trial ... [or] necessarily require that the parties make equal 
efforts to reveal relevant information relating to their case,’
  
  
67 it is possible (assuming 
no settlement is reached) that by participating in mediation a judge will be privy to 
information that he/she would not otherwise have been privy to during the trial 
process. Alternatively, if the judge-mediator does not go on to adjudicate if mediation 
fails, he or she could directly or indirectly disclose confidential information to the 
adjudicating judge. If a judge were aware of information revealed in confidence 
during the mediation this could prejudice the perception of that judge’s ability to 
bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the dispute.68
The provision of information in confidence could also undermine a party’s right to a 
fair trial. This is because allegations or insinuations may be made during mediation 
which, although inadmissible as evidence, may nevertheless influence the judge’s 
decision if the matter proceeds to trial. If the evidence is not formally admitted, the 
  
 
                                                 
66 Again, however, judicial mediation is no different in this regard to other prehearing processes. 
Stephen Yeazell has argued that if ‘one remembers that courts are instruments of government, it is not 
too much to call [the expansion of prehearing processes] both a change in the location of government 
power and the passage to private hands of some of what was once governmental power’. Above n 63, 
631. 
67 Tucker, above n 2, 85-86. 
68 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; Australian National Industries v 
Spedley Securities (1992) 26 NSWLR 411; Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74; Ebner v 
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337. 
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affected party would be unable to challenge its probity; contrary to accepted rules of 
evidence69 and the requirements of Ch III.70
What is Judicial Mediation intended to Achieve?  
 
 
 
What, then, is judicial mediation intended to achieve? Superficially, the aim of 
judicial mediation may appear immaterial to the question whether Ch III prohibits 
judicial mediation. As will be seen, however, whether judicial mediation accords with 
the requirements of Ch III will turn, in part, upon whether judicial mediation serves 
the rule of law.71
It may be fortunate that the manifest imperfections of our system, and of all 
other systems, give us so many practical problems to try to fix that we are 
spared the embarrassment of having to identify the goal towards which we 
 Put differently, if the purpose and/or effect of judicial mediation is 
consistent with rule of law values, then it is less likely to conflict with the 
implications drawn from Ch III. This proposition is developed throughout the 
following Chapters. The current section demonstrates that the objectives of judicial 
mediation can be traced to the access to justice movement, and that judicial mediation 
may be classified as a reform within the ‘third-wave’ of that movement. As such, and 
although it may also improve the quality of individual justice, it is suggested that the 
primary object of judicial mediation is to increase the efficiency of (and access to) the 
civil trial process. 
 
Chief Justice Gleeson has commented that:   
 
                                                 
69 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). 
70 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334. 
71 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193.  
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are presumably stumbling. So long as what we are seeking to achieve are 
relatively modest and measurable, improvements to a necessarily imperfect 
system, we can maintain our sense of purpose. However, occasionally 
someone must ask what is the ultimate objective.72
Presumably, the ultimate objective of civil justice reform is the attainment of an ideal 
civil justice system. The difficulty is that an ideal civil justice system is almost 
certainly unattainable; not only because there is no agreement as to the essential 
attributes of such a system, but because the perceived ‘practical problems’ to which 
Chief Justice Gleeson refers may be necessary evils of that system.
 
 
73 How accessible, 
cheap, efficient, and socially revered should a civil justice system actually be? 74
Civil justice reform cannot be viewed as a purely 20th century phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the most significant changes to the Australian civil justice system have 
taken place from the 1970’s onward, and can be assayed within the theories and 
ideologies espoused by the ‘access to justice’ movement.
 
While a single ‘utopian’ objective may be elusive, various smaller objectives of civil 
justice reform can be isolated from existing scholarship and research and can provide 
reference points. 
 
75 It is difficult to pinpoint 
the precise origins of the access to justice movement,76
                                                 
72 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Managing Justice in the Australian context’ (2000) 77 Reform 62, 63. 
73 Richard Ingleby, ‘Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory Participation’ (1993) 56 
Modern Law Review 441, 442. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Nadja Alexander, ‘Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave’ in Nadja Alexander (ed), 
Global Trends in Mediation (2006) 1-5; Astor and Chinkin, above n 5, 3-6.  
76 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Intellectual Founders of ADR’ (2000) 16 Ohio State Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 1, 2. 
 but two pivotal events in its 
early days were the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 
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with the Administration of Justice (the ‘Pound Conference’) in 1976, 77  and the 
Florence Access to Justice Project (the ‘Florence Project’), which took place 
throughout the 1970’s.78 At the heart of both of these forums, (as the name of the 
former suggests) 79  was a concern that individuals were becoming increasingly 
disenfranchised from the justice system. In Australia, the access to justice movement 
can be traced more specifically to the work of the Law and Poverty section of the 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (the ‘Australian Poverty 
Commission’), established by the Whitlam government in 1972. The Australian 
Poverty Commission produced a series of reports in 1975,80 culminating in a final 
report entitled ‘Law and Poverty in Australia’ in the same year.81
Ironically, delegates at the Pound Conference did not attempt to identify the ‘causes 
of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice’.
   
 
82  According to J. 
Clifford Wallace, ‘there was no information presented, from which one might assess 
popular dissatisfaction, a necessary precondition to identification of its causes’. 83
                                                 
77 Leo Levin and Russel Wheeler (eds), The Pound Conference: Perspectives of Justice in the Future 
(1979). 
78 Mauro Cappelletti (ed), The Florence Access to Justice Project, Volumes I – IV (1978). 
79 The Pound conference takes its name from a 1901 speech by Roscoe Pound: Roscoe Pound, ‘The 
Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice’ (1906) Republican American Bar 
Association 395.  
80 See, in particular, Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Michael Cass and Ronald 
Sackville), Legal Needs of the Poor, (1975); Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Ronald 
Sackville), Legal Aid in Australia, (1975); Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Ronald 
Sackville), Homeless People and the Law, (1975); Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 
(Adrian Jakobowicz and Berenice Buckley), Migrants and the Legal System, (1975); Australian 
Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Adrian Bradbrook), Poverty and the Residential Landlord-Tenant 
Relationship, (1975). 
81 Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Second Main Report: Law and Poverty in Australia, 
(1975). 
82 In fact, as J. Clifford Wallace recognises, Roscoe Pound did not attempt to identify the causes of 
dissatisfaction either. ‘Judicial Reform and Pound Conference of 1976’ (1982) 80 (4) Michigan Law 
Review 592, 593. 
83 Ibid.  
 
However, in a seminal article based on the findings of the Florence project Mauro 
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Cappelletti and Bryant Garth identified three broad ‘barriers’ to effective access to 
justice:  
 
1. ‘Costs of litigation’ (in terms of high legal fees, the futility of pursuing many 
small claims, and the time involved in litigation).84
 
 
2. ‘Relative party compatibility’ (in terms of financial resources, legal 
competence and comparative litigation experience).85
 
 
3. ‘The special problems of diffuse interests’ (in situations whereby individual 
rights can only be protected collectively, or the infringement of an individual 
right is too small to induce enforcement).86
 
  
The removal of financial barriers to access was a primary object of the Law and 
Poverty section of the Australian Poverty Commission, and (as demonstrated below) 
concerns as to the ‘cost’ of litigation remain a primary driver of civil justice reform in 
Australia.87
                                                 
84 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, ‘Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the World-Wide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective’ (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 183, 186-190. 
85 Ibid 190-193. 
86 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 194-195. 
87 Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, above n 81, 1. See, for example, the recent report by 
the Commonwealth Attorney General Department’s Access to Justice Task Force, A Strategic 
Framework for Access to Justice in the Civil Justice System, (September 2009), 8, which proposes a 
‘strategic framework’ for access to justice based on a model of ‘supply and demand’. 
  
 
Cappelletti and Garth observed that legal scholarship in the first half of the 20th 
century was predominantly confined to the development of formal rights for 
individuals, and was 
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typically formalistic, dogmatic, and aloof from the real problems of civil 
justice. Its concern was frequently one of mere exegesis or abstract system 
building; even when it went beyond this concern, its method was to judge the 
rules of procedure on the basis of historical validity and their operation in 
hypothetical situations.88
The authors went on to classify the access to justice movement by reference to three 
overlapping ‘waves’
 
 
89  which reflect a shift from the ‘individualistic, laissez-faire 
view of [formal] rights reflected in eighteenth and nineteenth century bills of rights, 
towards the social rights and duties of governments, communities, associations and 
individuals’. 90  An important incident of these new rights and duties was an 
assumption of ‘affirmative commitment by the State’91 to ensure that they were in fact 
accessible. Access to justice, in other words, meant effective access to justice.92
The Australian legal system … is based on the British common law which 
has long accepted as an article of faith the principle that justice must be 
 From 
an Australian perspective, the Australian Poverty Commission similarly explained 
that: 
 
                                                 
88 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84. As discussed at length in Chapter 5, the tendency to ‘judge rules 
of procedure on the basis of historical validity’ is still prevalent in Australian constitutional 
jurisprudence, and in this way the High Court has constructed a barrier between the judicial function 
and the influence of the access to justice movement (and in particular the third-wave of that movement).  
89 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 181. These ‘waves’ are described here as ‘overlapping’ because, 
as Justice Sackville has pointed out, the metaphor may otherwise give rise to the ‘misleading 
impression of a series of discrete changes to legal systems occurring at different periods in the 
development of legal systems.  It is more accurate to think of the “waves” as a number of interrelated 
changes.  Some may be continuing in one form or another, while others may be in retreat’. Justice 
Ronald Sackville, ‘Some Thoughts on Access to Justice’ (Paper presented to the First Annual 
Conference on the Primary Functions of Government, New Zealand, 28 – 29 November 2003), 5.  
90 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 184. See also, and generally, Mauro Cappelletti (ed), Access to 
Justice and the Welfare State (1979).  
91 Richard Claude, ‘The Classical Model of Human Rights Development’, in Richard Claude (ed) 
Comparative Human Rights (1976) 6, 32. 
92 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84,185. 
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administered impartially and without regard to a person’s means of social 
position. It is universally agreed that everyone, no matter how humble, 
should be entitled to his ‘day in court’. Lawyers and laymen alike consider it 
unthinkable that the legal system should discriminate against a person simply 
because he is poor. Yet even on these uncontentious criteria the law has 
failed to accord equal treatment … [S]ome people, simply because they are 
too poor, too ignorant or too frightened, do not have access to the courts nor 
do they obtain the legal assistance they need to enforce their basic rights and 
to protect themselves against grievous injustice.93
First wave reforms seek to achieve effective access by removing economic barriers 
through the introduction of programs such as legal aid and ‘judicare’.
 
 
94 The second 
wave responds to ‘the problem of representing group and collective – diffuse – 
interests other than those of the poor’ 95  through (amongst other things) the 
introduction of ombuds systems 96  and the recognition of class action suits (or 
‘representative proceedings’).97 The third wave represents attempts to ‘attack barriers 
in a more articulate and comprehensive manner’98 and includes the development of 
ADR processes and the introduction of case-management.99
                                                 
93 Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, above n 81, 1. 
94 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 197-209.  In Australia, legal aid as we recognise it today was first 
introduced by the Commonwealth Legal Aid Commission Act 1977. In fact, though, a limited form of 
legal aid has been available to Australian servicemen since the beginning of the Second World War. 
The Law Institute of Victoria provided legal aid to servicemen from 1940 onward, and other States 
quickly followed suit. The Commonwealth Legal Services Bureaux was established in 1942. See 
generally: Don Fleming and Frances Regan, ‘“Evatt’s Bastard Child”: The Commonwealth Legal 
Service Bureaux 1942 – 51’ (2003) Australian Journal of Legal History 15. 
95 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 209. 
96 Ibid 213. 
97 Ibid 217. Most Australian jurisdictions have operated ombudsmen systems since the mid 1970’s (see 
Ombudsman Act (Cth) 1976; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic); Ombudsman 
Act 1974 (NSW); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT)). In Queensland the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 
1974 (Qld) created an office comparable to that of an ombudsman. This Act has since been repealed by 
the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld). Western Australia does not have an ombudsman system. 
98 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 197. Nadja Alexander has described this process as ‘riding the 
third wave’; Nadja Alexander, above n 75, 1-35. 
99 These concepts are examined in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 There is also evidence to 
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suggest that ADR processes such as mediation now resolve a significant proportion 
(perhaps even the bulk) of civil disputes. This evidence is analysed in more detail 
later in this Chapter.100
Cappelletti and Garth’s ‘wave’ model provides a paradigm for examining the 
relationship between third-wave reforms such as judicial mediation, on the one hand, 
and concepts such as procedural fairness (which originated before the advent of the 
access to justice movement) on the other. This paradigm is useful because many of 
the issues raised by judicial mediation reflect broader practical and jurisprudential 
questions common to other third-wave reforms, including managerial judging or case 
management, and the implementation of so-called less adversarial trials (‘LATS’).
 
 
101
Is there still a need to improve access?  
 
Comparisons with these processes can provide valuable insights into how judicial 
mediation is likely to operate in practice, and the manner in which its expansion might 
be controlled. These processes are considered in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Overall, civil justice reforms implemented over the past 40 years (such as legal aid, 
the introduction of ombuds systems and the growth of case-management) appear to 
have had a positive impact on access to justice in Australia.102
                                                 
100 See below nn 184-212 and accompanying text. 
101 There was initially some debate as to whether the ‘wave’ metaphor is applicable outside the United 
States, and in civil law countries such as Germany in particular. According to Cappelletti and Garth, 
however, while ‘admittedly, a simple chronology based on the United States could be misleading, and 
while we should not expect precisely the same developments in all welfare states, we believe that the 
analysis underlying the wave metaphor is nevertheless valid’. Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, 
‘Introduction’, in Mauro Cappelletti (ed), Access to Justice and the Welfare State (1981), 5. 
 It might reasonably be 
102 As regards legal aid, for example, Justice Ronald Sackville has pointed out that for ‘those who have 
not experienced life without a national legal aid system, however flawed the system might be, it is 
perhaps easy to forget that until the establishment of the Australian Legal Aid Office by the Whitlam 
Government, there was no publicly funded legal aid scheme of general application in Australia 
providing legal representation in civil matters.  The very first step in enhancing access to justice was to 
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wondered, therefore, whether or to what extent the barriers identified by the access to 
justice movement still exist.  
 
The answer to this question is obfuscated by disagreement as to how the success of 
civil justice systems should be measured, and the relationship between the various 
measures adopted. Can a system be evaluated on the basis of cost alone? If so, can 
cost be distinguished from other quantitative issues such as time and delay, and 
qualitative issues such as disputant satisfaction, outcome durability and the 
psychological impact of litigation? Should the public costs associated with 
maintaining the justice system also be considered? 103
Is there a ‘crisis’ in civil justice? 
 The following part of this 
Chapter examines the relationship between the various measures commonly adopted 
to determine ‘success’ in civil justice, and concludes that although cost cannot be the 
sole measure of success, litigant expenditure can nevertheless be reduced without 
overburdening the courts or undermining the quality of civil justice. 
 
 
By the early 1990’s common law legal systems (and to a lesser extent civil law 
systems)104 had come to be viewed as ‘costly, inaccessible, and beset by delays’.105
                                                                                                                                            
fill that yawning gap’. Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘Access to Justice: Assumptions and Reality Checks’ 
(Paper presented to the Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales Access to Justice Workshop, 
Sydney, 10 July 2002), 2.  
 
103 According to the ALRC: ‘The public cost of financing federal courts, federal review tribunals, the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT), 
and related dispute resolution arrangements in federal commissions and ombudsmen, was 
approximately $350 million in 1997-98’. Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A 
review of the federal civil justice system, ALRC Report No 89 (2000) [4.6]. 
104 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Civil Justice in Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil Procedure’, in Sergio 
Chiarloni, Peter Gottlwald, Adrian Zuckerman (ed) Civil justice in crisis: Comparative perspectives of 
civil procedure (1999) 3-52. 
105 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Australian Judiciary in the 1990’s’ (Address to the Sydney Institute, 
Sydney, 15 March 1994), 1-2. Concerns of excessive cost, delay and complexity also underpinned the 
Woolf reforms in England and Wales. See Lord Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report (1995), 
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This perception led to claims of a ‘crisis’ in civil justice.106 Notable supporters of the 
crisis theory in Australia included Sir Anthony Mason 107 and the Commonwealth 
Attorney General Michael Lavarch.108
We think that the time has come for a concerted action to make justice more 
accessible to all Australians … Unless a systematic and sustained effort is 
made to achieve [this] … public faith in the institutions of the justice system 
is likely to remain low.
 In 1994, Attorney-General Michael Lavarch 
established the Access to Justice Advisory Committee (‘AJAC’), which stated that: 
 
109
The courts are overburdened, litigation is financially beyond the reach of 
practically everybody but the affluent, the corporate or the legally-aided 
litigant; governments are anxious to restrict expenditure on legal aid and the 
administration of justice. It is not an overstatement to say that the system of 
administering justice is in crisis.
 
 
In 1996, Chief Justice Brennan added further credence to the crisis theory, noting 
extra-curially that: 
 
110
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7. See also Nadja Alexander, ‘From common law to civil law jurisdictions: court ADR on the move in 
Germany’ (2001) 4(8) The ADR Bulletin 110, 112-113, who describes a perception of the litigation 
process in common law countries as ‘impossibly expensive, long and drawn out’. 
106 See, for example, Justice David Ipp, ‘Reforms to the Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation’ (Pt 1) 
(1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 705, 705; Justice David Ipp, ‘Reforms to the Adversarial Process in 
Civil Litigation’ (Pt 2) (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 790; Justice Geoffrey Davies, ‘Civil Justice 
Reform in Australia’ in Sergio Chiarloni, Peter Gottlwald, Adrian Zuckerman (ed) Civil justice in crisis: 
Comparative perspectives of civil procedure (1999) 166; Paul Michalik, ‘Justice Crisis in England and 
Wales’ in Sergio Chiarloni, Peter Gottlwald, Adrian Zuckerman (ed), Civil justice in crisis: 
Comparative perspectives of civil procedure (1999), above n 104, 117.  
107 Mason, above n 105. 
108 Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice – An Action Plan (1994) xxix. 
109 Ibid 4. 
110 Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘Key issues in judicial administration’ (Revised Version of a paper presented 
by Sir Gerard Brennan and Sir Thomas Eichelbaum at the Fifteenth Annual Conference Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration, Wellington, 20-22 September 1996). 
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The litigation ‘crisis’ encompasses (at least) two discrete concerns. The first concern 
is that the financial costs of litigation are excessive – both in terms of court fees, 
which may exceed ‘what is reasonable necessary to inhibit the launching of 
unnecessary proceedings’, and legal professional costs, 111 including ‘counsel fees, 
expert fees, discovery and documents’.112 The second concern is that the civil justice 
system lacks the capacity to efficiently dispose of an increasing number of cases 
being brought before it (the ‘litigation explosion’), resulting in excessive trial times 
and delays.113 The solutions to these concerns may conflict because, if the cost of 
litigation is too low, the number of cases filed is likely to increase, as will the burden 
on the courts (and vice versa).114
Whether concerns of excessive financial cost in litigation are (or ever were) justified 
is a moot point. This is partly because there is no universally agreed formula by which 
to determine what a reasonable level of cost is.
 This possibility is examined below.  
 
115
                                                 
111 Ibid. In England and Wales, legal professional costs were identified by the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs as an area of growing concern; the Department noting that solicitor’s fees had 
increased in excess of the rate of inflation. United Kingdom Department of Constitutional Affairs (UK), 
Further Findings: A Continuing Evaluation of Civil Justice Reforms, (2002), [7.7]-[7.8].  
<http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/reform/ffreform.htm#part7> at 12 October 2009. 
112 Lord Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (1996), Schedule III ‘Survey of Litigation Costs 
(Professor Hazel Grant)’, [2]. 
113 Marc Galanter, ‘Beyond the Litigation Panic’ (1988) 37 (1) Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science, 18. At the time of writing the Commonwealth Attorney-General Department’s Access to 
Justice Task Force has also just released a report stating that the ‘the economic downturn is likely to 
mean that more people will be making some contact with the justice system, or an agency that provides 
information or services relating to legal issues for help’. A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in 
the Civil Justice System, (September 2009) 12.  
114 In Brennan CJ’s opinion, this dichotomy highlights ‘the necessity for court procedures to be simple 
and for methods of dispute resolution that reduce the costs that would otherwise be incurred by going 
to trial’. Sir Gerard Brennan, above n 110. 
 For example, should the 
‘reasonableness’ of costs be determined by comparing the overall value of a claim 
with the amount expended on legal fees? If not, is there an ideal amount, or range 
115 The ALRC notes that ‘these are not easy questions to answer for the disparate case types in federal 
civil jurisdiction’. See generally, Tim Fry, ‘Costs of Litigation in the Family Court of Australia and in 
the Federal Court of Australia’ (Report to the ALRC, November 1999). 
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within which litigant expenditure should fall, and should this amount/range be linked 
to case type and/or jurisdiction? 
 
Despite continuing disagreement on this issue, it is apparent that concern as to the 
cost of litigation has been a primary catalyst for law reform in Australia and 
overseas. 116 While care must be taken to avoid careless comparisons with foreign 
statistics and commentary (not least because of Australia’s unique system of federal 
government),117
In his Interim Report, Lord Woolf cautioned that excessive ‘cost deters people from 
making or defending claims … For individual litigants the unaffordable cost of 
litigation constitutes a denial of access to justice’.
 Australian civil justice reform in the 1990’s drew heavily upon the 
work of Lord Woolf’s review of access to justice in England and Wales. It is useful, 
on this basis, to consider whether concerns of a crisis were ever warranted in that 
jurisdiction, and the measure of costs upon which Lord Woolf based his findings. 
 
118 In response, Michael Zander 
argued that there was insufficient evidence to support this contention, and described 
Lord Woolf’s references to cost, delay and complexity as ‘clichés’.119 In his Final 
Report Lord Woolf countered that, while there was little evidence of increasing costs 
in the majority of case types (with the exception of medical negligence), the 
‘proportionate’ costs of litigation were, nevertheless, excessive.120
                                                 
116 Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’, above n 2, 189. 
117 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 120 [189] (Kirby J). 
118 Lord Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report (1995), Ch 3, [13]. 
119 Michael Zander, ‘Why Lord Woolf’s Reforms of Civil Litigation Should Be Rejected’ in Adrian 
Zuckerman and Ross Cranston (eds) Reform of Civil Procedure: Essays on Access to Justice (1995), 81. 
120 Woolf, above n 112, Section I [10]-[11]. 
 On the basis of a 
review undertaken by the Supreme Court Taxing Office, His Lordship reported that 
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average costs among the lowest value claims consistently represent more 
than 100 per cent of claim value and in cases between £12,500 and £25,000 
average costs range from 40 per cent to 95 per cent of claim value. To put it 
another way, the present system provides higher benefits to lawyers than to 
their clients. It is only when the claim value is over £50,000 that the average 
combined costs of the parties are likely to represent less than the claim.121
The Woolf Inquiry in England and Wales preceded an inquiry into the Australian 
federal justice system by the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’). In the 
course of its inquiry, the ALRC released six background papers,
 
 
122  five issue 
papers, 123  and one discussion paper, 124  culminating in a final report entitled 
‘Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System’ in 2000 
(‘Managing Justice’). 125
                                                 
121 Woolf, above n 112, Section II, Ch 1, [11]. 
 In its final report, the ALRC rejected Lord Woolf’s 
proportionate costs model, on the basis that it assumes a correlation between the cost 
of litigation and claim value which is inappropriate in certain cases: 
 
122 Australian Law Reform Commission, Federal jurisdiction, ALRC BP 1 (1996); Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Alternative or assisted dispute resolution, ALRC BP 2 (1996); Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Judicial and case management, ALRC BP 3 (1996); Australian Law Reform 
Commission, The unrepresented party, ALRC BP 4 (1996); Australian Law Reform Commission, Civil 
litigation practice and procedure, ALRC BP 5 (1996); Australian Law Reform Commission, Experts, 
ALRC BP 6 (1999); Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the federal civil justice system, 
ALRC DP 62 (1999). 
123 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the adversarial system of litigation: Rethinking the 
federal litigation system, ALRC IP 20 (1997); Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the 
adversarial system of litigation: Rethinking family law proceedings, ALRC IP 22(1997); Australian 
Law Reform Commission, Technology -- what it means for federal dispute resolution, ALRC IP 23 
(1998); Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the adversarial system of litigation: Federal 
tribunal proceedings, ALRC IP 24 (1998); Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the 
adversarial system of litigation: ADR -- its role in federal dispute resolution, ALRC IP 25 (1998) 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the federal civil justice system, ALRC DP 62 (1999). 
124 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the federal civil justice system, ALRC DP 62 
(1999). 
125 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103.  
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An evaluation of the proportionality of costs and the legal claim is difficult to 
test in federal jurisdiction. A significant proportion of the litigation in the 
Federal Court and Family Court and federal review tribunals does not 
concern quantifiable money claims. A case may have no amount in dispute or 
a notional or unquantified amount, for example, a trademark, allegations of 
misleading and deceptive conduct, an administrative decision concerning a 
visa or benefit, or a family dispute concerning finances with related questions 
about parental contact with, or residence of, children.126
The ALRC did, nevertheless, measure the proportionate cost of litigation in the 
Family Court against family property, and found that 90% of litigants spent less than 
12% of the value of the disputed property on legal costs.
 
 
127  This proportion is 
ostensibly lower than that reported by Lord Woolf in England and Wales, although 
the unique nature of the federal family jurisdiction and the (presumably) high value of 
family property make direct comparisons difficult. The Victorian Law Reform 
Commission also acknowledged that proportionate costs can be misleading or 
inappropriate,128 but reported, nevertheless, that proportionate costs were ‘relatively 
high’ in a number of Victorian Supreme Court cases.129
How, then, should ‘cost’ be measured, and how has it been measured in Australia? In 
its final report on Managing Justice, the ALRC focussed on the median costs of 
litigation and the range within which costs fell. In its Final Report in 2000, the ALRC 
reported that the median cost of litigation in the Federal Court was $15820 for 
  
 
                                                 
126 Ibid [4.53]. 
127 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [4.54]. 
128 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Reform: Report, Report No 98 (2008), [656]-
[658]. The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia neither accepted nor rejected this approach: 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in 
Western Australia, Project No 92 (1999) Ch 16. 
129 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 128, 650. 
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applicants and $8463 for respondents, and ranged from $350 to over $1 million for 
applicants and $55 to over $1.1 million for respondents.130 In the Family Court the 
median cost of litigation was $2209 for applicants and $2090 for respondents, and 
ranged between $40 and $126,361 for applicants and $8 to $160,532 for 
respondents.131 Costs also varied considerably between case type.132
The ALRC considered the median costs of litigation to be ‘reasonable’.
  
 
133 However, 
the benchmark against which this ‘reasonableness’ was measured was not specified. 
Indeed, the ALRC acknowledged that questions ‘remain concerning how one 
determines generally, or in a particular case, whether the legal costs incurred were 
reasonable or excessive’.134 The figures presented by the ALRC are now almost a 
decade old, and a recent report by the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Access to 
Justice Task Force has cited ‘clear’ evidence to the effect that ‘legal costs have risen 
since the ALRC study was undertaken.135 Research conducted in Victoria suggests 
that the costs of litigation may also be higher at the State level than the earlier figures 
quoted by the ALRC. According to Tania Sourdin, the median cost of litigation in the 
Supreme and County Courts of Victoria is currently $35,000 ($86,108 mean), and 
ranges between $500 and $849,000.136
                                                 
130 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [4.12 – 4.13] 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid [4.14]. 
133 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [4.12]-[4.13]. Mean costs were not reported, 
presumably on the basis that the extreme costs of a small number of cases skewed the data. 
134 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [4.2]. 
135 Commonwealth Attorney General’s Access to Justice Task Force, 41; citing Law Council of 
Australia, Erosion of Legal Representation in the Australian Justice System, (2004) 28. 
136 Tania Sourdin, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria (2009) 98. 
 As might be expected, the median cost for 
disputants in the Supreme Court was higher than the median cost for disputants in the 
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County Court ($37,500 and $32,500 respectively).137
the conduct of civil litigation in the higher courts remains excessively 
expensive and beyond the financial capacity of many people. This problem 
has been compounded by the curtailment of civil legal aid schemes by both 
the state and federal governments in recent years.
 These figures support the earlier 
conclusion of the VLRC that 
 
138
In any event, and whatever an ‘appropriate’ cost for litigation may be, it is self-
evident that access to justice will be improved if litigation costs are reduced. This is 
provided, however, that a reduction in costs does not fuel a ‘litigation explosion’ with 
negative consequences for the efficiency or quality of civil justice. In fact, with the 
exception of personal injury litigation (the rapid expansion of which has been 
countered by specific legislative action in the States and territories),
  
 
The VLRC did not state what it believed the ‘cost’ of litigation to be, nor did it 
provide the measure against which this assessment was made. Assuming that the 
estimated costs were similar to those reported by Tania Sourdin, however, this 
assessment seems reasonable – especially in light of the ALRC’s findings, which 
suggest that federal courts are less expensive. 
 
139
 
 there is very 
little evidence to support fears of a litigation explosion. In an early American 
commentary on the issue, Marc Galanter concluded that:  
                                                 
137 Ibid. 
138 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 128, [77]. 
139 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Wrongs (Liability and 
Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs and 
Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); 
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
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Respect for the available evidence suggests a more benign reading of the 
current situation than inhabits discussions of the lawsuit crisis or litigation 
explosion. The United States is not faced with an inexorable exponential 
explosion of cases but with a series of local changes, some sudden but most 
incremental, as particular kinds of troubles move in and out of the ambit of 
the courts.140
Marc Galanter’s conclusion reflects the findings of the various law reform inquiries 
undertaken in Australia. In the federal context, the ALRC reported that:  
 
 
 
[T]he Commission’s investigation does not support the crisis theory – at least 
not in relation to the federal courts and tribunals. For example, the 
Commission found a rise in case loads in some areas of federal jurisdiction, 
but no ‘litigation explosion’; small numbers of cases taking two to three 
years to finality, evident room for improvement in case duration, but no 
systemic, intractable delay in case processing or resolution.141
The same would appear to be true at the State level. According to the VLRC, the 
volume of civil litigation in Victoria has increased in proportion with the expansion of 
the economy.
 
 
142
                                                 
140 Galanter, ‘Beyond the Litigation Panic’, above n 113, 29. See also Marc Galanter, ‘What We Know 
and Don’t Know (And Think We Know) about our Allegedly Contentious Society’ (1983) 31 UCLA 
Law Review 4; Marc Galanter, ‘The Day After the Litigation Explosion’ (1986) 46 Maryland Law 
Review 3; Marc Galanter, ‘Real World Torts’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 1093, 1155. 
141 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103 [1.48]. See also Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australia, above n 128, 5 [1.10]. 
142 Victorian Law Reform, above n 128, 66-67. 
 In Queensland, on the other hand, there may even have been a 
reduction in case volume for certain case types. In 2002, it was reported that the 
Queensland Supreme Court had developed a new fast-track system for certain 
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commercial cases in order to ‘compete for more business’.143
I do not know whether similar statistics have been gathered in Australia [as 
in the US]. But I have the clear impression that over the last 15 or 20 years, 
perhaps longer, the number of civil cases tried to judgment in Australia’s 
State and territory Courts, and in the Federal Court of Australia, either has 
diminished, or at least has not kept up with the number of judicial officers in 
those courts or the increase in the size of the population. My impression is 
that this is so no matter whether the comparison is made between raw 
numbers or only between the proportions of cases that are tried to 
judgment.
 In more general terms, 
Justice Hayne has also observed that: 
 
144
Even it is assumed (for the sake of argument), however, that certain reforms such as 
an increase in the availability of legal aid might lead to an overburdening of the 
courts, it does not follow that other reforms cannot at once reduce costs and increase 
settlement rates. In Sir Gerard Brennan’s view, the correlation between cost and case 
duration/delay simply emphasises ‘the necessity for court procedures to be simple and 
for methods of dispute resolution that reduce the costs that would otherwise be 
incurred by going to trial’.
 
 
145
 
 This view is supported by research conducted by Tim 
Fry for the ALRC, which indicates that case length and complexity are significant 
factors in the production of high legal costs. As regards the Family Court, Professor 
Fry’s analysis suggests that 
                                                 
143 Courier Mail (April 16th 2002); 5(1) ADR Bulletin 16. 
144 Justice Kenneth Hayne, ‘The Vanishing Trial’ (Paper presented at the Supreme and Federal Court 
Judges Conference, 23 January 2008), 2. 
145 Brennan, above n 110. 
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the cost of a case is determined by the total number of court events, whether 
the case went to hearing or not, whether there was legal aid funding or not, 
and the number of experts involved. Furthermore, evidence was found to 
suggest that the incremental costs of an additional directions hearing was 
significantly lower than the incremental cost of any other court event.146
the cost of a case is determined by the number of parties involved, whether 
"end of discovery" was reached, the number of experts, the total number of 
court events, and whether alternative dispute resolution (ADR) was 
attended.
 
 
As regards the Federal Court, Professor Fry’s analysis indicates that 
 
147
The ALRC subsequently recommended revisions to enhance the efficiency of existing 
case management systems and an increase in the use of ‘prehearing conferences’.
 
 
148 It 
also provided cautious support for the continued development of court-connected 
ADR.149
The Report considered that active case management, together with 
procedural reforms designed to encourage early disclosure of evidence and 
maximise opportunities for settlement, would be likely to decrease the cost of 
civil litigation, provide flexibility in the ways in which courts resolve 
 Ronald Sackville has summarised the ALRC’s recommendations as follows: 
 
                                                 
146 Fry, above n 115, 12. 
147 Fry, above n 115, 14. 
148 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [17.41]. 
149 Ibid [6.59]-[6.66]. 
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disputes, promote early settlement and utilise scarce court resources more 
effectively.150
Various procedural amendments have been implemented in Australia over the past 20 
years or so, either in the form of legislation (some of which responds to the 
recommendations made by the law reform inquiries discussed above)
  
 
151 or at the 
judiciary’s own motion through the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. 152  Ronald 
Sackville has concluded that the ‘changes in the judicial function identified in the 
Access to Justice Report in 1994 have continued apace. [For example] case 
management is regarded as an article of faith by most Australian courts’.153
Various overseas law reform agencies have also championed an increase in the case 
management role of judges and the use of ADR,
 These 
changes are considered in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
154 as opposed to an increase in 
litigant funding (the approach favoured in the first-wave).155
                                                 
150 Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the 
Judicial Role’ (Paper presented to the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Annual 
Conference, Brisbane, 12 – 14 July 2002), 5. 
151 For example, a number of Australian States have introduced ‘overriding objectives’ in their rules of 
civil procedure, requiring judges to draw a balance (‘proportionality’) between quantitative-efficiency 
and qualitative-justice: Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O1 r 4B; Supreme Court (General Civil 
Procedure Rules 1996 (Vic), r 1.14; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5; Civil Procedure 
Act 2005 (NSW), s 56; Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) r 3.  
152 For example, case management has been developed primarily by the Australian Courts. See below 
Chapter 6 nn 68-79 and accompanying text. 
153 Sackville, above n 150, 23. 
154 In 1994, the AJAC noted that, ‘there are many proposals for procedural reforms currently being 
considered to reduce the cost of litigation and to increase the opportunities for early settlement’. Access 
to Justice Advisory Committee, above n 108, xliii. See also: Ontario Law Reform Commission 
Rethinking civil justice: Research studies for the civil justice review Vols 1 and 2 Ontario Law Reform 
Commission Toronto 1996 (Ontario, Canada). In an Irish context, see Justice Susan Denham, Working 
Group on a Courts Commission, First Report: Management and Financing of the Courts (1996). 
Justice Susan Denham, Working Group on a Courts Commission, Second: Case Management and 
Court Management (1996). Justice Susan Denham, Working Group on a Courts Commission, Third 
Report: Towards the Court Service (1996).  
 In England and Wales, 
155 Note, however, that the VLRC called for an increase in legal aid funding as well as increased case-
management and ADR: ‘The commission believes the government should not rely on the pro bono 
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for example, the recommendations of the Woolf Report led to the introduction of a 
unified Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (CPR 2005 (England and Wales)) providing for, 
inter alia, greater case management on the part of judges (by way of referral to 
ADR)156 and the power for judges to reduce final awards if mediation orders are 
ignored. 157  In 2002, the Lord-Chancellor’s Department reported that the Woolf 
reforms appeared to have had a significant effect upon the number of claims issued in 
the County Court and High Court.158 According to that report, between April 1999 
and May 2001, 20% fewer claims were issued in the County Court, compared to a 
19.6% decrease in the High Court in 2001.159 Statistical analyses undertaken by the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs, however, indicate that the average cost of 
settling claims has actually increased since the reforms were introduced.160
 
   
Will Judicial Mediation ‘Improve’ Civil Justice? 
 
In summary, law reform agencies, jurists and academics have recommended an 
increase in judicial control over the trial process, and the introduction or enhancement 
of measures such as prehearing events or ADR. These recommendations may be 
expressed in an aspirational sense as civil justice ‘goals’. As a prehearing event which 
increases judicial participation and control over the trial process, judicial mediation 
has the potential to further both of these goals. This is assuming, however, that 
mediation offers some tangible benefit/s over and above litigation and/or existing 
                                                                                                                                            
sector to fulfil what is a fundamental government responsibility … Adequate legal aid funding is an 
essential component of the civil justice system’. Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 128, 614. 
156 Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales) r 1.4(2). 
157 Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales), r 44.5 (3). These procedures also support the 
further integration of ADR processes by providing a specific opportunity for participants to opt for 
ADR early in proceedings (Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales) r 26.4(1)). 
158 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Civil Justice Reform Evaluation – Further Findings (2002). 
159 Lord Chancellor’s Department, above n 158, [3.1]-[3.12]. 
160 United Kingdom Department of Constitutional Affairs, above n 111, [7.9]-[7.12]. 
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prehearing events. The following section provides an overview of research undertaken 
as to the effectiveness of mediation. While none of this research relates specifically to 
‘judicial’ mediation, it does indicate that judicial mediation has the potential to 
enhance efficiency - without undermining the quality civil justice. 
 
Will judicial mediation undermine the quality of civil justice? 
 
Whereas access to justice reforms have sought to provide less costly alternatives to 
formal adjudication and the streamlining of existing machinery, they have not 
typically been implemented as a means of improving the quality civil justice per se. 
This is principally because: 
 
Access to justice can only ever mean, in broad institutional and systemic 
terms, relatively equitable access to the legal process. Access to the system is 
no guarantee of a successful outcome from the process, and thus is no 
guarantee of litigant satisfaction in all cases.161
However, and as Cappelletti and Garth make clear, for access to be truly equal the 
provision of ‘quality’ justice must be equal as well.
 
 
162 Legal systems have ‘two basic 
purposes … First, the system must be equally accessible to all; second, it must lead to 
results that are individually and socially just’.163
                                                 
161 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the federal civil justice system, ALRC DP 62 (1999) 
[1.81]. 
162 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 186. 
163 Ibid 182. In its review of the civil and criminal justice system in Western Australia, the Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia identified broadly similar objectives for the civil justice system: 
‘The civil justice system should be managed in order to be expeditious, proportionate, and both 
procedurally and substantively just’. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 128, 47.  
 ADR researchers typically employ 
‘individual’ justice measures to assess the effectiveness of dispute resolution 
processes. These may reflect ‘efficiency’ objectives (such as cost, timeliness and 
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settlement rates), or ‘quality’ objectives (such as disputant satisfaction, outcome 
durability and perceived fairness). 164  In contrast, traditional legal scholarship 
measures the quality of justice by reference to social/jurisprudential concepts (such as 
the rule of law, due process and the separation of powers), and proponents of this 
approach argue that the ‘quality’ of civil justice is threatened by the pursuit of 
individual justice goals (and efficiency goals in particular).165
Disagreement as to how civil justice systems should be measured reflects two 
interrelated tensions. The first tension is between systemic measures of quality, on the 
one hand, and individual measures of quality, on the other (what is more important, 
the judiciary’s public and governmental role, or the just and efficient resolution of 
individual disputes?) This tension is widely acknowledged in the literature.
  
 
166
Ultimately, our judgment of a procedural system should go beyond its 
average speed, cheapness, and accuracy. We should think about what suits 
we want it to foster or discourage. We should think about how its procedures 
will affect litigants and others. We should recognize it as part of the 
governmental system, wielding powers that must be properly allocated and 
controlled. Very likely concerns such as these greatly influenced the creators 
 
According to John Leubsdorf, for example: 
 
                                                 
164 Kathy Mack, Court Referral to ADR: Criteria and Research (2003) 19, 25. 
165 See in particular, Resnik, above n 63; Judith Resnik ‘Many doors? Closing doors? Alternative 
dispute resolution and adjudication’ (1995) 10(2) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 211. 
166 See, for example, Astor and Chinkin, above n 5, 258; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Pursuing Settlement 
in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted of the Law of ADR’ (1991) 19 Florida State 
University Law Review 1, 6. Given this apparent conflict, it is notable that the ALRC was only 
‘explicitly directed’ by its terms of reference ‘to issues of cost, accessibility and efficiency’, and that it 
was left to the ALRC to identify the maintenance of ‘fair, open, dignified, and careful processes’ as an 
implicit requirement of the word ‘justice’. Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [1.11], 
[1.85]. The Western Australian Law Reform Commission was similarly directed toward matters of 
expediency alone, although like the ALRC it recognised that the ‘civil justice system should be 
managed in order to be expeditious, proportionate, and both procedurally and socially just’. Law 
Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 128, 47. 
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of past and present procedural systems, however loudly they may have 
proclaimed their desire to make lawsuits cheaper, speedier, and more 
accurate.167
The second tension, which focuses more specifically on measures of individual 
justice, is between what Carrie Menkel-Meadow has described as ‘quantitative-
efficiency’ and ‘qualitative-justice’.
 
 
This tension is a central theme of this thesis, and developed in the following chapters.  
 
168 This tension is also widely acknowledged in 
the literature.169
The greatest danger [in civil justice reform] is the risk that streamlined, 
efficient procedures will abandon the fundamental guarantees of civil 
procedure – essentially, those of an impartial adjudicator and of the parties 
right to be heard … We should not forget the fact that, after all, highly 
 According to Cappelletti and Garth, for example: 
 
                                                 
167 John Leubsdorf , ‘The myth of civil procedure reform’ in Sergio Chiarloni, Peter Gottlwald, Adrian 
Zuckerman (ed), Civil justice in crisis: Comparative perspectives of civil procedure (1999) 67. Justice 
Ronald Sackville has also cautioned that ‘the strengths of the current system may be overlooked or at 
least given insufficient attention. This carries with it with the further danger that unrealistic 
expectations will be created, specifically, that the courts (as distinct from other elements in the civil 
justice system) can continue to perform their traditional functions, yet comply with heightened 
community expectations that justice should be speedy, cheap and effective’: Justice Ronald Sackville 
‘The civil justice system - the process of change’ (Paper presented to the Beyond the Adversarial 
System Conference, Brisbane 10-11 July 1997) 8; Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘Reframing the Civil 
Justice System: The Case for a Considered Approach’, in Helen Stacey and Michael Lavarch, Beyond 
the Adversarial System (1999) 40.  
168 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-
Opted of the Law of ADR’, above n 166. Numerous different expressions have been used to describe 
these two objectives. Justice Geoffrey Davies and JS Leiboff, for example, have described it as one of 
‘Rolls Royce’ justice versus ‘Holden’ justice. Reforming the civil litigation system: Streamlining the 
adversarial framework' (1995) 25 Queensland Law Society Journal 111, 114. 
169 See also Adrian Zuckerman, who concludes that the ‘global aspect raises, therefore, questions of the 
relationship between the investment of resources and the performance of the system as a whole.  There 
is, however, a further aspect to cost. It concerns not the performance of the system as a whole, but the 
relationship between cost and individual justice’. Adrian Zuckerman, above n 104, 89. 
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technical procedures have been so moulded through many centuries of efforts 
to reduce arbitrariness and injustice.170
It is axiomatic that the pursuit of efficiency can be no guarantee of quality.
 
 
171 There is 
disagreement, however, as to whether (or to what extent) quantitative-efficiency and 
qualitative-justice are necessarily incompatible. Judith Resnik has argued that, as a 
result of the case-management role of judges (which she argues encourages judges to 
value the number of case dispositions over the quality of judgments) 172  the 
adjudicative process is in danger of disappearing.173
 The assumption of many proponents, that ADR will increase the options 
available to litigants within the publicly financed system may not be borne 
out. As the state makes alternative dispute resolution its own, both ADR and 
adjudication are being reconceptualised. As we proceed into the next century, 
the commitment to twentieth century style adjudication is waning. In this 
 This fear is premised upon a 
belief in the innate superiority of the traditional judicial process, and that this process 
is threatened by quantitative-efficiency reforms: 
 
                                                 
170 Cappelletti and Garth, above n 84, 291. It is worth noting, given these warnings, that according to 
the VLRC only qualitative-justice objectives are ‘fundamental’ requirements of the civil justice system. 
The VLRC identified eight ‘fundamental’ goals: Fairness, openness, transparency, proper application 
of the substantive law, independence, impartiality, accountability. The VLRC identified eight 
‘desirable’ goals: accessibility, affordability, equality of arms, proportionality, timeliness, getting to the 
truth, consistency and predictability. Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 128, 94-98. The 
goals identified by the VLRC are broadly comparable to a list of goals produced in 1996 by the 
Canadian Bar Association, although in the latter no distinction was drawn between desirable and 
fundamental goals. The Canadian Bar Association identified 13 goals: Justice, fairness, independence, 
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, understandability, accessibility, affordability, timeliness, 
proportionality, certainty, and efficiency. Report of the Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice (Ottawa: 
Canadian Bar Association National Task force on Systems of Civil Justice, August, 1996), 28. 
171 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [1.81]. 
172 Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’, above n 63, 422. 
173 Ibid 445. 
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interaction, we may soon find ourselves with a narrower, not a richer, form 
or range of forms of dispute resolution.174
John Leubsdorf has similarly cautioned that ‘the most firmly implanted myth of 
procedural reform may be that we can talk usefully about it as simply an effort to 
increase judicial efficiency, without talking about our visions of procedural and social 
justice’. 
  
 
175 For Judith Resnik and John Leubsdorf, then, quantitative-efficiency and 
qualitative-justice are in a state of general conflict, and (left unchecked) the blending 
of ADR and adjudication threatens to dilute the quality of the latter.176
In contrast, various commentators and organisations in Australia conclude that 
traditional adjudication and ‘quality’ justice are not synonymous, and that 
quantitative-efficiency and qualitative-justice are not necessarily opposed. In the 
considered view of the ALRC, for example, the ‘dichotomy’ between quality and 
efficiency is a false one.
  
 
177  Chief Justice Gleeson has similarly noted that 
‘expediency … is not regarded by the law as necessarily antithetical to justice,’178
                                                 
174 Resnik ‘Many doors? Closing doors? Alternative dispute resolution and adjudication’, above n 165, 
257-261. 
175 Leubsdorf, above n 167, 67. Justice Ronald Sackville has also cautioned that ‘the strengths of the 
current system may be overlooked or at least given insufficient attention. This carries with it with the 
further danger that unrealistic expectations will be created, specifically, that the courts (as distinct from 
other elements in the civil justice system) can continue to perform their traditional functions, yet 
comply with heightened community expectations that justice should be speedy, cheap and effective’: 
Justice Ronald Sackville ‘The civil justice system - the process of change’, above n 167. 
176 On the other hand, Carrie Menkel-Meadow argues out that, as ADR processes such as mediation are 
absorbed within the formal system ‘the power of our adversarial systems will co-opt and transform the 
innovations designed to redress some, if not all, or our legal ills’. ‘Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary 
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted of the Law of ADR’, above n 166. 
177 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [1.88]. 
178 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘The Future of Civil Justice – Adjudication or Dispute Resolution?’ 
(1999) 9 (3) Otago Law Review 449, 450.  
 and 
in evidence to the ALRC the Victorian Legal Aid Board stated that concepts ‘such as 
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‘best decisions’, ‘best lawyers’, ‘Rolls-Royce justice'’ … are a fiction and are not 
borne out by the quality of the decisions made.179
Of course, to say that the distinction between quality and efficiency is false is not to 
say that ADR processes necessarily lead to greater efficiency and quality than 
litigation, but is an underlying premise of ADR theory that this is generally the case. 
According to Roger Fisher and William Ury’s thesis, for example, non-determinative 
interest-based processes (such as some forms of mediation) lead to wiser, more 
amicable, and more efficient outcomes than determinative positional processes (such 
as litigation).
  
 
From an individual disputant’s perspective it simply makes no sense to view 
efficiency in contradistinction with quality, because the former is a key determinant of 
the latter. In other words, ‘disputant satisfaction’ will be influenced by how efficient a 
process is. To conclude that the blending of ADR and adjudication will necessarily 
undermine the quality of the trial process for the individual would be to ignore this 
elementary correlation. Whether certain efficiency reforms might undermine the 
quality (or integrity) of the civil justice system from a systemic perspective is another 
matter, and considered later in this thesis.  
 
180
the quality of dispute resolution is improved when models other than the 
formal adjudication model are used. Solutions to disputes can be tailored to 
 In another pioneering article, Carrie Menkel-Meadow stated that  
 
                                                 
179 Victoria Legal Aid, (Consultation with the ALRC, Melbourne, 26 August 1999). 
180 The authors state that, ‘in contrast to position bargaining, the principled negotiation method of 
focusing on basic interests, mutually satisfying options, and fair standards typically results in a wise 
agreement. The method permits you to reach a gradual consensus on a joint decision efficiently without 
all the transaction costs of digging into decisions only to have to dig yourself out of them. And 
separating people from the problem allows you to deal directly and empathetically with the other 
negotiator as a human being, thus making possible an amicable agreement.’Roger Fisher and William 
Ury, Getting to Yes: negotiating an agreement without giving in (first published 1983, 10th ed 1999), 14.  
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the parties’ polycentric needs and can achieve greater party satisfaction and 
enforcement reliability.181
There is some empirical evidence to support these views.
 
 
182
the number and complexity of the many variables make it very difficult to 
draw reliable general conclusions when the large mass of often conflicting 
research results is reviewed. It is also not possible to identify and isolate all 
possible variables when discussing the results of any particular research 
project. Research conclusions necessarily concentrate on a few factors or 
variables or qualities and may not specifically isolate certain other 
variables.
 However, it should be 
acknowledged from the outset that a great deal of the research undertaken into the 
effectiveness of ADR has failed to yield definitive results. This is partly because 
 
183
                                                 
181 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘For and against settlement: uses and abuses of the mandatory settlement 
conference’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 485, 487. Carrie Menkel-Meadow’s notion of ‘tailored’ 
dispute resolution is closely connected to the theory of ‘individualised justice’ advanced by Patrick 
Atiyah. Individualised justice (a term first coined by Professor Atiyah in an address at Oxford 
University in 1978) is the theory that the law continues to develop substantively and procedurally away 
from general principles and towards laws and procedures which aim ‘to find solutions, especially 
discretionary solutions, tailored to the circumstances of the individual dispute’. Patrick Atiyah, From 
Principles to Pragmatism (1978). See also Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, `Individualised justice -- The 
holy grail' (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 421, 430. Whereas individualised justice focuses on the 
development of substantive and procedural laws within the judicial system and is therefore concerned 
solely with adjudication, however, Carrie Menkel-Meadow is concerned with the broader civil justice 
system. Individualised justice is also central to the principle of proportionality, discussed in greater 
detail below. In a more recent article, Carrie Menkel-Meadow stated that processes ‘produce different 
kinds of outcomes – there are no universal processes that will always be better, fairer, or more efficient 
than others … Different kinds of disputes will call for different kinds of “handling,” “managing,” or 
resolution.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Intellectual Founders of ADR’, above n 76, 36. 
182 See, for example, Mack, above n 164, 25-36; Joan Kelly, ‘A Decade of Divorce Mediation 
Research’ (1996) 34(3) Family and Conciliation Courts Review 373, 377; Jessica Pearson, ‘Family 
Mediation’ in Susan Keilitz (ed), National Symposium on Court-Connected Dispute Resolution 
Research: A Report on Current Research Findings - Implications for Courts and Future Research 
(1994) 63. 
183 Mack, above n 182, 22. 
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Given these difficulties, can it be said (as is implicit in the suggestion that judges 
should mediate) that mediation is, in fact, ‘effective’?  
 
Is Mediation Effective? 
 
In light of the fact that the primary object of the access to justice movement has been 
to increase efficiency, this section considers the effectiveness of mediation by 
reference to settlement rates and cost savings (including time).184
Does mediation increase settlement rates? 
 While qualitative 
criteria such as durability of outcome, fairness and disputant satisfaction are 
inextricably linked with efficiency, they are not considered here in isolation for the 
reasons set out above. 
 
 
It is a familiar adage that ‘most cases settle’. Commentators and law reform agencies 
observe that, while adjudication lies at the heart of the civil justice system, the 
majority of civil disputes do not require a formal judgment.185
                                                 
184 The data considered below is drawn from two sources in particular: a meta-analysis of existing data 
undertaken by Kathy Mack in 2003, above n 164, and an empirical analysis of court-connected ADR in 
Victoria conducted by Tania Sourdin in 2009, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria, 
above n 136. 
185 See, for example, David Weisbrot, ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System and Economic Growth: 
Australian Experience’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 235, 245; Boulle, above n 5, 139; 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 128, 89.  
 Prehearing settlements 
may be achieved through private negotiation or through participation in one of the 
various ADR processes attached the formal court system. However, it is difficult to 
accurately gauge the overall number of disputes that do, in fact, ‘settle’. For one thing, 
statistical analyses are typically drawn from court records – precluding disputes 
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which have not entered the formal justice system.186 In Australia, the number of cases 
that settle after filing also varies considerably between courts and jurisdictions. 
Research conducted for the ALRC in 1999, for example, found that only 5% of 
family law cases required a formal judgment, in contrast with the Federal Court and 
the AAT187 where the figures were notably higher (35% and 34% respectively).188
1. Courts 
 
One possible explanation for this divergence may be the greater number of prehearing 
events in the Family Court. 
 
While it is difficult to estimate the overall number of disputes that settle and the 
manner in which they settled, however, it is possible to examine the settlement rates 
recorded by specific ADR programs. In 2003, NADRAC published statistics detailing 
the effectiveness of ADR processes conducted by: 
 
2. Tribunals/commissions/authorities 
3. Workers compensation conciliation schemes 
4. Industry/customer ADR schemes 
5. Government ombudsmen 
6. Health care complaints schemes 
7. Commonwealth funded family mediation services 
                                                 
186 In the US the figure is commonly estimated as somewhere between 85 and 95%. The Rand 
Corporation, Institute of Civil Justice (various reports), 1987-1992. See also Marc Galanter and Mia 
Cahill, ‘“Most Cases Settle” Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements’ (1994) 46 Stanford 
Law Review 1339, 1339. The authors point out that this figure can be misleading, as it does not 
distinguish between settlements reached by mutual agreement (through, for example, negotiation or 
mediation) and settlements produced through other non-judicial adjudicative processes (such as 
arbitration or dismissal). However, this distinction does not affect the fact that the majority of cases do 
not require a ‘judicial’ decision. This is discussed from an Australian perspective below. 
187 While the AAT is not a Ch III court these figures are still informative in the current context.  
188 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [6.53]; Tania Matruglio & Gillian McAllister 
Part one: Empirical information about the Family Court of Australia (ALRC, Sydney, February 1999) 
[6.1], [6.5.2]. 
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8. Community mediation services 
9. Legal aid commissions 
10. Commercial entities.189
 
 
No summary of findings was compiled by NADRAC, and no courts supplied figures 
detailing the number of cases ultimately requiring judgment. Different courts also 
adopted different measurement criteria, making comparisons difficult.190 The figures 
presented do nevertheless suggest that court-annexed mediation is generally an 
effective means of finalising disputes.191 In 2000-2001, for example, 45% of cases 
submitted for mediation by the Family Court were finalised.192 In 2001-2002, 55% of 
cases submitted for mediation in the Federal Court were finalised,193 and in the same 
period in the AAT some 77% of all cases filed were finalised through mediation or 
conciliation (supporting the ALRC’s findings).194
                                                 
189 NADRAC, ADR Statistics: Published Statistics on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia 
(2003). 
190 Justice Ronald Sackville has lamented the fact that much ‘of the statistical information dutifully 
compiled by courts and published, for example, in annual reports is of little value’. ‘From Access to 
Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the Judicial Role’, above n 150, 22. John Doyle 
and Chad Jacobi have also suggested that the judiciary should ‘avoid wasting precious resources by 
collecting and reporting information that is of no use to anyone’.  John Doyle and Chad Jacobi, 
‘Judicial Independence and Public Sector Accountability’ (2002) 11 Journal of Judicial Administration 
168, 172. 
191 The term ‘finalised’ is adopted here to indicate the attainment of a final outcome. This is done to 
avoid any confusion that may be caused by adopting the terms ‘settlement’ or ‘resolution’. The term 
‘settlement’, familiar to legal practitioners, is often used simply to imply a compromise between 
positions (by the facilitation of positional bargaining). The term resolution may be defined more 
broadly, as implying an outcome based on ‘a process of information sharing, relationship-building, 
joint-analysis and cooperation’; with a view to ‘resolving’ the underlying causes of dispute’: David 
Bloomfield, ‘Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management’ (1995) 32(2) Journal of Peace 
Research 151. 
192 NADRAC, ADR Statistics: Published Statistics on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia, 
above n 189, 7. 
193 Ibid 8. 
194 Ibid 18. 
 Statistics from State courts were 
less consistent, and many did not compile complete records. In South Australia, 
however, the District Court reported that 58% of the cases submitted for mediation in 
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the period 2000 to 2001 were finalised,195 and in Western Australia the Supreme 
Court recorded that mediation finalised 77% of cases referred during the same 
period.196
Private mediation providers reported generally higher finalisation rates than court-
annexed services. For example, in 2000 to 2001, Legal Aid New South Wales and 
Legal Aid Victoria reported finalisation by family conferencing in 89% and 80% of 
cases respectively.
 
 
197 Community mediation centres reported similar figures. In 2000 
to 2001, community mediations in the ACT resulted in verbal or written agreements 
in 77% of cases.198 In the same period in NSW 84% of community mediations were 
finalised,199 and in 2001 to 2002 in Queensland 84% of community mediations were 
finalised.200
In a subsequent report, NADRAC concluded that, ‘rates of agreements seem to be 
consistent across diverse forms of mediation and service types (about 50-85%)’.
  
 
201
There are now many surveys in Australia and various states of the United 
States of America, which consistently show that highly trained, debriefed, 
 In 
an abstract sense these figures suggest that mediation is indeed effective, and John 
Wade has observed that:  
 
                                                 
195 NADRAC, ADR Statistics: Published Statistics on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia, 
above n 189, 13. 
196 Ibid 16. 
197 Ibid 49. An earlier article notes that 88% of legal aid mediations in Queensland were successful, but 
does not provide a source or time-frame: Bernadette Rogers, ‘Multiple Roles in ADR’ (1999) 2 (1) The 
ADR Bulletin 1, 1. 
198 NADRAC, ADR Statistics: Published Statistics on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia, 
above n 189, 43. 
199 Ibid 44.  
200 Ibid. 
201 NADRAC, Summary of Research on ADR Effectiveness (Internal document), cited in Mack, above n 
164, 26. 
48 
 
 
 
problem-solving mediation services (especially in family and workers 
compensation disputes), staffed by wellpaid mediators, who use an intake 
process, are consistently successful in that they have moderate to very high 
… levels of settlement.202
However, for these figures to be meaningful consistent benchmarks or indicators are 
required, and (as John Wade acknowledges) these are often inadequate or 
unobtainable in ADR research.
 
 
203 The more useful question therefore, at least in the 
current context, is whether mediation increases settlement rates.204
Unfortunately, existing research does not overwhelmingly support the proposition that 
mediation increases settlement rates.
   
 
205 Indeed, Kathy Mack has concluded that most 
evaluations of ADR programs ‘showed no impact or mixed results on settlement 
rates’.206
                                                 
202 John Wade ‘Current Trends and Models in Dispute Resolution Part II’ (1998) 9 Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 113, 115. 
203 Ibid 114. See also, John Doyle and Chad Jacobi, above n 190, 172. 
204 Mack, above n 164, 25. However, much of the research undertaken does not necessarily reflect this 
distinction in reality. According to Kathy Mack, expressions ‘of satisfaction are very likely to involve 
some degree of comparison, even if implicit and uninformed, between the ADR process and outcome 
and what is thought would have happened had the dispute been litigated or resolved in some other 
way’. Above n 164, 21. 
205 Kathy Mack concludes that it is ‘difficult to draw general or widely applicable conclusions from this 
body of research’. Ibid 22. 
 The bulk of comparative research as to the effectiveness of mediation has 
206 Kathy Mack, above n 164, 29, citing: Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt (eds) Mediation Research: 
The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention (1989); Susan Keilitz, ‘Court-Annexed 
Arbitration’ in Susan Keilitz (ed), National Symposium on Court-Connected Dispute Resolution 
Research: A Report on Current Research Findings - Implications for Courts and Future Research State 
Justice Institute (1993); James Kakalik, An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral Evaluation 
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (1996) 53; Clarke, Stevens and Gordon, 'Public Sponsorship of 
Private Settling: Court-ordered Civil Case Mediation' (1997) 19(3) The Justice System Journal 311; 
Sharon Press, 'Florida's Court-Connected State Mediation Program' in Edward Bergman and John 
Bickerman (eds) Court-Annexed Mediation: Critical Perspectives on Selected State and Federal 
Programs (1998), Nancy Welsh, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in Minnesota - An Update on Rule 
114’ in Edward Bergman and John Bickerman (eds) Court-Annexed Mediation: Critical Perspectives 
on Selected State and Federal Programs (1998), 215; Robert Hann and Carl Baar, Evaluation of the 
Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program (Rule 24.1): Executive Summary and Recommendations 
Ontario (2001) 2; Deborah Hensler, ‘In Search of ''Good'' Mediation’ in Joseph Sanders and V.Lee 
Hamilton (eds) Handbook of Justice Research in Law New York, (2001) 258; Roselle Wissler  ‘Court 
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been undertaken in North America, though, and may not reflect the position in 
Australia. Indeed, in a recent study of court-annexed mediation in the Victorian 
Country and supreme courts, Tania Sourdin found that mediation plays a significant 
role in the production of settlement: 
 
[B]oth the survey and court-file data suggest that mediation is one of the 
most frequently used processes to finalise Supreme and County Courts 
disputes. In fact the survey and court-file data suggest it is the most 
frequently used process.207
The survey results indicated that 43.2% of cases were finalised by mediation, 
compared to just 7.4% at trial. The court-file data was less dramatic, indicating that 
16.1% of cases were finalised by mediation compared to 10.1% at trial. However, 
Professor Sourdin hypothesises that the divergence between survey and court-file data 
may be explained on the basis that ‘a possible 30 per cent of the 
‘dismissed/discontinued’ cases [recorded in the court-file data] were finalised at 
mediation’.
 
 
208
                                                                                                                                            
Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research’ (2002) 17 
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 641, 672. 
207 Sourdin, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria, above n 136, 136. 
208 Sourdin, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria, above n 136, 136.  
  
 
Even if these figures are representative of mediation in other Australian jurisdictions, 
however, and mediation is the most commonly used process for finalising disputes, 
this does not mean that mediation has necessarily increased settlement rates. 
Mediation may simply provide a structured alternative to negotiating on the ‘court 
house steps’. As Kathy Mack observes: 
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[S]ettlement rates per se may not tell us anything about the ADR program; 
the cases that settled might well have settled anyway, as most do. As trial 
rates are so low, it is very difficult to show any statistically significant 
reduction in trial rates as a result of ADR … Comparisons of adjudication 
and ADR sometimes fail to consider the impact of settlement negotiated by 
lawyers, so that cases resolved through ADR may have resolved anyway 
through conventional negotiation.209
Various commentators have also criticised the use of settlement rates as a measure of 
effectiveness, as it ignores qualitative factors such as outcome durability and disputant 
satisfaction.
 
 
210 While settlement rates may be a flawed determinant of success when 
viewed in isolation, however, they can be useful as part of a broader, multi-faceted 
analysis of efficiency. As discussed above, Tim Fry has observed that costs in the 
Federal and Family Courts are directly related to the total number of court events and, 
in the case of the Family Court, whether the case went to trial. 211 Thus, a more 
reliable indication of effectiveness can be obtained by determining whether ostensibly 
high rates of mediated settlement correlate with reported decreases in cost and case 
duration.212
                                                 
209 Mack, above n 164, 19 - 21, citing Susan Keilitz ‘Civil Dispute Resolution Processes’ in Susan 
Keilitz (ed), National Symposium on Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Research: A Report on 
Current Research Findings - Implications for Courts and Future Research State Justice Institute (1993) 
43; Steven Clarke and Elizabeth Gordon ‘Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: Court-ordered Civil 
Case Mediation’ (1997) 19(3) The Justice System Journal 311. 
210 Mack, above n 164, 20, citing Galanter and Cahill, above n 186; Kelly, above n 182, 375; Kressel 
and Pruitt, above n 206, 400-401; Raymond Whiting, ‘Family Disputes, Non-Family Disputes and 
Mediation Success’ (1994) 11 Mediation Quarterly 247, 251. 
211 Fry, above n 115, 12, 14. 
212 There is a correlation between cost and case duration because a reduction in the latter will ordinarily 
lead to a reduction in the former: Sourdin, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria, 
above n 136, 140. 
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Does mediation reduce the cost and/or duration of litigation? 
 
In 2002, in a closing address to a symposium on mediation 25 years after the Pound 
Conference, Frank Sanders opined that: 
 
We boast liberally about the time- and money-saving advantages of 
mediation, but there is little in the way of rigorous research to back up this 
claim. Nor is this merely a question of academic interest. In times of tight 
budgets, legislatures are prone to ask for proof that adoption of mediation 
programs will save money. So far as I know, except in very isolated 
specialized settings, there is no such research ... To be sure, such research 
would be incredibly difficult to do ... A further complexity would arise if one 
sought to take account of the claimed superiority of mediation over time in 
reducing future disputes, this requiring a longitudinal study. One would also 
need to distinguish between cost-savings to clients (caused in part by lower 
attorney fees) and cost savings to the court system.213
Professor Sander’s comments were a response to the development of mediation in the 
US,
 
 
214 but the same difficulties have limited Australian scholarship. In the context of 
family law disputes, Kathy Mack’s review of existing research found, ‘some evidence 
of cost benefits for participants in mediation, but the benefits for the courts [were] less 
clear’.215
                                                 
213 Frank E. A. Sanders, ‘Some Concluding Thoughts’ (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 705, 706.  
214 For a more in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of court-annexed mediation in the US, see: 
Douglas A. Van Epps, ‘The Impact of Mediation on State Courts’ (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 627; Roselle L Wissler, ‘Court Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What 
we know from empirical research. (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 641. 
 She also found that most evaluations of court referred ADR in general civil 
215 Mack, above n 164, 28, citing: Kelly, above n 182; Pearson, above n 182; Jessica Pearson and 
Nancy Thoennes, ‘Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade of Research’, in Kenneth Kressel and 
52 
 
 
 
litigation ‘showed no impact or mixed results on … time or cost savings’.216 The 
majority of research consulted to reach this conclusion was in fact American in origin, 
but English and Australian research is also contradictory. In England and Wales, the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs noted that 45% of respondents to a survey 
conducted by the Law Society in 2002 believed that an increase in court-annexed 
ADR following the Woolf reforms had resulted in a ‘front-loading of costs’ (that is to 
say, a transfer of costs from trial to negotiation and mediation etc).217 In Australia, the 
ALRC has similarly acknowledged that increased ‘demands on parties at earlier 
stages may increase and `front end load' costs for matters’.218
On the other hand, Tania Sourdin’s survey of disputants in Victoria revealed an 
estimated median cost-saving of $30,000 when a dispute was finalised by mediation. 
Legal practitioners in the same survey estimated that mediation reduced costs in 82% 
of cases, and Professor Sourdin observes that ‘a comparison of total legal and related 
professional costs spent during the dispute … suggests that mediation is the least 
costly method of finalisation and that the process can result in cost savings for 
litigants’.
 This danger is also 
emphasised by Tim Fry’s finding (above) that the number of prehearing events in the 
Family and Federal Court is associated with an increase in cost.  
 
219
                                                                                                                                            
Dean Pruitt, (eds) Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention 
(1989), 27-28. 
216 Mack, above n 164, 29. 
217 United Kingdom Department of Constitutional Affairs, above n 111, [7.2].  
218 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 103, [4.20]. 
219 Sourdin, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria, above n 136, 140. 
 Further research is required in order to determine whether these findings 
are representative of other Australian jurisdictions, but on the basis of the Victorian 
data mediation would appear to result in cost savings, a reduction in case duration, 
and an increase in the number of early settlements.  
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Will judicial mediation be effective? 
 
In summary, although quantitative gains (and access to justice in a narrow sense) 
cannot be the sole object of civil justice reform, the quality of individual justice can 
be improved by increased efficiency and decreased costs. While existing research 
does not universally support the proposition that mediation does in fact increase 
settlement rates and decrease costs, recent research conducted in Australia suggests 
that it can do so if appropriate referral criteria are implemented and mediators are 
properly trained.  
 
Of course, none of the research considered above relates specifically to judicial 
mediation, and it is difficult to accurately forecast what if any impact judicial 
mediation will have upon the efficiency or quality of civil justice in Australia. The 
limited information available suggests that it is likely to have a positive impact, 
however. In a recent letter, Judge Sidis reported a ‘high success rate of approximately 
95%’ in judicial mediations held in the NSW District Court.220 In an earlier article, 
Her Honour had reported a slightly lower, yet still considerable, settlement rate of 
almost 80% (saving more than 400 court days) in the more than 100 judicial 
mediations undertaken at that stage.221 There are also positive reports from judicial 
mediation programs overseas.222
                                                 
220 Letter from Judge Margaret Sidis to Iain Field, 20th August 2009. See Appendix. 
221 Sidis, ‘Judicial Mediation in the District Court’, above n 36, 74. 
 According to Justice Louise Otis, the architect of 
222 See also Peter Spiller, ‘Reflections on best judicial practice’ (2009) 19 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 22. The author discusses the success of referees in New Zealand Disputes Tribunals. 
Although these referees are not judicial mediators in the sense defined here, as they provide a decision 
in the absence of settlement, they do seek ‘agreed settlement where appropriate’, and are broadly 
comparable with judge mediators in this sense. According to Peter Spiller (at 22) the referees who run 
these tribunals ‘have a remarkably low rate of successful appeals against them. In the period 2006-2008, 
of the approximate 20,000 Disputes Tribunal cases that were disposed of each year, successful appeals 
accounted for 0.25% (2006), 0.2% (2007) and 0.17% (2008) of the cases disposed’. The author 
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Quebec’s pioneering judicial mediation program, judicial mediation has been 
effective in that jurisdiction in five key respects: 
 
1. It reduces costs 
2. It reduces delays 
3. It encourages party autonomy (disputants gain control over the outcome and 
avoid the uncertainty of possible appeal). 
4. It reflects a ‘collective maturity’ in litigant/lawyer attitudes (people are 
increasingly educated about and aware of the drawbacks of formal 
adjudication) 
5. It causes less psychological harm than litigation.223
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude that, in the 
right circumstances, judicial mediation can increase settlement rates and improve the 
quality of civil justice. Ensuring that judicial mediation is effective in practice will, of 
course, require careful implementation and a commitment to ongoing review.  
 
  
Synopsis of the Thesis 
 
At the beginning of this Chapter it was noted that academic and professional interest 
in judicial mediation has increased steadily in recent years, 224
                                                                                                                                            
identifies seven factors which may have enhanced this success: ‘Prehearing preparation’, ‘engaging 
with the humanity of the parties’, ‘running a clear and transparent process’, keeping focussed in the 
relevant issues and law’, ‘being honest with the parties’, giving both parties the opportunity to be heard, 
and ‘foreshadowing the essential elements in the decision’.  
 and that certain 
223 Justice Louise Otis, ‘Judicial Mediation: Prospects and Issues’ (Speech delivered to Seminar of the 
Victorian Bar, Melbourne, Thursday 14 May 2009). The Chief Justice of the Quebec Court of Appeal 
has reported that between 1998 and 2006, some 80% of civil, family commercial and criminal disputes 
submitted that Court’s judicial mediation program ‘settled successfully after one or two mediation 
sessions of 3 hours’. Michel Robert, ‘Judges as Mediators in Criminal Matters’ (Paper presented to the 
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law’s 20th International Conference, Brisbane 2 – 6 
July 2006), 6.  
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Australian courts may already engage in a form of judicial mediation. At the time of 
writing, the Victorian Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, is also actively engaged in a 
campaign to develop a judicial mediation program in that State.225
Opinion is divided as to whether judicial mediation is compatible with common law 
notions of due process and the fundamental nature of the judicial function. In some 
quarters judicial mediation is viewed as a ‘contradiction in terms’
 It is interesting to 
note, therefore, that (until recently) there has been relatively little debate as to whether 
judicial mediation will, in fact, increase the efficiency of civil justice. This may 
indicate a general acceptance that it will, or it may reflect a preoccupation with 
broader jurisprudential and constitutional issues raised by the concept. The analysis 
undertaken in this Chapter demonstrates that judicial mediation does have the 
potential to increase efficiency. Ultimately, however, it is these broader 
jurisprudential and constitutional issues with which this thesis is concerned. 
 
226 and a threat to 
the integrity of the judiciary.227 In other quarters, judicial mediation has been lauded 
as ‘the cutting edge of legal practice,’228 and a ‘natural evolution’ of the judicial 
role.229
                                                                                                                                            
224 See above n 2. 
225 Rob Hulls, ‘Changing the Culture of Disputes’ (2005) The Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators 
Australia News 43. 
226 Chodosh, above n 3.   
227 See, for example, the comments of Chief Justice James Spigleman: ‘I do not mean to suggest that 
improvements in judicial efficiency have not been required, nor that further improvements cannot 
occur. My proposition is that many advocates of such measures have an inadequate understanding of 
the way that such steps may adversely affect other values and of the incompatibility of some such 
measures with fundamental principle, including the principle of open justice’. Chief Justice James 
Spigelman, above n 62, 379-380. See also Sir Laurence Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’, 
above n 2.  
228 Hulls, above n 225. 
229 Justice Andrew Rogers, ‘Judges in Search of Justice’ (1987) 10 University of NSW Law Journal 93, 
104. 
 The latter view acknowledges that there is a certain inevitability to further 
judicial reform; a sentiment echoed by Justice Ronald Sackville, whose conclusions 
provide a fitting addendum to the preceding analysis: 
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Whatever view is taken about the limits of the judicial law-making function, 
the expansion of the role of the courts in managing justice is likely to 
continue.  The process that has been under way for some time is not readily 
reversed … It is widely acknowledged that the functions performed by 
Australian courts changed significantly during the last years of the twentieth 
century.  The changes have usually been explained and understood in terms 
of case management and the additional responsibilities thereby imposed on 
judges. It has become clear, however, that case management is only one 
aspect of a more fundamental shift in judicial responsibilities. Despite the 
concerns of those who resist the notion that courts should be seen as service 
providers, the fact is that they have chosen to become accountable in ways 
that transcend the traditional mechanisms associated with “open justice”.  
While the core of the judicial function remains both intact and inviolate, the 
expansion of the judicial role marks a transformation in the relationship 
between the courts and the wider community.  The transformation has yet to 
run its course.230
                                                 
230 Sackville, ‘From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the Judicial Role’, 
above n 150, 25-27.  
 
 
This thesis evaluates these conflicting opinions, and analyses the constitutional and 
jurisprudential principles upon which they are premised. By applying these principles 
to the working definition of judicial mediation model outlined at the beginning of this 
Chapter, the following Chapters demonstrate that judicial mediation can evolve in a 
manner consistent with the requirements of Ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution, 
and that this evolution poses no threat to the fundamental precepts of the judicial 
process or the Australian judiciary more generally.  
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Chapters 2 through 6 chart the High Court’s interpretation of Ch III of the 
Constitution, and in particular its interpretation of the term ‘judicial power’. The 
analysis undertaken in these Chapters demonstrates that the High Court has utilised 
the separation of powers to realise a particular set of rules relating to how legal 
disputes should be determined, and that these rules have been developed as vehicle for 
the maintenance of certain rule of law values. This has been achieved by securing four 
essential jurisdictions; exclusive jurisdiction (isolating the judicial power from 
legislative interference or usurpation), inherent jurisdiction (securing to the courts the 
ability to maintain the integrity of their processes), appellate jurisdiction (ensuring an 
avenue of appeal to the High Court from all Australian courts), and supervisory 
jurisdiction (providing an element of control over private modes of dispute resolution). 
Wherever possible, judicial mediation is evaluated by reference to these principles 
and essential jurisdictions as they are encountered, in order to gradually strip away the 
illusion that Ch III prohibits the vesting of mediation functions in Australian courts.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the doctrinal foundations upon which the High Court’s Ch III 
jurisprudence has been constructed. This analysis introduces the four essential 
jurisdictions noted above, and explains that the separation of powers doctrine provides 
the mechanism by which these jurisdictions are maintained. Two alternative 
approaches to the separation of judicial power are identified. The first approach is 
contained within the second limb of the ‘separation doctrine’, and prevents the vesting 
in Ch III courts of non-judicial functions or functions not incidental to the exercise 
judicial power. The second approach adopts notions of ‘incompatibility’ to control the 
vesting of functions in State courts, territory courts, and federal judges acting in their 
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private capacity. The principles stemming from both of these approaches will affect 
the development of judicial mediation, whether implemented by primary legislation or 
rules of court. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the implications of Ch III for Ch III courts (that is to say, 
federal courts, State courts and territory courts vested with federal judicial power). 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that, although mediation does not fall within the core meaning 
of the term judicial power (because it does not result in a binding determination), the 
power to mediate may nevertheless be vested in Ch III courts as function incidental to 
the exercise of that power (as is generally the case in respect of prehearing functions). 
That being so, whether judges can mediate will turn upon the extent to which the 
mediation process is consistent with the procedural implications derived by the High 
Court from Ch III.  
 
Chapter 4 unpacks the procedural implications of Ch III, and shows that the 
separation doctrine has resulted in a ‘judicial process’ implication. This implication 
comprises two broad components – a ‘due process’ component and an ‘integrity’ 
component – each of which has been developed separately by the High Court. While 
the former is now fairly well-established (and can be generally expressed in terms of 
procedural fairness), the requirements of the latter remain far from certain. It is 
nevertheless apparent that both components of the judicial process implication are 
firmly tethered to notions of impartiality, and it is concluded that constitutional 
impediments to judicial mediation are most likely to arise in this area. Chapter 4 also 
examines the High Court’s approach to the interpretation of statutory provisions 
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which affect court procedures, and demonstrates that a presumption in favour of 
legislative validity is ordinarily applied.  
 
Chapter 5 explores the persona designata exception, which allows federal judges to 
engage in certain non-judicial functions in their private capacity, and considers the 
implications of the Kable doctrine (the subject of Chapter 6) for State and territory 
judges acting in their private capacity. While the persona designata exception may 
permit federal judges to engage in a broader range of mediation functions than would 
otherwise be permissible in Australian courts, it is argued that judicial mediation 
should not be developed in this way for two reasons: firstly, because the persona 
designata exception has the potential to undermine the separation doctrine, and should 
be restricted to the conferral of administrative functions of judges; and secondly, 
because judicial mediation raises important questions about the nature of the judicial 
process and its relationship with ADR, which are more appropriately determined by 
the judiciary in the course of the judicial process. 
 
Chapter 6 considers whether Ch III might prohibit or limit judicial mediation in State 
and territory Courts. This Chapter demonstrates that, although State and territory 
courts have not traditionally been subject to the requirements of Ch III, certain of the 
procedural implications drawn in a Ch III context have been extended to State and 
territory courts by the convergence of two overlapping streams of High Court 
precedent. The first stream (the ‘Kable doctrine’) asserts the High Court’s power to 
strike-down legislation which is ‘incompatible’ with the vesting of federal judicial 
power in certain non-federal courts, while the second stream (the ‘Spratt stream’) 
reconceptualises territory courts in a manner comparable with State courts. Chapter 6 
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demonstrates that, despite the fact that the High Court has the capacity to invalidate 
State or territory legislation or court rules on the basis that they undermine the 
institutional integrity of the judiciary, this is highly unlikely to occur in practice. Two 
primary reasons are offered in support of this conclusion. First of all, the High Court 
has so narrowed the circumstances in which ‘incompatibility’ will arise under the 
Kable doctrine as to permit all but the most extreme usurpations of judicial power. 
Given that judicial mediation increases the discretionary power of the court, and that 
legislative provisions affecting more sensitive judicial functions have satisfied the 
incompatibility test, it is highly likely that judicial mediation will do so. Second of all, 
the High Court has consistently applied the same principles of statutory construction 
as it has in a Ch III context (considered in Chapters 3 and 4). By virtue of this 
approach, statutory provisions or rules of court will only be held invalid if they cannot 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the judicial process. Although this 
interpretative approach is likely to countenance the implementation of judicial 
mediation, a preference is expressed for a more purposive interpretative approach 
which focuses on the object of Ch III. Such an approach, it is argued, would achieve 
substantially the same outcome for judicial mediation (because efficient court 
procedures serve the rule of law), whilst also preventing what have, in many cases, 
amounted to legislative usurpations of judicial power. 
 
In light of the conclusions drawn in Chapters 2 through 6, it is concluded that whether 
judicial mediation accords with the requirements of Ch III will depend upon whether 
that process can be carried out in an impartial manner. On this basis, Chapter 7 returns 
to the ‘wave’ model outlined above, and demonstrates that the access to justice 
movement has resulted in a multi-jurisdictional increase in judicial control over the 
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civil trial process. Chapter 7 demonstrates that, whether as a direct result of this trend 
or not, the processes involved in mediation and adjudication are no longer (and 
perhaps never were) dichotomous. Rather, mediation and adjudication represent 
theoretical archetypes at opposing ends of the same procedural spectrum, with the 
reality of both lying somewhere in between. That being so, it is concluded that the 
question is not whether judges can mediate in an impartial manner per se, but how far 
towards the mediation end of the procedural spectrum judicial participation can travel 
before the rule against bias, or the integrity of the judiciary, is undermined. 
 
The first part of Chapter 8 identifies commonalities in the sources and structure of 
judicial mediation (as it has developed to date), vis-à-vis processes such as prehearing 
conferences and less adversarial trials (examined in Chapter 7). Through a 
comparative analysis with these processes, this analysis demonstrates that judicial 
mediation has developed (and is likely to continue to develop) within the 
incidental/inherent jurisdiction of the courts, and that formal procedures are unlikely 
to be established for its exercise. The second part of Chapter 8 returns to the 
mediation pressure points identified at the beginning of this Chapter, and plots the 
boundaries of acceptable practice applicable to judicial mediation on the procedural 
continuum developed in Chapter 7. A number of mitigating strategies are also 
identified which will reduce the likelihood of apprehended bias arising. It is 
concluded that whether bias is reasonably apprehended will depend on the unique 
circumstances of the case at hand, but that, in any event, the fact that the rule against 
bias is an implied requirement of Ch III will not affect the operation of the rule in 
practice. Put differently, unless an enabling provision or rule of court positively 
requires a court conducting judicial mediation to undermine the rule against bias, the 
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principles of due process implied by Ch III will not result in the validity of the 
provision or rule in question.  
 
The final part of Chapter 8 considers whether judicial might undermine the integrity 
of the judiciary. Building on the analysis undertaken in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, it is 
concluded that judicial mediation is highly unlikely to undermine the integrity of 
Australian courts (federal, State or territory). Three primary reasons are offered in 
support of this conclusion: because judicial mediation satisfies the criterion of 
integrity (public confidence/impartiality), because procedural discretions are unlikely 
to be held invalid save in the most extreme circumstances, and because judicial 
mediation is, in any event, consistent with the underlying object of the separation 
doctrine and the Kable doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
The following five Chapters trace the development of Ch III jurisprudence in order to 
determine the manner in which, and extent to which, the Constitution imposes limits 
on, or liberates opportunities for, judicial mediation. The relevant principles are 
appraised as they apply in three overlapping domains: Ch III courts, judges (federal 
State and territory) acting in their private capacity, and State and territory courts.  
 
This Chapter examines the conceptual foundations upon which the principles 
appraised in the following Chapters are constructed. The Chapter begins by painting, 
with a very broad brush, a picture of Australia’s constitutional landscape. The aim at 
this stage is not to render a detailed representation of this landscape, but rather an 
impressionistic image of the influences, assumptions and arrangements which bring 
substance to the issues explored in this thesis. To this end, analysis focuses on the 
influence of British and US constitutional theory, the relationship between the 
separation of powers and the rule of the law, the changing role and status of the States 
and territories, and the historical relationship between the judicial system and private 
modes of dispute resolution. This analysis reveals three jurisdictions which are 
necessary to maintain the rule of law in Australia: ‘exclusive’, ‘appellate’, and 
‘supervisory’.  
 
The second half of this Chapter introduces two alternative approaches to the 
separation of judicial power. The first approach is encapsulated in the ‘separation 
doctrine’, which fosters a strict approach to the separation of judicial power. This 
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approach identifies and isolates certain functions that are exclusively judicial in nature 
(the ‘first limb’), and prevents the vesting in Ch III courts of non-judicial functions or 
functions not incidental to the exercise judicial power (the ‘second limb’). The second 
limb recognises the need to ensure the ‘inherent’ jurisdiction of the courts, which is in 
turn identified as the fourth jurisdiction necessary to maintain the rule of law. The 
second approach offers an alternative to the second limb of the separation doctrine, 
and allows the vesting of functions in State courts, territory courts and federal judges 
acting in their private capacity, provided that they are not ‘incompatible’ with the co-
exercise of federal judicial power. The implications drawn from both of these 
approaches will affect the development of judicial mediation, whether implemented 
by primary legislation or rules of court.  
 
The Commonwealth Constitution: influences, assumptions and 
arrangements 
 
The Australian Constitution unites what were, prior to Federation in 1901, distinct 
colonies under British dominion. The British Queen remains the formal head of the 
Australian State, although in reality she (or rather the British government) no longer 
retains any direct influence over Australian affairs. The Balfour Declaration on the 
Status of Dominions in 1926,1
                                                 
1 Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, The Balfour Declaration on the Status of Dominions (London, 
November 15, 1926). 
 endorsed by the Australian Prime Minister and the 
Prime Ministers of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State, 
indicated the belief of those nations that although ‘united by a common allegiance to 
the Crown’, they were nevertheless, ‘autonomous Communities within the British 
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Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another’.2 The sentiment of 
these words went unrealised in Australia until they were finally affirmed by the 
British Statute of Westminster in 1931, 3  and later by the Australian Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth).4
The Constitution itself is contained in S9 of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 (UK), which followed a positive referendum in each of the 
colonies, with the exception of Western Australia, between 1898 and 1900. Western 
Australia held a referendum shortly thereafter, and was included as an original State at 
that time.
  
 
5 Although enacted by the Imperial Parliament, the Bill was drafted by 
Australian delegates to the National Australasian Convention during a series of 
assemblies held between 1891 and 1897.6
A basic question for the delegates to these assemblies was how to 
structure a federation within the Westminster tradition of government. 
Britain, of course, could provide no experience with federalism, since the 
Scots, the Welsh and the Irish were part of a United Kingdom, not a 
federated one … [I]t was inevitable that the delegates should look to the 
Constitution of the United States as the other major model of federation 
within the English speaking world.
 Patrick Parkinson has observed that;  
 
7
                                                 
2 Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, The Balfour Declaration on the Status of Dominions (London, 
November 15, 1926), 14. 
3 Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK), ss 2 – 6. 
4 Australian Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth), ss 2-6. 
5 Gabriel Moens’ and John Trone, Lumb and Moens’ The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia: Annotated (6th ed 2001) 6. 
6 Keven Booker, Arthur Glass and Robert Watt, Federal Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2nd ed 
1998), 21-22. 
7 Patrick Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law (2nd ed, 2001). 128-129. England is also 
part of the United Kingdom. 
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As a result, the combined influence of British and US Constitutional theory and 
practice (and to a lesser extent the ‘semi-federal Constitution of the Dominion of 
Canada’)8 is clearly evident in the arrangement of the Australian Constitution, which 
adopts certain of the structural features associated with both constitutional models to 
create a monarchical system that is structured federally. 9  Thus, the Australian 
Constitution divides the various powers of the Australian Commonwealth between a 
federal legislature, executive, and judicature,10
 
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal 
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such 
other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as 
it invests with federal jurisdiction.
 whilst retaining the British monarch as 
the notional head of each branch. Chapter I of the Constitution establishes a bicameral 
federal parliament, comprising the Queen as head, a senate, and a house of 
representatives. Chapter II formally lodges executive power in the Queen, to be 
exercised by the Governor-General as her representative, and Chapter III establishes a 
High Court, which exercises the judicial power of the commonwealth. S 71 states that: 
11
The courts identified in s 71 may be referred to collectively as ‘Ch III courts’, 
although the ‘other courts’ mentioned (principally State supreme courts) also enjoy a 
 
 
                                                 
8 Justice Michael McHugh, ‘Tensions Between the Executive and Judiciary’ (2002) 6 The Judicial 
Review 111, 112.  
9 Sir John Quick and Sir Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth 
(1901), 129; Parkinson, above n 7; Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 18-27. 
10 The Constitution of the United States separates power between the President (Article I, Sec 1), 
Congress (Article II, Sec 1) and the Supreme Court (Article III, Sec 1).  
11 S71 closely resembles Article III, Sec 1 of the US Constitution which provides that the ‘judicial 
power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish’. 
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distinct, non-federal role. The implications of this distinction are considered in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
The separation of powers 
 
The Australian Constitution does not expressly require a separation of governmental 
powers. 12  Rather, ‘the conclusion that the Constitution embodies a separation of 
powers is attributed to the terms and structure of the Constitution itself’,13 and, in 
particular, the division of legislative, executive and judicial functions between the 
first three Chapters of the Constitution. 14  In determining the implications of this 
division, the High Court has been influenced by British and US constitutional 
theory.15 By and large, US constitutional principles (in particular the writings in The 
Federalist)16 have dominated the High Court’s approach to the separation of judicial 
power,17 whereas British parliamentary convention has determined the relationship 
between executive and legislative power. 18
                                                 
12 It is common to attribute the separation of powers doctrine to the writings of the French jurist 
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (1748). However, John Locke had previously 
written an account of the concept in Two Treatises of Government: In the Former, The False Principles 
and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, And His Followers, are Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is 
an Essay concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil-Government (1689). 
13 Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Separation of Powers’, in Fiona Wheeler and Brian Opeskin, The Australian 
Federal Judicial System (2000) 3, 7. 
14 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54; R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of 
Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; Cheryl Saunders, above n 13, 8. 
15 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590, 597.  
16 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist (first published 1788). 
17 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 153. 
18 The most influential exponents of British constitutionalism are arguably Albert Venn Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (first published 1885, 10th ed 1959) and Sir 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first published 1765). 
 Arguably the most significant of the 
British conventions adopted is the system of ‘responsible government’; that is to say, 
a parliamentary system in which  
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the Crown acts on the advice on its Ministers and, on the other hand, the 
Ministers are responsible to the Parliament for the actions of the Crown. In 
the long run the Parliament, comprising the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, is in a position to control the Executive Government.19
Responsible government is by definition antithetic to an absolute separation of powers, 
as it defies a clear separation of executive and legislative functions. For this reason, 
and in reaction to perceived abuses of legislative power at the hands of their colonial 
ancestors,
  
 
20  the doctrine was explicitly repudiated by the framers of the US 
Constitution,21 and executive power was vested specifically in the President.22 This 
rejection, and the correspondingly dogmatic separation of all three institutional 
powers in the US, has led commentators to describe the US approach as requiring a 
‘strict’ application of the separation of powers doctrine. 23 The British approach, in 
contrast, has been referred to as encompassing a ‘broad’ power separation.24 The High 
Court’s approach to the separation of judicial power in Australia, and the influence of 
US and British constitutional theory in this area, is examined in the second half of this 
Chapter. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that, in contrast with its acceptance of a 
broad separation of executive and legislative powers, the High Court has sought to 
ensure a strict separation of judicial power.25
                                                 
19 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 364-365 (Barwick CJ). See also Brown v 
West (1990) 169 CLR 195, 205 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
20 Edward S Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914) 20. 
21 INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1982) 962 (Powell J). 
22 Article 2, s 1 states that the ‘executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America’. 
23 See, for example, Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 155.  
24 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 301 (Williams J). See 
also Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 155;  Peter Gerangelos, ‘The Separation of Powers and 
Legislative Interference with Judicial Functions in Pending Cases’ (2002) 30 Federal Law Review, 1. 
 As a result, the Australian Constitution 
25 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorhead (1909) 8 CLR 330; New South Wales v Commonwealth 
(1915) 20 CLR 54; Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander (1918) 25 CLR 434; 
Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257; R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte 
Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 585 (Dixon and Evatt J); R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of 
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has been described as an ‘asymmetric’ constitutional model, 26 or a ‘mutation’ of 
British and American constitutional principles.27
The rule of law 
  
 
 
In Chapter 1, it was noted that the relationship between Ch III and rule of law is of 
particular relevance to the question whether judges can or should mediate, and it is 
through the application of the separation of powers doctrine that rule of law values are 
realised.28
Were it [the judiciary] joined with the legislative, the life, liberty and 
property of the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose 
decisions would be then regulated only by their own opinions, and not by 
any fundamental principles of law; which, though legislators may depart 
from, yet judges are bound to observe.
 The relationship between these concepts has been acknowledged by the 
High Court since the earliest days of Federation. In Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v 
Moorhead, for example, Isaacs J approved of Sir William’s Blackstone’s ‘learned’ 
observation that:   
 
29
In Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth, Dixon J provided a powerful 
endorsement of the view that the Constitution is generally subject to the requirements 
of the rule of law. In His Honour’s view, the Constitution 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 426-28 [340]-[344] (Kirby J), 
467 [472] (Hayne J). 
26 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 156; Suri Ratnapala, Australian Constitution Law: Foundations 
and Theory (2nd ed, 2007) Ch 5. 
27 W Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (1976), 125-127. 
28 Fiona Wheeler has explained that the separation doctrine ‘serves’ rule of law objectives, ‘and is not 
an end in itself’. Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the new High Court’ 
(2004) 32 Federal law Review 205, 209.  
29 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 382 (Isaacs J), citing Sir William Blackstone, above n 18, 269. 
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is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, 
to some which it gives effect as, for example, in separating the judicial 
power from other functions of government, others of which are simply 
assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be said that the rule of 
law forms an assumption.30
Dixon CJ’s view is undoubtedly correct.
  
 
31 However, it is one thing to say that the rule 
of law is a constitutional ‘assumption’, and quite another to give practical meaning to 
that concept.32 The values encapsulated within the rule of law cannot be stated with 
precision. Chief Justice Murray Gleeson has observed extra-curially that even the 
‘essence’ of the rule of law is ‘far from precise,’33 and Ivor Jennings has described the 
concept as an ‘unruly horse’, the only purpose of which may be ‘distinguishing 
democratic or constitutional government from dictatorship’.34 Alan Hutchinson and 
Patrick Monaghan have dubbed the rule of law ‘the will-o-the-wisp of constitutional 
theory,’35 and according to Iain Stewart the concept is ‘a juristic chocolate factory, a 
category with no definite content apart from law itself and hence open to almost any 
content’.36
                                                 
30 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193. 
31 See, for example: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 69 (Deane and Toohey JJ); 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557; Plaintiff 157/2002 v Minister 
for Immigration (2003) 211 CLR 476, 31 [492], 513-514 [103]-[104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ). Other assumptions include federalism and representative government. 
32 This is despite the fact that the rule of law has been evolving since (at least) the time of Plato and 
Aristotle. Freidrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960) 162-175. 
33 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’ (speech delivered at Melbourne 
University, Melbourne, 7 November 2001). 
34 Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (first published 1933, 5th ed, 1965) 60. 
35 Alan Hutchinson and Patrick Monaghan ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’, in Alan Hutchinson and 
Patrick Monaghan (eds) The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (1987) 97, 99. 
36 Iain Stewart, ‘Men of Class: Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on “Separation and Powers” and “The 
Rule of Law” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 187, 191. 
 Despite these difficulties, Albert Venn Dicey’s formulation of the rule of 
law broadly encompasses its requirements, and the three overlapping elements 
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comprising that formulation are sufficiently inclusive for present purposes.37
the need to curb the conferral of discretionary power on government officials 
in the interests of certainty and predictability; the ability to seek a remedy in 
independent courts ... and the importance of equality before the law. 
 Denise 
Meyerson has summarised Dicey’s conception of the rule of law as  
 
38
As will become clear over the course of the following Chapters, the High Court has 
sought to satisfy these requirements by constitutionally entrenching certain 
jurisdictions historically associated with the traditional judicial process, as opposed to 
regulating the content of the substantive laws as such.
 
 
39
The States and territories 
  
 
 
The third feature of Australia’s constitutional landscape, which it is useful to 
introduce at this stage, is the relationship between the States and territories and 
Australia’s federal system. This highly complex relationship (and the manner and 
extent to which Ch III limits the functions that may be vested in State and territory 
courts) is the subject of a more detailed analysis in Chapter 6.  
  
                                                 
37 In Albert Venn Dicey’s words, it ‘means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance 
of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power... Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by 
the law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing 
else. It means, again, equality before the law or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of 
the land administered by the ordinary law courts; the “rule of law” in this sense excludes the idea of 
any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens 
or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’. Albert Venn Dicey, above n 18, 202-03. 
38 Denise Meyerson, ‘The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers’ 4 Macquarie Law Journal (2004) 
1, 1.  
39 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 44 (Brennan CJ), 63-63 (Dawson J), 142 (McHugh J), 
153 (Gummow J); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh 
JJ); Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 533 [45] (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
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Upon the passage of the Commonwealth Constitution the various constitutions in 
force throughout the Australian colonies were continued ‘as at the establishment of 
the Commonwealth’ subject to any conflict with any power vested exclusively in a 
commonwealth institution by the Commonwealth Constitution.40 Section 77 (iii) of 
the Constitution empowers Parliament to vest federal jurisdiction in any State court, 
and prior to the creation of the High Court41 federal judicial power was exercised 
throughout the newly created Commonwealth entirely by the existing State supreme 
courts (the so-called ‘autochthonous expedient’).42 Most State courts now exercise a 
mixture of State and federal judicial power, whereas federal courts are precluded from 
exercising State judicial power.43
By virtue of s 73 of the Constitution, the States undertook to maintain an avenue of 
appeal from the supreme courts to the High Court. The territories, in contrast, were 
not party to the ‘federal compact’, but rather ‘creatures of the Commonwealth … 
entirely within the scope of the territories power in s 122 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution’.
  
 
44 As territory courts could not be vested with federal judicial power 
they drew instead upon the legal machinery of the States,45 and s 122 provided no 
direct line of appeal from territory courts to the High Court.46
 
  
                                                 
40 Commonwealth Constitution s 106. 
41 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The first three High Court judges were sworn in on the 6th November 1903. 
See Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘The Centenary of the High Court’ (Paper delivered at the 13th AIJA 
Oration in Judicial Administration, Melbourne, 3 October 2003). 
42 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268 (Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). Re Wakim, Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 540 (Gleeson 
CJ). This was in direct contrast with the approach adopted in the US, where State courts were never 
considered suitable for the vesting of federal jurisdiction. 
43 Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and territories (2006) 341; citing 
Re Wakim, Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
44 Ibid 1. 
45 Carney, above n 43, 1. 
46 In Porter v The King; Ex Parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432, the High Court held that an avenue of 
appeal could nevertheless be granted by Parliament to the High Court under s 122. See also Capital TV 
and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591. 
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Most of the Australian colonies had developed a system of responsible government 
prior to federation, 47  and the principles governing the division of legislative and 
executive powers were therefore broadly comparable at the State and federal level. At 
no point, however, had any of the States derived a strict separation of judicial power 
from their colonial Constitutions; a situation unchanged by the passage of the 
Commonwealth Constitution.48 In recent years, the High Court has made in-roads into 
the autonomy previously enjoyed by the States, by asserting the need to maintain the 
integrity of Australia’s ‘integrated … judicial system’. 49 One consequence of this 
‘“radical” addition to the body of Australian constitutional law,’50 is that certain of the 
implications drawn from Chapter III may now also apply to the courts of the States. 
The High Court has also extended the boundaries of Australia’s integrated judiciary to 
include the courts of the territories,51
                                                 
47 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 13-14. Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the 
Australian States and territories, above n 43, 341. 
48 Gerard Carney, ‘Wilson & Kable: The Doctrine of Incompatibility – An Alternative to Separation of 
Powers?’ (1997) 13 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 175, 183; citing NSW: Clyne v 
East (1967) 68 SR(NSW) 385, 395, 400; Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers 
Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 381, 407, 
410, 419-420. Victoria: Collingwood v Victoria (No 2) [1994] 1 VR 652. South Australia: Gilbertson v 
South Australia (1976) 15 SASR 66, 85; Grace Bible Church v Reedman (1984) 36 SASR 376. 
Western Australia: JD & WG Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168. See also John Alvey, 
‘The Lack of Separation of Powers in Queensland’ (2006) 9 Public Administration Today 64; Justice 
David Malcolm, ‘The Judiciary Under the Constitution: The Future of Reform’ (2003) 31(2) Western 
Australian Law Review 129. 
49 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 102 (Gaudron J), 114 (McHugh J), 137 (Gummow J).  
50 Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Kable doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State Courts’ (2005) 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 15, 21; citing Justice Michael McHugh, ‘The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989 – 2004 (Inaugural Sir Anthony Mason Lecture in Constitutional 
Law, Sydney, 26th November 2004) 7. 
51 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
 thereby securing an avenue of appeal from (and 
a degree of control over) the courts of the territories. The manner and extent to which 
this capacity has been exercised is the subject of Chapter 6.  
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Private dispute resolution and supervisory jurisdiction 
 
Just as the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction is essential to the integrity of 
Australia’s judicial system, so too is the assurance of a supervisory jurisdiction in 
respect of private dispute resolution processes essential to the performance of the 
judiciary’s governmental obligations. Common law countries have accommodated 
ADR mechanisms at the periphery of the formal court system for years. Arbitration 
was one of the earliest ADR process to be integrated with the formal justice system. 
More recently, various non-determinative ADR processes such as mediation have 
been annexed to the courts. By ensuring judicial supervision of and control over these 
processes, lawmakers (parliamentary and judicial) have secured to the courts the 
power to manage their growth and development by way of appeal, remittal or review 
(in the case of arbitration) or by stemming or increasing the flow of referrals (in the 
case of court-connected processes). Court-connected processes are examined in 
Chapter 7.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, an important conceptual distinction should be drawn 
between private and international arbitration, on the one hand, and the various quasi-
judicial tribunals established by statute, on the other.52
                                                 
52 Statutory arbitral tribunals have a long history in Australia. The Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904 purported to establish a quasi-judicial Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration. Isaacs J expressed the view that the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
was so fundamental to the Australian justice system that it was ‘conspicuously on the face of the 
Constitution, the third party to every significant industrial dispute’. (R v Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Merchant Service Guild (1913) 15 CLR 586, 609-610 (Isaacs 
J)). International arbitrations are subject to the International Arbitration Act 1974, which adopts the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. 
 This is because private and 
international arbitration have the potential to dilute judicial power by drawing the 
power to determine legal disputes into the private or international sectors, whereas 
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quasi-judicial tribunals threaten to usurp judicial power by transferring that power to 
other (non-judicial) governmental bodies. The High Court’s approach to the latter 
mode of arbitration is considered in the second half of this Chapter.  
 
Arbitration is far older than the common law,53 and is historically integral to the 
provision of civil justice in England;54 especially in commercial matters.55  The first 
Act of Parliament governing the arbitral process in England was the English 
Arbitration Act 1697, 56  which codified various aspects of the common law and 
established a statutory supervisory jurisdiction.57 The English Act was adopted by the 
various Australian colonies at the time of settlement, and together with the relevant 
rules and principles of English common law forms the basis of Australia’s arbitration 
system. 58
                                                 
53 In contrast, non-determinative processes such as mediation are historically an ‘integral feature’ of the 
cultural tradition in certain Asian, religious and traditional societies, Veronica Taylor and Michael 
Pryles, ‘The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia’ in Michael Pryles (ed), Dispute Resolution in Asia 
(1997); Bee Chen Goh, Law without Lawyers, Justice without Courts: On Traditional Chinese 
Mediation (2002); Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2005), 50. 
54 The first known record of arbitration in England is contained in a letter to King Alfred’s son, Edward 
the Elder, in AD920. The ‘Fonthill Letter’ dates from the year AD 920 to King Alfred’s son, Edward 
the Elder, from an official appointed by the King as an arbiter. However, arbiters were probably 
employed for some time before this. In ancient Rome, a wide range of disputes were handled by 
arbiters resulting in binding arbitration agreements (‘compromissum’). A similar system is likely to 
have been applied in Roman Britain. Derek Roebuck, Early English Arbitration (2008), 48, 60, 137. 
55 Peter Behrens, ‘Arbitration as an Instrument of Conflict Resolution in International Trade: Its Basis 
and Limits’, in Daniel Friedman and Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker (eds), Conflict Resolution in 
International Trade: A Symposium (1993). Private arbitration has since flourished in the areas of labour 
relations/employment disputes and international commerce, where arbitration remains ‘a preferred 
form of dispute resolution’. Tania Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005) 37. 
56 The earliest English judgment to mention arbitration is Vynior's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 80. 
57 However, prior to the passage of the Arbitration Act in 1996 the common law remained the primary 
source of arbitration law in England (Michael Mustill and Stewart Boyd, Commercial Arbitration 
(1989), 53). According to Robert Merkin, the 1697 Act is ‘the closest thing to a definitive code of 
arbitration law which has ever been enacted in England’. Robert Merkin, Arbitration Act 1996 An 
Annotated Guide (1996), 1. The 1996 Act reflects many of the provisions of the Model Law developed 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Other countries have 
adopted the Model Law in its entirety. See, for example, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act 1990. 
58 Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, (2nd ed, 2002) 299-301. Despite 
its origins in English law, however, the current statutory framework for commercial arbitration in 
Australia differs from the English framework. Significantly (and in contrast with the revised English 
system), Australia’s domestic arbitration laws have not been designed to mirror the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. 
 The current Australian framework comprises a series of Uniform 
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Commercial Arbitration Acts established by the States and territories.59
Given the ancient origins of arbitration, and its historic popularity in certain fields of 
dispute resolution, it is unsurprising that formal legal systems have seen a need to 
assert their sovereignty over arbitration in matters of public adjudication. As Scrutton 
LJ remarked, there ‘must be no Alsatia in England where the King’s writ does not 
run’.
 For reasons 
that will become apparent, however, it is important to acknowledge that the Uniform 
Commercial Arbitration Acts embody principles developed at common law.  
 
60 Were arbitration agreements capable of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts 
this sovereignty would be jeopardised. For this reason, the courts necessarily exercise 
‘a supervisory jurisdiction [in respect of private arbitration] by allowing appeals to be 
brought in a limited class of case’.61
Judicial power in respect of arbitration is nevertheless restricted to a limited range of 
functions,
  
 
62
                                                 
59 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW); Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1985 (NT); Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA); Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 
(ACT); Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1986 (Tas); Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld). The Uniform Acts (which, while 
similar, are not in fact identical) resulted from a series of Law Reform Commission reports and a 
uniform Bill prepared by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in 1984. See, for example; 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Commercial Arbitration and Commercial Causes, 
Project No 18, (1974); Law Reform Commission of NSW, Report on Commercial Arbitration, LRC 27 
(1976). None of the Uniform Acts define the scope of the term ‘commercial arbitration’, and 
uncertainties remain as to whether certain disputes are properly to be considered ‘commercial’. 
Generally speaking a domestic dispute which is referred to an arbitrator by private agreement will be 
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Acts (John Sharkey and John Dorter, Commercial Arbitration 
(1986), 11), although the Uniform Acts do not apply to family of neighbourhood disputes (Astor and 
Chinkin, above n 58, 302). 
60 Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt and Co [1922] 2 KB 478. 
61 Ronald Bernstein, Handbook on Arbitration Practice (1987) 15. However, clauses which state that 
an arbitral award is a condition precedent to litigation are valid: Scott v Avery [1856] 5 HL Case 811.  
62 Ronald Bernstein identifies five ways in which the English Courts assist the arbitral process: by 
exercising the power to stay proceedings, by appointing arbiters, by assisting with the conduct of a 
reference, by enforcing arbitral awards, and by exercising a supervisory jurisdiction (Bernstein, above 
n 61, 14-15). 
 reflecting the fact that the relationship between arbitration and the judicial 
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system has been ‘dominated by the law of contract’.63 Arbitration is invoked by the 
private agreement of the parties (the ‘arbitration agreement’), either at the time of 
contract or in respect of an existing dispute, and the general sentiment of judicial 
opinion in common law countries has been that ‘the courts have acted quite rightly in 
requiring good reason to be shown why this part of a contract should not be strictly 
performed’.64
These differences are most apparent in the extent to which the courts will intervene to 
correct legal error. In England and Australia, a distinction is drawn between 
substantive errors in fact and in law. A supervising court will generally have no 
jurisdiction to review an arbitrator’s findings on the basis that he/she has erred in fact. 
An error in law, on the other hand, may be reviewable by a supervising court in 
certain circumstances. Thus, the Uniform Commercial Arbitration Acts require that 
arbitrators provide reasons for their decisions, and grant the supreme courts of the 
States a limited power of review on points of law.
 While the general approach to the supervision of arbitration reflects a 
private rights model, however, the remit of that supervisory jurisdiction is not the 
same throughout the common law world. Certain countries (such as Australia and 
England) have demonstrated a relatively paternalistic attitude towards the supervision 
of arbitration, whereas the approach in other countries (most notably the US) has been 
characteristically laissez-faire in nature.  
 
65
                                                 
63 Michael Mustill and Stewart Boyd sate that ‘those who devise a law or arbitration may choose 
between two alternative views of the relationship. First, they may regard arbitration as an aspect of 
public law. The arbitrator is a delegate of judicial powers which are essentially the property of the 
State … Alternatively, the legal system may treat arbitration as a branch of private law [in which] the 
mutual obligations of the parties in relation to the conduct of the reference, are created and regulated by 
the private bargain between the parties, and are no concern of the State’. Above n 57, 4.  
64 Bristol Corporation v John Aird & Co [1913] AC 241 (Lord Moulton). See also Tuta Products Pty 
Ltd v Hutcherson Bros Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 253, 257-258 (Barwick CJ).  
 The rationale for this distinction 
65 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW), ss 29, 38; Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic), ss 29, 
38; Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (NT), ss 29, 38; Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA), ss 29, 
38; Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA), ss 29, 38; Commercial 
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is that, whereas disputants should be bound by an agreement to have an arbiter 
determine the facts in dispute, if no recourse to the courts were available for an error 
in law an arbitrator would be free to give effect to his/her notions of justice or of what 
the law ought to be.66
In contrast, US arbitrators are generally free to make decisions in accordance with 
their own sense of law and equity.
 The threat posed by this possibility to the exclusive vesting of 
judicial power in Ch III courts is patent.  
 
67 Moreover, the American Arbitration Association 
‘actively discourages’ arbitrators from writing detailed reasons for their decisions – 
further limiting the opportunity for judicial interference with an arbitral award. 68 
According to John Murray, Alan Rau and Edward Sherman, ‘the tactic of ensuring the 
finality of arbitration by harnessing Delphic decisions to a hard-to-rebut presumption 
of validity has been extremely effective’.69
                                                                                                                                            
Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT), ss29, 38; Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (Tas), ss 29, 38; Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld), ss 29, 39. 
66 Mustill and Boyd, above n 57, 27. Previously, in England, appeals on points of law were only 
available when apparent on the face of the award. As there was no general requirement for an arbiter to 
issue reasons for his/her decision, this reduced the opportunity for courts to intervene on substantive 
grounds. Section 52 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (England and Wales), however, provides that arbiters 
must provide reasons for their decisions (unless the parties agree otherwise). Section 69 of the Act also 
provides the court with the power to review an arbitral decision on a point of law, at its own leave, in 
certain circumstances. In the US, by way of contrast, the courts have repeatedly emphasised that they 
have no general jurisdiction to correct substantive errors; either in law or in fact. In United 
Paperworkers v Misco, Inc., 484 US 29 (1987), the Supreme Court explained that courts, ‘do not sit to 
hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of 
lower courts’. Justice White also stated, at 36, that ‘the Court made clear almost 30 years ago that the 
courts play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator. The courts are not 
authorized to reconsider the merits of an award, even though the parties may allege that the award rests 
on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract’. See also; Hill v Norfolk and Western Railway 
Co, 814 F2d 1192, 1194-1195 (7th Circuit 1987), where Judge Posner stated that: ‘As we have said too 
many times to want to repeat again, the question for decision by a federal court asked to set aside an 
arbitration award – whether that award is made under the Railway Labour Act, the Taft Hartley Act, or 
the United States Arbitration Act – is not whether the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in interpreting the 
contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in interpreting the contract; it is whether they interpreted 
the contract’. See also: Steelworkers v American Manufacturing Co, 363 US 564, 567 – 568 (1960). 
67 In the Matter of the Arbitration between Silverman and Benmore Coats, Inc, 461 NE 2d 1261, 1266 
(NY 1984); Marsch v Williams, 28 Cal Rptr 2d 402 (Cal Ct App 1994). 
68 John Murray, Alan Rau and Edward Sherman, Arbitration (1996) 15.  
69 Murray, Rau and Sherman, above n 68. 
 As a result, the boundaries of substantive 
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arbitral discretion have not been controlled and limited in the US to the extent that 
they have been in England and Australia.   
 
While English and Australian arbiters must generally ‘apply the law’, however, this 
does not extend to a duty to follow ‘judicial’ rules of procedure.70 Arbitral procedure 
is governed by the arbitration agreement (which may incorporate the arbitral rules of 
certain associations) 71  and the requirements of procedural fairness. 72  Unless an 
arbitrator fails to accord with these requirements, the courts have no jurisdiction to 
review the process by which an arbitral decision has been made. As discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4, however, the requirements of procedural fairness are not 
fixed, and will vary depending upon ‘the nature of the jurisdiction or power exercised 
and the statutory provisions [if any] governing its exercise’. 73
[T]here is a … wide variety in the procedures which courts have treated as 
acceptable. At the one extreme can be found a procedure which is virtually 
indistinguishable from that which would be followed in a High Court action. 
At the other is a procedure involving a degree of abbreviation and 
 Moreover, while 
arbiters must act in accordance with procedural fairness the practical implications of 
that concept are not the same as they are for judges, and the requirements of 
procedural fairness will differ between arbitrations. As Michael Mustill and Stewart 
Boyd have explained: 
 
                                                 
70 Mustill and Boyd, above n 57, 70. 
71 For example, the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators (IAMI) operate two procedures that may be 
specified in the Arbitration Agreement; The IAMA Arbitration Rules and the IAMA Fast Track 
Arbitration Rules. (IAMA, The IAMA Rules Incorporating the IAMA Fast Track Rules (2007)).  
72 Bernstein, above n 61, 39. 
73 National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 296, 314 
(Gibbs CJ). 
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informality wholly repugnant to all the principles on which an English trial is 
conducted.74
Judicial acceptance of otherwise ‘repugnant’ procedures reinforces the private nature 
of arbitration and supports the view that contracting parties should be free to settle 
their disputes according to the terms of their own bargain. It also reflects the 
historically specialist nature of arbitration, and acknowledges that the success of 
arbitration rests, in part, upon disputant confidence in the arbitrators understanding of 
the issues presented.
 
 
75 As a result, a breach of procedural fairness will rarely be 
established in an arbitral context,76 and it is even less likely to result in the remittal of 
an arbitral award. 77
                                                 
74 Mustill and Boyd, above n 57, 16. 
75 From a US perspective, Lon Fuller has observed that an ‘arbitrator will frequently interrupt the 
examination of witnesses with a request that the parties educate him to the point where he can 
understand the testimony being received. This education can proceed informally, with frequent 
interruptions by the arbitrator, and by informed persons on either side, when a point needs 
clarification ... There is in this informal procedure no infringement whatever of arbitrational due 
process. On the contrary, the party’s chance to have his case understood by the arbitrator is seriously 
impaired if his representative has to talk into a vacuum, if he addresses his words to uncomprehending 
ears’. Lon Fuller, ‘Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator’ (1963) Wisconsin Law Review 3, 12. 
76 Mustill and Boyd, above n 57, 254. 
77 Ibid. 
 Nevertheless, the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts over 
arbitration in procedural matters remains an essential feature of the civil justice 
framework. By retaining the power to sanction inappropriate conduct the judiciary has 
protected the integrity of its governmental role, and the mere existence of this 
jurisdiction is likely to limit the worst excesses of procedural impropriety (as 
arbitrators will seek to avoid the stigma of judicial rebuke). In Chapter 6, it is 
suggested that similar imperatives may underpin the High Court’s approach to States 
and territory courts, and that this may explain the apparent failure of the Kable 
doctrine.  
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The preceding analysis demonstrates that the rule of law lies at the heart of the 
Australian Constitution, that the High Court is functionally charged with maintaining 
it, and that the performance of this function involves the maintenance of three 
essential (and overlapping) jurisdictions:  
 
1. Exclusive jurisdiction (which insulates judicial power from usurpation by 
quasi-judicial bodies).  
 
2. Appellate jurisdiction (which ensures a direct line of appeal to the High Court 
from all Australian courts). 
 
3. Supervisory jurisdiction (which provides the judiciary – and ultimately the 
High Court – with ultimate control over private forms of dispute resolution). 
 
The first two of these jurisdictions are considered, and their relevance to the 
development of judicial mediation illustrated, in the following Chapters. The 
remainder of this Chapter focuses on the separation doctrine and the maintenance of 
the judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction, and a fourth and final jurisdiction (‘inherent’ 
jurisdiction) is identified as a possible rationale for the second limb of that doctrine. 
Attention is drawn to the incompatibility doctrine where relevant. 
 
The ‘Separation Doctrine’ 
 
Because 71 of the Constitution vests ‘judicial power’ (and only judicial power) in Ch 
III courts, the definition of that concept is pivotal to the question whether judges may 
mediate in Ch III courts. Ch III does not define judicial power, hence the precise 
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scope and meaning of the concept has fallen to the High Court to interpret.78 In the 
performance of this task the High Court has developed (and subsequently been guided 
by) two fundamental principles stemming from the textual arrangement of the 
Constitution and the influences and assumptions set out in the previous section. The 
first principle is that judicial power cannot be conferred on bodies other than courts 
within the meaning of s71. The second principle is that ‘power which is not within 
[judicial power] or incidental thereto cannot be conferred on a federal court or on a 
State court exercising Federal jurisdiction’.79
These two principles (or ‘limbs’) may be referred to collectively as the ‘separation 
doctrine,’
  
 
80 and encapsulate the cumulative outcome of a series of High Court cases, 
beginning with Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorhead (‘Huddart v Parker’),81 
and culminating in R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (the 
‘Boilermakers’ Case’). 82   Despite the relative age of the Boilermakers’ Case it 
remains the principal Australian authority on ‘the place of the judicial power in the 
application of the doctrine of separation of powers in a federation,’83 and represents a 
convenient point of origin for the analysis of a number of overlapping streams of High 
Court precedent.84
                                                 
78 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (5th ed 2008), 219. 
79 For an introduction to the High Court’s performance of this task see, for example: Zines, above n 78; 
Ratnapala above n 26, 122; Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 153. 
80 This term is adopted by Fiona Wheeler in her various commentaries on the topic, including: Wheeler, 
‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ 
(1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248; Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and 
Chapter III in the new High Court’, above n 28. 
81 (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
82 (1956) 94 CLR 254. 
83 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 154. 
  
84 In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, the Commonwealth argued that the High Court’s 
development of the ‘chameleon doctrine’ (discussed in Chapter 3) meant that the rule in the 
Boilermakers’ Case did ‘not matter much anymore’. This argument was firmly rejected by Kirby J 
(426-428 [340]-[344]) and Hayne J (467 [472]). In Hayne J’s view, whatever ‘the ambit of the so-
called chameleon doctrine, by which a power that may be exercised administratively or judicially may 
take its colour from the body to which it is given, the doctrine does not strip the concept of separation 
83 
 
 
 
 
The following section describes the evolution of the separation doctrine, and further 
develops the relationship between that doctrine and the rule law. The incompatibility 
doctrine is also introduced at this stage, as the seeds of this alternative approach to the 
second limb of the separation doctrine were sown during this period. Although the 
incompatibility doctrine failed to gain majority support vis-à-vis the exercise of 
federal judicial power, notions of incompatibility have since been revived in the 
context of the persona designata exception (allowing the vesting of certain non-
judicial functions in federal judges acting in their private capacity),85 and the Kable 
doctrine (limiting the functions that may be vested in State or territory courts).86
Only Chapter III Courts may exercise judicial power (the ‘first limb’) 
 The 
implications of the incompatibility doctrine for judicial mediation (and its application 
in these discrete contexts) are considered in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
At first glance, the relevance of the first limb of the separation doctrine to the 
development of judicial mediation is less obvious than the second limb, as it does not 
directly limit the functions that may be vested in Ch III courts. However, the first limb 
provides one possible foundation for the ‘judicial process’ implication and, as 
explained in greater detail in Chapter 4, this implication is highly relevant to the 
development of judicial mediation. On a more fundamental level, the first limb also 
operates to ensure the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal judiciary which, as noted 
                                                                                                                                            
of powers of all meaning. Contrary to the submissions of the Commonwealth, the chameleon doctrine 
does not mean that Boilermakers’ “does not matter much any more.” There remains a real and radical 
difference between the judicial power of the Commonwealth and executive and legislative power’. The 
chameleon doctrine is examined in Chapter 3. 
85 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
86 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577; Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 
CLR 57; Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
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above, is as an essential condition for maintaining the rule of law. In contrast, the 
second limb of the separation doctrine does not directly serve any of the three 
essential jurisdictions outlined above. Rather, the second limb seeks to further the 
object of the first limb – the maintenance of judicial independence and impartiality87
The principle that ‘parliament has no power to entrust the exercise of the judicial 
power to any other hands’ than ‘courts in the strict sense of the term’ was initially 
identified by Griffith CJ in Huddart v Parker,
 
– by protecting certain aspects of inherent jurisdiction. The second limb is considered 
in more detail later in this section. 
 
88  but it is New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (the ‘Wheat Case’)89 which serves as the most clear illustration of the 
importance attached to the ‘first limb’ of the separation doctrine by the High Court.90
The Commission was created by the Inter-State Commission Act 1912 (Cth) which 
granted the Commission ‘judicial powers’ to carry out its constitutional mandate. As a 
 
The Wheat Case revolved around the creation of an ‘Inter-State Commission’ as 
required by sections 101 to 104 of the Constitution, which, according to s101, was to 
be granted; 
 
such powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems 
necessary for the execution and maintenance, within the Commonwealth, 
of the provisions of this Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and 
of all laws made thereunder. 
 
                                                 
87 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 152. 
88 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 355. 
89 (1915) 20 CLR 54. 
90 Zines, above n 78, 208. 
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preliminary issue, a majority of the High Court considered that the administrative 
structure of the Commission was such that it could not be considered a federal court 
for the purposes of s71.91 In particular, their Honours held that the terms of tenure set 
out for Commissioners in s 103 were irreconcilable with the provisions of tenure set 
out for federal judges in s72.92 The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the 
discretion to vest in the Commission, ‘such powers of adjudication and administration 
as the Parliament deems necessary’, could include the vesting of federal judicial 
power in a court which did not satisfy the tenure requirements of s72. The majority 
held that it could not. In Griffith CJ’s view, ‘the provisions of s71 are complete and 
exclusive, and there cannot be a third class of Courts which are neither Federal Courts 
or State Courts invested with Federal jurisdiction’.93
Chapter III is headed ‘The Judicature’, and vests the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth not in the Sovereign simply, or as he may in Parliament 
direct, but in specific organs, namely, Courts strictly called. They are the 
High Court, such other federal courts as Parliament creates, and such 
other Courts as it invests with Federal jurisdiction. There is a mandate to 
create a High Court; there is a discretionary power to create other federal 
courts; and there is a discretionary power to invest with Federal 
jurisdiction such State Courts as Parliament finds already in existence, 
that is, State Courts. But that exhausts the judiciary … It would require, 
in view of the careful delimitation I have mentioned, in my opinion, very 
 Similarly, according to Isaacs J: 
 
                                                 
91 (1915) 20 CLR 54, 62 (Griffith CJ), 89-90 (Isaacs J), 106-107 (Powers J); 109-110 (Rich J).  
92 Ibid 61-62 (Griffith CJ), 93 (Isaacs J), 107 (Powers J), 109 (Rich J). S103 provides that 
Commissioners are to be appointed for a period of seven years unless removed by a vote of both 
Houses of the Parliament. S72 provides that Federal Court judges are to be appointed for life. 
93 (1915) 20 CLR 54, 62. 
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explicit and unmistakable words to undo the effect of the dominant 
principle of demarcation.94
Although the majority judgment in the Wheat Case was couched in terms of the form 
and drafting of the Constitution, it is apparent that their Honours’ were principally 
concerned with the need to ensure the isolation of judicial power so at prevent its 
usurpation by quasi-judicial bodies at the direction of Parliament (thereby ensuring 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary and furthering the rule of law).
 
 
95
[T]he first limb of the separation doctrine specifically promotes the 
independent and impartial exercise of judicial power by directing such power 
away from the legislative and executive branches to ‘courts’ (s71) including 
‘federal courts’ whose judges cannot be arbitrarily removed from office.
 As Fiona 
Wheeler has observed: 
 
96
Thus, a primary object of the first limb of the separation doctrine is to further the 
second of the broad rule of law values (or elements) identified in the first part of this 
Chapter; that is to say, ‘the ability to seek a remedy in independent courts’.
 
 
97 The first 
element (curbing ‘the conferral of discretionary power on government officials’) 98
                                                 
94 (1915) 20 CLR 54, 89-90. 
95 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 93 – 94. Isaacs J was particularly concerned 
that, if vested with s71 judicial power, the Commission could try criminal cases without appeal on the 
merits to the High Court. His Honour was also concerned that as there is no requirement that members 
of the Commission be legally qualified, laymen could notionally overrule a State Court and perhaps 
even the High Court on the facts. John Finnis has argued that this concern ignores the fact that Federal 
Court judges are not required by the Constitution to have any legal training. ‘Separation of Powers in 
the Australian Constitution’ (1968) 3 Adelaide Law Review 159. However, as Leslie Zines points out, it 
is ‘far more likely that there would be laymen as members of the Commission than as members of a 
Federal Court’. Zines, above n 78, 211.  
96 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 28, 208; citing 
Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Boilermakers Case’, in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks (2003), 166. 
97 Meyerson, above n 38, 1. 
98 Ibid. 
 is 
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made possible by the realisation of the first, whereas the third element (‘equality 
before the law’) 99 is not protected in Australia.100
The first limb of the separation doctrine was reaffirmed three years later in Waterside 
Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander (‘Alexander’s Case’),
  
 
101 where it 
fell to the High Court to consider whether the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration (the ‘Arbitration Court’) could make orders penalising the failure to 
honour industrial awards. Applying the Wheat Case, the majority in Alexander’s Case 
held that the Arbitration Court did not constitute a Federal Court as s 12 of the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) provided that the 
appointment of the President to that Court was for a renewable period of seven years, 
and not for life as required for Ch III judges by s 72.102 Once again, compliance with 
the requirements of s72 was deemed essential according to Isaacs J (this time joined 
by Rich J), as the ‘independence of the tribunal would be seriously weakened if the 
Commonwealth Parliament could fix any less permanent tenure than for life’.103
In addition to restating that Ch III courts must satisfy the tenure requirements for 
judges set out in s 72, three of the majority judges also considered whether the 
primary function of the Arbitration Court excluded the co-vesting in that Court of 
federal judicial power. While strictly speaking these comments were obiter, they were 
 Thus, 
the Arbitration Court could not be validly vested with the power to enforce its own 
orders.  
 
                                                 
99 Meyerson, above n 38, 1. 
100 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 44 (Brennan CJ), 63-63 (Dawson J), 142 (McHugh J), 
153 (Gummow J); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh 
JJ); Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 533 [45] (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
101 (1918) 25 CLR 434. 
102 Ibid 461 (Barton J), 469-470 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 488 (Powers J).  
103 Ibid 469 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). 
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later adopted by the majority in the Boilermakers’ Case in justification of the second 
limb.104 Powers J believed that ‘a compulsory arbitration Court is not a Court to settle 
existing rights between parties. Its powers are more legislative than judicial’.105
The two functions [arbitral and judicial] … are quite distinct. The 
arbitral function is ancillary to the legislative function, and provides 
the factum upon which the law operates to create the right or duty. The 
judicial function is an entirely separate branch, and first ascertains 
whether the alleged right or duty exists in law. Not only are they 
different powers, but they spring from different sources in the 
Constitution. The Arbitral power arises under sec 51 (xxxv); the 
judicial power under sec 71. 
 Isaacs 
and Rich JJ stated that arbitral functions could not be considered judicial as: 
 
106
The fact that arbitration and mediation are both commonly classified as forms of ADR 
might lead the casual observer to assume that the rule in Alexander’s Case prohibits 
judicial mediation. Such an assumption would be flawed for a number of reasons. 
 
 
Thus, Isaacs and Rich JJ were of the view that the Arbitration Court was not a Ch III 
court because arbitral decisions are not made by reference to existing rights, and 
because the Constitution had specifically assigned the ‘arbitral power’ to Parliament. 
Even if the Arbitration Court had satisfied the tenure requirements set out in s 72, 
therefore, it would have been beyond Parliament’s legislative power to vest Ch III 
judicial power in that Court by virtue of the first limb.  
 
                                                 
104 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 281 (Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
105 Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v JW Alexander (1918) 25 CLR 434, 485. 
106 Ibid 464-465.  
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Most importantly, as pointed out in Chapter 1, mediation does not affect pre-existing 
rights.107
First of all, the ‘arbitral power’ to which Isaacs and Rich JJ referred is the power to 
make laws in respect of industrial conciliation and arbitration under s 51 (xxxv) of the 
Constitution. The scope of this power is limited to arbitration ‘for the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one of the States’. 
The Constitution says nothing of other forms of arbitration. Thus, s 51 (xxxv) would 
not (in isolation) prevent the vesting of federal judicial power in courts established for 
the purpose of engaging in arbitration in any other circumstances; say, for example, 
under one of the Uniform Commercial Arbitration Acts.
 Mediation is by definition non-determinative, thus the distinction drawn by 
Isaacs and Rich JJ between arbitration and judicial decision-making simply has no 
application. Even insofar as arbitration is concerned, however, their Honours 
conclusions must be qualified in two respects. 
 
108
Second of all, Isaac and Rich JJ’s conclusion that arbitration is inherently legislative 
in nature (because it involves a determination of new rights) cannot be reframed as a 
prohibition on the vesting of arbitral functions in Ch III courts. While it is true that the 
arbitral function is also non-judicial in nature (because the existence of pre-existing 
rights is an essential element of judicial power),
  
 
109
                                                 
107 Simon Roberts, ‘Mediation in Family Disputes’ (1986) 46 Modern Law Review 537, 546; NADRAC, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Definitions (1997), 5; Boulle, above n 53, 65; Sourdin, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, above n 55, 26. 
108 These Acts are referred to in the first part of this Chapter. 
109 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead  (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ). 
 the first limb only prevents the 
vesting of exclusively judicial functions in non-judicial bodies; it does not prevent the 
vesting of non-judicial functions in Ch III courts (the second limb). While this may be 
a rational extension of their Honours reasoning (and an extension made by the High 
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Court and the Privy Council in the Boilermakers’ Case), Isaacs, Rich and Powers JJ 
stopped short of recognising any such requirement. Thus, the rule in Alexander’s Case 
is confined to the less restrictive proposition that ‘the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth may be vested only in a court, such a court being one whose primary 
function or functions are judicial in character’110 (or as Isaacs J put it in the Wheat 
Case, courts ‘strictly called’).111
In any event, Parliament’s direct response to Alexander’s Case did not reflect any 
distinction between judicial and non-judicial functions. Instead, amendments to the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act were passed in 1926 restoring the enforcement 
powers of the Court.
  
 
112 The validity of this restoration was premised on structural 
changes to the Arbitration Court, and in particular the appointment of three ‘Judges’ 
and a ‘Chief Judge’ – all of whom would be appointed for life. A series of cases 
followed in which the High Court either accepted the valid constitution of the 
Arbitration Court,113 or considered that the implications of the distinction drawn by 
Isaacs, Rich and Powers JJ between arbitral and judicial functions remained uncertain 
and did not require consideration.114
                                                 
110 Ratnapala, above n 26, 150. 
111 (1915) 20 CLR 54, 93. 
112 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1926 (Cth). 
113 See, for example, R v Taylor; Ex parte Roach (1951) 82 CLR 587. 
114 In R v Foster; Ex parte Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Assurances Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 138, the 
majority stated that, whether ‘and how far judicial and arbitral functions may be mixed up is another 
question, one which fortunately the Court has never been called upon to examine’, at 155 (Dixon, 
Fullagar and Kitto JJ). The answer to the same question was also avoided in a unanimous decision in R 
v Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia (1955) 93 CLR 528, 542 (Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto, and Taylor JJ).  
 Of course, any such ruling would have had far 
reaching consequences, as the constitutionality or otherwise of the Arbitration Court 
was merely a prelude to the broader constitutional issue of whether or not a single 
body could be endowed with judicial and non-judicial functions. The overwhelming 
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impression from High Court precedent at this time was that it could not,115
for some years performed functions which are not the exercise of 
judicial power at all … The exercise of ‘arbitral’ functions in relation 
to industrial disputes is lawful because the Commonwealth Parliament 
has made a valid law in the exercise of its power under sec. 51 (xxxv.) 
of the Constitution.
 but a small 
number of pronouncements suggested that it could. In Victorian Stevedoring and 
General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (‘Dignan’) for example, Evatt J stated that 
the Arbitration Court has 
 
116
Similarly, in R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (‘Lowenstein’),
 
 
117 
a majority of the High Court held that s 217 of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 – 1933 (Cth) 
validly conferred both judicial and non-judicial functions on the Bankruptcy Court. 
The objection raised by the appellant was that s 27 allowed the Court, ‘both to charge 
a prisoner with an offence and then itself to prosecute and try him for the offence with 
which the court has already charged him’.118 Such a combination of functions, it was 
argued, allowed the Court to be litigant and judge at the same time.119
It is not possible to rely upon any doctrine of absolute separation of 
powers for the purpose of establishing a universal proposition that no 
court or person who discharges Federal judicial functions can lawfully 
 In Latham’s CJ 
opinion, however; 
 
                                                 
115 See, for example, R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 585 
(Dixon and Evatt J).  
116 (1931) 46 CLR 73, 116-117. 
117 (1938) 59 CLR 556 (Latham CJ, Rich, Starke and McTeirnan JJ; Dixon and Evatt JJ in dissent).  
118 R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 564 (Latham CJ). 
119 Ibid, 588-589 (Dixon and Evatt JJ). 
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discharge any other function which has been entrusted to him by 
statute.120
These cases can be seen to support the alternate ‘incompatibility’ approach to the 
separation of powers noted earlier. In their dissenting judgment in Lowenstein, Dixon 
and Evatt JJ framed this approach negatively, observing that ‘if the inherent character 
of the function reposed in the courts is at variance with the conception of judicial 
power, then, in our opinion, it must fail’.
 
 
121 However, their Honours’ did not say that 
the opposite would be true: viz. that if a function is compatible with the conception of 
judicial power it will be valid. This positive restatement may have been broadly 
consistent with Evatt J’s earlier statement in Dignan, but it seems highly doubtful that 
Dixon J intended any such inference, as His Honour is generally acknowledged as the 
author of the majority judgment in the Boilermakers’ Case (and thus the second 
limb).122
Despite various attempts to steer the High Court toward a broad separation of powers 
model similar to the British, however (which might have allowed the admixture of 
certain judicial and non-judicial functions within the same body) ‘the High Court had 
already laid the foundation for a contrary proposition’.
  
 
123  In Re Judiciary and 
Navigation Acts, the High Court ruled that Ch III courts were prohibited from 
providing ‘advisory opinions’.124
                                                 
120 R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 556 (Latham CJ), 566. 
121 Ibid 588-589. 
122 See, for example, Zines, above n 78, 602. 
123 Peter Hanks, Patrick Keyzer, and Jennifer Clarke, Australian Constitutional Law: Commentaries 
and Materials, (7th ed 2004), 394. 
124 (1921) 29 CLR 257 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ; Higgins J in dissent). 
 The decision confirmed that the strict separation of 
judicial power was an essential feature of the federal model and, correspondingly, that 
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Ch III provides an exhaustive account of the functions that may be vested in Ch III 
courts. In so doing, their Honours’ also laid the final foundation for the second limb 
of the separation doctrine.  
 
It is worth clarifying from the outset that the status of advisory opinions is only of 
contextual relevance to the development of judicial mediation. An evaluative model 
of judicial mediation may see a judge providing an opinion, but as mediation is non-
determinative these opinions would not constitute advisory opinions in the sense 
prohibited by Re Judiciary and Navigation Act (that is to say, declarations of law). 
Rather, the importance of Re Judiciary and Navigation Act lies in the relationship 
between advisory opinions, the approach subsequently encapsulated in second limb of 
the separation doctrine, and the rule of law.  
 
The facts of Re Judiciary and Navigation Act revolved around certain provisions of 
the Judiciary Act 1903, which purported to allow the Governor General to apply to 
the High Court for an advisory opinion as to the legal validity of any Act of 
Parliament. Their Honours’ considered that the provision of advisory opinions was 
‘clearly a judicial function’ (because it required an ‘authoritative declaration of law’) 
and was therefore an exercise of judicial power.125 Whether Parliament could vest 
non-judicial powers in a court exercising federal jurisdiction was not, therefore, in 
issue.126
                                                 
125 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 264. 
126 Saunders, ‘The Separation of Powers’, above n 13, 12.  
 Rather, the issue was whether Parliament had the power under s 76 to confer 
original jurisdiction upon the High Court to hear ‘matters’ (and whether the High 
Court could therefore exercise federal judicial power in respect of such matters) other 
than those specified in s 75; a question which the majority answered in the negative: 
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Section 75 confers original jurisdiction on the High Court in certain 
matters, and s 76 enables Parliament to confer original jurisdiction on it 
in other matters … This express statement of the matters in respect of 
which and the Courts by which the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
may be exercised is, we think, clearly intended as a delimitation of the 
whole of the original jurisdiction which may be exercised under the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth, and as a necessary exclusion of 
any other exercise of original jurisdiction.127
The High Court’s decision in Re Judiciary and Navigation Act (and the principle that 
Ch III courts cannot provide advisory opinions) has been revisited on various 
occasions over the years, and the ‘arguments for and against advisory opinions are 
well rehearsed’.
 
 
128 From a purely technical point of view (and as the majority in the 
Boilermakers’ Case subsequently acknowledged) the case could simply have been 
determined by holding that advisory opinions are not an exercise of judicial power 
(because they do not involve the determination of an existing controversy), rather than 
by distinguishing between federal and non-federal judicial power.129
                                                 
127 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265. 
128 John Williams, ‘Re-thinking Advisory Opinions’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 205, 205. These 
arguments were debated at length during the ‘Adelaide Debates’ (Australasian Federal Convention, 
Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 20 April 1897). Various 
Commonwealth Committees and Commissions have investigated this issue over the years: 
Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission on the Constitution, Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Constitution (1929); Commonwealth, Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs: Advisory Opinions by the High Court, Parliamentary Paper No 222 (1977); The Australian 
Constitutional Convention (Minutes and Proceedings and Official Record of Debates of the Australian 
Constitutional Convention, Perth, 26 July 1978); Australian Judicial System Advisory Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Australian Judicial System (1987). 
129 (1956) 94 CLR 254, 274 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). The Privy Council agreed 
on appeal; Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 
95 CLR 529, 541. The Boilermakers’ Case does not affect the principle finding in Re Judiciary, 
however, that advisory opinion are not ‘matters’ within the meaning of 76. In fact, the High Court has 
since determined that the provision of advisory opinions will ordinarily be contrary to the judicial 
process (and not, therefore, within the meaning of judicial power: Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd 
(1999) 198 CLR 334, 357-358 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
 However, the 
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bulk of arguments made in favour of advisory opinions have been practical in 
nature.130 Critics of Re Judiciary and Navigation Act have argued that the provision of 
advisory opinions could lead to qualitative and quantitative benefits, including 
reduced litigation times and costs, increased certainty, timely legislative review in 
cases of emergency, and reduced friction between States and the Commonwealth 
(because advisory opinions are generally permissible in the former).131 Patrick Keyzer 
has argued that if members of the public could seek advisory opinions this could help 
to ‘achieve the objectives of equal respect and equal dignity, to enable the realization 
of constitutional identity, and to correct the power imbalance between the people and 
the polities’, 132
Intrinsic in many of these arguments is the belief that advisory opinions will serve the 
rule of law. In John Williams view, the narrow interpretation of the term ‘matter’ is a 
‘form or judicial gate-keeping,’
 by removing the need for litigants to demonstrate standing in 
constitutional cases.  
 
133
to the degree that it is informed by such fundamental notions as the rule of 
law, parliamentary responsibility and the separation of powers. It would be a 
strange situation if in focusing on the technical issues we lost sight of these 
fundamental principles.
 and should only be entertained 
 
134
 
  
                                                 
130 Stephen Crawshaw, ‘The High Court of Australia and advisory opinions’ (1977) 51 Australian Law 
Journal 112, 119: citing Terrance Smiljanich, ‘Advisory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in 
Intergovernmental Co-operation’ (1971–1972) 24 University of Florida Law Review 328, 338. 
131 These were the primary findings of the Australian Constitutional Convention (see Minutes and 
Proceedings and Official Record of Debates of the Australian Constitutional Convention, Perth, 26 
July 1978, 30-32).  
132 Patrick Keyzer, ‘Open Constitutional Courts in Australia’ (PhD Thesis, the University of Sydney, 
2008), 158. 
133 Williams, above n 128, 206. 
134 Ibid 208. 
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Kirby J has similarly opined that:  
 
The current rather narrow state of authority on the Court's original 
jurisdiction to provide advisory opinions may one day require reconsideration 
as the Court adapts its process to a modern understanding of its constitutional 
and judicial functions … The judicial function is not frozen in time. This 
Court should remain alert to developments in judicial procedures which 
further, in proper ways, the defence of the rule of law. So far as is compatible 
with the judicial function, courts should endeavour to be constructive and 
useful to parties in dispute.135
Despite the conceptual and practical difficulties associated with the High Court’s 
approach in Re Judiciary, however, the prohibition on the provision of advisory 
opinions has also been defended on policy grounds.
  
 
Later in this thesis a similar argument is developed as regards the development of 
judicial mediation, and it is suggested, on this basis, that the procedural implications 
drawn from Ch III should be applied having regard to the purposive nature of the 
separation doctrine. 
 
136
                                                 
135 North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595, 666. See also Re 
Wakim, Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 600 [186]-[187] (Kirby J): ‘The makers did not intend, 
nor did they have the power to require, that their wishes and expectations should control us who now 
live under its protection. The Constitution is read by today’s Australians to meet, so far as its text 
allows, their contemporary governmental needs. The Constitution, and in particular Ch III, does not 
impose Laocoönian constraints on this Court. The proper approach to Ch III, applicable to these 
proceedings, is that recently stated by Gleeson CJ and McHugh J in Abebe v The Commonwealth. Rigid 
and impractical outcomes are justified only by ‘‘the clearest constitutional language’’ which ‘‘compel 
them’’.  As their Honours concluded in that case, so do I here. ‘‘Nothing in the language of Ch III 
forces such limited and rigid choices on the parliament’’.’  
 In 1977, Stephen Crawshaw 
136 In evidence to the Royal Commission on the Constitution, for example, Owen Dixon KC argued that 
advisory opinions would allow parties to engage the High Court in questions for purely political 
purpose. Sir Owen also argued that advisory opinions ‘merely give you an advance copy of the judge’s 
view, which is likely to change and which ought to change if further argument suggests to him that 
there are good reasons for taking another view’. Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission on 
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detailed seven arguments against advisory opinions.137
Stephen Crawshaw went on to debunk each of these arguments in turn, observing, 
inter alia: that the ‘politicisation’ argument falsely assumes that ‘by delivering an 
advisory opinion, a court becomes part of the executive or legislature;’
 John Williams has usefully 
summarised these arguments as follows (again, none of these arguments relate 
directly to judicial mediation): 
 
The first [argument relates] to the fact that advisory opinions infringe the 
separation of powers doctrine in that [they call] upon the judiciary to 
undertake legislative functions. Secondly, the granting of such opinions 
would tend to politicize the court. Thirdly, advisory opinions by definition 
involve hypothetical questions that lack the depth of concrete examples. 
Fourthly, as these are hypothetical questions, there is unlikely to be provision 
for interested parties to have an opportunity to the present to the court 
arguments that might enrich the debate. Fifthly, abstract questions may be 
framed in such a way as to “mislead” the court in its adjudication so as to 
elicit the desired answer. Sixthly, advisory opinions may form binding 
precedent without the benefit of concrete facts. Seventhly, advisory opinions 
would impose a greater burden on the courts. 
  
138 that the 
suggestion that the High Court should only consider legislation vis-à-vis existing 
controversies ignores the fact that, in reality ‘it is not necessary in many constitutional 
cases to have specific concrete facts before the court;’139
                                                                                                                                            
the Constitution, Minutes of Evidence, Part 3, 791. Cf. Commonwealth, Senate Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs: Advisory Opinions by the High Court, Parliamentary Paper No 222 
(1977) 23.  
137 Crawshaw, above n 130, 120-26. 
138 Ibid, 121. 
139 Ibid, 122. 
 and that, in any event, ‘the 
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normal adversary system with its emphasis on conflict and self-interest is far from 
serving as the proper forum in which to determine important constitutional issues’.140 
Finally, Stephen Crawshaw argues that the predictable ‘floodgates’ argument (that 
advisory opinions would impose a greater burden on the courts) should not be allowed 
to trump the judiciary’s constitutional obligations. In short, if the judiciary’s workload 
must be increased to serve the rule of law, so be it.141
[K]illing a law at birth might engender timidity in governments. Progressive 
legislation in Australia has often proceeded by constitutional ‘adventures’ 
undertaken by governments who are prepared to test the established 
constitutional limits and to make new constitutional arguments in support of 
their legislative programs. Persuasive new arguments, made in concrete cases 
concerning new legislative initiatives, advance the law. It is precisely this sort 
of legislation that is most likely to be subject to a negative opinion from the 
Court. Those (including Kirby J himself) who promote the view that the 
Constitution should adapt to current needs and values, should particularly 
value the opportunity to advance fresh perspectives in constitutional 
interpretation. Of their very nature, advisory opinions are likely to be 
conservative (as well as sterile) since the rules of construction … which are 
designed to ‘protect’ legislation by constraining the Court in its dealings with 
‘live’ Acts, are less likely to be a constraint on the Court in the formulating of 
an opinion.
  More recently, Helen Irving has 
argued that advisory opinions may (ironically) stymie the development of novel 
procedures that seek to improve access to justice:  
 
142
                                                 
140 Crawshaw, above n 130, 123. 
141 Ibid 124-25. 
142 Helen Irving, ‘Advisory Opinions, The Rule of Law, and the Separation of Powers’ (2004) 4 
Macquarie Law Journal 105, 132-33.  
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With the greatest of respect, these arguments are unconvincing. First of all, the 
principal rule of construction to which Helen Irving refers is the presumption in 
favour of legislative validity. 143 The maxim ut res valeat magis quam pereat (‘in 
order that the thing might rather have effect than be destroyed’) 144  operates to 
maintain the separation of powers by preventing the judicial usurpation of legislative 
power.145 Whether the author’s reference to a “‘live’ Act’ is a reference to a statute 
which is ‘in force’, or to a statute in respect of which individual rights are not at stake, 
is uncertain. In either case, however, why would the presumption in favour of validity 
not be applied if an Act was not live? What would be the point of an advisory opinion 
if the effect of this presumption was ignored?  Even if this presumption is somehow 
‘less likely to be a constraint on the Court in the formulating of an opinion’, why does 
it necessarily follow that the opinion delivered would be conservative and sterile as a 
result? Secondly, there does not appear to be any discernable policy reason why 
‘concrete cases’ should be required before governments can make out a case in 
support of the legislation passed. Aside from the fact that important constitutional 
decisions have in the past been made by reference to hypothetical scenarios,146
                                                 
143 This presumption is examined in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
144 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2004), 446. 
145 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J); A-G (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 
267 (Dixon J). 
146 Including, significantly, the Boilermakers’ Case, in which the High Court considered the Arbitration 
Court to be invalid without reliance upon the specific facts of the case: R v Kirby; Ex parte 
Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. 
 it is 
entirely appropriate that governments should be able to justify legislation before 
individual rights are placed in jeopardy. Charles Kingston made this point during the 
Adelaide Debates, beseeching delegates not to ‘attach too much weight to the 
suggestion that we should go through the old routine of having to find some 
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unfortunate people to make it a personal quarrel before we can obtain the decision of 
the highest court in the realm’.147
In any event, the principle that Parliament may only require federal courts to exercise 
judicial power in respect of matters set out in Ch III is now, for better or for worse, 
settled law,
 Finally, it is difficult to comprehend why expanding 
the opportunity for judicial scrutiny would undermine the ‘opportunity to advance 
fresh perspectives in constitutional interpretation’. On the contrary, it seems axiomatic 
that the power to make advisory opinions would increase the opportunity to advance 
fresh perspectives.  
 
148 and (as the analysis in the following Chapters demonstrates) the High 
Court’s application of the presumption in favour of validity has permitted all but the 
most extreme of the governments ‘constitutional “adventures.”’149
                                                 
147 The Adelaide Debates, above n 128, 966.  
148 See, for example, Re Wakim, Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
149 Irving, above n 142. 
 Moreover, and as 
noted above, the prohibition on the provision of advisory opinions does not directly 
affect the provision of judicial mediation. What is of importance in the current context 
is that the underlying principle in Re Judiciary and Navigation Act (that by negative 
inference Ch III limits the functions that may be vested in federal courts) was 
affirmed by the High Court in the Boilermakers’ Case, and this proposition is now 
enshrined within the second limb or the separation doctrine. As a result of the second 
limb, mediation functions may only be vested in Ch III courts if they fall within the 
meaning of the term judicial power, or are incidental thereto. 
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Only judicial power or powers incidental thereto may be vested in Ch III 
Courts (the ‘second limb’) 
 
In the Boilermakers’ Case the High Court for the first time directly addressed the 
issue whether or not Parliament could confer judicial and non-judicial powers on the 
same body. Once again, the body in question was the Arbitration Court as 
reconstituted following Alexander’s Case, and the issue before the court was whether 
the power to make arbitral orders affecting the work and pay conditions of industry 
workers (a non-judicial power) and the power to enforce those orders and punish 
contempts of its power (both judicial powers) could be bestowed upon the same 
body.150 As has already been intimated, the answer provided by a majority of the High 
Court 151  (and the Privy Council on appeal) 152
The majority began by reaffirming the High Court’s position that the adoption of the 
British doctrine of responsible government as regards the separation of executive and 
legislature powers does not necessitate the rejection of the US constitutional model as 
regards the separation of judicial power.
 was that they could not. Specific 
considerations in the ruling included the extent of Parliament’s ‘incidental legislative 
power’ under s 51 and, more importantly, Parliament’s power to legislate in respect of 
Ch III judicial power. 
 
153
                                                 
150 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia  (1956) 94 CLR 254, 266. 
151 Ibid 266-99 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ; Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ dissenting). 
152 Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 
529. Viscount Simonds provided the sole judgment. 
153 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275. The US approach 
was nevertheless distinguished on the basis that the US Constitution grants a legislative power to create 
inferior tribunals, which the Australian Constitution does not, at 268. 
 Unlike the separation of executive and 
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judiciary, the majority considered that the clear ‘demarcation of the powers of the 
judicature’154
it cannot be left to the judicial power of the States to determine either the 
ambit of Federal power or the extent of the residuary power of the States 
… The powers of the Federal judicature must therefore be at once 
paramount and limited. The organs to which Federal judicial power may 
be entrusted must be defined, the manner in which they may be 
constituted must be prescribed and the content of their jurisdiction 
ascertained.
 is vital to the integrity of the Constitution, as 
 
155
On this basis, the majority reasoned, while the legislative power granted to Parliament 
by s 51 (xxxix) allows Parliament to furnish federal courts with functions that are 
incidental ‘to the performance of the functions derived under or from Chap III … 
[or] … to the execution of the powers given by the Constitution to the federal 
judicature,’
 
 
156 this is necessarily the extent of s 51. With this exception, their Honours 
confirmed (as already established in the Wheat Case and Alexander’s Case), that all 
legislative acts ‘directed to’ the judicial power must accord with the requirements of 
Ch III. As such, no part of the judicial power may be vested in ‘any body or person 
except a court created pursuant to s. 71 and constituted in accordance with s. 72 or a 
court brought into existence by a State’.157
                                                 
154 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid 270. 
157 Ibid. 
 The majority considered that it had already 
been decided ‘once and for all’ in Alexander’s Case ‘that the function of an industrial 
arbitrator is completely outside the realm of judicial power and is of a different 
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order,’ 158 thus the Arbitration Court was not a court for the purposes of s 71.159 
Consequently, as the powers to enforce orders and punish contempts are judicial 
powers, the relevant sections of the Act were necessarily invalid.160
It is apparent that the High Court could have decided the Boilermakers’ Case solely 
on the basis of the rule in Alexander’s Case (the first limb), and it has been questioned 
whether the second limb was ‘really necessary to the resolution of the principal issue 
in the case’.
  
 
161  The lasting significance of the decision, however, lies in the joining of 
the first limb with the second limb. The majority expressed the opinion that the 
recognition of the second limb was necessary in order to justify the first,162
There is, of course, a wide difference [between prohibiting the vesting of 
judicial powers in non-judicial bodies and the vesting of non-judicial 
powers in judicial bodies] … But if the latter cannot be done clearly the 
former must then be completely out of the question. A number of 
considerations exist which point very definitely to the conclusion that the 
Constitution does not allow the use of courts established by or under 
Chap. III for the discharge of functions which are not in themselves part 
of the judicial power and are not auxiliary or incidental thereto.
 although 
the basis for this opinion is unclear in the judgment:  
 
163
The High Court and Privy Council decisions can be explained by reference to two 
interrelated considerations. The first consideration is the form and drafting of the 
 
 
                                                 
158 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 281. 
159 Ibid 289. 
160 Ibid 299. 
161 Ratnapala, above n 26, 162. 
162 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271. 
163 Ibid. 
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Constitution,164 which delineates between the executive and legislature on the one 
hand (which cannot be strictly separated because of the doctrine of responsible 
government) 165  and the judiciary on the other. The second consideration, which 
informs the first, is the role of the judiciary in the ‘maintenance and enforcement of 
the boundaries of federalism’. 166  According to the Privy Council (in language 
borrowed from the Federalist)167
in a Federal system the absolute independence of the judiciary is the 
bulwark of the constitution against encroachment whether by the 
legislature or by the executive. To vest in the same body executive and 
judicial power is to remove a vital constitutional safeguard.
 the strict separation of the judicial power is essential 
because 
  
168
It will be recalled that, in Re Judiciary and Navigation Act, the High Court 
distinguished between federal judicial power (which may be vested in federal courts) 
and non-federal judicial power, (which may be not be vested in federal courts), and 
that the High Court considered the provision of advisory opinions to fall within the 
latter category.
 
 
169 In the Boilermakers’ Case, the High Court disagreed (as did the 
Privy Council on appeal),170 describing the distinction ‘between judicial power lying 
within Chap. III and judicial power lying outside Chap. III’ as ‘tenuous and unreal’.171
                                                 
164 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 272; Attorney-General 
(Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 529, 538. 
165 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275. 
166 Ibid 276. 
167 Hamilton, Madison and Jay, above n 16. 
168 Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 
529, 540-41. 
169 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265. 
170 Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 
529, 541. 
171 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 274. 
 
Rather, their Honours’ explained, the distinction ‘is between judicial power within 
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Chap. III and other powers’.172
To turn to the provisions of the Constitution dealing with those other 
powers or functions surely must be to find confirmation for the view that 
no functions but judicial may be reposed in the judicature. If you knew 
nothing of the history of the separation of powers, if you made no 
comparison of the Australian instrument of government with ours, if you 
were unaware of the interpretation it had received before our Constitution 
was framed according to the same plan, you would still feel the strength of 
the logical inferences from Chaps. I, II and III and the form and contents of 
ss.1, 61 and 71.
 This conclusion derives, so the majority argued, from 
the textual arrangement of the Constitution: 
 
173
confirms the inference to which its terms, independently considered, give 
rise, namely that courts established by or under its provisions have for their 
exclusive purpose the performance of judicial functions and that it is not 
within the legislative power to impose or confer upon them duties or 
authorities of another order.
 
 
Their Honour’s concluded that the demarcation of governmental powers between 
Chapters I, II, and III of the Constitution 
 
174
                                                 
172 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 274-75.  
173 Ibid 275. 
174 Ibid 278. 
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The Privy Council agreed with the High Court that the separation of powers ‘is clearly 
to be seen’ in the structure of the Constitution.175 Their Lordships also agreed that, by 
negative inference, the exclusive vesting of governmental powers in the executive, 
legislative and judiciary means that those powers cannot be vested in any another 
organ of government.176 From this conclusion, their Lordships inferred that no power 
other than judicial power (or functions incidental thereto) may be vested in a Ch III 
court.177
Williams J disagreed with the majority that a strict separation of powers could be 
inferred from the Constitution. His Honour expressed a preference for the approach 
taken in Lowenstein, in which the High Court had accepted the ‘contention that non-
judicial functions cannot be imposed on a court which are incompatible with its strict 
judicial functions:’
  
 
178
In relation to Chap III the [separation of powers] doctrine means that only 
courts can exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and that 
nothing must be done which is likely to detract from their complete ability to 
perform their judicial functions. The Parliament cannot, therefore, by 
legislation impose on the courts duties which would be at variance with the 
exercise of these functions or duties and which could not be undertaken 
without a departure from the normal manner in which courts are accustomed 
to discharge those functions.
  
 
179
 
 
                                                 
175 Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 
529, 537. 
176 Ibid 538. 
177 Ibid 539, 554. 
178 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 313. 
179 Ibid 314. 
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Contrary to the view of Isaacs and Rich JJ in Alexander’s Case, Williams J found 
‘nothing at variance between the arbitral duty to make the award and the curial duty to 
enforce it:’180
The Constitution like any other written instrument must be construed as a 
whole and it appears to me that, far from any implication arising from its 
provisions as a whole that this Court and other federal courts that the 
Parliament creates cannot be invested with other than judicial powers, the 
implication in the case of some of the powers conferred on the Parliament by 
s 51 of the Constitution, arising from their and language, if implication be 
needed, is to the contrary ... Unless there is something tacit in the 
Constitution which prevents the whole of these functions being performed by 
one tribunal it would appear to be convenient that the one tribunal should 
perform them.
  
 
181
Williams J’s focus on the Constitution ‘as a whole’ has found support more recently 
as a means of bringing the territories within the ‘federal compact,’
 
 
182
                                                 
180 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 317. 
181 Ibid 307. 
182 This topic is considered at length in Chapter 6. The principle cases are Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 
CLR 132; Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361, 370-72 (Dixon J); Newcrest Mining 
(WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 568 (Gaudron J), 598 (Gummow J), 662 (Kirby J); 
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 175 (Gummow J); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 
196 CLR 553, 604-05 [128]-[133] (Gaudron J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v 
Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [29] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); 
Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 353-354 [74] (French CJ), 388-389 [188]-[189] 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ), 419 [286] (Kirby J). 
 and, as already 
noted, His Honour’s incompatibility approach has been revived as an aspect of the 
persona designata exception and the Kable doctrine. Insofar as Ch III courts are 
concerned, however, it is the separation doctrine (comprising the two limbs adjoined 
in the Boilermakers’ Case) which emerges as the appropriate mechanism by which to 
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determine the functions that may be vested in those courts.183
What is the object of the separation doctrine? 
 What, then, does the 
separation doctrine seek to achieve? 
 
 
As has been noted on a number of occasions in the preceding analysis, determining 
the object of the separation doctrine is a crucial pre-requisite to establishing whether 
judges can or should mediate. Most commentators agree that the separation doctrine 
rests not upon ‘the text of the Constitution but matters of policy related to the exercise 
of judicial power’,184
Alexander Hamilton famously described the US Supreme Court
 but there are subtle differences of opinion as to what, precisely, 
those matters of policy are. This section demonstrates that, although the approach 
adopted by High Court and the Privy Council’s in the Boilermakers’ Case may be 
explained by reference to the principles of federalism, the ultimate object of the 
separation doctrine must be the preservation of liberty; ergo the rule of law.  
 
185 as the ‘faithful 
guardians of the constitution’, and the judiciary as ‘bulwarks of a limited constitution 
against legislative encroachment’.186 In federal Australia, the essentiality of the High 
Court’s independence has been explained (using similar language) by reference to that 
Court’s role as the ‘guardian of the Constitution’.187
                                                 
183 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 154. 
184 Zines, above n 78, 217.  
185 One notable distinction between the US Supreme Court and the Australian High Court is that the 
latter can hear appeals from State supreme courts in original jurisdiction, as well as State courts vested 
with federal jurisdiction (Sec 75). It is far less significant to establish, therefore, whether the 
jurisdiction of the State court in question was State or federal, as the High Court is able to consider the 
merits of both. In contrast, the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is confined to 
federal matters, and State matters are subject only to judicial review. 
186 Hamilton, Madison and Jay, above n 16, 78.  
187 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 March 1902, 10971, 10981 
(Alfred Deakin).  
 The Blackstonian approach to 
power separation adopted in the UK also recognises the independence of the judiciary 
109 
 
 
 
as an essential ‘preservative of the public liberty’. 188
not, in fact, grounded upon Blackstonian conceptions. On the contrary, 
the [High] Court … [has returned] to one strand of the Federalist 
justification to support separation of judicial powers, the view of the 
judiciary as an essential adjudicator of the boundaries of federalism.
 However, according to Haig 
Patapan, the High Court’s approach to the separation of the judicial power is  
 
189
[W]hile an independent judiciary will be the hallmark of any society that 
claims to be under the ‘rule of law’, and in many unitary forms of 
government it will be argued for under the banner of separation of 
powers, the High Court has recognised and attached great importance to 
the separation of powers in order to achieve judicial independence 
because of the role played by that Court in the interpretation of a Federal 
Constitution. [B]ecause of the technicality that can be associated with 
identifying the scope of the judicial power, this may well leave room for 
the argument that the reasons for seeking it have been forgotten.
 
 
Keven Booker, Arthur Glass and Robert Watt, have similarly concluded that:  
 
190
While these views accurately reflect the reasoning adopted by the High Court, 
outlined above, it must be recognised that the federalist approach is not an end in 
itself. The separation doctrine may reflect the need to protect the High Court’s role as 
the guardian of the Constitution, but this role is in turn necessary to maintain the rule 
 
 
                                                 
188 Blackstone, above n 18, Book 1, 268. 
189 Haig Patapan, ‘Separation of Powers in Australia’ (1999) 34 Australian Journal of Political Science 
391, 399. 
190 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 152-53. 
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of law. 191 As Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ stated in 
Wilson v Minster for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, the ‘separation of the 
judicial function from the other functions of government advances two constitutional 
objectives: the guarantee of liberty and, to that end, the independence of Ch III 
judges’.192 For this reason, Fiona Wheeler’s conclusion that ‘the exclusive vesting of 
federal judicial power in Chapter III courts, although suggested by s71 of the 
Constitution, draws decisive force from our inherited legal traditions and the need to 
promote the supremacy of law over Parliament,’ 193 is preferable. On either view, 
however, it can be agreed that the ‘general policy’ of the separation doctrine is to 
ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. 194 The first limb serves this 
objective by maintaining the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court. The second 
limb serves this object by protecting the judiciary’s power to regulate its own 
processes (‘inherent’ jurisdiction). 195
                                                 
191 ‘The law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally form part of a 
constitutional code, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and 
enforced by the courts; that, in short, the principles of private law have with us been by the action of 
the courts and Parliament so extended as to determine the position of the Crown and its servants; thus 
the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land’. Albert Venn Dicey, above n 18, 203. 
192 (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11. 
193 Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248, 
253. See also Ratnapala, above n 26, 162. 
194 Christine Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional Principle' (1994) 16 
Adelaide Law Review 341, 354. 
195 Wendy Lacey, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power, and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of 
the Constitution’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57. 
 This object, and the subtly distinct ways in 
which the two limbs of the separation doctrine serve it, is examined in more detail in 
the following Chapters.  
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Does the ‘second limb’ still matter? 
 
Criticisms of the second limb of the Boilermakers’ Case have ‘been around for nearly 
as long as the case itself’.196 By and large, these criticisms have been directed at the 
practical consequences of the rule, and in particular the difficulties associated with 
classifying powers as judicial or non-judicial in nature.197 According to Sir Anthony 
Mason, one of the most common ‘shortcomings’ attributed to the second limb of the 
rule in the Boilermakers’ Case is that it requires ‘the classification of functions 
according to the concept of judicial power’, which is itself historically difficult to 
define.198
for the effective working of the Australian Constitution or for the 
maintenance of the separation of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth or for the protection of the independence of the courts 
exercising that power. The decision leads to excessive subtlety and 
technicality in the operation of the Constitution without … any 
compensating benefit’. 
 In R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and 
Builder’s Labourers’ Federation (‘R v Joske’), Barwick CJ expressed the opinion that 
the ‘principal conclusion’ of the High Court was unnecessary 
 
199
As a matter of logic, it is also difficult to understand how the considerations outlined 
by the High Court and Privy Council lead independently or collectively to the 
 
 
                                                 
196 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 168. 
197 See generally, Patrick Lane, ‘The Decline of the Boilermakers Separation of Powers Doctrine’ 
(1981) 55 Australian LawJournal 6. 
198 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘A New Perspective on Separation of Powers’ (1996) No 82, Canberra Bulletin 
of Public Administration 1, 5. 
199 R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builder’s Labourers’ 
Federation (1974) 130 CLR 87, 90. Mason J was also of the opinion, at 102, that ‘a series of questions 
arise as to the course which this Court should adopt in relation to the principle conclusion reached’. 
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conclusion that all non-judicial powers are necessarily executive or legislative in 
nature. First of all, while it was certainly open to the High Court and Privy Council to 
rule that, because certain powers are positively vested in one branch of government 
those powers cannot be vested in another branch of government, it does not follow by 
necessary implication that only judicial power may be vested in or carried out by 
courts.200 In order to reach this conclusion it must first be accepted that legislative, 
executive and judicial power ‘constitute the sum total of all power that lies outside the 
province of judicial power’ 201
there is no clear warrant for the view that all functions can be 
subsumed under the categories ‘legislative’, ‘executive’ and ‘judicial’. 
If that is so, the maxim [expressio uniuns est exclusio alterius] does not 
lead to the conclusion of the Privy Council that powers which cannot 
be so categorised and are outside the scope of Chapter III cannot be 
conferred on a court. 
 (or there would be no threat to the separation of 
powers). And, according to Leslie Zines,  
 
202
The Australian Constitution cannot be worked by supposing classes of 
function which are not covered by the conceptions of legislative, 
executive and judicial power, and which therefore can be allocated – 
presumably at the will of Parliament – to any of the three established 
branches of government. The logic of negative inferences from positive 
 
 
Geoffrey Sawer, on the other hand, has stated that: 
 
                                                 
200 Geoffrey Sawer, ‘The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism’ (1961) 35 Australian Law 
Journal 177, 179.  
201 Ratnapala, above n 26, 62. 
202 Zines, above n 78, 217; citing Jacob Fajgenbaum and Peter Hanks, Australian Constitutional Law 
(1972), 407.  
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statutory provisions on which the Boilermakers’ Case formally 
depends may involve to some extent the fallacy of simple conversion or 
begging the question, but the Constitution does not stand alone; it is 
part of a complex structure of law which includes the pre-existing State 
Constitutions and the general body of the common law, and there is no 
formal fallacy in inferring from that system as a whole the proposition 
that the positive powers of the Commonwealth are confined to those set 
out in the Constitution. Hence any function must somehow be fitted 
into the categories there given, or must fall within the residuary powers 
of the States.203
Geoffrey Sawer’s conclusion reflects the High Court’s belief, expressed in the 
Boilermakers’ Case, that the ‘powers of the Federal judicature must … be at once 
paramount and limited’.
 
 
204  Inherent in this conclusion is the proposition that the 
Commonwealth derives its powers from the States, and that any powers which are not 
incidental to the judicial power or capable of designation as legislative, executive or 
judicial in nature, therefore belong to the States and cannot be vested in or carried out 
by Ch III courts. With the utmost respect, this conclusion disregards the fact that all 
State and federal powers and institutions ‘spring from the same source – British 
sovereignty,’205 and that both are ‘in fact merely different grantees and trustees of 
power, acting for an on behalf of the people of the Commonwealth’.206
                                                 
203 Sawer, above n 200, 177-78.  
204 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275. 
205 Quick and Garran, above n 9, 928. 
206 Ibid. 
 Once this 
simple fact is accepted there is no reason whatsoever why a function which falls 
outside the category of legislative, executive or judicial must belong to the States. If 
anything, it must belong to the Imperial Parliament.   
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In addition to the raft of definitional problems set in motion by the second limb, it 
may be unnecessary to apply the rule to any Ch III court other than the High Court.207 
Leslie Zines explains that, as the High Court is the only Court ‘guaranteed jurisdiction 
over the commonwealth,’ 208 and is omnipresent as the final appellate court in all 
federal matters, it is irrelevant whether the ‘admixture’ of judicial and non-judicial 
functions would ‘sap the independence’ of other federal and State courts.209 Provided 
that the High Court itself is not vested with non-judicial powers the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Court will continue to provide a constitutional safeguard, and the 
object of the second limb will be satisfied.210
With the Federal Court now occupying such an increasingly important role in 
the determination of general federal litigation, and with the High Court’s 
caseload increasingly being restricted to the more important constitutional 
  
 
It might be added that when the decision in the Boilermakers’ Case was handed down 
the Federal Court, Family Court and Federal Magistrates Court did not exist, and that, 
whether truly necessary at the time or not, the second limb may simply no longer 
reflect the complexities of Australia’s contemporary judicial system. Keven Booker, 
Arthur Glass and Robert Watt, have asked: 
 
                                                 
207 Zines, above n 78, 297; Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 169. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 There may be circumstances in which the High Court has no appellate jurisdiction, but generally 
speaking ‘it has been assumed that the reference to judgments, decrees, orders and sentences relates to 
determinations made by the relevant courts in the exercise of judicial power’. Mellifont v A-G (Qld) 
(1991) 173 CLR 289, 300 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). In any event, 
although judicial mediation does not involve a judicial decision as such, the settlement produced will 
be enforced as a consent order, which is appealable under s 73 of the Constitution. This issue is 
examined in Chapter 3. It might also be noted that certain civil law countries, such as Germany, have 
created a distinct hierarchy of constitutional courts, thereby circumventing this issue. 
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matters, is there a constitutional need to keep all of the federal judges at arms 
length and untainted from contact with the Federal Executive?211
On the other hand, Leslie Zines points out, to focus purely on this policy argument 
would be to ignore the importance that both the High Court and the Privy Council 
attached to the ‘form and drafting’ of the Constitution, s 72 of which vests judicial 
power in the High Court and ‘such other courts as Parliament creates’.
 
 
212  To 
distinguish between courts vested with federal judicial power on the basis that the 
independence of the High Court alone is necessary to safeguard the Constitution 
would, therefore, ‘be to rely on the principle of the separation of powers directly and 
mainly, giving only subordinate weight to the textual considerations that 
predominated in the judgment’.213 The High Court has also made it increasingly clear 
in recent years that Australia has an ‘integrated’ judiciary, in which the actions of one 
court reflect on the integrity of all others. 214
One final, and critical, point should be made. Although the approach adopted by the 
High Court in the Boilermakers’ Case has been criticised, the purpose of the second 
limb has not. Academic and judicial critiques have questioned whether strict power 
separation is the most appropriate mechanism by which to protect the judicial function 
 That being so the sapping of 
independence and impartiality from any Australian court could theoretically interfere 
with the High Court’s role as the guardian of the constitution. This possibility is 
examined in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
211 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 6, 169. 
212 Zines, above n 78, 297. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 175 
(Gummow J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146; K-
Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471. 
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from legislative interference, but they have not suggested that it should not be 
protected. The object of the separation doctrine is considered in more detail in 
Chapter 4.215
Do the implications of the separation doctrine affect rules of court? 
   
 
 
One final issue must be addressed before considering in detail the specific rules 
derived by the High Court from Ch III. In Chapter 8 it is demonstrated that, in order 
to be implemented effectively, judicial mediation will require the provision of a broad 
procedural discretion (or a series of discretions). Such discretions may be vested in Ch 
III courts directly by the Commonwealth Parliament, or by the judiciary itself as rules 
of court. Accepting that the second limb of the separation doctrine limits the functions 
that may be vested in Ch III courts by Parliament, does it also affect the functions that 
judicial committees can establish in the form of court rules? 
 
To answer this question it is first necessary to determine how, precisely, the power to 
mediate would be vested in a Ch III court by Parliament. Section 51 (xxiv) of the 
Constitution confers on Parliament the power to make laws with respect to ‘the 
service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal process 
and the judgments of the courts of the States’. Section 51 (xxxix) also confers on 
Parliament the power to make laws for matters ‘incidental to the execution of any 
power vested ... in the Federal Judicature’. Both of these powers are ‘subject to’ the 
Constitution, and thus the meaning of the term judicial power as defined by the High 
Court. If judicial mediation is implemented by Parliament via primary legislation, 
then the rules stemming from the separation doctrine (outlined in the following two 
                                                 
215 See below Chapter 4 nn 10-49 and accompanying text. 
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Chapters) will limit that function to the extent that it affects a federal court (or courts) 
created under s 71. These rules will also limit the functions that State or territory 
parliaments may vest in the ‘other courts’ referred to in s 71 when exercising federal 
judicial power under s 71, but they will not otherwise limit State or territory 
legislative power.216
As explained in Chapters 7 and 8, however, it seems more likely that judicial 
mediation will continue to develop within the incidental/inherent jurisdiction of the 
courts.
  
 
217 Rules of court are a form of delegated legislation,218 and in federal courts 
created under s 71 this function is delegated as an incidental function by virtue of s 51 
(xxxix).219
                                                 
216 The position of the States and territories is considered in Chapter 6. In brief, however, the High 
Court has traditionally adopted the view that Parliament must take State courts as it finds them 
(Federated Sawmill, Timberyard and General Woodworkers’ Employees’ Association (Adelaide 
Branch) v Alexander (1912) 15 CLR 308). As such, the separation doctrine only applied to State courts 
vested with judicial power when actually exercising that power. This position has since been altered by 
Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 so that certain implications of CH II do also apply to State 
courts. Territory Courts were not subject to the separation doctrine because they created under s 122 
(which is contained in Ch V) and were not traditionally considered to be subject to Ch III at all (R v 
Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629, 635 (Griffith CJ)). It is apparent that they may now be vested with 
federal judicial power under s 71, however, and may therefore be considered ‘other courts’ in the same 
manner as State courts are for the second limb of the Boilermakers’ Case (See, for example, Northern 
Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 604-05 [128]-[133] (Gaudron J). This position was confirmed 
in North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
217 See, for example, Federal Court Rules 1979, O 72; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 126; 
Supreme Court Consolidated Practice Directions (Jan 2009) (WA) Para 4.2. 
218 The High Court Rules 2004 are made by a majority of the Justices of the High Court under s 48 of 
the High Court of Australia Act 1979. The Federal Court Rules 1979 are made by a judicial committee 
in accordance with s 59 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The Family Law Rules 2004 are 
made by a majority of judges under s 123 of the Family Law Act 1975; The Federal Magistrates Court 
Rules 2001 are made by a majority of Federal Magistrates under s 81 of the Federal Magistrates Act 
1999, and are supplemented by the Federal Court Rules 2004 (s 1.05). Note, however, that these rules 
are actually created by the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department. The onset of judicial self-
governance, and what this function means for the nature of the judicial function, is considered in 
Chapter 7. 
219 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 368 – 369 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J). 
 It follows that rules of court determined by federal courts are notionally 
subject to the same principles of validity as rules vested directly in those courts by 
Parliament (because, either way, the discretion ultimately belongs to Parliament). 
However, as explained above, the separation doctrine is rooted in ‘the need to 
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promote the supremacy of law over Parliament’.220
Questions relating to the validity of the rules of the superior courts arise 
infrequently. When they do, the general principles that apply to delegated 
legislation made by the executive are applied to determine validity. The issue 
that arises most frequently is whether the rules are concerned with matters of 
‘practice and procedure’ or whether they attempt to deal with issues 
extending beyond this description.
 If rule making power is in fact 
exercised by the judiciary, then there is no risk of this object being subverted. This 
raises the question: do the constitutional implications stemming from the separation 
doctrine apply to rules of court created by federal courts? The answer to this question 
is almost certainly ‘yes’, but there is little authority on point. As Dennis Pearce and 
Stephen Argument have observed:  
 
221
The ‘general principle’ as regards delegated discretionary powers was expressed by 
Latham CJ in Shrimpton v Comonwealth.
  
 
222 His Honour explained that the ‘discretion 
must be used and the power exercised bona fide and with the view of achieving ends 
or objects not outside the purpose for which the discretion or power is conferred’.223
                                                 
220 Wheeler, above n 193. 
221 Dennis Pearce and Stephen Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (3rd ed 2005), 120; citing 
Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311; Ousley v R (1997) 192 CLR 69; State Bank of South 
Australia v Hellaby (1992) 59 SASR 304; Airservices Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 
200. 
222 (1945) 69 CLR 613. 
223 Ibid 620. 
 
Thus, if a rule of court were to sanction the performance of a function that was 
contrary to the implications deriving from the separation doctrine, that rule would 
exceed the discretionary rule making power granted by the relevant statute, and would 
be invalid. 
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There is another reason why rules of court must be subject to the same Ch III 
implications as primary legislation however, which is equally important. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that, by vesting judicial power in Ch III courts, ‘the Constitution’s intent 
and meaning were that judicial power would be exercised by those courts with all that 
that notion essentially requires’. 224
[T]he rule of law … lies at the heart of the Judicature provided for in the 
Constitution. Attempts by law to alter, impair or detract from that hypothesis 
immediately invite consideration of the prescription necessarily implied in 
Ch III … [L]awmakers (including judges expressing the common law) 
cannot impede [those implications].
 It would hardly serve that purpose if judicial 
committees were able to vest in Ch III courts functions that required them to conduct 
proceedings in a manner that undermined judicial independence and impartiality. This 
view is indirectly supported by Kirby J’s dissenting opinion in APLA Ltd v Legal 
Services Commissioner: 
 
225
The same reasoning naturally applies in respect of rules of court applicable to State 
courts when exercising federal jurisdiction. What, though, of the rules that apply in 
State and territory courts when they are not exercising federal judicial power (or in 
courts not vested with that power at all)? In such instances the separation doctrine has 
no application, but the Kable doctrine does,
 
 
226 and this doctrine was extended to 
territory courts in NAALAS v Bradley.227
                                                 
224 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607. 
225 (2006) 224 CLR 322, 440-41. 
226 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
227 (2004) 218 CLR 146 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ) 
 Court rules in the States and territories are 
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also made by way of delegated legislation. 228
 
 Thus, a rule of court that is 
‘incompatible’ with the nature of judicial power will be invalid, in just the same way 
as a rule of court subject to the second limb of the separation doctrine will be. Unless 
otherwise indicated, therefore, a reference in this thesis to a statutory provision may 
be interpreted as a reference to a rule of court, and the principles set out in the 
following Chapters will apply to the development of judicial mediation regardless of 
how judicial mediation is actually implemented in practice.  
Summary and approach to subsequent analysis 
 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to introduce certain of the key concepts and 
principles that underpin the analysis in the following Chapters. To this end, four 
overlapping jurisdictions have been identified which operate to maintain the rule of 
law – appellate, supervisory, exclusive, and inherent – and the role of the separation 
doctrine in safeguarding the latter two of these jurisdictions has been briefly 
outlined.229
                                                 
228 The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (which apply to the Queensland Supreme Court, 
District Court and Magistrates Court) are established under s118 the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 
1991 by the Governor in Council and approved by a ‘Rules Committee’ comprising judges from each 
of the courts. The Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) are made under s 200 of the Supreme Court Civil 
Procedure Act 1932 (Tas). The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW) (which apply to the NSW 
Supreme Court, District Court and Magistrates Court) are created in accordance with s 9 of the Civil 
Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) by a ‘Uniform Rules Committee’ established in s 8 of the Act. The 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (and other rules) are made by ‘three or more judges’ under s 72 
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). The Supreme Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA) (and other rules) are 
made by ‘the judges of the Supreme Court’ under s 167 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). Rules of 
court in Victoria are more piecemeal than other States, but are all made under s 25 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1989 (Vic). Rules of court in the Northern Territory are made by a majority of judges under s 
86 of the Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT); The Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) are made by a ‘rule 
making committee’ established under s 9 the Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) (rule-making power is 
conferred on that committee by s 7). 
229 It is not suggested that these four jurisdictions are the only jurisdictions necessary to maintain the 
rule of law, merely the most applicable to this thesis. 
 It has also been explained that, whether or not the separation doctrine 
stands up to 60 years of judicial and academic scrutiny, the two limbs adjoined in that 
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case are now firmly established tenets of Australian constitutional jurisprudence.230 
As such, the scope and meaning of the term judicial power remains critical to 
determining which functions Parliament may vest in Ch III courts,231 and whether 
judicial mediation is constitutional. As noted, however, the distinction between 
judicial and non-judicial power, and the range of incidental functions that may be 
vested in Ch III courts, is often difficult to discern. Various streams of precedent have 
consequently emerged which seek to determine whether given powers or functions 
fall within the meaning of judicial power of functions incidental thereto. These 
streams can be categorised as pertaining to one of three broad definitional approaches: 
the subject of judicial power, the indicia of judicial power, and the exercise of judicial 
power.232
The first approach is not directly relevant in the current context because, as pointed 
out earlier in this Chapter, judicial mediation does not affect the ‘matters’ in respect 
of which Ch III courts may exercise judicial power – merely the way in which those 
matters are determined. The second and third of these approaches are of direct 
relevance to judicial mediation, however. Chapter 3 examines the High Court’s 
analysis of the indicia of judicial power, and demonstrates that, while judicial 
mediation cannot be classified as a judicial power, it may be classified as a function 
incidental thereto.  
 
 
                                                 
230 See, for example: Steele v Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board (1955) 92 CLR 177, 186, 187; 
Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v Thornton (1953) 87 CLR 144, 151; Victoria v Australian Building 
Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation [No 2] (1982) 152 CLR 179, 183, 186-
87; Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 396, 400-01, 419, 440, 449-500; Re Wakim; Ex Parte NcNally 
(1999) 198 CLR 511.   
231 See, for example; Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 426-28 [340]-[344] (Kirby J), 467 [472] 
(Hayne J). 
232 Suri Ratnapala identifies three ‘aspects or power’: ‘jurisdiction, mode of action, and the 
consequences of action’. Above n 26, 123. 
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CHAPTER 3  
JUDICIAL POWER AND INCIDENTAL FUNCTIONS 
 
In Chapter 2 it was explained that the strict approach to power separation adopted by 
the High Court assumes that all governmental functions can be classified as legislative, 
executive or judicial in nature. It was also noted that the second limb of the rule in 
Boilermakers’ restricts the functions that may be vested in federal courts to those that 
are within or incidental to the meaning of the term ‘judicial power’, and that various 
overlapping streams of High Court precedent can be distinguished which seek (in 
differing ways) to distinguish between judicial and non-judicial functions.   
 
This Chapter considers the High Court’s attempts to identify the defining features, or 
‘indicia’, of judicial power, and concludes that while mediation is irrefutably a non-
judicial function (because it does not result in a binding determination of existing 
rights), this fact alone does not preclude federal courts from exercising mediation 
functions.1
                                                 
1 To the author’s knowledge no court in Australia has yet classified mediation as a function exclusive 
to any particular branch of government. David Spencer has made the same observation: David Spencer, 
‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 1’ (2006) 17 Australian Dispte Resolution Journal 130, 
135. The issue was discussed but left unanswered in Fagshall v Foster (1995) 50 Dispute Resolution 
Journal 86. 
 The argument presented is essentially as follows: judicial mediation is 
comparable with other prehearing processes which represent discrete steps, or 
‘incidents’, in the litigation process. These processes may alter the course that 
proceedings take, but they do not remove the decision-making power of the court. 
While incidental functions are typically limited to functions historically associated 
with the judicial process, this does not mean that novel functions cannot also be 
vested in courts. What matters in such instances is whether the function in question is 
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capable of judicial application. Theoretically, a function will be incapable of judicial 
application if it requires a court to determine new rights,2 or to conduct proceedings in 
a manner contrary to the ‘judicial process’.3
The Primary Indicia 
 Since mediation does not affect existing 
rights it is the second of these requirements which is of particular relevance to the 
development of judicial mediation. This requirement (the ‘judicial process’ 
implication) is the focus of Chapter 4.  
 
 
The term ‘judicial power’ has proven difficult to define. In R v Davison, Dixon CJ 
and McTiernan J noted that, ‘many attempts have been made to define judicial power, 
but it has never been found possible to frame a definition that is at once exclusive and 
exhaustive,’4 and in R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty 
Ltd (the ‘Tasmanian Breweries’ case), Windeyer J commented that ‘the concept 
seems to me to defy, perhaps it were better to say transcend, purely abstract 
conceptual analysis’.5
The difficulty of characterising a particular exercise of power as 
administrative or judicial and thus of defining exhaustively the boundaries of 
judicial power stems from the fact that there is not a true dichotomy between 
 In Cabal v United Mexican States, the Federal Court explained 
that: 
 
                                                 
2 Blackburn, Low & Co v Vigors (1887) 12 QBD 531; Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead 
(1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ); Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander 
(1918) 25 CLR 434, 464 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). 
3 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J). The ‘judicial process’ 
implication represents the culmination of the second ‘stream’ outlined in the Chapter 2 (the exercise of 
judicial power), and is considered in detail in Chapter 4. 
4 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 366. 
5 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 394. See 
also Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 497 (Gaudron J), ‘it may not yet be possible to 
define judicial power in a way that is at once exclusive and exhaustive’. 
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powers as such which may be said to be judicial and those which may be said 
to be administrative.6
Similar observations have been made as regards the boundary between adjudication 
and mediation; a point discussed at length in Chapter 7. Despite these difficulties, 
judicial power is characterised at the most rudimentary level by three primary 
elements or ‘indicia’.
 
 
7 Whether a given power or function falls within the concept of 
judicial power, ‘depends upon the indicia present in the power being ‘weighed up’ 
against those which are absent, or against other indicia to the contrary’. 8  The 
‘primary’ indicia can be distilled from early judicial attempts to define judicial power. 
The ‘classical statement’9 of judicial power was provided by Griffith CJ in Huddart v 
Parker, and provides the natural starting point for most commentaries:10
I am of the opinion that the words judicial power as used in s 71 of the 
Constitution mean the power of which every sovereign must of necessity 
have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its 
subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property; The exercise 
of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has the power to 
give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) 
is called upon to take action.
 
 
11
 
 
                                                 
6 Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311; [2001] FCA 427, [77] (Hill, Weinberg and 
Dowsett JJ). As discussed at length in Chapter 6, similar language has been adopted by ADR theorists 
in relation to the taxonomy of ideologically discrete dispute resolution processes.  
7 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and 
Materials, (3rd ed 2002), 621. 
8 Ibid. 
9 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 387 (Taylor J). 
10 See, for example, Keven Booker, Arthur Glass and Robert Watt, Federal Constitutional Law: An 
Introduction (2nd Ed 1998);  Blackshield and George Williams, above n 7, 619-620; Suri Ratnapala, 
‘Australian Constitutional Law (2nd ed 2007) 125; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 
(5th ed, 2008) 219. 
11 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357. 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed a similar formulation of judicial power, explaining 
that ‘a judicial enquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on 
present or past facts and under laws already supposed to exist,’12
[T]o make [a tribunal’s] determinations judicial, the essential element is 
that it should have power, by its determination within jurisdiction, to 
impose liability or affect rights. By this I mean that the liability is imposed, 
or the right affected by the determination only, and not by the fact 
determined, and so that the liability will exist, or the right will be affected, 
although the determination be wrong in law or in fact.
 and according to 
Palles CB: 
 
13
As Dixon CJ and McTiernan J pointed out in R v Davison, Griffith CJ emphasised the 
fact that judicial power can be exercised only in respect of an existing controversy, 
whereas Palles CB stressed the importance of pre-existing rights.
  
 
14
[A] judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the 
future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the 
exercise of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a 
new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as 
between those persons or classes of persons. In other words, the process to be 
followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the 
facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the 
 Oliver Wendell 
Holmes did not emphasise the importance of any particular element, but observed all 
three. In the Tasmanian Breweries case, Kitto J explained that in his view: 
 
                                                 
12 Prentis v Atlantic Coast Line Co, 211 US 210 (1908), 226-27. 
13 The Queen v Local Government Board (1902) 2 IR 349, 373 (Palles CB). 
14 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 367-68. 
126 
 
 
 
facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which, so long 
as it stands, entitles and obliges the persons between whom it intervenes, to 
observance of the rights and obligations that the application of law to facts 
has shown to exist.15
These formulations, all of which have ‘distinct echoes of the Diceyan formulation of 
the Rule of Law,’
 
 
16 can be distilled to reveal the primary indicia of judicial power in 
Australia:17
1) A existing controversy 
 
 
2) A binding and authoritative decision  
3) Pre-existing rights (life, liberty and property) 
 
According to Leslie Zines, if ‘these three elements are present, that is, the function 
involves a conclusive determination of a controversy about existing rights, the 
function belongs exclusively to the judiciary’.18
                                                 
15 (1970) 123 CLR 361, 374-75. 
16 Alan Hall, ‘Judicial Power, the Duality of Functions and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (1994) 
22 Federal Law Review 13, 18. The relationship between the rule of law and the meaning of judicial 
power is examined further in Chapter 4, nn 10-45 and accompanying text. 
17 This has been confirmed on numerous occasions. See, for example R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 
386 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty 
Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 398-99 (Windeyer J). 
18 Zines, above n 10, 220. 
 In addition, the second limb of the 
rule in the Boilermakers’ Case confirms that a function which does not satisfy these 
three elements is necessarily non-judicial in nature. However, it does not follow that 
the judiciary cannot exercise functions which are non-judicial. Indeed, the courts have 
frequently exercised non-judicial functions on the basis that they are incidental to the 
exercise of judicial power, and it is within this category that, for the reasons set forth 
in this and the following Chapters, mediation is properly to be classified.  
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Implied Incidental Functions 
 
Every conferral of power in the Constitution carries with it those implied incidental 
powers necessary to exercise that power. This convention derives from English and 
American principles of constitutional interpretation.19 In Barton v Taylor, the Privy 
Council stated that whatever ‘in a reasonable sense, is necessary for these purposes, is 
impliedly granted whenever any such legislative body is established by competent 
authority’. 20
The principle that everything which is incidental to the main purpose of a 
power is contained within the grant itself, is so firmly established and so well 
understood in English law that it would have been superfluous to incorporate 
it in an express provision of the Constitution.
 Similarly, in Le Mesurier v Connor, Knox CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ 
explained that: 
 
21
In the context of judicial power, Patrick Lane has explained that incidental ‘powers 
will be in themselves innominate powers … or, at all events, will not be essentially 
non-judicial powers’.
  
 
22
                                                 
19 Booker, Glass and Watt, above n 10, 60. 
20 [1886] AC 197, 293.  
21 (1929) 42 CLR 481, 497. 
22 Patrick Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed 1998) 486. 
 There is some debate as to whether functions may be properly 
classified as ‘innominate’, and this debate is considered in more detail below. That 
incidental powers may not be ‘essentially non-judicial’ in nature, however, reflects 
the outcome of a series of High Court judgments prior to and including the 
Boilermakers’ Case. In R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein 
(‘Lowenstein’), Latham CJ expressed the view that incidental judicial functions may 
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be vested in federal courts provided that they are not ‘inconsistent with the 
coexistence of judicial power’. 23
Many functions perhaps may be committed to a court which are not 
themselves exclusively judicial, that is to say which considered 
independently might belong to an administrator. But that is because they are 
not independent functions but form incidents in the exercise of strictly 
judicial powers.
 Shortly thereafter, in Queen Victoria Memorial 
Hospital v Thornton (‘Thornton’), the full bench of the High Court explained that:  
 
24
On the facts, their Honours considered that the function in question (‘making an 
appointment in substitution for the appointment made by an employer’)
  
 
25
what is a bare administrative function cannot be committed to a court. Such a 
function cannot be committed to a court so to speak in gross as opposed to a 
thing appurtenant to the performance of a principal judicial duty to which it 
is an accessory.
 was 
exclusively administrative in nature and could not be carried out judicially. In Steele v 
Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board, a full court of the High Court once again 
clarified (in a single judgment), that  
 
26
As was noted in the previous Chapter, these decisions were delivered before the 
incompatibility doctrine had been superseded by the second limb in the Boilermakers’ 
 
 
                                                 
23 (1938) 59 CLR 556. 
24 (1953) 87 CLR 144, 151 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor J). 
25 Ibid 150. 
26 (1955) 92 CLR 177, 186-87 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) See also Seaman’s 
Union of Australia v Matthews (1957) 96 CLR 529, 535, where Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Kitto and 
Taylor JJ stated that incidental powers cannot be ‘manifestly and clearly of an arbitral character’. 
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Case and the second limb fosters a stricter approach to the separation of core judicial 
and non-judicial functions in federal courts than the incompatibility doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the Boilermakers’ Case does not significantly alter the rules governing 
the vesting of incidental (non-judicial) functions in the judiciary. In essence, the 
central enquiry is still one of ‘compatibility’. According to the majority in the 
Boilermakers’ Case: 
 
On more than one occasion of late attempts have been made in judgments of 
this Court to make it clear that a function which, considered independently, 
might seem of its own nature to belong to another division of power, yet, in 
the place it takes in connection with the judicature, falls within the judicial 
power or what is incidental to it. There are not a few subjects which may be 
dealt with administratively or submitted to the judicial power without 
offending against any constitutional precept arising from Chap III.27
As already noted, a power will be non-judicial (‘in its essential nature’) if it does not 
satisfy the primary indicia of judicial power. It is no simple matter, however, to 
determine whether a non-judicial function ‘is properly incidental’ to the exercise of 
judicial power. The overarching question in this regard, which has evolved through 
the High Court’s treatment of non-judicial functions, is whether there exists a 
sufficient nexus between the non-judicial function and the exercise of judicial power. 
In answering this question, the High Court has taken account of the historical 
association between the function and the jurisdiction in which it is exercised, the 
effect of the function in question upon pre-existing rights, and whether that function 
 
 
                                                 
27 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 278. 
130 
 
 
 
may be performed in accordance with the ‘essential attributes of the curial process’.28
Innominate and Chameleon Functions 
 
A combination of these three considerations will guide the High Court when 
determining whether a function is properly to be classified as incidental to the 
exercise of judicial power. These matters are returned to below. Before doing so, 
however, it is necessary to deal briefly with the theory of innominate and chameleon 
powers.  
 
 
Confusion has been added to the rules governing incidental functions by the 
recognition of so-called ‘innominate’ and ‘chameleon’ functions; that is to say, 
functions which are not exclusively judicial, legislative or executive, and which it is 
within the power of the legislature to categorise (in the case of innominate 
functions),29 or which acquire the character of the body in which they are invested (in 
the case of chameleon functions).30
                                                 
28 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J). 
29 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153. 
30 Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v Baya Pharma Pty Ltd (1959) 101 CLR 652; R v Quinn; Ex parte 
Consolidated Foods Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 1. 
 These theories have the potential to obscure the 
true nature of incidental functions and the rules governing the vesting of those 
functions in federal courts. 
 
The theory of innominate powers originates in the judgment of Isaacs J in Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (the ‘Second BIO Case’). In His Honour’s view: 
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[C]ertain ... matters may be subject to no a priori exclusive delimitation, but 
may be capable of assignment by Parliament in its discretion to more than 
one branch of government. Rules of evidence, the determination of the 
validity of parliamentary elections, or claims to register trade marks would 
be instances of this class.31
Suri Ratnapala has described the proposition that certain powers are innominate as ‘a 
chimera that evaporates’ when the conceptual errors which underpin it are exposed, 
and which ‘amounts to an abdication by the High Court of its constitutional 
responsibility to classify functions and to confine them to the appropriate branch of 
government’.
 
 
32 The first conceptual error relates to the difference between the concept 
of judicial power and the rules of separation (the concept/rule dichotomy). 33  In 
Thornton and R v Davison, Suri Ratnapala argues, the High Court ‘was not saying 
that these powers were innominate, but were recognising that the Constitution does 
not preclude Chapter III courts from making orders incidental to the effective 
performance of their judicial functions’.34
[T]he propriety of the exercise of a power by a given department does not 
depend upon whether, in its essential nature, the power is executive, 
 The reason why the power to determine the 
validity of parliamentary elections (which is inherently judicial) resides in Parliament, 
is because s 47 of the Constitution explicitly vests that power in Parliament. It is not, 
as Isaacs J stated, because the power is innominate. This distinction is manifest in the 
writings of Westel Willoughby, upon whose account the High Court based their 
theory of incidental powers in the Boilermakers’ Case: 
 
                                                 
31 (1926) 38 CLR 153, 178-79. 
32 Ratnapala, above n 10, 137. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 138. 
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legislative or judicial, but whether it has been specifically vested by the 
Constitution in that department, or whether it is properly incidental to the 
performance of the appropriate functions of the department into whose hands 
its exercise has been given.35
The second misconception is the difference between subject and function (the 
‘subject/function dichotomy’),
 
 
36 and it is this misconception which is of particular 
relevance presently. Suri Ratnapala reasons that, in ‘the constitutional context, 
“function” refers to the mode by which a subject of the law is treated. So it makes no 
sense to speak of an innominate “function.”’37
If by ‘power’ the Court meant the ‘subject’ aspect of power, the decisions are 
stating the obvious. All subjects are innominate in the sense that they can be 
dealt with legislatively, executively or judicially. But that is not what the 
Court meant. The Court suggested that the functions in question are 
 Put differently, the Constitution views 
the word ‘function’ as a verb, and the word ‘subject’ as a noun. Only subjects can be 
‘innominate’, because the function is inherent to the nature of the power exercised 
(e.g. judges do things judicially). In R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods (‘R v 
Quinn’), he argues, the High Court confused subject and function by finding that the 
power to deregister a trade mark was innominate. Since the power to deregister trade 
marks is clearly a function and not a subject (because it describes what courts are to 
do in relation to the ‘subject’ (trademarks)), their Honours meant that any branch of 
government may carry out this function. This is ‘a logical impossibility:’ 
  
                                                 
35 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 278-79; citing Westel 
Woodbury Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States (2nd ed 1929), 1620. 
36 Ratnapala, above n 10, 138. 
37 Ibid. 
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innominate – hence capable of being entrusted to any one of the three great 
branches.38
There is, however, an important difference between functions which are inherently 
executive, legislative or judicial in the sense that they require the determination of a 
subject in the manner of the relevant branch of government, and functions which 
simply affect the process to be adopted prior to that determination. The ‘functions’ 
identified in the Second BIO Case and R v Quinn relate to the manner in which Courts 
determine the relevant subject and, as Suri Ratnapala points out, such functions 
cannot be innominate. There are numerous functions, however, which have no bearing 
upon decision-making and which do not therefore fall within the range of functions 
necessarily exclusive to the executive, legislature or judiciary. When, in R v Davison, 
Dixon and McTiernan JJ expressed the view that certain powers have a ‘double 
aspect’, they were not suggesting that the judiciary may determine rights in the 
manner of the executive or legislature. Rather, their Honours were pointing out that 
just because ‘a thing may be done in the course of the exercise of judicial power is not 
to say that it may not be done without the exercise of judicial power’.
 
 
39
Once the misconceptions outlined above are accepted, the theory of chameleon 
powers (which derives from the theory of innominate powers)
  
 
40
                                                 
38 Ratnapala, above n 10, 139. 
39 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 368. 
40 R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods (1977) 138 CLR 8 (Jacobs J). 
 becomes redundant in 
a Ch III context. It goes without saying that many non-determinative functions are, in 
a sense, chameleon-like. According to Windeyer J, for example; ‘an incidental and 
preliminary enquiry takes its character, for relevant purposes, from the character of 
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the jurisdiction of which it is a phase.41 However, and as discussed in more detail 
below, the fact that such functions have been validly vested in federal courts can be 
explained within the rules governing implied incidental functions, and the 
presumptions of statutory interpretation applied to that end. To say that a function is 
innominate or chameleon-like, therefore, is simply to say that it may be ‘impliedly 
incidental’. In any event, there do not appear to be any instances of powers which are 
administrative in nature being vested in a court on the basis that they have a 
chameleon-like quality.42 As Hayne J recently commented in Thomas v Mowbray, 
‘the chameleon doctrine does not mean that Boilermakers “does not matter much any 
more.” There remains a real and radical difference between the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth and executive and legislative power’.43
Historical association between function and jurisdiction 
 
 
 
A number of differing approaches to the definition of judicial power can be isolated 
from case law. Patrick Keyzer identifies three ‘relatively distinct approaches’ 44  - 
historical, 45  analytical 46  and functional 47  - but is careful not to overstate their 
exclusivity as, in his words, ‘multiple approaches may be adopted in any particular 
case’. 48
                                                 
41 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 399.  
42 Ratnapala, above n 10, 139. 
43 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 467 [472]. See also 426-428 [340]-[344] (Kirby J).  
44 Patrick Keyzer, ‘Constitutional Law’, (2nd ed, 2005) 252. 
45 ‘[W]hich emphasises the utility of historical and traditional understandings of judicial power’. Ibid. 
46 ‘[W]hich emphasises what are regarded to be the essential characteristics of judicial-decision-making 
that distinguish it from other types of decision-making’. Ibid. 
47 ‘[W]hich emphasises that some types of activities are common to courts and non-judicial tribunals, 
and so the discriminating feature is whether the relevant powers have been (and can be) vested in a 
court. Ibid.  
48 Ibid. 
 Leslie Zines acknowledges that various approaches have been adopted to 
define judicial power, but suggests that the historical approach plays an overarching, 
or predominant role:  
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In these matters the courts have been guided largely by history; the values 
involved in the separation of powers and by social policy, as well as by strict 
analysis. Indeed, in a sense, the concept of judicial power … is itself derived 
from historical examination, that is, what the courts have done.49
In addition to determining which functions are ‘exclusively’ judicial in nature, the 
historic approach has been applied in ‘cases where the power in dispute hovers 
between a judicial and non-judicial appellation’.
 
 
50
1. The making of procedural rules of court. 
 Indeed, with few exceptions the 
functions which the High Court has classified as incidental have possessed some 
historical association with the judicial process. In the leading case on the matter, R v 
Davison, Dixon CJ and McTiernan J identified various powers as established 
incidents in the exercise of judicial power. Of the functions identified by their 
Honours, only one (the administration of enemy property) did not possess an historic 
association with the exercise of judicial power. The functions identified were: 
  
2. The administration of trusts in the absence of a dispute between parties or the 
adjudication of rights. 
3. The maintenance and guardianship of infants. 
4. Consent to marriage of a ward of court. 
5. The exercise of a power of sale. 
6. The administration of enemy property. 
7. Various insolvency orders. 
                                                 
49 Zines, above n 10, 221. 
50 Enid Campbell and H.P. Lee, The Australian Judiciary (2001) 40. 
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8. Grants of probate.51
 
In the same case, Kitto J explained that if a function has traditionally fallen to the 
judiciary to perform, it will ordinarily be conclusive of that function’s suitability for 
judicial performance: 
 
 
Where the action to be taken is of a kind which had come by 1900 to be so 
consistently regarded as peculiarly appropriate for judicial performance that 
it then occupied an acknowledged place in the structure of the judicial system, 
the conclusion, it seems to me, is inevitable that the power to take that action 
is within the concept of judicial power as the framers of the Constitution 
must be taken to have understood it.52
Subsequent authorities confirm the centrality of historic considerations in the 
determination of incidental powers.
 
 
53
it is a recognised part of judicial power to make orders of the sort authorized 
by the sections in question in the exercise of judicial power to hear and 
 In Cominos v Cominos, the High Court held 
unanimously that the power to make discretionary orders was incidental to the 
exercise of judicial power in relation to matrimonial proceedings principally (although 
not exclusively) because of the historic association between similar orders and 
matrimonial proceedings. As McTiernan and Menzies JJ explained, 
 
                                                 
51 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 368-69. 
52 Ibid 382. 
53 In R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne (1955) 92 CLR 157, 167, a near identically 
constituted High Court to that in R v Davison (Williams J replacing Webb J) placed particular emphasis 
on historical considerations when faced with a challenge to the long standing power of the Senate and 
House of Representatives to determine and punish contempt of Parliament. In that instance, the Court 
considered that the power had not historically been treated as strictly judicial, but rather ‘as proper 
incidents of the legislative function’. 
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determine matrimonial causes. The powers conferred by the sections are 
ancillary too, and take their colour from, the valid grant of jurisdiction to 
hear and determine matrimonial causes.54
Walsh J agreed, noting that, in ‘considering the powers conferred by [the discretions 
in question], it is necessary to have regard to the jurisdiction which the court has been 
given,’
 
 
55 and Gibbs J stated that ‘the power is … exercised as an incident to judicial 
proceedings’.56
the decisive consideration [is] that an award of maintenance has been 
traditionally made as the consequence of a curial process, by way of an order 
granting a form of relief which is ancillary to the principal relief sought … 
[viz.] …  a decree for the dissolution of marriage. An order for maintenance 
is made in consequence or in contemplation of the granting of that principal 
relief. It forms part of the totality of the orders made in the course of a curial 
procedure.
 Mason J concluded that 
 
57
Committal proceedings have also been held to constitute an incidental function 
because they have traditionally been conducted by the judiciary.
  
 
58  In Huddart v 
Parker, Griffith CJ concluded that committal proceedings were non-judicial in nature 
because they merely constituted ‘a preliminary step’ in the curial process, and that 
this step was traditionally carried out by the executive.59
                                                 
54 (1972) 127 CLR 588, 591.  
55 Ibid 503. 
56 Ibid. Stephens J agreed that the power related to judicial power, but did not expressly categorise that 
power as incidental. 
57 Cominos v Cominos (1972) 127 CLR 588, 608. 
58 While this thesis is not directly concerned with the criminal jurisdiction, the reasoning applied by the 
High Court in this regard extends to other Ch IIII jurisdictions. 
59 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357. 
 On the facts, His Honour 
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was not directly concerned with the role of courts in committal proceedings, but, 
rather, with whether powers analogous to committal proceedings could be vested in 
the Comptroller-General (a non-judicial body) in accordance with the first limb of the 
separation doctrine.60
In Pearce v Cocchiaro (‘Pearce’), the High Court confirmed that committal 
proceedings constituted an exercise of incidental judicial power for the purposes of 
the second limb of the separation doctrine.
  
 
61  The challenge in Pearce was to a 
statutory provision of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, which purported to confer a power 
upon special magistrates to determine certain offences summarily during committal 
proceedings.62
In so far as the sub-section confers on the special magistrate power of a non-
judicial kind [viz. the carrying out of committal proceedings] … it is a valid 
law in respect to those matters in relation to which the Parliament may create 
criminal offences.
 The provision was attacked on the basis that, as committal proceedings 
were a non-judicial function, they could not be reposed in a court of summary 
jurisdiction. Having established that special magistrates constituted a ‘court’ for the 
purposes of Ch III, Gibbs J (with whom Stephens, Jacobs and Aickin JJ agreed) 
concluded that: 
 
63
According to the majority, therefore, committal proceedings could be vested in the 
special magistrates (under s 51 (xvii)) because those proceedings were historically 
 
 
                                                 
60 The High Court confirmed that committal proceedings do not constitute an exercise of judicial power 
in Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415, 435-436. Once again, however, the decision turned upon 
whether committal proceedings were exclusive to Federal courts. 
61 (1977) 137 CLR 600. 
62 Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 273 (2) 
63 (1977) 137 CLR 600, 609 (Gibbs CJ; Stephen Jacobs and Aickin JJ in agreement).  
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incidental to the determination of summary offences, and this jurisdiction was validly 
vested by virtue of s 77 (iii). In R v Murphy the High Court was asked to determine 
whether committal proceedings could be vested in the Supreme Court of NSW when 
exercising Commonwealth judicial power. In a lengthy statement (which it is worth 
reproducing in its entirety) the full court of the High Court stated that, although 
 
the relationship between committal proceedings and the trial of an indictable 
offence is such that they are part of the matter which the trial ultimately 
determines, we are also, perhaps necessarily, of the view that the relationship 
is such that to make provision for the conduct of committal proceedings is 
incidental to the investing of a State court with jurisdiction to try an 
indictable offence against a law of the Commonwealth. … The hearing of 
committal proceedings in respect of indictable offences by an inferior court is 
a function which is sui generis. Traditionally, committal proceedings have 
been regarded as non-judicial on the ground that they do not result in a 
binding determination of rights. At the same time they have a distinctive 
judicial character because they are curial proceedings in which the magistrate 
or justices constituting the court is or are bound to act judicially and because 
they affect the interests of the person charged. The procedure followed on the 
hearing of committal proceedings is similar to that followed on the hearing of 
judicial proceedings … Even though they are properly to be regarded as non-
judicial in character, committal proceedings themselves traditionally 
constitute the first step in the curial process, possibly culminating in the 
presentation of the indictment and trial by jury. They have the closest, if not 
an essential, connection with an actual exercise of judicial power.64
 
 
                                                 
64 (1985) 158 CLR 596, 614-16. 
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The fact that historical considerations have been highly influential in the High Court’s 
classification of incidental functions need not be laboured any further. 65  If some 
manner of historical connection were pre-requisite to the vesting of incidental 
functions in federal courts, this would not ‘bode well for the acceptance of mediations 
as a permissible exercise of non-judicial power’.66 Mediation is not sui generis in the 
sense that committal proceedings are. However, as noted above, whether the courts 
have historically carried out a given function is but one of the considerations to be 
taken into account when determining whether it may be vested in a federal court. The 
judicial process invariably changes over time or there would be no need for the 
established incidental power of courts to determine rules of court. Moreover, if courts 
could only ‘do’ what courts ‘have done’ the judicial role would be frozen in time, and 
Parliament’s legislative power under ss 51 (xxiv) and (xxxix) (and the federal 
judiciary’s delegated power under the latter) would be undermined. Despite the 
central role of legal history in the determination of judicial power, therefore, it cannot 
be the sole determinant of it. Indeed, according to Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ, to adopt a purely historical approach to the determination of judicial 
power would ‘be to place reliance upon the elements of history and policy which, 
whilst they are legitimate concerns, cannot be conclusive’.67 Likewise, in R v Joske; 
Ex parte Shop Distributive & Allied Employees Association, Mason and Murphy J 
stated that:68
                                                 
65 For a recent example of the continued emphasis placed on historical considerations, however, see 
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, [16] (Gleeson CJ), [79] (Gummow and Crennan JJ), [595] 
(Callinan J). 
66 Phillip Tucker, 'Judges as mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition?’ (2000) 11 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 84, 88. Although this statement was made in relation to the functions that may be 
vested in Judges in their private capacity, it is equally applicable in the current context.   
67 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245, 267. 
68 (1976) 135 CLR 194. 
  
 
141 
 
 
 
It is no objection that the function entrusted to the Court is novel and that the 
Court cannot in exercising its discretion call in aid standards elaborated and 
refined in past decision; it is for the Court to develop and elaborate criteria 
regulating the discretion.69
There is no reason in principle therefore, why a function which is not historically 
associated with the exercise of judicial power cannot be vested in a Ch III court, 
provided that it does not require that court to act in a non-judicial manner (a 
functional and analytical enquiry). This may occur if courts are involved in the 
creation of new rights, or by undermining the essential attributes of the curial process 
(the ‘judicial process’ implication).
 
 
70
the course of legislation in comparatively recent times does not, in itself, 
provide a foundation for the historical legal approach. If the legislation 
requires the exercise of a power to determine questions the determination of 
which will affect what are traditionally regarded as basic legal rights, the 
judicial nature of the power springs from the effect which the exercise of the 
decision-making function under the legislation will have on legal rights 
 The particular importance attached to the 
former consideration vis-à-vis the historical legal approach was highlighted by Jacob 
J in R v Quinn; 
 
                                                 
69 (1976) 135 CLR 194, 216. See also McTiernan J at 202, who stated that the function was ‘of a 
judicial nature or incidental to the exercise of judicial power’, and Mason and Murphy JJ at 216 who 
concluded that the ‘exercise of the power given … if not in itself an exercise of judicial power (which 
in our opinion it is), is incidental to proceedings for a declaration of invalidity’. 
70 As noted in the following Chapter, the judicial process implication has evolved primarily in a 
procedural fairness context. There is some debate as to whether or not certain substantive rights are 
also protected by the due process component of the implication. See Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, 
Judicial Power and Chapter III in the new High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal law Review 205; Justice 
Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as Well as Procedural 
Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235. However, recent authority suggests that the High Court 
has little interest in extending this limb of the due process component: APLA Ltd v Legal Services 
Commissioner (2006) 224 CLR 322, [217] (Gummow J); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 
[111] (Gummow and Crennan JJ).  
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rather than from the history of similar legislation reposing the function in a 
judicial tribunal.71
Is Mediation an Incidental Judicial Function? 
 
 
The principle that judicial power may only be exercised to determine existing rights, 
and its implications (if any) for judicial mediation, are considered in detail below. The 
judicial process implication is the subject of Chapter 4. 
 
 
The following part of this Chapter examines the primary indicia in more detail. It is 
conceded that mediation cannot be classified as an exclusively judicial function 
(because it does not result in a binding determination of rights), and that it must 
therefore be classified as a non-judicial function. However, it is argued that the power 
to mediate may nevertheless be vested in a Ch III court as an incidental judicial 
function (provided that it is not an exclusively executive or legislative function). 
Since mediation is unlikely to affect substantive rights, it is concluded that the critical 
question is whether judicial mediation can be carried out in accordance with ‘the 
essential character of a court [and] with the nature of judicial power.72
An Existing Controversy 
 
 
 
In Re Judiciary, it will be recalled,73
                                                 
71 (1977) 138 CLR 1, 12. 
72 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan Deane and Dawson JJ). 
73 See above Chapter 2 n 126 and accompanying text. 
 Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke 
JJ held that the High Court could not provide advisory opinions - despite the fact that 
their Honours considered such opinions to be a judicial function - because they were 
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not a ‘matter’ in respect of which Commonwealth judicial power could be 
exercised.74 This was because, ‘there can be no matter within the meaning of the 
section [s76] unless there is some immediate right, duty or liability to be established 
by the determination of the Court’.75 To this may be added the rule that courts may 
not actively seek out disputes in the manner of inquisitors, but must wait until ‘called 
upon to take action’.76
Generally speaking a controversy will involve at least two disputants, although there 
are exceptions. Strictly speaking, for example, child-related proceedings under Pt. VII 
of the Family Law Act 1975 involve an investigation into the best interests of the child 
as opposed to the resolution of a dispute between parties per se.
 
 
77
 
 Other functions 
which do not involve the resolution of an existing controversy between two parties 
have been successfully vested in federal courts on the basis that they have historically 
fallen to the judiciary. As discussed above, however, these exceptions are best 
explained on the basis that they are incidental to the exercise of judicial power. 
As judicial mediation does not affect the manner in which disputes are initially 
brought before the courts, it satisfies this aspect of judicial power.78
                                                 
74 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265. 
75 Ibid 265. 
76 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ). 
77 The status of Commonwealth child-related proceedings is highly debatable. According to Anthony 
Dickie, Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 provides the Commonwealth with powers to ‘make an 
order relating to the “welfare” of children … [that is] … virtually equivalent to the power possessed by 
a Supreme Court pursuant to its parens patriae jurisdiction’. Anthony Dickie, Family Law (4th ed 2002) 
395. However, the powers provided by Part VII power are limited and flow from statute – not the 
Constitution. Given that implied procedural rights are attached to judicial power, it may not be accurate 
to say that child-related proceedings do not involve the resolution of a controversy between two parties. 
78 The LAT process may be an exception to this rule, as child-related proceedings do not strictly 
speaking involve a dispute between parties. However, it can hardly be doubted that child-related 
proceedings constitute ‘matters’ under Ch III. 
 Applying Griffith 
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CJ’s definition of judicial power, the next issue is how, if at all, judicial mediation 
will affect the power of a court to issue a binding and authoritative decision.79
An Authoritative, Binding and Conclusive Determination 
  
 
 
The terms ‘authoritative’, ‘binding’ and ‘conclusive’ are interchangeable, 80
1. the doctrine of res judicata (matters cannot be litigated twice by the same 
parties), 
 and 
‘encompass three qualities of a judicial decision’:  
 
 
2. the doctrine of functus officio (judges cannot reopen the same case except in 
very limited circumstances),  
 
3. the doctrine of collateral attack (a decision made within jurisdiction cannot be 
challenged in collateral proceedings - as opposed to a direct attack by way of 
appeal etc).81
 
 
In addition, the High Court has confirmed that a decision cannot be subject to a 
complete de novo hearing before it can be enforced.82
 
 Brennan J (as then was) has 
justified the requirement that judicial power be exercised to produce a binding 
decision on the basis that:   
                                                 
79 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357.  
80 Gabriel Moens’ and John Trone, Lumb and Moens’ The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia: Annotated (6th ed 2001), 233. 
81 Ratnapala, above n 10, 129-34. 
82 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153. 
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Both public policy and the interests of the litigants require that there should 
be an end to litigation as to a particular subject matter once a judgment 
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties as to that matter has been 
recovered.83
Prehearing Functions? 
 
 
How, then, are the various prehearing processes which courts frequently engage in to 
be classified according to this core element of judicial power? The following section 
demonstrates that these functions constitute discrete steps, or ‘incidents’, in the 
litigation process. 
 
 
In the US, judicial power is defined by Article III, and has been restricted by the 
Supreme Court to ‘the trial and determination of cases’.84 Matters such as the taking 
of affidavits, arresting individuals and committing those individuals for trial are not 
an exercise of judicial power because they do not result in a binding determination of 
rights. 85  The situation in Australia is effectively the same. As Patrick Lane has 
explained, when determining whether a power is judicial, ‘one looks at the decision, 
rather than the process to get there’. 86
                                                 
83 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589, 609, citing Lockyer v Ferryman 
(1877) LR 2 AC 519.  
84 Robertson v Baldwin, 165 US 275, 279 (1897).  
85 Ibid. According to Justice Brown, the definition of judicial power in Art III extends ‘only to the trial 
and determination of “cases” in courts of record … [but] … Congress is still at liberty to authorize the 
judicial officers of the several States to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts 
not of record – such, for instance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial 
offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as 
may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power, rather than a part of the judicial power itself’. 
86 Lane, above n 22, 467. 
 Windeyer J made the same point in the 
Tasmanian Breweries case: 
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An exercise of judicial power, in the relevant sense, obviously means more 
than mere adjudication … Duties of adjudication may be incidental to 
administrative tasks which are performed as part of the executive power of 
government … But that does not mean that [the executive] … are exercising 
the judicial power. That only occurs at the final stage of the process.87
Because a function must yield a binding decision to be considered ‘exclusively 
judicial’, prehearing functions are invariably non-judicial. This was the reasoning 
applied in Pearce and Murphy, as discussed above, with the result that committal 
proceedings are considered non-judicial in nature despite the fact that they do, in a 
sense, determine rights and interests. As a prehearing function which does not 
determine rights in any sense, mediation is ipso facto non-judicial.
 
 
88
However, the fact that mediation is non-determinative does not have any bearing upon 
whether the power to mediate may be vested in the judiciary as an incidental function. 
It is the capacity to make a binding determination that must exist in a judicial tribunal 
– not the making of a binding determination as such. Parties have always been free to 
settle during trial proceedings. A settlement agreement is enforced as a consent order 
issued by the court, thus the objectives of the doctrines of res judicata, functus officio 
and collateral attack are still satisfied. Not only may judicial power be exercised in 
proceedings which result in non-adjudicated settlements, such outcomes are generally 
preferred to the provision of a binding determination.
  
 
89
                                                 
87 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 398 
(emphasis added). 
88 Various commentators have reached the same conclusion. See Tucker, above n 66, 89; Justice 
Michael Moore, ‘Judges as Mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition or Accommodation?’ (2003) 14 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 188; David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – 
Part 1’ (2006) 17 ADRJ 130, 135. 
89 Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2005) 165. 
 As discussed in Chapter I, 
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modern case management systems are designed to encourage settlement as early as 
possible in the trial process, and various high profile judges have expressed their 
preference for negotiated outcomes whenever possible.90
In conformity with the general principle that an appeal does not lie from a 
decision made otherwise than in the exercise of judicial power, it has been 
held that, interlocutory orders aside, an appeal will not lie under s73 from a 
decision which does not finally determine the parties' rights and obligations 
in controversy.
  
 
A related question, which it is convenient to address at this stage, is whether judicial 
mediation might unconstitutionally interfere with the appellate jurisdiction of the 
High Court. In Mellifont v Attorney General of Queensland (‘Mellifont’), Mason CJ, 
Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ stated that: 
 
91
At first glance, this passage might be taken to suggest that no appeal will lie from a 
successful judicial mediation, because no final decision will have been made by the 
judge. However, and as the majority pointed out in Mellifont,
 
 
92
                                                 
90 See, for example, Kewside Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd [1990] ATPR 46-059, 102 (French J); 
Hemmes Hermitage Pty Ltd v Abdurahmann (1991) NSWLR 343 (Kirby J). 
91 Citing Smith v Mann (1932) 47 CLR 426, at 445-446; Minister for Works (WA) v Civil and Civic Pty 
Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 273, at 277-279, 281, 285-287, 288-292; Yule v Junek (1978) 139 CLR 1, at 14; 
Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438, at 450; Swiss Aluminium Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1987) 163 CLR 421, at 425. 
92 Mellifont v A-G (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289, 300. 
 s 73 of the 
Constitution provides an appellate jurisdiction in respect of ‘all judgments, decrees, 
orders, and sentences’. Any settlement reached by the parties during judicial 
mediation will be enforced as a consent order, and a right of appeal will therefore lie 
to the High Court. Of course, there is unlikely to be any basis on which to seek an 
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appeal (unless there has been a manifest breach of procedural fairness), but this does 
not undermine s 73.93
Pre-Existing Rights 
 
 
The only remaining question (in order to satisfy the primary indicia) is whether 
mediation involves the creation of new rights. Ch III courts apply rights, they do not 
create them. Thus (applying a strict separation of powers), the creation of new rights 
is not ‘judicial’. This aspect of the primary indicia overlaps with the ‘judicial process’ 
implication addressed in the following Chapter, as both take account of the manner in 
which judicial power is exercised.  
 
 
The notion that judicial power may only be exercised to determine existing rights, and 
cannot be invoked to create new rights, is an underlying assumption of the common 
law judicial model. For ease of reference, it is convenient to refer to this limitation as 
the ‘existing rights’ principle. In Blackburn, Low & Co v Vigors, Lord McNaughten 
expressed his belief that, ‘it is not the function of a Court of justice to enforce or give 
effect to moral obligations which do not carry with them legal or equitable rights.94 
Similarly, in Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander, Isaacs and 
Rich JJ recognised that, a ‘court of law has no power to give effect to any but rights 
recognized by law’.95
                                                 
93 Philip Tucker has also pointed out that it may be ‘effectively impossible for ... appellants to adduce 
sufficient evidence to sustain their case’. This danger is examined in Chapter 8. Above n 66, 90.  
94 (1887) 12 QBD 531. 
95 (1918) 25 CLR 434, 464. 
 This can be contrasted with arbitral tribunals, their Honours’ 
explained, because arbitral tribunals determine: 
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a claim by one of the disputants that existing relations should be altered, and 
by the other that the claim should not be conceded. It is therefore a claim for 
new rights. And the duty of the arbitrator is to determine whether the new 
rights ought to be conceded in whole or in part … But his declaration of 
opinion does not make it law. He does not legislate. It is always the State 
which gives the arbitrators opinion efficacy, and stamps his decision with the 
character of a legal right or obligation.96
The tension between legal realism and Griffith CJ’s definition of judicial power is 
obvious,
 
 
97 but even if legal discretions do effectively allow judges to ‘make law’ this 
does not necessarily undermine the idea that judges should only determine existing 
rights. What this requirement ‘excludes from the concept of judicial power is the 
authority to resolve matters of legal right in the manner of legislative and 
administrative bodies’.98 Discretionary powers may involve judges in law making, but 
it is law making restricted by due process and limited by the facts of the cases 
presented before the court.99
Nevertheless, as the consideration of ‘policy’ is ordinarily a legislative and/or 
executive function, functions which create new rights by reference to policy concerns 
are liable to undermine the second limb of the separation doctrine. In Precision Data 
Holdings Ltd v Wills (‘Precision Data’), a full court of the High Court stated that: 
  
 
                                                 
96 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander (1918) 25 CLR 434, 464. 
97 Legal realists argue that legal decisions cannot be reached by the application of existing legal rights 
alone, because a number of equally legitimate outcomes can be generated in disputes by recourse to the 
same general principles. According to Roberto Unger, for example, the legalist/formalism argument is 
stymied by ‘a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of, a method of legal 
justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, 
disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary. Though such conflicts may not be 
entirely bereft of criteria, they fall far short of the rationality that the formalist claims for legal analysis’. 
Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976), 561. 
98 Ratnapala, above n 10, 128. See also Zines, above n 10, 254. 
99 Ibid. 
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Functions may be classified as either judicial or administrative according to 
the way in which they are to be exercised. So, if the ultimate decision may be 
determined not merely by the application of legal principles to ascertained 
facts but by considerations of policy also, then the determination does not 
proceed from any exercise of judicial power. That is not to suggest that 
considerations of policy do not play a role, sometimes a decisive role, in the 
shaping of legal principles … Furthermore, if the object of the adjudication is 
not to resolve a dispute about the existing rights and obligations of the parties 
by determining what those rights and obligations are but to determine what 
legal rights and obligations should be created, then the function stands 
outside the realm of judicial power.100
As Lumb and Moens explain, generally ‘speaking, the wider the discretion the more 
likely it is that the power conferred upon the body will be treated as a power to create 
new rights (that is, as constitutive and not interpretative)’.
 
 
101
The existence of some judicial discretion to apply or withhold the 
appointed legal remedy is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
determination of such a matter in the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth. But it is perhaps necessary to add that the discretion must 
 This proposition accords 
with the view expressed by Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Kitto and Taylor JJ stated in R v 
Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (‘R v Spicer’): 
 
                                                 
100 (1991) 173 CLR 167, 189. 
101 Moens’ and Trone, above n 80, 535. 
151 
 
 
 
not be of an arbitrary kind and must be governed or bounded by some 
ascertainable tests or standards.102
As might be expected, the earliest cases to consider the existing rights principle arose 
in the context of the first limb of the separation doctrine. In Silk Brothers Ltd v The 
State Electricity Commission of Victoria,
 
 
103
In R v Spicer, a majority of the High Court held that a power purportedly granted to 
the Industrial Court to disallow ‘any rule of an organisation which, in the opinion of 
the court’ was, inter alia, ‘tyrannical or oppressive’ or imposed ‘unreasonable 
conditions upon the membership of any member or upon any applicant for 
membership,’
 the High Court held that the power vested 
in judicial tribunals to fix fair rents was not an exercise of judicial power (despite the 
fact that the decision was based on an existing controversy and binding in nature) 
because it required a consideration of broad economic policy factors - ergo the 
creation new rights (the right to receive a higher rent).  
 
104 attempted to vest in the Court a discretion which could not be carried 
out in a judicial manner. In the opinion of Dixon J (as he then was), the criteria 
involved were, ‘vague and general and give much more the impression of an attempt 
to afford some guidance in the exercise of what one may call an industrial discretion 
than to provide a legal standard governing a judicial discretion’.105 The discretion was 
therefore invalid under the second limb of the separation doctrine, because the 
‘consideration … of industrial policy’106
 
 is an executive or legislative function. 
                                                 
102 (1957) 100 CLR 312, 317. 
103 (1943) 67 CLR 1. 
104 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s 140. 
105 R v Spicer (1957) 100 CLR 277, 290 (see also Kitto J at 306). 
106 R v Spicer (1957) 100 CLR 277, 310 (Taylor J). 
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Again, in the Tasmanian Breweries case, a majority of the High Court held that the 
discretionary power purportedly granted by the Trade Practices Act 1965 to 
determine whether a trade practice or restriction was contrary to ‘the public interest’, 
could not be vested in a federal court as an incident in the exercise of judicial power. 
With reference to the limitations outlined in R v Spicer (above), Windeyer J explained 
that the ‘public interest is a concept which attracts indefinite considerations of policy 
that are more appropriate to law-making than to adjudication according to existing 
law’.107
The Presumption in favour of legislative validity 
  
 
 
In recent years, however, the existing rights principle ‘has not proved to be a great 
restriction on [Parliament’s] … power to confer functions on Courts’.108
It is a received canon of judicial construction to apply in cases of this kind 
with more than ordinary anxiety the maxim Ut res magis valeat quam pereat 
[in order that the thing might rather have effect than it be destroyed]. 
Nullification and confusion of public business are not lightly to be 
ignored...There is always an initial presumption that Parliament did not 
 This is partly 
because, when determining whether a statutory discretion is governed by 
‘ascertainable tests or standards’, the courts will assume that Parliament did not intend 
to exceed its legislative powers. Put differently, they will ‘read down’ legislation so as 
to afford it an interpretation that accords with the requirements of Ch III. As Isaacs J 
explained in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd 
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation;  
 
                                                 
107 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 400. 
108 Zines, above n 10, 251. 
153 
 
 
 
intend to pass beyond constitutional bounds. If the language of a statute is 
not so intractable as to be incapable of being consistent with this presumption, 
the presumption should prevail.109
In discharging our duty of passing upon the validity of an enactment, we 
should make every reasonable intendment in its favour. We should give to 
the powers conferred upon the Parliament as ample an application as the 
expressed intention and the recognised implications of the Constitution will 
allow. We should interpret the enactment, so far as its language permits, so 
as to bring it within the application of those powers and we should not, 
unless the intention is clear, read it as exceeding them.
 
 
Likewise, in Attorney-General (Victoria) v The Commonwealth, Dixon J warned that:  
 
110
Nothing would tend to detract from the influence and the usefulness of this 
Court more than the appearance of an eagerness to sit in judgment on Acts of 
Parliament, and to stamp the Constitution with the impress which we wish it 
to bear. It is only when we cannot do justice, in an action properly brought, 
 
 
Closely connected to (but distinct from) this presumption is the notion that the 
judiciary should only decide constitutional questions when necessary on the facts. As 
Higgins J stated in Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees’ Union (NSW): 
 
                                                 
109 (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180. 
110 (1945) 71 CLR 237, 267. 
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without deciding as to the validity of the Act, that we are entitled to take out 
this last weapon from our armoury. 111
As will be seen, the presumption in favour of legislative validity has facilitated the 
development of the persona designata doctrine, on the one hand, and diluted the 
application of the judicial process implication and the Kable doctrine, on the other. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the High Court is somehow bound by 
this approach. Effective power separation requires an examination of substance as 
well as form, especially when individual rights and liberties are at stake.
 
 
112
When a constitutional limitation or restriction on power is relied on to 
invalidate a law, the effect of the law in and upon the facts and circumstances 
to which it relates – its practical operation – must be examined as well as its 
terms in order to ensure that the limitation or restriction is not circumvented 
by mere drafting devices.
 Brennan 
CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ made this point in Ha v New South Wales:  
 
113
The relationship between literal and purposive interpretive approaches is explored in 
more detail in the following Chapters. It is uncontroversial to state, however, that the 
former has dominated the High Court’s treatment of the existing rights principle. In R 
v Commonwealth Industrial Court; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
Australia Section, discretionary powers guided by the Courts own view as to what 
 
 
                                                 
111 (1908) 6 CLR 469, 590. See also: Lambert v Weichelt (1954) 28 ALJR 282, 283 (Dixon CJ), Cheng 
v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248, 270 [58] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ), Re Patterson; Ex 
parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 473-474 (Gummow and Hayne). 
112 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
113 (1997) 189 CLR 465, 498. Even judges noted for their tendency towards legalism have strayed from 
the presumption in favour of validity to achieve a desired outcome. See, for example, XYZ v The 
Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532, 591-595 [174]-[180] (Callinan and Heydon JJ).  
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was ‘oppressive’, ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unjust’, were considered to be capable of 
‘strictly judicial application’ despite the fact that these criteria were ‘more readily … 
associated with administrative rather than judicial discretions’.114 Likewise, in R v 
Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builder’s 
Labourers’ Federation, the discretionary power to invalidate rules of an organisation 
which were ‘oppressive, unreasonable and unjust’115 was considered by Barwick CJ 
to be ‘eminently suitable’ criteria for judicial application.116 Again, in Cominos v 
Cominos, the High Court held that the discretionary power of the Court to make such 
orders as ‘it thinks proper’ and as are ‘just and equitable’, were ‘not so indefinite as to 
be susceptible of strictly judicial application’.117
Any residual belief that the existing rights principle limits Parliament’s power to vest 
law-making powers in federal courts has surely evaporated in the wake of the High 
Court’s ruling in Thomas v Mowbray.
 The discretionary power examined in 
Cominos v Cominos can be seen to encompass both substantive and procedural 
elements, and is considered again in Chapter 4. 
 
118 That case concerned the validity of Div 104 
of the Criminal Code (Cth), which confers upon the Federal Magistrates Court the 
power to make interim control orders for the home detention of a person suspected or 
terrorist activity. Section 104.4(1)(c) requires the Court to consider what is 
‘reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of 
protecting the public from a terrorist act’.119
                                                 
114 (1960) 103 CLR 368 
115 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s 143 
116 (1974) 130 CLR 87, 94. 
117 (1972) 127 CLR 588, 599 (Gibbs J).  
118 (2007) 233 CLR 307. 
119 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.4(1)(c), (d). 
 Having established that the provision in 
question was a valid law under the Commonwealth’s defence and external affairs 
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power,120 a majority of the High Court (Kirby and Hayne JJ dissenting) held that the 
function was capable of judicial application despite the fact, as Kirby J pointed out, 
that it required the Court to make ‘its decision without the benefit of a stated, pre-
existing criterion of law afforded by the legislature’.121
If, as in the present case, Parliament decides to confer a power on the judicial 
branch of government, this reflects a parliamentary intention that the power 
should be exercised judicially, and with the independence and impartiality 
which should characterise the judicial branch of government … The power to 
restrict or interfere with a person's liberty on the basis of what that person 
might do in the future, rather than on the basis of a judicial determination of 
what the person has done, which involves interfering with legal rights, and 
creating new legal obligations, rather than resolving a dispute about existing 
rights and obligations, is in truth a power that has been, and is, exercised by 
courts in a variety of circumstances. It is not intrinsically a power that may 
be exercised only legislatively, or only administratively.
 According to Gleeson CJ: 
 
122
It is apparent that the majority view sprang from the perceived desirability of judicial 
oversight in respect of administrative powers affecting individual liberties. Such 
oversight, Gleeson CJ explained, should ‘be regarded as a good thing, not something 
to be avoided’.
 
 
123
                                                 
120 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 324 [6] (Gleeson CJ), 359-364 [132] – [148] (Gummow 
and Crennan J), 400 [262] (Kirby J), 459 [444] (Hayne J), 506 [590] (Callinan J), 511 [611], 525 [649] 
(Heydon J).  
121 Ibid 419 [322] (Kirby J). 
122 Ibid 327-28 [15] (Gleeson CJ). 
123 Ibid 329 [17] (Gleeson CJ). As discussed in Chapter 8, a belief in the benefits brought to certain no-
judicial functions by judicial independence and impartiality in matters pertaining to civil rights also led 
to the development of the person designata doctrine (in that instance the issue was the granting of 
telephone intercept warrants). 
 Callinan J similarly pointed out that, were it accepted that the power 
to issue control orders could not be carried out judicially, this could ‘conceivably 
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produce the consequence that a person in the plaintiff's position might be subjected to 
a form of administrative detention’. 124  And, in His Honour’s view, risks ‘to 
democracy and to the freedoms of citizens are matters of which courts are likely to 
have a higher consciousness’.125
Academic commentary concerning Thomas v Mowbray has focussed principally on 
the High Court’s expansive interpretation of the defence power
 
 
126 and the perceived 
inability, highlighted by that case, ‘of Australian judges to prevent unjust human 
rights outcomes in the face of federal legislation that is unambiguous in its intent and 
that falls within a constitutional head of power’.127 This has in turn led to renewed 
calls for the introduction of a bill of rights.128
It is perhaps too easy to state simply that the power to apply pre-existing law 
in order to resolve a dispute between the parties is an expression of judicial 
power; whilst the power to determine the content of rights and obligations 
governing particular circumstances in futuro is a legislative function. As 
 The civil liberties context within which 
the decision was made should naturally be borne in mind when forecasting the 
broader implications of Thomas v Mowbray, but the decision nevertheless exemplifies 
the ineffectiveness of the existing rights principle as a limitation upon Parliament’s 
ability to vest broad policy based discretions in courts. According to Paul Fairall and 
Wendy Lacey: 
 
                                                 
124 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 506 – 507[592]. 
125 Ibid 508 [599]. 
126 Helen Irving, ‘The High Court Fails History in Thomas’ (2007) 45(8) Law Society Journal 54, 54. 
127 Justice Michael McHugh, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?' (Speech delivered at the New 
South Wales Bar Association, Sydney, 8 August 2007), 44. 
128 Ibid; Paul Fairall and Wendy Lacey, ‘Preventative Detention and Control Orders Under Federal 
Law: The Case for a Bill of Rights’ (2008) 31 (3) Melbourne University Law Review 1072, 1096; John 
Von Doussa ‘Reconciling Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism – A Crucial Challenge’ (2006) 13 
James Cook University Law Review 104, 120-23. 
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Thomas v Mowbray demonstrates, this formulation does not logically 
determine whether the power to determine the extent of a control order 
regime based on an assessment of future risk is a judicial or executive or 
indeed legislative function.129
This assessment tallies with the theory espoused by Kenneth Culp Davis, that all 
governmental decision-making involves an element of discretion, and that the 
question is not therefore whether discretionary decision-making should occur, but 
how much discretion decision-makers should have.
 
 
130
The effective excision of the existing rights principle removes a significant obstacle to 
the proliferation of certain third-wave reforms, such as case management and less 
adversarial trials, which are realised through the provision of broad substantive 
discretions.
 The gradual erosion of the 
existing rights principle, culminating in Thomas v Mowbray, indicates that the High 
Court is willing to extend significant latitude to Parliament when determining the 
appropriate balance in respect of discretions affecting existing rights, especially 
(although not exclusively) in matters concerning civil rights or the public interest.  
 
131
                                                 
129 Fairall and Lacey, above n 128, 1081. 
130 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Enquiry (1969). 
131 Case management and the less adversarial trials are analysed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 However, it is highly unlikely that judicial mediation would offend the 
existing rights principle in any event, especially if mediating judges do not 
subsequently adjudicate. In such circumstances it is hard to imagine how the 
mediation process might affect the pre-existing substantive legal rights of the parties. 
The pivotal question in respect of judicial mediation, therefore, is whether it may be 
exercised in accordance with the procedural implications derived from Ch III. This 
question is the focus of the following Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4  
IMPLIED JUDICIAL PROCESS 
 
In Chapter 3, it was concluded that a function which is not historically associated with 
the exercise of judicial power may nevertheless be vested in a Ch III court if it can be 
exercised in a judicial manner. It was also noted that, as judicial mediation is unlikely 
to affect substantive legal rights (because mediators have no determinative power), 
the pivotal question in this regard will be whether mediation can be carried out in 
accordance with ‘the essential character of a court [and] with the nature of judicial 
power’.1
This Chapter charts the development of the judicial process implication as it applies to 
federal courts. The first part of the Chapter examines the doctrinal basis of the judicial 
process implication, and identifies two disparate theoretical approaches based on the 
first and second limb of the separation doctrine respectively. The second part of the 
Chapter goes on to demonstrate that, while the full extent of the implied rights 
component of the implication remains uncertain, it is trite law that a degree of 
 The essential characteristics derived by the High Court from Ch III extend to 
various public and individual (due process) rights, and may also extend to certain 
judicial powers necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. Implied 
rights and integrity (which overlap in certain instances) are referred to here as 
components of a broader principle of implied ‘judicial process’ (the ‘judicial process’ 
implication).  
 
                                                 
1 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan Deane and Dawson JJ). 
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procedural fairness (or ‘natural justice’)2 and open justice is required in the exercise 
of judicial power.3 In contrast, it is shown that no procedures have yet been held 
invalid on the basis that they undermine the judicial integrity of a Ch III court.4 In the 
course of this analysis, further support is found for the proposition that the primary 
object of the judicial process implication is to ensure the inherent jurisdiction of the 
courts5 (the fourth of the essential jurisdictions identified in Chapter 2).6 The final 
part of this Chapter demonstrates that, while the judicial process implication 
notionally limits the functions that may be vested in the judiciary by Parliament (in 
combination with the overlapping rule that Parliament may not direct the exercise of 
judicial power) 7 this fact alone will seldom hinder Parliament’s power to vest non-
judicial functions in Ch III courts. By adopting the presumption that Parliament does 
not intend to exceed its legislative power,8
                                                 
2 The term ‘procedural fairness’ is adopted in preference to the term ‘natural justice’ so as to avoid 
confusion ‘between the relevant common law requirements of fairness and detachment and the 
jurisprudence of wider theological and civilian perceptions of natural law’.  Australia Broadcasting 
Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 366 (Deane J). See also Plaintiff 157/2002 v Minister for 
Immigration (2003) 211 CLR 476 [25] (Gleeson CJ). 
3 Fiona Wheeler refers to this component of the implication as the ‘due process’ implication: Fiona 
Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal Law 
Review 205. See also Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (5th ed, 2008), 273-94; Tony 
Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and 
Materials, (3rd ed 2002) 1268; Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally 
Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248. 
4 State legislation has only been held invalid on the basis that it is incompatible with ‘institutional 
integrity’ on two occasions: Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; Re Criminal Proceeds 
Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40. This highly uncertain area of law is discussed at length in 
Chapter 6.  
5 Wendy Lacey, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power, and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of the 
Constitution’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57.  
6 See above Chapter 2 nn 190-194 and accompanying text. 
7 Liyanage v R [1976] 1 AC 259, 290 (Lords MacDermott, Morris, Guest, Pearce and Pearson); 
Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation v Commonwealth 
(1986) 161 CLR 88, 96 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); Leeth v Commonwealth 
(1992) 174 CLR 455, 469-70 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ); Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 36-37 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
8 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J).  
 the High Court will ordinarily strike down 
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an Act/statutory provision only if a presumption in favour of validity cannot be 
applied.9
Judicial Process and the Rule of Law 
 
 
 
The judicial process implication derives from the separation doctrine, the object of 
which (as pointed out in the Chapter 2) is to maintain judicial independence and 
impartiality because of the pivotal role played by the judiciary in Australia’s federal 
system and, ultimately, to maintain the rule of law.10
Prior to the Boilermakers’ Case, Dixon J (as he then was) and Evatt J had already laid 
one possible foundation for the implication of certain procedural requirements under 
the auspices of the incompatibility doctrine.
 The emphasis placed by the 
High Court on the purposive nature of the separation doctrine (as opposed to the 
abstract definition of judicial power) may affect the extent to which federal judges are 
permitted to mediate in accordance with Ch III. 
 
11
                                                 
9 See, for example: A-G (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 267 (Dixon J). Cominos v 
Cominos (1972) 127 CLR 588, 599 (Gibbs J); Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 
617, 650, (Gibbs J); Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 257 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, 
Stephen and Mason JJ); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 531-40 (Mason CJ), 650 
(Dawson J), 692 (Toohey J), 721 (McHugh J). Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 [20] 
(Brennan CJ), 202 [53] (Toohey J), 210-211 [78]-[80] (Gaudron J), 239 [168] (Gummow J) 276 [243]- 
[244] (Hayne J); Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365; Crestin v Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420. 
10 See above Chapter 2 nn 182-94, and accompanying text. See also Polyukhovich, where Gaudron J 
observed that it ‘is not in doubt that Ch III is the source of important prohibitions which, amongst other 
things, operate to guarantee the independence of the federal judiciary’. Polyukhovich v Commonwealth 
(1991) 172 CLR 501, 697. 
11 A majority of the High Court agreed that non-judicial functions may not be vested on a Ch III court 
if they are incompatible with the exercise of judicial power, but disagreed with Dixon and Evatt JJ that 
the function in question was incompatible. R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein 
(1938) 59 CLR 556, 566, 573 (Latham CJ), 573 (Rich J), 576-577, 591 (Starke J). 
 In R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex 
parte Lowenstein (‘Lowenstein’), Their Honours held that a function which allowed 
the Bankruptcy Court to charge and prosecute bankrupts, contrary to the maxim nemo 
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potest esse simul actor et judex (‘no one can be litigant and judge at the same time’), 
did not:  
 
fall within the conception of judicial power. The maxim quoted does not 
express a mere caution against human frailty. It epitomises part of the English 
notion of the judicial function. A long course of development produced a 
conception of the judicial process which placed the court in the position of a 
detached tribunal entertaining and determining civil and criminal pleas 
brought before it … [The provision before the Court] terminated in an act 
which under the Constitution can be done only in the exercise of judicial 
power, namely, the conviction of an offender and the passing of judgment 
upon him; yet the duty is to be performed in a manner at variance with the 
conception of judicial power.12
This conclusion, according to their Honours’, was based not on ‘the wisdom, 
propriety or justice of the course laid down by the provision. It is entirely a question 
of the nature of the legislative power’. 
 
 
13 By referring to ‘English notions’ of the 
judicial function, Dixon and Evatt JJ emphasised the historical meaning of the term 
judicial power, and drew only indirectly on inherited constitutional ‘assumptions’ 
such as the rule of law. 14  Dixon J would presumably have reached the same 
conclusion had he been addressing the issue vis-à-vis the separation doctrine, given 
that he was the senior judge in the Boilermakers’ Case.15
                                                 
12 R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 588-89 (Dixon and Evatt 
JJ). 
13 Ibid 589. 
14 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J). 
15 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia  (1956) 94 CLR 254, 266-99 (Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). See above Chapter 2 nn 149-82 and accompanying text. 
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In his dissenting judgment in the Boilermakers’ Case,16 Williams J also considered 
that Parliament could not vest in Ch III courts ‘functions which courts are not capable 
of performing consistently with the judicial process,’ 17  because this would be at 
variance with those courts’ functions as repositories of Commonwealth judicial power. 
Unlike Dixon and Evatt JJ’s approach however (which focussed on the meaning of 
the term ‘judicial power’, and could have applied with equal effect under the 
separation doctrine), Williams J identified this requirement in order to demonstrate 
that the strict separation of judicial called for by the majority was unnecessary to 
protect the judiciary’s role as the guardian of the Constitution.18
Of course, the ‘incompatibility’ approach was outrun by the ‘second limb’ of the rule 
in the Boilermakers’ Case
   
 
19 (that Ch III courts may only exercise judicial power of 
functions incidental thereto).20 In the early 1990’s, however, the High Court (led by 
Deane and Gaudron JJ) found that an adherence to the ‘judicial process’ was also an 
implicit requirement of the separation doctrine.21 Christine Parker has observed that 
‘the precise basis’ upon which their Honours constructed this implication is unclear, 
but identifies a number of possible rationales. 22
                                                 
16 Williams J intimated that he would have agreed with Dixon and Evatt JJ that the non-judicial 
functions in question in Lowenstein were incompatible with the Court’s judicial functions. R v Kirby; 
Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 313. 
17 His Honour appeared to adopt his dissenting position for essentially pragmatic reasons, observing 
that ‘until very recently ... the Arbitration Court has always been accepted as a body properly 
constituted to undertake its dual activities’. Ibid 315. 
18 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 316. 
19 Although it would later be revived as a means of limiting the functions that may be vested in federal 
judges in their private capacity (analysed in Chapter 6), and of limiting State and Territory legislative 
power in respect of State and Territory courts (analysed in Chapter 7). 
20 Boilermakers’ Case (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271. 
21 Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 149, 150 (Gaudron J); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 
172 CLR 501, 607 (McHugh J), 703-04 (Gaudron J); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 
486-87 (Toohey and Deane JJ), 501-02 (Gaudron J); Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 
176 CLR 1, 27-28 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
22 Christine Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional Principle' (1994) 16 
Adelaide Law Review 341, 354. 
 Building on Christine Parker’s 
analysis, Fiona Wheeler has identified two ‘alternate theories for derivation of the due 
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process principle’.23 While these rationales/theories were identified in an individual 
rights context (reflecting a general trend in constitutional scholarship at the time),24
The first approach, adopted initially by Deane J, is founded on the ‘general policy’ of 
the separation doctrine;
 
the same reasoning naturally applies to the integrity component of the judicial process 
implication.  
 
25  that is to say, to ensure judicial independence and 
impartiality because of the critical role played by the judiciary in the ‘maintenance 
and enforcement of the boundaries of federalism’.26
The main object of the sometimes inconvenient separation of judicial from 
executive and legislative functions separation … will, of course, be achieved 
only by the Constitutions requirement that judicial power be vested 
exclusively in the courts which it designates if the judicial power so vested is 
exercised by those courts in accordance with the essential attributes of the 
curial process. Indeed, to construe Ch. III of the Constitution as being 
concerned only with labels and as requiring no more than that the repository 
of judicial power be called a court would be to convert it into a mockery, 
rather than a reflection, of the doctrine of separation of powers … [I]n 
insisting that the judicial power of the Commonwealth be vested only in the 
courts designated by Ch. III, the Constitution’s intent and meaning were that 
 Deane J’s approach draws on the 
first limb of the rule in the Boilermakers’ Case by emphasising the purpose behind the 
Constitutions exclusive vesting of judicial power in courts. In Polyukhovich v The 
Commonwealth of Australia (‘Polyukhovich’), His Honour stated that:  
 
                                                 
23 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 209. 
24 Lacey, above n 5, 57-58. 
25 Parker, above n 22, 354. 
26 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 276. 
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judicial power would be exercised by those courts with all that that notion 
essentially requires’.27
Thus, in Deane J’s view, the first limb of the separation doctrine has two purposes: to 
ensure that exclusively judicial functions are exercised in a judicial manner, and to 
protect those functions from legislative interference.
  
 
28 Put differently, the reason for 
the exclusive vesting of functions in the judiciary is not only to prevent their 
usurpation by Parliament, but because the rule of law requires that judges act 
judicially to protect individual rights and to safeguard the legitimacy of judicial 
decision-making.29
Those provisions [of Ch III] not only identify the possible repositories of 
Commonwealth judicial power. They also dictate and control the manner of 
its exercise. They are not concerned with mere labels or superficialities. They 
are concerned with matters of substance. Thus, in Ch III's exclusive vesting 
of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the ‘courts’ which it 
designates, there is implicit a requirement that those ‘courts’ exhibit the 
essential attributes of a court and observe, in the exercise of that judicial 
power, the essential requirements of the curial process, including the 
obligation to act judicially.
 His Honour reaffirmed this view in Leeth v Commonwealth (this 
time joined by Toohey J): 
 
30
 
 
                                                 
27 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607. 
28 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 355 (Griffith CJ); New South Wales 
v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 62 (Griffith CJ), 89-90 (Isaacs J), 106-07 (Powers J); 109-10 
(Rich J); Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander (1918) 25 CLR 434, 461 (Barton 
J), 469-70 (Isaacs and Rich JJ), 488 (Powers J). 
29 Deane J’s approach reflects the view expressed by Jacobs J, that the Constitution ‘has traditionally 
protected the rights of persons by ensuring that those rights are determined by a judiciary independent 
of the parliament and the executive’. R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods 138 CLR 1, 11. 
30 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-87. 
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Shortly thereafter, in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Deane J again noted 
(this time joined by Brennan and Dawson JJ) that ‘the Constitution's concern is with 
substance and not mere form,’31 and that (as such) judicial power must be exercised 
consistently with ‘the essential character of a court [and] with the nature of judicial 
power’. 32  Their Honours also explicitly emphasised the connection (albeit in a 
criminal context) between the exercise of judicial power and the rule of law.33
It is crucial to appreciate that, although Deane J’s approach draws on the first limb of 
the separation doctrine (isolating judicial power from legislative usurpation), it 
actually serves, and reinforces the object of, the second limb (by ensuring the integrity 
of the judicial function).
  
 
34 Whereas the majority in the Boilermakers’ Case relied on 
the form and drafting of the Constitution to achieve this end,35 however, Deane J’s 
approach focuses directly on the rule of law values served by Ch III. In contrast, the 
approach favoured by Gaudron J is founded directly in the second limb of the 
separation doctrine, and expands ‘the traditional doctrine of the separation of judicial 
power by including an entirely new element in it that guarantees judicial process to 
individuals’.36
It is upon and with respect to “judicial power” as a concept or abstraction that 
s. 71 has its primary and substantive operation...Judicial power is usually 
defined in terms of its subject matter, but it is a power that, for complete 
 In Harris v Caladine, Gaudron J stated that: 
 
                                                 
31 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 27-28. With reference to Blackstone and Coke, their Honours explained that every ‘citizen is 
“ruled by the law, and by the law alone” and “may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can 
be punished for nothing else.”’ 
34 See above Chapter 2 nn 190-194. 
35 See above Chapter 2 nn 195-205. 
36 Parker, above n 22, 354 – 355. See also Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the 
High Court’, above n 3, 210. 
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definition, requires description of its dominant and essential characteristic, 
namely, that it is exercised in accordance with that process which is referred 
to as “the judicial process.”37
In Polyukhovich, Gaudron J again stated that ‘an essential feature of judicial power is 
that it be exercised in accordance with the judicial process,’
 
 
38
It has often been said that judicial power has not proved susceptible of 
exhaustive or exclusive definition ... [One] feature which renders ‘judicial 
power’ difficult to define is that it cannot be defined only in terms of its 
content. It is necessary to have regard to the manner in and the processes by 
which the power is or is to be exercised. It is an essential feature of judicial 
power that it should be exercised in accordance with the judicial process.
 and in Leeth v 
Commonwealth (‘Leeth’), Her Honour considered that:  
 
39
Despite the fine distinction separating the reasoning adopted by Deane J and Gaudron 
J, Fiona Wheeler has identified two reasons for preferring Deane J’s approach. Firstly, 
the second limb of the separation doctrine has been criticised for requiring ‘excessive 
subtlety and technicality in the operation of the Constitution’.
 
 
40 Attempts to provide a 
definition of judicial power ‘that is at once exclusive and exhaustive’41 have failed 
due to the elusive and fluid nature of the concept.42
                                                 
37 Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 149, 150. 
38 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703-04. 
39 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 501-02.  
40 R v Joske; ex parte Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (1974) 
130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick CJ). See above Chapter 2 195-205 and accompanying text. 
41 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 366 (Dixon CJ, McTeirnan J). 
42 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 501 – 502 (Gaudron J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young 
(1991) 172 CLR 460, 497 (Gaudron J); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 532 
(Mason J). 
 Deane J’s approach avoids the 
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need to ‘place further emphasis on the abstract nature of judicial power,’43 focusing 
instead upon the object of the separation doctrine and the rule of law values served by 
it. The second reason that Fiona Wheeler prefers Deane J’s approach is that ‘the 
second limb of the separation doctrine has not historically been as stable as the first. 
In the 1970s and 1980s it appeared that the High Court might overturn the second 
limb and replace it with an incompatibility test’.44 Even if the second limb of the 
separation doctrine had given way to an incompatibility test, of course, a similar 
implication is likely to have crystallised as an aspect of incompatibility.45
In summary, at least two distinct rationales can be identified for the development of 
the judicial process implication: it may flow from the form and content of the 
Constitution and the abstract meaning of the term ‘judicial power’ (as per Gaudron J), 
or, alternatively, it may reflect the rule of law values which the separation doctrine 
seeks to realise (as per Deane and Toohey JJ). It remains unclear which of these 
rationales is correct, and (for the most part) the answer to this question is unlikely to 
significantly affect the practical consequences of the judicial process implication.
 After all, 
Gaudron J’s approach is, in essence, a restatement of the approach propounded by 
Dixon and Evatt JJ in Lowenstein. Elements of due process have also been recognised 
as measures of incompatibility vis-à-vis the persona designata exception and the 
Kable doctrine (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
46
                                                 
43 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 210. 
44 Ibid 211; citing R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders’ 
Labourers’ Federation (1974) 130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick CJ), 102 (Mason J); Hilton v Wells (1985) 
157 CLR 57. See above Chapter 2 nn 112-21 and accompanying text. 
45 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 211. See also 
George Winterton, ‘The Separation of Power as an Implied Bill of Rights’, in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), 
Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 185, 202 (n 117).   
46 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 210. 
 
However, the importance of the distinction between these approaches will become 
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increasingly apparent if (as seems likely) changing social and economic requirements 
continue to stimulate the introduction of new and varied judicial functions and 
procedures (such as judicial mediation). In Chapter 2, it was explained that historical 
considerations have had the greatest influence on the High Court’s interpretation of 
judicial power. While ‘the values involved in the separation of powers’47
One final point should be made. The conclusion drawn in Chapter 2 – that the 
implications derived from the separation doctrine will apply to rules of court – is 
supported regardless of which approach (Deane or Gaudron JJ’s) is adopted. It is 
implicit in both approaches that the judicial process implication will limit the 
procedures that can be developed by the judiciary. This proposition is borne out by 
the High Court’s judgments in Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd
 have also 
influenced the High Court in this regard, Deane J’s approach increases the emphasis 
placed upon the purposive nature of the separation doctrine and provides a more 
malleable (and meaningful) benchmark against which to measure the boundaries of 
acceptable judicial practice.  
 
48  and Ebner v 
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy49
                                                 
47 Zines, above n 3, 221. 
48 (1999) 198 CLR 334. 
49 (2000) 205 CLR 337. 
 (‘Ebner v Official Trustee’) (which apply and extend 
the judicial process implication in a non-statutory context). As will be seen, however, 
this distinction is unlikely to make a significant difference in any event, as (in all 
probability) the validity of judicial mediation will turn upon how judges exercise the 
discretionary power to mediate in practice; irrespective of its source. 
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Which ‘Rights’ are implied by Ch III? 
 
The following part of this Chapter explores the boundaries of the due process 
component of the judicial process implication, in order to determine which aspects of 
that concept will control the capacity of Ch III courts to engage in judicial mediation. 
This analysis demonstrates that substantive due process rights are unlikely to be 
protected by the judicial process implication, but that common law rules of procedural 
fairness have now been substantially absorbed by it. It is concluded that whether 
judges can mediate in Ch III courts will depend upon whether judicial mediation can 
be carried out without bias, in a manner that ensures the provision of a fair trial, and 
consistently with the requirements of open justice. 
 
Since its inception in Polyukhovich and Leeth the judicial process implication has 
been affirmed on a number of occasions.50 In Nicholas v The Queen (‘Nicholas’) it 
gained majority support,51
Judicial power is not adequately defined solely in terms of the nature and 
subject matter of determinations made in exercise of that power. It must also 
be defined in terms that recognise it is a power exercised by courts and 
exercised by them in accordance with the judicial process.
 and Gaudron J once again restated her belief that: 
  
52
 
  
 
Her Honour went on to identify what she believed to be the essential characteristics of 
a court (or the ‘judicial process’):  
                                                 
50 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy 
(2000) 205 CLR 337; Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, 352 [44] (McHugh J). 
51 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ), 202 (Toohey J), 207-209 (Gaudron), 232 (Gummow JJ). 
52 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73]. 
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In my view, consistency with the essential character of a court and with the 
nature of judicial power necessitates that a court not be required or 
authorised to proceed in a manner that does not ensure equality before the 
law, impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, the right of a party to 
meet the case made against him or her, the independent determination of the 
matter in controversy by application of the law to facts determined in 
accordance with rules and procedures which truly permit the facts to be 
ascertained and, in the case of criminal proceedings, the determination of 
guilt or innocence by means of a fair trial according to law. It means, 
moreover, that a court cannot be required or authorized to proceed in any 
manner which involves an abuse of process, which would render its 
proceedings inefficacious, or which brings or tends to bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.53
In US constitutional theory it is well established that due process consists of 
substantive and procedural aspects.
  
 
This formulation provides a useful point of reference from which to chart the 
development of implied rights (due process and public) on the one hand, and the 
requirements of judicial integrity (encompassed in the final three of Gaudron J’s 
requirements) on the other. 
 
54
                                                 
53 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73]. 
 In a substantive sense it relates to the validity of 
54 The ‘substantive due process’ doctrine is rooted in the fourteenth amendment to the US Constitution, 
s 1 of which states that no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision expansively by incorporating within it the substantive 
rights provided by the Bill of Rights, and certain ‘fundamental rights’ essential to the maintenance of 
‘liberty’. Landmark decisions include: Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) (workers rights); Gitlow 
v New York, 268 US 652 (1925) (right to free speech); Brown v Board of Education, 47 US 583 (1954) 
(right to racial equality); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963) (right to legal representation); 
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) (right to be advised of constitutional rights on arrest); Roe v 
Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (right to procure an abortion); Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 123 (2003) (right 
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laws which conflict with constitutionally protected rights and liberties, and in a 
procedural sense it refers to the requirement that decision-makers adopt procedures 
appropriate to the forum in question. For a while (and as Gaudron J suggested in 
Nicholas) it looked as though the due process implication might also guarantee 
certain substantive due process rights – despite the fact the Australia has no due 
process clause similar to the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, or a bill 
of rights equivalent to the US Charter.55
In Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ reasoned that the ‘conceptual basis of the 
Constitution’
  
 
56 and the implications of the separation of judicial power, require that 
the due process implication be interpreted so as to include a duty to ‘extend to the 
parties before it equal justice, that is to say, to treat them fairly and impartially as 
equals before the law and to refrain from discrimination on irrelevant or irrational 
grounds’.57 Gaudron J also concluded that the Constitution guarantees an element of 
equality before the law, but (consistent with her definitional approach) founded her 
conclusion on the ‘much narrower’ grounds that this guarantee is implicit within the 
meaning of judicial power.58
                                                                                                                                            
to sexual privacy). See generally: Edward Keynes, Liberty, Property, and Privacy: Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Substantive Due Process (1996); Michael J Phillips, The Lochner Court, Myth and 
Reality: Substantive Due Process from the 1890s to the 1930s (2001); Peter J Rubin, ‘Square Pegs and 
Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights’ (2003) 103(4) 
Columbia Law Review 833. 
55 Gaudron J also suggested in Polyukhovich that the due process implication may prevent the 
application of certain retroactive laws: ‘The usurpation of judicial power by a law which declares a 
person guilty of an offence produces the consequence that the application of that law by a court would 
involve it in an exercise repugnant to the judicial process. It is repugnant to the judicial process because 
the determination of guilt or innocence is foreclosed by the law’. Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 
172 CLR 501, 706. 
56 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486. 
57 Ibid 487. 
58 Ibid 501-02. 
  In other words, Gaudron J proposed that a substantive 
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law would be invalid if it directed a Ch III court to treat people unequally, because 
such a law could not be exercised in accordance ‘with the judicial process’.59
Neither of these views found support with other members of the Court, and the 
proposition that Ch III implies substantive due process rights is now doubtful.
 
 
60 
Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ found no basis for the proposition that 
substantive equality is constitutionally guaranteed.61 Nor, according to their Honours’, 
is the exercise of substantively discriminatory laws inconsistent with the judicial 
process. The due process implication is premised upon the need to maintain ‘the 
essential attributes of the curial process’, and this process is principally governed by 
‘the rules of natural justice [which] are essentially functional or procedural’ in 
nature.62 Thus, the due process implication operates to limit the ‘the function of a 
court rather than the law which a court is to apply’.63
A Ch III court cannot be made to perform a function which is of a non-
judicial nature or is required to be performed in a non-judicial manner. 
Chapter III may, perhaps, be regarded in this way as affording a measure of 
due process, but it is due process of a procedural rather than substantive 
nature.
 This position was supported by 
a majority in Kruger v Commonwealth, Dawson J, for example, stating that: 
 
64
                                                 
59 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 501-02. 
60 An alternative view, discussed in more detail below, is that Ch III indirectly protects procedural 
rights by entrenching the inherent/implied power of courts to ensure fairness in legal proceedings. As 
Wendy Lacey points out, it is widely recognised that ‘the powers falling within the scope of a court's 
inherent jurisdiction are ancillary or incidental to a court's general jurisdiction and are, therefore, 
procedural in nature’. Lacey, above n 4, 64-65; citing Peter Twist, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of 
Masters’ (1996) New Zealand Law Journal 351; and Sir Jack Jacob “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court” (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, 24–5.  
61 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469. 
62 Ibid 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ). 
63 Ibid 469. 
64 (1997) 190 CLR 1 [35] (Dawson J). 
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The rejection of Gaudron J’s view is logical if it is accepted that the statutory 
provision in question in Leeth, which required Ch III courts to sentence federal 
offenders in accordance with divergent State or territory legislation, is properly 
characterised as substantive in nature. However, it is well recognised that the dividing 
line between substantive and procedural laws ‘is not always easy to draw,’65 and there 
is merit to the proposition (expressed by Gaudron J in Kruger) that a substantive law 
which requires a Ch III court to exercise a power ‘in a discriminatory manner’ may be 
invalid in both a procedural and a substantive sense. 66 Wong v The Queen 67  and 
Cameron v The Queen68 would appear to confirm this position.69
Whether or not implied due process does in fact encompass certain substantive rights, 
it is of course the procedural aspects of due process which are of particular relevance 
to the validity of judicial mediation (because judicial mediation is non-determinative, 
and therefore unlikely to directly affect substantive rights).
 
 
70 Even in this narrower 
context, however, the scope of constitutionally implied due process remains 
uncertain.71
                                                 
65 Justice Michael McHugh, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as Well as 
Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235, 236. 
66 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 112. See also, APLA Ltd v Legal Services 
Commissioner (2006) 224 CLR 322, [217]; Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in 
the High Court’, above n 3, 224. 
67 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 608 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); 
68 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, 352 [44] (McHugh J): ‘If there is one principle which 
lies at the heart of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, it is that courts, exercising federal 
jurisdiction, cannot act in a way that is relevantly discriminatory’. 
69 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 282; Zines, 
above n 3, 282. 
70 See above Chapter 1 nn 13-17 and accompanying text. 
 
71 Zines, above n 3, 274. See also Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High 
Court’, above n 3, 220. There are, of course, numerous pronouncements to the effect that judges must 
act ‘judicially’. See, for example, Re Watson; Ex Part Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 257-58 
(Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ), ‘a judge of the Family Court exercises judicial power and 
must discharge his duty judicially’. In Ebner; Kirby J observed that ‘it is difficult to read the provisions 
of Ch III, viewed in context and having regard to their purposes, without deriving a requirement that 
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In Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Affairs, a majority 
of the High Court stated that if a function is performed judicially, it is performed 
‘without bias and by a procedure that gives each interested person an opportunity to 
be heard and to deal with any case presented by those with opposing interests’.72 
Although the majority judgment in Wilson arose in the context of the incompatibility 
doctrine, ‘it is but a short step [from this pronouncement] to the due process 
requirement’. 73  As noted above, Gaudron J took this short step in Nicholas, 
explaining that in her view the procedural implications of the due process implication 
include, inter alia, independence and impartiality, and the right of a party to be heard 
in respect of claims made against him/her in accordance with a procedure conducive 
to that purpose. Both of these pronouncements reflect the common law requirements 
of procedural fairness, which comprises two broad heads: the ‘fair hearing rule’ 
(which embodies the principle audi alterum partem, or ‘hear the other side’), and the 
‘rule against bias’ (which reflects the principle nemo judex in parte sua, or ‘no person 
may judge their own case’).74 These two heads are examined in more detail below, 
but it may be stated, in general terms, that Ch III courts must adhere to the principles 
of procedural fairness.75
                                                                                                                                            
the courts for which Ch III provides must be “courts” and act in accordance with the “judicial 
process.”’  
72 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 16 
(Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
73 Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in 
Australia’, above n 3, 259. 
74 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 569-570 (Gibbs CJ) 582 (Mason J) 602 (Wilson J) 628 (Brennan J) 
633 (Deane J). 
  
75 See, for example: Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150 (Gaudron J); Chu Kheng Lim v 
Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 26-27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); Grollo v Palmer 
(1995) 184 CLR 348, 394-95 (Gummow J); Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 (Brennan 
CJ), 208 (Gaudron J). See also Fiona Wheeler, Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III 
in the High Court’, above n 3; Parker, above n 22; Wendy Lacey,  above n 5, 57; Leslie Zines, 
‘Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional Law’ (2002) 5 Constitutional Law and 
Policy Review 21; Patrick Keyzer, ‘Pfeiffer, Lange, the common law of the Constitution and the 
Constitutional right to natural justice’ (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 87; Sir Anthony Mason, 
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It is, however, one thing to state that judges must conduct proceedings in accordance 
with the principles of procedural fairness, and quite another to determine the scope 
and content of that concept in a prescriptive manner. For one thing, the extent to 
which these principles apply will vary from case to case.76 As Graeme Johnson has 
explained, ‘the contents of natural justice range from a full-blown trial into 
nothingness’.77 Procedural fairness cannot be defined in absolute terms because, ‘the 
degree of procedural fairness implied will … be consistent with the significance of the 
right or interest at stake’.78
The authorities show that natural justice does not require the inflexible 
application of a fixed body of rules; it requires fairness in all the 
circumstances, which include the nature of the jurisdiction or power 
exercised and the statutory provisions governing its exercise. 
 Thus, Gibbs CJ explained in National Companies and 
Securities Commission v News Corporation, that: 
 
79
The critical question in most cases is not whether the principles of natural 
justice apply. It is: what does the duty to act fairly require in the circumstances 
of the particular case? 
 
 
Similarly, according to Mason J:  
 
80
                                                                                                                                            
‘Trends in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1995) 18 University of New South Wales Law Journal 237, 
245. 
76 Margaret Allars, ‘Procedural fairness: disqualification required by the bias rule’. (1999) 4 (3) 
Judicial Review 269, 271: ‘Since the content of procedural fairness is flexible, depending upon the 
circumstances of the case, no general rules can be stated as to the kind of hearing which is required’. 
77 Graeme Johnson ‘Natural Justice and Legitimate Expectation in Australia’ (1985) 15 Federal Law 
Review 39, 71. Brennan J accepted this proposition in Kioa v West, (1985) 159 CLR 550, 615-16. 
78 Patrick Keyzer, ‘Constitutional Law’, (2nd ed, 2005) 275. 
79 National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 296, 314. 
80 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 585. 
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In addition, the due process implication does not extend to all aspects of procedural 
fairness. The High Court has approached the constitutional limits of the rule against 
bias and the fair hearing rule discretely; a cautionary approach which recognises the 
elusive nature of procedural fairness, and the inherent ‘danger in entrenching [the 
rules of natural justice] by means of implication from Chapter III so that no evolution 
is possible as new situations or even new social perceptions arise’.81
The Rule against Bias 
 The following 
two sections explore the constitutional entrenchment of these rules in detail, in order 
to determine which procedural rules judicial mediation must comply with if it is to be 
carried out by Ch III courts. 
 
 
Deane J has observed that the apprehension of bias principle covers ‘at least … four 
distinct, though sometimes overlapping, main categories of case’: interest, conduct, 
association, and extraneous information. 82  A distinction was traditionally drawn 
between pecuniary interests, on the one hand, and other interests or categories of bias. 
Thus, a judge who had a pecuniary interest in a matter would be automatically 
disqualified from hearing that matter (irrespective of the circumstances);83 whereas 
the test in all other instances would be whether bias had been ‘reasonably 
apprehended’.84
                                                 
81 Zines, above n 3, 279. 
82 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74 (Deane J). 
83 Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 10 ER 301; Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 
CLR 41,74-75 (Deane J). 
84 R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Lord Hewart); Re Watson; Ex parte 
Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 264 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ); Webb v The Queen 
(1994) 181 CLR 41, 47 (Mason CJ and McHugh J).  
 The distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests has 
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now been abandoned in Australia; as explained in more detail below.85 For a time, 
there was also a question whether the reasonable apprehension test might have been 
replaced by a test of ‘real likelihood’ or ‘real danger,’86 following a series of cases in 
England to that effect. 87 However, any such suggestion was unanimously rejected by 
the High Court in Webb v The Queen.88
The reasonable apprehension test is a test of possibility rather than 
probability. The question [in all instances] is whether the fair minded 
observer may or ‘might’, rather than ‘would’ entertain a reasonable 
apprehension. It is a test which is not always easy to apply for it may involve 
questions of degree and particular circumstances may strike different minds 
in different ways.
 Thus, in Australia: 
 
89
The specific requirements of the rule against bias, and the circumstances in which 
judicial mediation might result in apprehended bias, are considered at length in 
Chapter 8.
 
 
90
                                                 
85 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 356-57 [54-55] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ), 366 -67 [92]-[98] (Gaudron J), 381-90 [141]-[163] (Kirby J dissenting). 
86 R v Sawyer (1980) 71 Cr. App. R. 283, 285-286; R v Spencer [1987] AC 128, 144; R v Gough [1993] 
A.C. 646, 668, 670 (Lord Goff); R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577. 
87 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 51-53 (Mason CJ and McHugh J) 57 (Brennan J), 67-74 
(Deane J), 87-88 (Toohey J). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Margaret Allars, above n 76, 276-77. 
90 See below Chapter 8 nn 66-174 and accompanying text. 
 The remainder of this section focuses on the relationship between the 
rule against bias and Ch III. 
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The bulk of the High Court’s constitutional analysis of the rule against bias has arisen 
in the context of the persona designata exception. 91
Subsequent authority supports the logic of this conclusion. In Ebner v Official Trustee 
in Bankruptcy (‘Ebner v Official Trustee’), two members of the High Court (Gaudron 
and Kirby JJ) found the rule against bias to be an implicit requirement in the context 
of Ch III courts.
 The procedural implications 
derived from Ch III in this area must also apply to federal courts, however, or judges 
would be subject to tighter constitutional controls in their private capacity than they 
would be in their judicial capacity.  
 
92
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ determined matters on the basis of 
common law principles alone, observing that the rule against bias reflects the 
fundamental common law requirement that trials must be conducted by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.
 Ebner v Official Trustee involved two appeals. The first appeal 
(Ebner) arose out of proceedings in the Federal Court, in which the presiding judge 
was a ‘contingent beneficiary’ of a family trust, which in turn had an interest in the 
outcome of proceedings. The second appeal (Clenae) arose out of proceedings in the 
Victorian Supreme Court, during the course of which the presiding judge inherited 
shares in the plaintiff bank. In short, both appeals were founded in apprehended bias 
on the basis that the judge had a pecuniary interest in the proceedings. 
 
93
                                                 
91 The Persona designata exception is considered in Chapter 6. The principal cases are: Hilton v Wells 
(1985) 157 CLR 57; Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; and Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and 
Torres Straight Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
92 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362 [79] (Gaudron J); 382-383 [145]-
[146] (Kirby J). 
93 Ibid 382-344 [3] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also: Forge v Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 79 [73] (Gummow Hayne and Crennan JJ), 
122 [195]. 
 Their Honours noted that a judge may be 
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disqualified (and any judgment/order delivered declared invalid) as a result of ‘actual 
bias’ or a reasonable ‘apprehension of bias’, but did not accept that: 
 
there is a separate and free-standing rule of automatic disqualification which 
applies where a judge has a direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the 
outcome of the case over which the judge is presiding. The principle of 
general application earlier considered would have been sufficient (had it then 
existed) to cover the case of Dimes. For the reasons already explained, a rule 
of automatic disqualification would be anomalous. It is in some respects too 
wide, and in other respects too narrow. There is ‘no reason in principle why it 
should be limited to interests that are pecuniary, or why, if it were so limited, 
it should be limited to pecuniary interests that are direct’.94
That a mere apprehension of bias is sufficient to breach the requirements of 
procedural fairness their Honours explained, ‘gives effect to the requirement that 
justice should be done and be seen to be done’.
  
 
95 Thus, the appropriate test in all 
instances is whether ‘a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the 
judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is 
required to decide’. 96 The majority found no such apprehension to have arisen in 
either of the cases on appeal.97
                                                 
94 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 356-57 [54]-[55] (Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
95 Ibid 382-44 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
96 Ibid. See also R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 258-63 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, 
Stephen and Mason JJ); Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288, 293-94; 
Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 67 (Deane J); Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 492 
[11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
97 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 358 [58] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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Gaudron and Kirby JJ went further, drawing an explicit connection between the 
common law apprehension of bias test and the impartiality requirements implied by 
Ch III. Kirby J expressed the view that ‘the ultimate foundation for the judicial 
requirements of independence and impartiality rests on the requirements of, and 
implications derived from, Ch III of the Constitution’.98
the underlying principle which, on occasions, requires that a judge disqualify 
himself or herself is that courts must act impartially and must also be seen to 
act impartially. These are requirements embedded in the common law and in 
all developed legal systems. In my view, they are also required by Ch III of 
the Constitution.
 Gaudron J was also of the 
opinion that; 
 
99
In light of Ebner v Official Trustee, (and despite the fact that Kirby J and Gaudron 
JJ’s views were, strictly speaking, obiter) it is now clear that the common law 
apprehension of bias rules form an essential part of the judicial process implication. 
According to Leslie Zines, ‘the rules regarding bias seem to be at the heart of the 
judicial process and of the purpose of the separation of powers’.
 
 
100 Likewise, Fiona 
Wheeler has stated that ‘Gaudron J’s view that the rules governing judicial 
disqualification for bias in Australia are constitutional requirements is surely correct 
in federal jurisdiction’. 101
                                                 
98 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 382-83 [145]-[146] (Kirby J). 
99 Ibid 362 [79]. 
100 Lesie Zines, above n 3, 278. 
101 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 216. See also: 
Enid Campbell, ‘Waiver of Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias – A Constitutional 
Issue’ (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 41, 41.  
 These views have since been confirmed by McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ in North Australian Aboriginal 
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Legal Aid Service v Bradley.102
It summary, whether Ch III courts can engage in judicial mediation in accordance 
with the judicial process implication will depend, in part, upon whether, as a 
consequence of judicial mediation, ‘a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably 
apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the 
question the judge is required to decide’.
 Ebner v Official Trustee is also significant in that it 
applies the impartiality limb of the due process implication in a non-statutory context, 
demonstrating (as noted previously) that court procedures and practice directions are 
also susceptible to invalidity if they cause a court to act in a manner which 
undermines the rule against bias.  
 
103
The Fair Hearing Rule 
 This deceptively simple proposition 
conceals a raft of highly complex issues regarding the nature of the judicial function 
and the reality of judicial practice. These issues are the focus of Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
 
Certain aspects of the traditional judicial process which seek to ensure fairness in the 
trial process have also been identified as implicit requirements of Ch III. At common 
law, the fair hearing rule requires that a party should be allowed to make submissions 
(written or oral), to cross-examine witnesses, 104
                                                 
102 (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [29]. 
103 Ibid.  
104 This right is reflected in pt 2.1 div 2, s 27 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).  
 and, in certain circumstances 
(although principally as a defendant in criminal matters), should be entitled to the 
disclosure of information by the opposing party. By and large, the High Court’s 
consideration of the fair hearing rule as an implication of Ch III has taken place in a 
criminal context; reflecting Deane J’s proposition that ‘the guarantee involved in the 
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vesting of judicial power exclusively in Ch.III courts is at its most important in 
relation to criminal matters.105
Because it is an essential feature of judicial power that it be exercised in 
accordance with the judicial process, Ch III provides a guarantee, albeit only 
by implication, of a fair trial of those offences created by a law of the 
Commonwealth which must be tried in the courts named or indicated in s71 
[of the Constitution].
 Until recently, however, this aspect of the due process 
component had only been identified in the dissenting judgments of Gaudron and 
Deane JJ.  In Re Nolan; Ex parte Young, for example, Gaudron J explained that: 
 
106
The fundamental prescript of the criminal law of this country is that no 
person shall be convicted of a crime except after a fair trial according to law. 
In so far as the separation of power is concerned, that principle is entrenched 
by the Constitution’s requirement of the observance of judicial process and 
fairness that is implicit in the vesting of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth exclusively in the courts which Ch.III of the Constitution 
designates.
 
 
In Dietrich v The Queen, Deane J adopted similar reasoning: 
 
107
While the right to a fair trial may be ‘at its most important’ in criminal matters, the 
same implication naturally applies in civil matters, and it was in this context that the 
  
 
                                                 
105 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 581 (Deane J). 
106 (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496. 
107 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326 (Deane J). Gaudron J also reiterated her earlier 
opinion, at 362, that it ‘is fundamental to our system of criminal justice that a person should not be 
convicted of an offence save after a fair trial according to law … The fundamental requirement that a 
trial be fair is entrenched in the Commonwealth Constitution by Ch. III’s implicit requirement that 
judicial power be exercised in accordance with the judicial process’. 
184 
 
 
High Court finally recognised the fair hearing limb of the judicial process 
implication. 108 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (‘Bass’) involved three appeals 
concerning an alleged failure by the Federal Court to provide a fair hearing in respect 
of certain matters determined under the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the Financial 
Services Act 1987 (NSW). 109  Despite observing that no facts had been agreed 
between the parties or determined by the Court in relation to a key issue, the Full 
Court of the Federal Court issued a declaration on the basis of its own ‘view’ of the 
facts, supported only by ‘general background information’ in the amended statement 
of claim.110
Judicial power involves the application of the relevant law to facts as found 
in proceedings conducted in accordance with the judicial process. And that 
requires that the parties be given an opportunity to present their evidence and 
to challenge the evidence led against them. It is contrary to the judicial 
process and no part of judicial power to effect a determination of rights by 
applying the law to facts which are neither agreed nor determined by 
reference to the evidence in the case.
 In a unanimous judgment, a Full Court of the High Court held that the 
Federal Court had failed to accord procedural fairness, and drew a direct connection 
between the fair hearing rule and Ch III: 
 
111
Bass secures the first two limbs of the common law fair hearing rule (that a party 
should be allowed to make submissions and to cross-examine witnesses) at the heart 
 
 
                                                 
108 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334. 
109 Woodlands, Bass & Conca v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (HomeFund case) (1996) 68 FCR 
213. 
110 Ibid 217. 
111 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
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of the due process implication.112 Even in this narrow context, however, the existence 
of a constitutional right to a fair hearing does not afford an absolute constitutional 
protection. As noted above, the requirements of procedural fairness are not fixed, and 
will vary according to the rights at stake and the nature of jurisdiction in question. 
This point has been made repeatedly in the application of the fair hearing rule at 
common law. The admission of certain evidence, for example, (such as confessional 
evidence, hearsay and evidence illegally obtained) has generally been seen as a matter 
of judicial discretion having regard to what is fair in the circumstances.113
This point was made clear in Nicholas. In that instance, the High Court determined 
that the fair hearing rule did not operate to exclude the admission of certain evidence 
obtained illegally by law enforcement.
 It goes 
without saying that the recognition of a constitutionally implied right to a fair hearing 
does not replace this discretion with an obligation to exclude evidence in certain 
circumstances. On the contrary, the constitutionally entrenched right to a fair trial 
prohibits legislation which purports to remove such discretionary powers. 
 
114
                                                 
112 This proposition has been recognised on a number of occasions. See, for example, Gypsy Jokers 
Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, [103] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon 
and Kiefel JJ). See also Ray Fitzpatrick Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning (No 4) [2008] NSWLEC 161 
(Unreported, Sheahan J and Sheehan AJ, 29 April 2008), [47], where it was stated that the ‘High Court, 
in a series of important cases, has clearly established the principle that when a trial court embarks on 
consideration of a separate question it should seek to do so on clearly or easily established facts, or on 
the basis of an agreed statement of facts’.. 
113 This was previously explained without reference to Ch III in Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 
ALJR 656, 666. In the context of confessional evidence, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ stated that 
evidence should be excluded where, ‘it would be unfair to the accused to use his statement against 
him ... Unfairness, in this sense, is concerned with the accused's right to a fair trial, a right which may 
be jeopardised if a statement is obtained in circumstances which affect the reliability of the statement’.  
114 This principle has since been applied by the Supreme Court of South Australia. In Rann v Olson 
(2000) 76 SASR 450, 484 [189], Doyle CJ stated with reference to Nicholas, that if ‘one thing is clear, 
it is that Parliament is at liberty, as it frequently does, to make laws that affect the manner in which the 
courts conduct cases, the evidence that they are permitted to receive, and subject to certain limitations 
the effect that may or must be given to particular evidence’. 
 The appellant had been indicted on drug 
importation charges, and argued that an amended provision of the Crimes Act 1914 
undermined his right to a fair hearing by directing that the court admit evidence 
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obtained illegally; overriding the rule established in Ridgeway v The Queen115 (the 
‘Ridgeway discretion’) that the Court may exclude such evidence on public policy 
grounds.116 The provision in question (s 15x) stated that the court was to disregard 
evidence that narcotics were imported by a law enforcement officer in the course of a 
so-called ‘controlled importation’. This discretion, the appellant argued, was ‘itself an 
exercise of judicial power distinct from a step in the practice or procedure which 
governs the exercise of judicial power’. 117 Brennan CJ (with whom the majority 
agreed) held that the provision did not interfere with a fair hearing as it did not 
‘impede the finding of facts by a jury;’118 it merely increased the material available to 
the court by which it could determine guilt or innocence. Had the provision actually 
determined guilt or innocence (by removing the discretionary power to determine 
what was fair in the circumstances), it would have constituted an unconstitutional 
legislative direction of the judicial power.119
Beyond the general requirements of the common law fair hearing rule secured in Bass, 
the constitutional reach of the fair hearing limb of the judicial process implication 
remains uncertain. As Chief Justice Spigelman observed in Lodhi v R, the ‘High 
Court has not recognised a right to a fair trial as a free standing right’.
 This aspect of the judgment in Nicholas 
is considered in more detail below. 
 
120
                                                 
115 (1995) 184 CLR 19. 
116 The South Australian case of R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24, 35 [43] is also instructive in this area. 
In that case, the appellant argued that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence (a police analysis 
of cannabis found in the possession of the appellant) which had been ‘mistakenly’ destroyed by the 
police before an independent analysis of the substance could be undertaken in accordance with s 52A 
of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). The Supreme Court of South Australia Court of Criminal 
Appeal distinguished the Ridgeway discretion (which Martin J described as the ‘public policy’ 
discretion) from a general ‘discretion focussed upon considerations of unfairness to the accused’. 
117 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 [22] (Brennan CJ).  
118 Ibid 188 [21] (Brennan CJ). 
119 Ibid 206 [67] (Gaudron J). 
120 Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470, [74]. 
 Indeed, even 
the right to trial by jury – positively mandated by s 80 of the Constitution – has been 
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interpreted narrowly by the High Court. 121  Nevertheless, certain features of and 
limitations on the fair hearing implication can be gleaned from subsequent case law. 
In Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd, a majority of the 
High Court limited the implication by ruling that the right against self-incrimination 
(while a fundamental human right) did not extend to corporations.122 In Dietrich, the 
High Court found that the fair hearing rule may require that a court grant a stay of 
proceedings in certain instances (on the facts, an indigent accused charged with a 
federally indictable offence was unable to secure counsel), but did not find a right to 
legal counsel as such.123 In Femcare Ltd v Albright, the Federal Court found that 
while individuals have a right to notification of proceedings, parties to representative 
proceedings had no general right of notification to proceedings taken on their behalf 
(although it may be required in certain circumstances). 124
If, by reason of sleep episodes or serious inattention, the reality or the 
appearance exists that a trial judge has substantially failed to discharge his or 
her duty of supervision and control of the trial process in a trial by jury, then 
enough has been made out to establish a miscarriage of justice. The question 
whether there has been the reality or appearance of a substantial failure by the 
 And, more recently, in 
Rafael Cezan v The Queen, French CJ considered that judicial inattention (the trial 
judge had slept through a significant portion of the hearing) may amount to a breach 
of the fair hearing rule: 
 
                                                 
121 Anthony Gray, ‘Mockery and the Right to Trial by Jury’ (2006) 6(1) Queensland University of 
Technology Law Journal 66. The author explains, at 79-80, that s 80 has been rendered ‘impotent’ 
because Parliament has been allowed to determine arbitrarily which offences are subject to ‘trial on 
indictment’.  
122 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477. See Zines, 
above n 3, 275. 
123 Dietrich v The Queen 1992 177 CLR 292. 
124 (2000) 100 FCR 331 [54]-[84] (Black CJ, Sackville and Emmett JJ). 
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judge to perform his or her duty will [as with all such matters] require 
assessment of a number of factors.125
As discussed in more detail below, French CJ also attempted to link the fair hearing 
rule with the integrity component of the judicial process implication. However, while 
the remainder of the High Court agreed with French CJ that, on the facts, a 
miscarriage of justice had arisen, they did not find it necessary to ‘develop’ or 
‘amplify’ existing constitutional principles to reach this conclusion.
 
 
126
What bearing, then, do these requirements have upon the provision of judicial 
mediation? The simple answer is that, in the vast majority of cases, they are unlikely 
to have any bearing whatsoever. As the Full Court made clear in Bass, the 
requirements of the fair hearing rule relate to the ‘judicial power to effect a 
determination of rights’.
  
 
At the most, therefore, the fair hearing limb of the judicial process implication may 
require that parties be notified of proceedings against them; be given an opportunity 
to present and challenge evidence; have a right against self-incrimination (in the case 
of private individuals); have a right to a stay of proceedings if necessary in the 
interests of justice; and have a right to appropriate supervision of the trial process. 
 
127
                                                 
125 (2008) 236 CLR 358, 387 [93]. This accords with the presumption that the courts will only answer 
constitutional question when necessary on the facts. See Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery 
Employees' Union (NSW) (1908) 6 CLR 469, 590. 
126 Ibid 391 [110] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). Gummow J stated, at 389 [101], that the ‘appeals to 
this Court may be decided favourably to the appellants by reference to the State legislative structure 
and the common law of Australia respecting the character of trial by jury, without entering upon the 
question whether s 80 of the Constitution imposed requirements which both went beyond those of the 
common law and were not satisfied by the conduct of the trial of the appellants’. 
127 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
 In contrast, and as noted at the beginning of Chapter 1, it 
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is an essential feature of mediation that the mediator does not provide a decision.128 
Thus, provided judicial mediation occurs during prehearing, the fair hearing rule is 
unlikely to touch judicial mediation at all. It is conceivable that judicial mediation 
may undermine the fair hearing rule if mediation fails and the matter proceeds to trial. 
In such circumstances an allegation or insinuation may have been made during 
mediation which, though inadmissible as evidence, influences the judge’s decision. If 
the evidence is not formally admitted then the affected party might argue that he or 
she has been denied the opportunity to challenge it; contrary to accepted rules of 
evidence.129
                                                 
128 NADRAC, Alternative Dispute Resolution Definitions (1997), 5. Hugh Landerkin and Andrew Pirie, 
‘Judges as Mediators: What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?’ (2003) 82(2) 
Canadian Bar Review 249, 256; Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (2005) 65. 
129 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). The rule in Brown v Dunn supports the fair hearing rule by 
requiring that a party, ‘put to an opponent’s witness in cross-examination the nature of the case upon 
which it is proposed to rely in contradiction of his evidence’. Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] 
Qd R 65, [31]-[36] (Fryberg J). Likewise, numerous principles enshrined within the Evidence Act are 
instrumental to the assurance of a fair trial, such as, for example, the ‘opinion rule’ and the ‘credibility 
rule’ (ss 76, 102) which exclude certain types of non-probative evidence. Indeed, the intimacy of the 
connection between evidentiary principles and the provision of a fair trial is such that the ‘no evidence 
rule’ (viz. that a decision affecting individual rights can be made only on the basis of probative 
evidence) has been recognised, from time to time, as a third, independent rule of procedural fairness. In 
Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808, 820, for example, the Privy Council considered that the 
‘rules of natural justice which are germane to this appeal can, in their Lordships’ view, be reduced to 
[the following two rules] … The first rule is that the person making a finding in the exercise of … a 
jurisdiction must base his decision upon evidence that has some probative value … The second rule is 
that he must listen fairly to any relevant evidence conflicting with the finding and any rational 
argument against the finding that a person represented at the inquiry, whose interests may be adversely 
affected by it [presents]’. (Lords Diplock, Keith, Scarman, Bridge and Templeman). In Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal v Alan Bond & Ors (1990) 170 CLR 321, 356-57, Mason CJ implicitly 
acknowledged the ‘no evidence’ rule by reference to Mahon and various other English decisions 
(although it is unclear whether His Honour viewed the rule as a principle of natural justice or as an 
ultra vires grounds for judicial review). 
 However, in such circumstances the rule against bias would provide a 
more appropriate avenue of appeal, as it would in reality be the possibility that the 
judge may not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the dispute (on the basis of 
extraneous information) that would be the real concern – not the inability of the 
affected party to challenge the probity of evidence. The rule against bias is examined 
in more detail vis-à-vis judicial mediation in Chapter 8. 
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Open Justice 
 
One final aspect of the due process component exists which may be of relevance to 
the development of judicial mediation. In addition to procedural fairness, it is a core 
feature of the common law tradition that proceedings should be held in public. In 
Daubney v Cooper, the King’s Bench stated that ‘it is one of the essential qualities of 
a Court of Justice that it’s proceedings should be public, and that all parties who be 
desirous of hearing what is going on ... have a right to be present’.130 In the leading 
English case on the matter, Scott v Scott, the House of Lords identified open courts as, 
‘a sound and very sacred part of the constitution of the country and the administration 
of justice’.131 Open justice is also a central feature of the US judicial system. In a 
criminal context, the ‘right’ to open justice is expressly recognised in the Sixth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, which requires ‘a speedy and public trial’, and in 
Richmond Newspapers Inc v Virginia the US Supreme Court found that a public right 
to attend criminal trials is afforded by the First and Fourth Amendments.132
Unsurprisingly, therefore, open justice has also been described as ‘an axiom of 
Australian law’.
  
 
133 In Dickason v Dickason, a Full Bench of the High Court held that, 
‘there is no inherent power in a Court of justice to exclude the public in as much as 
one of the normal attributes of a Court is publicity, that is the admission to the public 
to attend proceedings’. 134
                                                 
130 (1829) 109 ER 438, 440. 
131 [1913] AC 417, 473 (Lord Shaw). 
132 448 US 555 (1980). 
133 Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Seen to be Done: the Principle of Open Justice – Part 1’ (2000) 74 
Australian Law Journal 290, 293. 
134 (1913) 17 CLR 50, 51. 
 Again, in Russell v Russell, the High Court held that a 
provision of the Family Law Act 1975 which required State courts exercising Ch III 
judicial power to sit in camera was beyond Parliament’s legislative power, as the 
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requirement of ‘publicity’ represents a fundamental distinction between the judicial 
and administrative powers.135
There can be little doubt that open justice is also an implicit requirement in the 
exercise of federal judicial power.
  
 
136  In Re Nolan; Ex parte Young, Gaudron J 
expressed the view that the judicial process includes, ‘open and public enquiry 
(subject to limited exceptions)’.137 In Grollo v Palmer, McHugh J confirmed that 
‘open justice is the hallmark of the common law system of justice and is an essential 
feature of the exercise of federal judicial power’. 138  More recently still in K-
Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court, and with specific reference to State 
courts vested with Ch III judicial power (Re Nolan involved a military tribunal, 
Grollo the persona designata exception), French CJ stated that open justice is ‘an 
essential part of the functioning of courts in Australia’.139 Thus, legislation which 
requires proceedings to be held in private is likely to be invalid - subject to the 
‘direction rule’, discussed below,140 and various historical exceptions.141
                                                 
135 (1976) 134 CLR 495, 520 (Gibbs J). See also McPherson v McPherson [1936] AC 177, 200 (Lord 
Blanesburgh).  
136 Zines, above n 4, 274-75; Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally 
Entrenched Due Process in Australia’, above n 4, 261-62. Following Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) 
(2004) 223 CLR 57, however, it seems unlikely that open justice is an implied requirement in State 
courts. This case is examined in detail in Chapter 6. 
137 (1990) 172 CLR 460, 496. Gaudron J does not define what these limited exceptions are. Nor did Her 
Honour do so in Harris v Caladine, a judgment to which she referred when making this statement 
(1991) 172 CLR 84,150-52). However, following Harris v Caladine one obvious exception to the 
requirement that the judicial process be held in public is in the case of judicial functions carried out by 
court officers (see Chapter 2). 
138 (1995) 184 CLR 348, 379. 
139 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2008) 252 ALR 471 [10]. 
140 See below nn 214-37 and accompanying text. 
 
141 As Patrick Keyzer has observed, ‘the principle of open justice was always qualified’. ‘Media Access 
to Transcripts and Pleadings in “Open Justice”: A Case Study (2002) 2(3) The Drawing Board 209, 
210. See also Chief Justice Beverley McLachlan, ‘Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence – To 
the Better Administration of Justice’ (2003) 8 Deakin Law Review 1. In Cunningham v The Scotsman 
Publications Ltd [1987] SLT 698, 705-706, Lord Clyde stated that ‘Of course, there must be exceptions 
to the general rule and these exceptions may also be found to be justified by other considerations of 
public interest and public policy in the administration of justice. Cases occur and circumstances may 
arise where it is proper for the doors of the court to be closed. Of course, too, there are practical 
considerations which, in the proper control and management of the court's business necessarily impose 
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Despite the fact that open justice and procedural fairness are both well established 
tenets of the judicial process, it can be difficult to discern the boundaries between 
them, as the former ‘furnishes a lens ... through which departures from the standards 
embodied in at least one limb of natural justice [the rule against bias] may be 
perceived’. 142
Quite apart from the public’s right to know what matters are being 
determined in the courts and with what consequences, open and public 
proceedings are necessary in the public interest because secrecy is conducive 
to the abuse of power and, thus, to injustice.
 More directly, the presence of the public may prevent abuses of 
process from arising in the first place. As Gaudron J explained in Nolan: 
 
143
[T]here does exist a clear conceptual distinction between the idea of natural 
justice and that of open justice. It is possible to imagine a situation in which a 
person is afforded all the rights that have ever been claimed in the name of 
natural justice (an oral hearing, a tribunal free of even the slightest suspicion 
of bias, and so on), and for the hearing nevertheless to take place behind 
closed doors. Conversely, one could imagine a situation of hearing being held 
openly, with full right of access accorded to the public and the press, yet the 
 
 
According to Joseph Jaconelli, however, it is possible to broadly distinguish between 
open justice and procedural fairness: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
some restraint on the understanding of the bystander. It would not be practicable to circulate copies of 
documents referred to in open court around the public benches. But these considerations should not 
detract from the general principle of openness in judicial proceedings’. 
142 Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice: A critique of the open trial (2002) 32. 
143 (1990) 172 CLR 460, 497. 
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person whose case is to be heard is denied the most basic elements of a fair 
hearing.144
It follows, on the basis of the preceding analysis, that if a procedure required a court 
to undermine the principles of open justice it would be invalid, as it could not be 
performed in accordance with an essential requirement of the judicial process. It is 
nevertheless extremely doubtful that the principles of open justice will affect the 
development of judicial mediation in Ch III courts. This is because, generally 
speaking, the ‘demands of open justice apply only to the hearing proper’.
 
 
Thus, while the relationship between open justice and procedural fairness is a highly 
complex one, the essence of the distinction between them lies in the fact that the 
former operates principally in the public interest by providing a general right of 
access to judicial proceedings, whereas the latter protects individual interests by 
ensuring the determination of individual rights in a fair and impartial manner. This 
broad distinction is sufficient for present purposes. 
 
145
Pre-trial business is routinely conducted in chambers, with the usual 
consequences that the press and public are denied admission ... The specific 
case of interlocutory proceedings aside, it would be difficult to adduce a 
 Judicial 
mediation is a prehearing process. Thus, as with the fair hearing rule, the principles of 
open justice have little to say on the matter. The requirements of open justice are also 
typically greater in criminal proceedings than civil proceedings (as with the 
requirements of procedural fairness), and in civil proceedings:  
 
                                                 
144 Jaconelli, above n 142. 
145 Jaconelli, above n 142, 65. 
194 
 
 
reason for opening up the whole range of pre-trial procedure to public and 
press access.146
Various civil prehearing processes are examined in Chapter 7, which may or may not 
be held in camera, and which are nevertheless well established incidents of the civil 
trial process. To the current writer’s knowledge, no Australian court has ever 
entertained the suggestion that any of the processes discussed interfere with open 
justice.
 
 
147
Non-curial Due Process 
  
 
 
It is necessary to highlight the fact that a significant number of recent High Court 
decisions concerning constitutionally implied due process have taken place in an 
administrative context.148 These decisions confirm that all decision-makers149 must 
provide a fair hearing which is free from bias, regardless of whether the decision-
making power is exercised in a curial or non-curial context. 150  In substance the 
principles to be applied are the same in both contexts. 151 No simple comparison can 
be made, however, between procedural fairness as it applies in an administrative 
setting and procedural fairness as it pertains to the exercise of judicial power.152
                                                 
146 Joseph Jaconelli, above n 142, 65-66. 
147 See also the analysis of committal proceedings in Chapter 3 above nn 58-64 and accompanying text. 
148 See, for example, Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex part Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Plaintiff 157/2002 
v Minister for Immigration (2003) 211 CLR 476; Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651. 
149 Provided, of course, that the decision affects individual rights: Salemi v MacKellar [No 2] (1977) 
137 CLR 396, 452 (Jacobs J); Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584 (Mason J). 
150 See, for example, Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 553 [111 - 113] (Gaudron J); 
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex part Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 131-34 [132]-[140] (Kirby J). 
151 Margaret Allars, ‘Procedural fairness: disqualification required by the bias rule’ (1999) 4 (3) 
Judicial Review 269, 152. 
152 In Australia Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 366, Deane J recognised ‘the 
potential for confusion between an [administrative decision-maker’s] obligation to act judicially and 
the well-settled notion of exercising judicial power’. 
 Not 
only does the doctrinal basis for the implication differ between these discrete contexts, 
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its ‘content’ necessarily varies in accordance with the nature of the power 
exercised.153
As noted above, constitutionally implied due process derives in a curial context from 
the separation doctrine and serves rule of law values (namely judicial independence 
and impartiality) via that doctrine.
 
 
154 In a non-curial context the implication also 
serves rule of law values, but it does not flow from the requirements of Ch III or seek 
to preserve the independence or impartiality of the judiciary. It flows, rather, from the 
need to limit the exercise of executive power.155 Were a statutory decision-maker to 
exercise decision-making functions in a manner contrary to procedural fairness (in the 
absence of explicit statutory language to that effect),156 that exercise would constitute 
an error in law and an excess of jurisdiction.157
The requirement that courts observe procedural fairness provides a mechanism by 
which judicial independence and impartiality (and thus the integrity of the judicial 
function) is maintained. The impartial exercise of executive power, on the other hand, 
is not essential to the ‘maintenance and enforcement of the boundaries of 
  
 
                                                 
153 Johnson, above n 77, 71. 
154 Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’, above n 3, 208-11. 
155 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex part Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 131 [132] (Kirby J).  
156 Mason J, for example, has recognised ‘a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according 
procedural fairness in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and 
legitimate expectations subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention’. Kioa v 
West, (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584 (emphasis added). In Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural 
Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 73 [43], Gleeson CJ and Hayne J similarly noted that a 
statutory provision did ‘not contain “plain words of necessary intendment” which exclude the rule 
against bias. It is improbable in the extreme that Parliament intended that bias on the part of a delegate 
would not vitiate the delegate's decisions’. See also Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 
CLR 106, 109-10, 112, 118-19; Salemi v MacKellar [No 2] (1977) 137 CLR 396, 401, 442; FAI 
Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, 348-49, 362-63; Laws v Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70, 89 (Mason CJ and Brenann J). 
157 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Re Minister for Immigration & 
Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 67 [26] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J). See also 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597. 
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federalism’. 158  It is the High Court’s power to issue ‘a writ of Mandamus or 
prohibition or an injunction … against an officer of the Commonwealth’159 which 
preserves these boundaries (and thus the rule of law) – not the requirement that 
Commonwealth officers exercise their powers in accordance with procedural fairness 
as such.160
The fair hearing aspect of the due process implication in particular will differ between 
curial and non-curial decision-making processes.
 
 
161  For one thing, administrative 
tribunals are not strictly adversarial in nature. Administrative tribunals do not 
adjudicate in a judicial sense (that is to say, on the basis of legal positions identified 
and argued by opposing litigants); they review prior administrative decisions 
affecting individual rights on the basis of information deemed relevant by the 
decision-maker. 162
                                                 
158 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 276. 
159 Commonwealth Constitution s 75(v). 
160 R v Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574, 586 (Denning J); Church of 
Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 70 (Brennan J); Enfield City Corp v Development 
Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, 157 [56] (Gaudron J); Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex 
part Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 134 [140] (Kirby J); Plaintiff 157/2002 v Minister for Immigration 
(2003) 211 CLR 476. 482-83 [5]-[8], (Gleeson CJ), 513-14 [103]-[104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ) 
161 In Kioa v West, (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584, Mason J noted ‘the need to insist on the adoption in the 
administrative process of fair and flexible procedures for decision-making, procedures which do not 
necessarily take curial procedures as their model’. Similarly, in Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 
197 CLR 510, 553 [112], Gaudron J recognised ‘the emergence of a rule of procedural fairness which 
requires “fair [but] flexible procedures ... which do not necessarily take curial procedures as their 
model.”’ See, however, Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 343-44 [4]-[5] 
where Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ explained that the ‘application of the [procedural 
fairness] principle in connection with decision-makers outside the judicial system must sometimes 
recognise and accommodate differences between court proceedings and other kinds of decision-
making … These differences, however, must not obscure the fundamental principle’. 
162 In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518, 540-541 [71], 
Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that in ‘adversarial litigation, findings of fact that are made will reflect 
the joinder of issue between the parties. The issues of fact and law joined between the parties will be 
defined by interlocutory processes or by the course of the hearing. They are, therefore, issues which the 
parties have identified. A review by the Tribunal is a very different kind of process. It is not adversarial; 
there are no opposing parties; there are no issues joined. The person who has sought the review seeks a 
particular administrative decision … and puts to the Tribunal whatever material or submission that 
person considers will assist that claim. The findings of fact that the Tribunal makes are those that it, 
rather than the claimant, let alone adversarial parties, considers to be necessary for it to make its 
decision’.  
 It follows that considerable care should be taken when 
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determining the application of decisions concerning procedural fairness in an 
administrative setting to questions of procedural fairness in a judicial context. 
 
Which ‘characteristics’ are essential to judicial ‘integrity’? 
 
So far, analysis has concentrated on the judicial process implication from an 
individual and public rights perspective. There exists a second category of implication, 
however, which focuses on the need to maintain the ‘integrity’ of the judicial process 
from an institutional or systemic perspective. While the integrity of the judiciary may 
be informed by notions of procedural fairness and/or open justice (for example, a 
function that undermines a parties procedural rights may also, by implication, 
undermine integrity), the concept is potentially broader in application and may be 
enlivened in situations where ordinary procedural rules are not. This highly uncertain 
area of law is complicated by the fact that the term ‘integrity’ has been adopted in two 
(notionally discrete) doctrinal spheres.163 First of all, ‘institutional integrity’ has been 
identified as the ‘touchstone’ of compatibility in determining the functions that may 
be vested in State courts by State parliaments164 (the Kable doctrine).165
This section examines the concept of integrity as it has developed as an implication of 
the separation doctrine in the context of Ch III courts. The section begins by 
 Second of all, 
integrity has been identified as an implication of the separation doctrine; potentially 
limiting the functions that may be exercised by Ch III courts, or by Ch III judges 
acting in their private capacity.  
 
                                                 
163 For a concise summation of this concept in an incompatibility context see Femcare Ltd v Albright 
(2000) 100 FCR 331, [49] (Black CJ, Sackville and Emmett JJ).  
164 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 617 – 618 [102] (Gummow J), 629 – 630 
[144] (Kirby J). 
165 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
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discussing the nature of inherent jurisdiction, and goes on to demonstrate that certain 
functions of inherent jurisdiction have been identified as characteristics central to the 
integrity of the judiciary. On this basis, it is argued that the implied rights component 
of the judicial process implication can also be explained as an aspect of 
constitutionally entrenched inherent jurisdiction.166 The concept of public confidence 
or repute is also introduced at this stage. This requirement, which ‘loomed large in a 
number of cases,’167
What is ‘inherent jurisdiction’? 
 has now receded into a broader constitutional requirement of 
independence and impartiality; a requirement which is, in turn, a core feature of 
integrity. The requirements of institutional integrity as an aspect of the Kable doctrine 
are considered in Chapter 6, as is the interrelationship between the principles 
developed by the High Court in a Ch III and State/territory context. 
 
 
While the High Court has seldom highlighted the connection between the 
implications drawn from Ch III and the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts, there 
exists 
 
an alternative approach to rights or guarantees derived from the separation of 
powers ... that does not adopt a strict ‘rights based’ approach … [T]hat 
alternative is to view Chapter III as entrenching the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of 
the Court to protect its own processes, the effect of which would indeed be 
more in keeping with the absence of widespread rights or guarantees 
                                                 
166 Lacey, above n 5. 
167 Zines, above n 3, 274. 
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contained in the Constitution, and provides a preferable basis for drawing 
implications from the separation of judicial power.168
Courts have always shown exceptional sensitivity to infringement on their 
domain; many of the dicta suggesting limits on parliamentary supremacy 
based on ‘implied freedoms’ or ‘fundamental law’, for example, have arisen 
in this context. The Communist Party case also fits squarely within this 
tradition of judicial self-preservation. As Brian Galligan has aptly remarked, 
‘The Communist Party Case was not primarily about civil liberties, but about 
the limits of legislative and executive power and supremacy of the judiciary 
in deciding such questions’.
  
 
This proposition underpins the suggestion made in Chapter 1; that inherent 
jurisdiction is one of four jurisdictions necessary to maintain the rule of law. 
Commentaries in related areas of Ch III jurisprudence support to this view, and cast 
doubt upon the notion that Ch III operates directly to protect individual rights and 
liberties. George Winterton, for example, has concluded that: 
 
169
It follows that an understanding of the nature and scope of inherent (or implied) 
jurisdiction is prerequisite to a full appreciation of jurisprudence in this area. Once 
unpacked, the limited scope of inherent jurisdiction also provides an additional 
rationale for the demise of public confidence as a free standing constitutional 
principle (as the maintenance of public confidence is not historically a function of 
 
 
                                                 
168 Lacey, above n 5, 71. 
169 George Winterton, ‘The Communist Party Case’ in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks (2003), 108, 133; citing Brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court (1987) 
203. 
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inherent jurisdiction). This analysis also provides much needed context to the High 
Court’s treatment of the Kable doctrine; discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
 
What, then, is ‘inherent’ jurisdiction? As Wendy Lacey has observed, the ‘term 
“inherent jurisdiction” is one that few lawyers would be unfamiliar with, though it is 
certainly one that most lawyers would struggle to adequately define’.170 In part, this is 
because inherent jurisdiction is ‘so amorphous and ubiquitous and so pervasive in its 
operation that it seems to defy the challenge to determine its quality and to establish 
its limits’.171
[T]he power which a court has simply because it is a court of a particular 
description. Thus the Courts of Common Law without the aid of any 
authorising provision had inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of their 
process and to punish for contempt.
 In very general terms, though, inherent jurisdiction can be defined as: 
 
172
In other words, the term ‘inherent’ refers to innate quality that exists in a court 
because of its nature as a court, irrespective of any statutory powers vested in it by 
Parliament. Keith Mason describes inherent jurisdiction as a ‘judicial power of last 
resort,’
 
 
173 and identifies four broad functions (or objects) served by it.174 Adopting 
this classification, Wendy Lacey provides a list of specific inherent powers (included 
here as footnotes):175
 
 
                                                 
170 Lacey, above n 5, 63. 
171 Sir Jack Jacob, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, 51. 
172 R v Forbes; Ex parte Bevan (1972) 127 CLR 1, 7 (Menzies J). 
173 Keith Mason, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1983) 57 The Australian Law Journal 449, 
458. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Lacey, above n 5, 66; citing Jacob, above n 171, Mason, above n 173, and Justice Paul de Jersey, 
‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’ (1985) 15 Queensland Law Society Journal 325, 330.  
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(1) Ensuring convenience and fairness in legal proceedings:176
 
 
(2) Preventing steps from being taken that would render judicial proceedings 
inefficacious: 177
 
 
(3) Preventing abuse of process:178
 
 
(4) Acting in aid of superior courts and in aid or control of inferior courts 
and tribunals:179
 
 
It will be noted that these functions are all ‘ancillary or incidental to a court’s general 
jurisdiction, and are, therefore, procedural nature’.180 It follows that the difficulties 
encountered by the High Court when determining the substantive aspects of the due 
process implication (discussed above) could have been (or may still be) alleviated by 
reframing the implication in terms of an inherent power to ensure fairness and 
convenience in legal proceedings.181
                                                 
176 Developing rules of court and practice directions; Remedying breaches of the rules of natural justice 
and setting aside default orders; The power to correct, vary or extend an order to prevent injustice; The 
power to order that a case be heard in camera; The power to prohibit the publication of part of 
proceedings; The power to decline to proceed with a matter if the proceedings are not properly 
constituted; The power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution, including cases where a prolonged 
or inordinate delay means that the defendant is likely to suffer prejudice; The power to compel 
observance of the court's process and obedience of and compliance with its orders; The power to 
punish for contempt of court, including any conduct calculated to interfere with the due administration 
of justice; The power to exercise protective and coercive powers over certain classes of persons (i.e. 
parens patriae, control over practitioners and officers of the Court); The right to inspect documents 
denied to one of the parties. 
177 The power to order security for costs in civil actions; The power to stay the execution of a judgment; 
The power to grant certain remedies including Anton Piller Orders and Mareva Injunctions. 
178 The power to stay or dismiss proceedings where an action is frivolous, vexatious, oppressive, or 
groundless; The power to stay proceedings where a more suitable alternative forum is available or has 
already been invoked; The power to stay proceedings where a criminal charge is pending; The power to 
stay proceedings for want of prosecution; The power to order a stay of proceedings, whether permanent 
or temporary, whether conditional or unconditional, and where such order is demanded by the 
circumstances of the case in order to prevent injustice. 
179 The power to order a stay of proceedings pending an appeal to a superior court. 
180 Lacey, above n 5, 64-65. 
181 Lacey, above n 5, 71. 
   
202 
 
 
 
In Australia, the concept of inherent jurisdiction is complicated by the fact that 
statutory courts (such as the Federal Court, the Family Court and the Federal 
Magistrates Court), do not possess inherent jurisdiction in the sense that superior 
courts of record do. As Wilson and Dawson JJ observed in Jackson v Sterling 
Industries Ltd:  
 
Ordinarily a superior court of record is a court of unlimited jurisdiction which 
means that, even if there are limits to its jurisdiction, it will be presumed to 
have acted within it. That is a presumption which is denied to inferior courts 
and is denied to a federal court such as the Federal Court.182
Federal courts nevertheless exercise powers ‘similar to, if not identical with, inherent 
power’.
 
 
183
not a common law court as were the three common law courts at Westminster. 
Accordingly, it is “unable to draw upon the well of undefined powers” which 
were available to those courts as part of their “inherent jurisdiction”. The 
Family Court is a statutory court, being a federal court created by the 
Parliament within the meaning of s71 of the Constitution. A court exercising 
jurisdiction or powers conferred by statute “has powers expressly or by 
implication conferred by the legislation which governs it” and “[t]his is a 
 These powers, which can be referred to as ‘implied incidental’ powers, 
were discussed at length in the preceding Chapter. In DJL v The Central Authority, 
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ explained that the Family 
Court is 
 
                                                 
182 (1987) 162 CLR 612, 618. 
183 Ibid 623-24 (Deane J). 
203 
 
 
matter of statutory construction”; it also has “in addition such powers as are 
incidental and necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction or the powers so 
conferred”. It would be inaccurate to use the term “inherent jurisdiction” here 
and the term should be avoided as an identification of the incidental and 
necessary power of a statutory court.184
While subtle differences between inherent and implied incidental jurisdiction may 
exist, however, it ‘would appear that the “implied powers” of federal courts will be 
considered to include the powers normally associated as falling within the ambit of 
“inherent jurisdiction.”’
 
 
185 This Chapter relates to ‘Ch III courts’, which includes 
superior courts of record possessing inherent jurisdiction (the High Court, State 
supreme courts, and other State courts vested with federal judicial power), and 
statutory courts granted implied incidental power by Parliament (the Federal Court 
and the Family Court). The Federal Magistrates Court is also a Ch III court, but 
occupies the somewhat curious position of being neither an inferior court (with no 
implied incidental power), nor a superior court of record.186
It may ... be arguable that this Court’s implied incidental powers are less than 
those of the Federal Court and Family Court, and, by analogy, less than the 
inherent jurisdiction of the courts of common law of unlimited jurisdiction. 
At the very least, the failure to create this Court as a “superior” court of 
record under the FM Act may be taken as an indication that the Federal 
Parliament did not intend to create this Court as a superior court of record. 
 The Federal Magistrates 
Court has itself addressed this issue: 
 
                                                 
184 (2000) 201 CLR 226, 240-41, 268 (Kirby J). 
185 Lacey, above  n 5, 70. 
186 Section 8(3) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) states that the ‘Federal Magistrates Court is 
a court of record and is a court of law and equity’. 
204 
 
 
Put another way it is arguable that this Court’s implied incidental power to 
make orders necessarily incidental to its express powers is not as broad as 
that of the Federal Court because the Federal Court is expressed by statute to 
be a superior court of record. If that argument is correct it may seem 
anomalous to some given that this Court and the Federal Court, and this 
Court and the Family Court, have concurrent jurisdiction in many areas, and 
concurrent, but sometimes limited, jurisdiction in other areas.187
Maintaining ‘Integrity’ 
 
 
For the sake of convenience, and despite the concerns expressed by the High Court in 
DJL v The Central Authority, the term ‘inherent jurisdiction’ is adopted here as a 
reference to the powers or jurisdiction possessed by any Ch III in order to satisfy the 
four broad functions set out above. This distinction helps to distinguish between 
novel functions vested in or carried out by Ch III courts (implied incidental functions), 
on the one hand, and the power or jurisdiction of the courts to maintain their own 
processes and integrity (inherent jurisdiction), on the other.    
 
 
The significance of the preceding section is that it rationalises the High Court’s 
otherwise inconsistent approach to the requirements of judicial ‘integrity’. It may also, 
consequently, offer some insight into how this aspect of the judicial process 
implication will develop.  
 
                                                 
187 Original citation unknown. Referenced in Toni Lucev, ‘The Federal Magistrates Court: jurisdiction, 
practice and procedure and cross-vesting applications’ (Materials presented to Western Australian Bar 
Associations Bar Readers Course, 21 May 2008) <http://www.fmc.gov.au/pubs/docs/cross-
vesting.pdf.> at 13 October 2009. 
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In Nicholas, discussed above, a majority of the High Court found that s 15x of the 
Crimes Act 1914 did not undermine the integrity of the judicial process. Nevertheless, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ expressed the view that (in certain 
circumstance) the power of the courts to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process 
may exceed the reach of Parliament’s legislative power. The ‘circumstances’ which, 
it was intimated, might undermine integrity, reflect certain of the broad functions of 
inherent jurisdiction. 
 
McHugh J agreed with the majority that s 15x did not fall within previously 
established factual (rights based) scenarios, but found that the provision nevertheless 
offended the integrity of the judicial process. According to His Honour: 
 
Section 15x does not contemplate a “legislative judgment” against specified 
individuals, nor does it serve to inflict punishment on specified persons 
without a judicial trial or to adjudge criminal guilt. Nor does it direct the 
federal courts not to make a finding concerning rights or duties that an 
accused person would otherwise be entitled to under the existing law or to 
change the direction or outcome of pending judicial proceedings. It does, 
however, direct courts exercising federal jurisdiction to disregard a fact that 
is critical in exercising a discretion that is necessary to protect the integrity of 
Ch III courts and to maintain public confidence in the administration of 
criminal justice.188
Kirby J also considered s 15x to be invalid. His Honour began by identifying a 
number of considerations that might be taken into account by a court when 
 
 
                                                 
188 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 222 [115]. 
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determining whether a legislative provision is invalid; including the extent to which 
the provision is directive, public confidence, conflict with the ‘general indicia of 
invalidity’, and the ‘particularity of the legislation’. 189
another and more fundamental reason which sustains the judicial 
discretion or power in question. It is a reason that is relevant to the 
nature of the judicial power itself. It charts the limits upon any 
legislative modification of that rule. I refer to the many judicial 
expressions explaining the rule in terms of the right and duty of the 
courts to protect the integrity of their own processes and to prevent the 
administration of justice being brought into disrepute with consequent 
loss of public confidence. In the United States of America, where the 
separation of the judicial power under the Constitution bears many 
similarities to the position in Australia, the obligation of courts to “set 
their face against enforcement of the law by lawless means” is often 
expressed in constitutional terms...Upholding the integrity of the 
judicial system is the unavoidable obligation of courts. It cannot be 
surrendered to the other branches of government.
 Kirby J then went on, 
crucially, to recognise 
 
190
McHugh and Kirby JJ’s judgments can be distilled to reveal two broad features of 
integrity, and two overarching reasons for the invalidity of s 15x. First, s 15x removes 
certain features of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and, second, the removal of the 
  
 
                                                 
189 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 258 [201]. The particularity of the legislation was, in 
Kirby J’s view, at 260-64 [202]-[208], a significant (although not in itself sufficient) grounds for 
invalidity. 
190 Ibid 258 [201], 265 [213]; citing Sorrells v United States , (1932) 287 US 435, 457; Sherman v 
United States, (1958) 356 US 369, 380; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54, 78; Pollard v The Queen 
(1992) 176 CLR 177, 202-03; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19, 31.  
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discretionary power to exclude evidence illegally obtained threatens to diminish 
public confidence in the courts. Both of these factors had featured heavily in the High 
Court’s earlier ruling in Ridgeway. 191 Gaudron J reached a similar conclusion in 
principle, also reflecting her earlier findings in Ridgeway.192
[C]onsistency with the essential character of a court and with the nature of 
judicial power necessitates that ... a court cannot be required or authorized to 
proceed in any manner which involves an abuse of process, which would 
render its proceedings inefficacious, or which brings or tends to bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.
 On the facts Her Honour 
found s 15x to be valid, but she agreed with McHugh and Kirby JJ that certain 
inherent powers, and the need to maintain public confidence in the courts, were both 
central to the nature of judicial power:  
 
193
As noted above, the power to prevent an abuse of process, the power to prevent steps 
from being taken that would render judicial proceedings inefficacious (both identified 
by Gaudron J), the power to prevent the administration of justice being brought into 
disrepute, and the power to safeguard the fairness of legal proceedings (identified by 
McHugh and Kirby JJ) are all functions of inherent jurisdiction. In contrast, the need 
  
 
                                                 
191 In Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19, 38, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ stated that ‘the 
public interest in maintaining the integrity of the courts and in ensuring the observance of the law and 
minimum standards of propriety by those entrusted with powers of law enforcement’. The joint 
judgment did not directly identify public confidence as a factor, but their Honours did refer to 
international judgments which did. According to McHugh J, at 82-83, the ‘discretion to exclude such 
evidence is grounded in public policy. The trial judge must weigh two aspects of the public interest. 
First, the judge must weigh the admission of the evidence against the public interest in convicting those 
who break the law in question. Second, the judge must weigh the admission of the evidence against the 
public interest in ensuring that public confidence in the justice system is not undermined by the 
perception that the courts of law condone or encourage unlawful or improper conduct on the part of 
those who have the duty to enforce the law’. 
192 Ibid 62. Gaudron J had stated that the ‘inherent powers of superior courts to prevent an abuse of 
process exist to protect the courts and their proceedings, and to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice’.  
193 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73]. 
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to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice does not historically fall 
within the inherent power of the court. This aspect of Gaudron, McHugh and Kirby 
JJ’s opinions reflects what appeared (at the time) to be a free standing constitutional 
principle which had, hitherto, evolved as an aspect of the so-called incompatibility 
doctrine.194
Prior to the High Court’s ruling in Nicholas, various commentators had expressed 
concern regarding the growing importance attached to public confidence as a measure 
of constitutional validity. Robert Orr, for example, had noted that one effect of the 
public confidence requirement was to place the reputation of the courts above the 
‘liberty of subjects’.
  
 
195  Elizabeth Handsley had similarly opined that, to ‘base a 
constitutional theory about judicial independence on the maintenance of public 
confidence in the judiciary is to turn the doctrine on its head’ (because independence 
requires that courts apply the law, regardless of public opinion). 196
To hold that a court's opinion as to the effect of a law on the public 
perception of the court is a criterion of the constitutional validity of the law, 
would be to assert an uncontrolled and uncontrollable power of judicial veto 
over the exercise of legislative power. It would elevate the court's opinion 
about its own repute to the level of a constitutional imperative.
 In Nicholas, 
Brennan CJ said that: 
 
197
                                                 
194 This doctrine, and its implications if any for judicial mediation, are considered at length in Chapters 
5 and 6. 
195 Robert Orr, ‘Kable v DPP: Taking Judicial Protection Too Far?’ (1996) 11 Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law Forum 1, 14-15. 
196 Elizabeth Handsley ‘Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Red Herring for the Separation of 
Judicial Power’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 183, 197. See also Elizabeth Handsley, ‘Do Hard Laws 
Make Bad Cases? The High Court’s Decision in Kable v DPP (NSW) (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 
171, 175-77.  
197 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 197 [37] (Brennan CJ). 
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Hayne J agreed with Brennan CJ that the ‘courts’ opinion of what is necessary, or 
desirable, to preserve their reputation is not a sound test of constitutional validity’.198  
However, His Honour also agreed with Gaudron, McHugh and Kirby JJ that the 
discretionary power to exclude evidence illegally obtained is rooted in the need ‘to 
protect the integrity of the courts’, and that this discretion is ‘an incident of the 
judicial powers vested in the courts’.199
I need not, and do not, decide whether there are some inherent powers of the 
courts which cannot be abolished ... If the rejection of evidence of illegally 
procured offences had been held to be inevitably required in all cases because 
only in that way could the reputation of the courts be protected, the question 
whether Parliament might change or abolish that rule might (I do not say 
would) have arisen. But that is not the case with this rule.
 On the facts, however, Hayne J found that s 
15x did not interfere with the judicial process in such a manner: 
 
200
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from Nicholas as regards the scope and 
content of the term ‘integrity’. Most of the High Court’s analysis of the concept took 
place in obiter, and a number of distinct analytical approaches can be identified in the 
judgments. Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ nevertheless agreed in principle 
that the removal of certain inherent powers may exceed Parliament’s legislative 
competency,
 
 
201
                                                 
198 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 275 [242]. 
199 Ibid 272-73 [234]. 
200 Ibid 26 [243]-[244]. 
201 Lacey, above n 4, 75-77. 
 and this proposition appeared to lie in the need to maintain the 
integrity of the courts. It is far from certain which inherent powers might be protected, 
however, or the circumstances in which integrity might otherwise be undermined. 
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Indeed, Nicholas demonstrates that even the most fundamental features of inherent 
jurisdiction can be substantially removed by Parliament without interfering with this 
aspect of implied judicial process (although principally for reasons of construction, as 
discussed below).202
Contrary to the views expressed by Brennan CJ and Hayne J, Gaudron, McHugh and 
Kirby JJ agreed that public confidence (or repute) represented a valid measure of 
legislative validity. Subsequent case law (principally in the context of State/territory 
legislative power) confirms that the view of Brennan CJ and Hayne J has prevailed.
 
 
203 
While public confidence may not (in isolation) constitute an appropriate measure of 
constitutional validity, however, the fact remains that notions of repute and public 
confidence are inextricably linked to the apprehension of bias rule,204
The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in 
the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and 
 and this rule is 
implicit in the exercise of judicial power. Remedying breaches of natural justice is 
also a function of inherent jurisdiction. Thus, in Ebner v Official Trustee, Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ explained that: 
 
                                                 
202 Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ recognised this fact in Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v 
Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 560 [39]: ‘As indicated by the result in Nicholas v The 
Queen, upholding the validity of s 15x of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), there is no impermissible 
interference with the exercise of judicial power even by such a significant evidentiary provision 
displacing the common law formulated in Ridgeway v The Queen’. Prior to the development of the 
judicial process implication it was generally accepted that Parliament could remove inherent powers, 
although the presumption of interpretation was always against it. See, for example, Cameron v Cole 
(1944) 68 CLR 571, 589 (Rich J); Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 239, 
252 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron J).   
203 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 593 [23] (Gleeson CJ); 617-18 [102] 
(GummowJ); Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 519 [6] (Gleeson CJ), 542 [79] (Kirby J); 
Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 78 [68] (Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan). 
204 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 344-45 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure 
from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined.205
Despite references to the term ‘integrity’, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ did not go so far as to classify the apprehension of bias rule as an implication of Ch 
III, but Gaudron and Kirby JJ did.
 
 
206
Because State courts are part of the Australian judicial system created by Ch 
III of the Constitution and may be invested with the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth, the Constitution also requires ... that, for the maintenance of 
public confidence, they be constituted by persons who are impartial and who 
appear to be impartial even when exercising non-federal jurisdiction. 
 For Gaudron J, the appearance of impartiality 
was central to the maintenance of public confidence in the judicial system: 
 
207
                                                 
205 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 345 [7] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ); See also earlier pronouncements to this effect, including Deane J in Webb v 
The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 68: ‘it is of fundamental importance that the parties to litigation and 
the general public have full confidence in the integrity, including the impartiality, of those entrusted 
with the administration of justice’. 
206 See above nn 98-99 and accompanying text.  
207 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 361 [81]. 
 
 
That public confidence can no longer be considered a free standing constitutional 
principle is not fatal to the underlying principle expressed by Her Honour; viz. that the 
fact and appearance of impartiality is an implicit requirement for all courts vested 
with federal judicial power – whether exercising that power or not. As the appearance 
of impartiality is measured objectively, this invariably attracts considerations of 
public confidence, public opinion, and open justice. Writing extra-curially, Chief 
Justice Spigelman has expressed the view that: 
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It is institutional legitimacy that explains one great marvel of our social 
system: why do the overwhelming majority of Australians obey the law, and 
refrain from taking the law into their own hands, even when the risk of 
detecting a breach is low and the application of a deterrent sanction even 
lower?208
The somewhat elusive criterion of "public confidence" is in some cases, such 
as the appearance of bias, subsumed in what a fair and reasonable observer 
would think. The courts nevertheless depend in a real sense upon public 
confidence in the judicial system to maintain their authority. The 
maintenance of that authority depends, inter alia, upon that element of the 
judicial process which requires that parties before the court be given and be 
seen to be given a fair hearing … The appearance of a court not attending to 
the evidence and arguments of the parties and control of the conduct of the 
proceedings is an appearance which would ordinarily suggest to a fair and 
reasonable observer that the judicial process is not being followed. 
 
 
French CJ recently made a similar point in Rafael Cezan v The Queen (and also 
attempted to extend this reasoning to the fair hearing rule): 
 
209
French CJ was not joined by the remainder of the High Court, who, as observed 
earlier, did not find it necessary to ‘develop’ or ‘amplify’ existing constitutional 
  
 
                                                 
208 Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Seen to be Done: the Principle of Open Justice – Part II’ (2000) 74 
Australian Law Journal 378, 380. 
209 Rafael Cezan v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 358, 380-81 [71]-[72]. 
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principles to reach this conclusion.210
In summary, it is possible that the integrity of a Ch III court will be undermined if a 
court no longer possesses the capacity to exercise certain powers of inherent 
jurisdiction. However, it is uncertain which inherent powers this principle might 
extend to (with the exception of the power to remedy breaches of procedural fairness), 
or the circumstances in which integrity might otherwise be undermined. Early judicial 
comments regarding the importance of maintaining public confidence reflected (and 
have now withdrawn into) the need to maintain the fact and appearance of impartiality. 
Chapter 6 examines the High Court’s development of institutional integrity as an 
aspect of the Kable doctrine, and concludes that the approach adopted by the High 
Court in that doctrinal sphere has brought the constitutional discourse full circle; 
reframing the fact and appearance of independence and impartiality (the underlying 
purpose of the separation of judicial power) as the fundamental requirement of 
institutional integrity.
 Common sense nevertheless dictates that this 
view is correct (whether explicit in the High Court’s reasoning or not).  
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210 Rafael Cezan v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 358, 391 [110] (Hayne, Crennin and Kiefel JJ). 
Gummow J stated, at 389 [101], that the ‘appeals to this Court may be decided favourably to the 
appellants by reference to the State legislative structure and the common law of Australia respecting 
the character of trial by jury, without entering upon the question whether s 80 of the Constitution 
imposed requirements which both went beyond those of the common law and were not satisfied by the 
conduct of the trial of the appellants’.  
211 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 78 [68] (Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan JJ). This explanation reflects the earlier judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 343 [3]. 
 However, what if any implications these judgments might 
have for the development of the integrity component of the judicial process principle 
is far from clear. As explained at length in Chapter 6, the object of the Kable doctrine 
is to ensure the institutional integrity of the federal judiciary – not the integrity of 
State courts as such – and the High Court may apply (what appear to be) the same 
principles differently to a Ch III court.  
214 
 
 
 
In any event, as the following section demonstrates, future constitutional challenges to 
judicial mediation are unlikely to be decided by reference to the essentiality or 
otherwise of a particular aspect of the traditional judicial process (whether that aspect 
is framed in terms of individual rights, public rights, or the integrity of the judiciary). 
The High Court’s approach in all jurisdictions (federal, State and territory) indicates 
that the pivotal question will be whether or not an impugned function expressly 
removes judicial discretion vis-à-vis the ‘essential’ feature of judicial process in 
question. In these matters the High Court has consistently read down provisions in 
favour of legislative validity,212
‘Reading Down’ Discretionary Functions 
 and it is for this reason, above all, that legislation or 
rules of court implementing judicial mediation will almost be certainly be valid. 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, when interpreting the object of a statutory provision the courts 
will assume that ‘Parliament did not intend to pass beyond constitutional bounds.213
                                                 
212 See above Chapter 3 nn 108-30. 
213 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J). See also A-G (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 
CLR 237, 267 (Dixon J). 
 It 
was also explained that, by virtue of this presumption, the principle that the courts 
should only apply law (as opposed to making it) has effectively become redundant. 
The same principle applies in respect of statutory provisions which have the potential 
to undermine the judicial process implication. In such instances the presumption may 
be applied in two distinct instances: to read down a provision which might otherwise 
constitute a statutory direction to conduct proceedings in a manner at odds with the 
judicial process (contrary to the ‘direction’ rule); or to read down a provision which 
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might otherwise constitute the vesting of a discretion so broad as to be incapable of 
performance in accordance with the judicial process. 
 
The ‘Direction Rule’ 
 
The proposition that Parliament may not direct the exercise of judicial power is 
nothing new. It has long been recognised that the legislature cannot interfere with the 
judicial process in such a way as to adjudge criminal guilt,214 and the same limitation 
will apply to any legislative provision which directs the exercise of judicial power. 
This principle is referred to here as the ‘direction rule’. 215
Just as a series of High Court decisions prior to 1920 staked the judiciary’s 
claim to a guaranteed minimum set of functions immune from either 
legislative or executive usurpation (these functions being exclusively 
‘judicial’ in nature), so too the due process implication [and the requirements 
of integrity] secures to the courts a guaranteed measure of control over their 
own procedures at the expense of Parliament.
 Polyukhovich, Leeth, Lim 
(and more recently Nicholas) make explicit the connection between the direction rule 
and the judicial process implication. As Fiona Wheeler has explained: 
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214 See (in addition to Polyukhovich, Leeth, Lim and Nicholas): Liyanage v R [1967] 1 AC 259, 290-91; 
Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 97 (Toohey J), 131 (Gummow J); Kruger v Commonwealth 
(1997) 190 CLR 1, 84 (Toohey J). In the context of US criminal law, ‘an enactment which imposes 
punishment on specified persons or members of a specified group without a judicial trial’ is referred to 
as a ‘Bill of Attainder’, and the same terminology has been adopted in Australia (Zines, above n 4, 282). 
215 Peter Gerangelos has referred to this limitation as the ‘direction rule’: Peter A Gerangelos, ‘The 
Separation of Powers and Legislative Intervention in Pending Cases’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 61. 
See also Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Comment on Peter A Gerangelos, “Legislative Intervention in Pending 
Cases” (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 95, 95.  
216 Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in 
Australia’, above n 3, 253. 
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In Leeth v Commonwealth (‘Leeth’), Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ explained 
that, ‘it may well be that any attempt on the part of the legislature to cause a court to 
act in a manner contrary to natural justice would impose a non-judicial requirement 
inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power. 217  In the leading case on the 
matter,218
the making of a law which requires or authorises the courts in which the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth is exclusively vested to exercise judicial 
power in a manner which is inconsistent with the essential character of a court 
or with the nature of judicial power. In exclusively entrusting to the courts 
designated by Ch III the function of the adjudgment and punishment of 
criminal guilt under a law of the Commonwealth, the Constitution’s concern is 
with substance and not mere form.
 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (‘Lim’), a bare majority of the 
High Court extended the principle in Leeth to other aspects of the judicial process 
implication, stating that the Commonwealth legislative power does not extend to  
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217 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470. 
218 As Fiona Wheeler points out, the significance of Lim lies in the fact that ‘Brennan and Dawson JJ 
joined with Deane J in expressly recognizing’ the due process implication. Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia’, above n 3, 250.  
219 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
Gaudron J agreed s 54 R was invalid in a separate judgment, at 58. 
 
 
Lim concerned the validity of certain sections of Div 4B of the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth), which provided for the custody ‘of certain non-citizens’. Brennan, Deane and 
Dawson JJ held that s 54R of the Act purported ‘in unqualified terms’ to prevent the 
judiciary from ordering the release of persons imprisoned by the Executive, and that 
this constituted 
 
217 
 
 
a direction by the Parliament to the courts as to the manner in which they are 
to exercise their jurisdiction. It is one thing for the Parliament, within the 
limits of the legislative power conferred upon it by the Constitution, to grant 
or withhold jurisdiction. It is a quite different thing for the Parliament to 
purport to direct the courts as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of 
their jurisdiction. The former falls within the legislative power which the 
Constitution, including Ch III itself, entrusts to the Parliament. The latter 
constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the judicial power which Ch III 
vests exclusively in the courts which it designates.220
An important distinction must nevertheless be drawn between statutory provisions 
which merely affect the procedures to be adopted by a court,
 
 
221 and the imposition of 
functions which effectively usurp judicial power (by determining the outcome). The 
former will ordinarily constitute a legitimate exercise of legislative power,222
It is one thing to say, for instance, in an Act of Parliament, that a man found 
in possession of stolen goods shall be conclusively deemed to have stolen 
them, and quite another to say that he shall be deemed to have stolen them 
unless he personally proves that he got them honestly.
 while 
the latter will not. As Isaacs J stated in Williamson v Ah On:  
 
223
The latter example would be valid (provided that it could be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the judicial process implication) whereas the former would necessarily 
 
 
                                                 
220 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 36-37 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ in agreement; Mason CJ and Toohey J 
dissenting). 
221 Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515; Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173. 
222 Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95, 108, 126-27, 128; Orient Steam Navigation Co Ltd v 
Gleeson (1931) 44 CLR 254, 259-60, 262-63, 264; Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307, 316.  
223 Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95, 122. 
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be invalid because it directly usurps judicial power by conclusively determining the 
outcome. In reality, and despite the view of the joint judges in Lim that the 
Constitution is concerned ‘with substance and not mere form,’224 it is unlikely that an 
Act which merely amends the procedures to be adopted will be invalid. Indeed, the 
High Court has only held such provisions to constitute an unconstitutional direction of 
judicial power on a handful of occasions.225 In the vast majority of cases, suspect 
provisions have been read down so as not to constitute usurpations of judicial power. 
Even in Lim (one of the few occasions on which the direction rule was successfully 
applied), Mason CJ and Toohey J dissented on the basis that the provision in question 
was capable of being construed within Parliament’s legislative competence. 226 
Similarly, in Polyukhovich, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ227 held that a 
provision of the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth), which sought to make indictable certain 
acts committed in the course of the Second World War, did not usurp Commonwealth 
judicial power because, inter alia, the court retained the power to determine whether a 
person had engaged in conduct contrary to the War Crimes Act.228
In Nicholas, a majority of the High Court held that s 15x of the Crimes Act 1914 was 
not invalid as it did not usurp judicial power by ultimately determining whether an 
action under the Crimes Act would succeed or fail.
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224 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).  
225 Notable occasions include Lim (discussed below) and Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.  
226 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 14. 
227 Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ in dissent: Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 
593 (Brennan J), 631 (Deane J), 707-08 (Gaudron J) 
228 Ibid 531-40 (Mason CJ), 650 (Dawson J), 692 (Toohey J), 721 (McHugh J).   
229 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 [20] (Brennan CJ), 202 [53] (Toohey J), 210-11 
[78]-[80] (Gaudron J), 239 [168] (Gummow J) 276 [243]-[244] (Hayne J). 
 Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron 
and Hayne JJ applied a narrow interpretation of s 15x in line with the presumption 
that Parliament does not intend to exceed its legislative powers. So constructed, s 15x 
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did not ‘conclusively’ determine guilt or innocence, or inhibit the provision of a fair 
trial, and the rule in Lim was not engaged.230
Section 15x does not impede or otherwise affect the finding of facts by a jury. 
Indeed, it removes the barrier which Ridgeway placed against tendering to the 
jury evidence of an illegal importation of narcotic goods where such an 
importation had in fact occurred. Far from being inconsistent with the nature of 
the judicial power to adjudicate and punish criminal guilt, s15x facilitates the 
admission of evidence of material facts in aid of correct fact finding.
 According to Brennan CJ:  
 
231
Toohey J agreed, finding that s15x did nothing to prevent a court from excluding 
evidence from a controlled importation ‘on the basis of unfairness to the accused or 
because the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value’.
 
 
232
direct that the consequences of the unlawful conduct be disregarded: thus, it 
does not require a court to disregard resultant unfairness to an accused or to 
the trial process. Nor does it direct that the consequences of the admission of 
the evidence in question be disregarded: thus, it does not require a court to 
ignore the tendency of the evidence to bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.
 
Similarly, in Gaudron J’s view, s15x did not:  
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230 Hayne J reached a similar conclusion, finding that if ‘the rejection of evidence of illegally procured 
offences had been held to be inevitably required in all cases because only in that way could the 
reputation of the courts be protected, the question whether Parliament might change or abolish that rule 
might (I do not say would) have arisen. But that is not the case with this rule’. Nicholas v The Queen 
(1998) 193 CLR 173, [244]. 
231 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 [20] (Brennan CJ); See also Chu Kheng Lim v 
Minister for Immigration  (1992) 176 CLR 1, 37 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
232 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, [46]. 
233 Ibid 210 [79]. 
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Hayne J agreed with the majority that s 15x was valid. In His Honour’s view, ‘the 
legislation deals only with the reception of evidence; it does not deal directly with 
issues of guilt or innocence of any offence charged against those in whose 
prosecutions the evidence may be led’.234 As noted previously, McHugh and Kirby JJ 
dissented on the basis that s 15x undermined the integrity of the judicial function,235 
but McHugh J did agree with the majority that s 15x did not constitute a direct 
usurpation of judicial power.236
The distinction between statutory provisions which affect the procedures to be 
adopted and the imposition of functions which effectively usurp judicial power is of 
the utmost importance to the development of judicial mediation, because it is 
‘improbable in the extreme that Parliament would in terms authorise a Chapter III 
court to exercise judicial power in a partial manner’.
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234 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 277 [249]. The same approach was recently adopted by 
the Federal Court in Priestley v Godwin (2008) 172 FCR 139. [64]-[65]. Bennet J concluded as follows: 
‘The applicant argues that s 31A of the Federal Court Act is invalid on the grounds that it constitutes 
an impermissible intrusion by the Legislature into the judicial process. The main point of the 
applicant’s submissions is that s 31A of the Federal Court Act and O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules 
preclude evidence from being admitted in a contested summary dismissal application, and that s 31A 
directs the Court as to the outcome of that application. There is nothing in the Federal Court Act or the 
Federal Court Rules that prevents evidence from being admitted in a summary dismissal application. 
While s 31A of the Federal Court Act does ‘lower the bar’ for summary dismissal, replacing the 
previous test, that is not inconsistent with judicial decision-making. Section 31A does not interfere with 
the process of giving weight to any evidence admitted, nor does it direct the outcome to be arrived at in 
any particular cases’. 
235 See above nn 188-91 and accompanying text. 
236 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 222 [115]. Kirby J did not ultimately express a view on 
the issue, although His Honour did state that he favoured an approach which focused in ‘substance 
rather than form’, which may have resulted in invalidity on the facts. Ibid 261 [203].  
237 Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in 
Australia’, above n 3, 260. 
 This proposition is borne out 
by the statutory language adopted in respect of the various prehearing processes 
analysed in Chapter 7, and the judicial mediation processes consider in Chapter 8.   
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Procedural Discretions to be Performed Judicially 
 
In the preceding cases it was argued (unsuccessfully for the most part) that Parliament 
had unconstitutionally directed the exercise of judicial power – often by enacting 
provisions which narrowed or removed a discretionary power of the court. There 
exists another category of case, however, in which the opposite is true; that is to say, 
in which Parliament enacts provisions which increase the discretionary power of the 
court. The discretions in question may be substantive in nature (in which case they 
may undermine the existing rights principle, as discussed in Chapter 3), or they may 
be procedural in nature (in which case they may undermine the judicial process 
implication). The same interpretative presumption is applied in all instances, however, 
and it is highly unlikely that a procedural discretion would be invalid on the basis that 
it is incapable of performance in accordance with the judicial process implication. 
This point is of the utmost significance because judicial mediation will almost 
certainly be implemented by provisions which increase the procedural discretion of 
judges; a proposition evidenced in Chapter 8. 
 
In Cominos v Cominos it was argued that section 86(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1959 (Cth),238 which provided the court with the discretionary power to make such 
orders as it considered ‘just and equitable in the circumstances of the case’, was so 
wide as to amount to a non-judicial discretion.239 The High Court held unanimously 
that it was not, as it was ‘exercised as an incident to judicial proceedings, [and it was] 
committed to a court and a judicial process [was] prescribed for its exercise’. 240
                                                 
238 Repealed by Matrimonial Causes Act 1966 (Cth), repealed by Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
239 Cominos v Cominos (1972) 127 CLR 588. 
240 Ibid 599 (Gibbs J). 
 
Shortly after the passage of the Family Law Act 1975, in Re Watson; Ex parte 
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Armstrong, the requirement that judges proceed without ‘undue formality’ was held to 
be implicitly restricted by the requirement that it be exercised ‘in accordance with 
legal principles’. 241  Similarly, in Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores, the 
discretionary power to grant an injunction under the Trade Practices Act 1965 (Cth) 
was held to be within Parliament’s legislative power, as, according to Gibbs J, ‘it goes 
without saying that in [exercising the function, the Industrial Court] must hear both 
parties and in other respects proceed judicially’.242 In Femcare Ltd v Albright,243 the 
Federal Court applied similar reasoning to hold valid certain provisions of the Federal 
Court Act 1976, which required the court to notify parties to representative 
proceedings only when ‘reasonably practicable’ and not ‘unduly expensive’.244
More recently, the presumption that Parliament intends a function to be exercised in 
accordance with the judicial process has been applied in relation to broad procedural 
discretions comprising the Less Adversarial Trial (‘LAT’) process applied in the 
federal Family Law jurisdiction.
 
 
245
no warrant to compromise issues of fairness and the usual requirements must 
be met. These are that determinations be made impartially, on the basis of all 
relevant material that the parties were able to put before the trial judge, 
without any pre-judgment and that the parties were given an adequate 
opportunity to be heard.
 In Truman v Truman, the Full Court of the Family 
Court affirmed that the LAT process gives  
 
246
                                                 
241 Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 257 ((Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ). 
242 Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617, 650 (Gibbs J). 
243 (2000) 100 FCR 331, [84] (Black CJ, Sackville and Emmett JJ). 
244 Federal Court Act 1976, s33X(2) or s33Y(5) 
245 The LAT process is examined at length in Chapter 7 below. See nn 163-93 and accompanying text. 
246 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365, [1.63] (Bryant CJ, Kay and Thackray JJ). 
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This position, their Honours explained, reflects Paragraph 6.3 of Practice Direction 
No 2. Of 2006, which states that each ‘party has the right to be heard in keeping with 
the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness’. Their Honours also noted, 
however, that ‘the changes brought about by the LAT process not only authorise but 
positively encourage judges to depart further still from the adversarial model’.247 This 
point is returned to in Chapter 7. Truman v Truman has since been affirmed by the 
Full Court in Crestin v Crestin.248
Chapter 6 examines Kirby J’s consistent objections to the High Court’s interpretative 
approach in the application (or rather non-application) of the Kable doctrine.
  
 
249 Kirby 
J’s view is not confined to the States and territories, and is supported by several of the 
judgments considered above (in particular Leeth250 and Chu Kheng Lim). 251
                                                 
247 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365, [7]. 
248 (2008) 39 Fam LR 420. 
249 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 630 [144], 632 [149], 634-35 [157], 635 
[159], 631 [147]; Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 536 [56]; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v 
Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 572 [84], 563 [52]. 
250 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-87 (Toohey and Deane JJ). 
251 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
 These 
earlier judgments collectively emphasised the importance of examining an act’s 
substance and effect, and rejected the mechanical interpretation of individual 
legislative provisions. By allowing for a purposive application of the judicial process 
implication, which permits that an act may be held invalid if its overriding object or 
effect is contrary to the Constitution’s exclusive vesting of judicial power in Ch III 
courts, this approach is more apt to ensure an effective separation of judicial power 
than the dogmatic application of a presumption in favour of validity. In addition to the 
advantages identified by Fiona Wheeler (outlined above), a purposive approach to 
legislative construction also has a greater capacity to distinguish between novel 
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judicial procedures which seek to improve access to justice, on the one hand, and 
legislative attempts to direct (or subvert) the exercise of judicial power, on the other. 
This argument is developed in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, it seems highly improbable 
that any of the current members of the High Court will pick up the gauntlet laid down 
by Kirby J.  
 
One final issue must be dealt with. In Chapter 1, it was stated that the judicial 
objectives of judicial mediation are opposed to the principle of stare decisis because a 
‘successful’ system of judicial mediation will reduce the frequency of judicial 
decisions. It is possible, therefore, that judicial mediation could undermine the law 
making role of the judiciary if it significantly reduced the frequency of judicial 
decisions – especially in novel areas of law. As pointed out in Chapter 5, however, it 
seems unlikely that judicial mediation would ever displace adjudication as the 
judiciary’s primary function. In any event, as the doctrine of stare decisis has never 
been identified as an implied requirement of Chapter III, the issue falls outside the 
scope of this thesis.252
Summary of Relevant Procedural Rules implied by Ch III: 
  
 
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, the following rules can be identified which 
will determine the boundaries within which the federal judicial function can evolve 
(ergo the extent to which judges can mediate), and the effect that conduct which 
exceeds those boundaries will have upon the discretionary function exercised to that 
end: 
 
                                                 
252 See below Ch 5, nn 125-129 and accompanying text. 
225 
 
 
(1) Federal courts cannot proceed in a manner which: 
 
A. unfairly interferes with a parties ability to present evidence or to 
challenge evidence led against him/her; 
B. prevents a party (other than parties to representative proceedings) from 
being notified of proceedings against them; 
C. requires a party (who is a private individual) to incriminate him/herself; 
D. has the effect of excluding members of the public from the final 
hearing, except in certain limited instances.  
 
(2) Federal courts cannot be prevented from:  
 
A. staying proceedings if necessary in the interests of justice;  
B. ensuring the effective supervision of the trial process. 
 
(3) Federal courts cannot proceed in a manner which: 
 
A. is bias, or leads to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
B. might lead reasonable members of the public to conclude that the court 
is not impartial. 
 
(4) If a function vested in the judiciary cannot be exercised in a manner consistent 
with the rules set out in (1), (2) or (3) the statutory provision or rule of court 
establishing that function will be invalid. 
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(5) If a function vested in the judiciary can be exercised in accordance with the 
rules set out in (1), (2) or (3), the exercise of that function in a manner which 
undermines those rules will not invalidate the statutory provision or rule of 
court which establishes that function.  
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that rules (1) and (2) are unlikely to affect the 
development of judicial mediation, as they are constructed around the exercise of a 
court’s decision-making power. It is axiomatic that these rules have little relevance to 
prehearing procedures in which judges have no determinative power. Rule (3) may, 
however, limit the extent to which federal judges may mediate, and in order to address 
this issue it is necessary to examine in more detail the judicial process and the nature 
of the judicial function. This examination is undertaken in Chapters 7 and 8. The 
following two Chapters consider whether opportunities exist for judges to engage in 
judicial mediation in their private capacity, and whether any of the implications 
identified in this Chapter might also apply to State or territory courts. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THE PERSONA DESIGNATA EXCEPTION 
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, examined the extent to which, and the manner in which, Ch III 
limits the functions that may be vested in Ch III courts. It was concluded that 
mediation functions may be vested in Ch III courts as incidental functions (in 
accordance with the second limb of the separation doctrine) if they can be carried out 
in a manner consistent with the rule against bias and the (uncertain) requirements of 
judicial integrity. In Chapters 7 and 8 it is shown that, in the vast majority of cases, 
judicial mediation will satisfy these requirements. However, a number of exceptions 
to the separation doctrine have also developed over the years. 1 These exceptions 
reflect the difficulties associated with a strict separation of judicial and non judicial 
functions, while remaining outwardly loyal to the separation doctrine.2
                                                 
1 Once such exception permits that judicial functions may be delegated to court officers in certain 
circumstances. While this exception is not directly relevant to judicial mediation because it does not 
limit the functions that judges may perform (see David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? 
– Part 2’ (2006) 17(4) Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 189, 190) certain of the key judgments in 
this area are also of relevance to the development of the Kable doctrine, insofar as they consider 
whether, or to what extent, the Commonwealth has the power to regulate the constitution of State 
courts. This connection is identified in Chapter 6. The primary cases are: Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 
42 CLR 481; Bond v George A Bond & Co Ltd (1930) 44 CLR 11; R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353; 
Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69; Knight v Knight (1971) 122 CLR 114; Commonwealth v Hospital 
Contribution Fund (1971) 122 CLR 114; Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 361.  
2 Judith Shklar has posited that the contradictions inherent to our most basic legal principles may be a 
necessary evil of those principles: ‘Although it is philosophically deeply annoying, human institutions 
survive because most of us can live comfortably with wholly contradictory beliefs. Most thoughtful 
citizens know that the courts act decisively in creating rules that promote political ends – to name only 
civil rights – of which they approve. They also insist that the impartiality of judges and of the process 
as a whole requires a dispassionate, literal pursuit of rules carved in marble … If we value flexibility 
and accept a degree of contradiction, this paradox may even seem highly functional and appropriate’. 
Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (1964), x. 
 This Chapter 
examines the ‘persona designata’ (‘designated person’) exception, and asks whether 
it might offer further opportunities for the expansion of judicial mediation in 
Australian courts. 
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The High Court’s reasoning in the Boilermakers’ Case has been noted for its legalistic 
approach to power separation.3 Ironically, this approach has led to the adoption of 
equally legalistic reasoning in order to circumvent, or ‘outflank’, the second limb of 
the separation doctrine, in order to permit the appointment of judges in administrative 
positions.4 In a Ch III context, the persona designata exception is premised upon a 
distinction between the powers vested in federal courts under s 71 of the Constitution 
and the judges appointed to those courts under s 72. The upshot of this distinction is 
that a judge may engage in a function in a private capacity that is non-judicial in 
nature, provided that it is not ‘incompatible’ with the performance of his/her judicial 
functions.5
It has been argued that the persona designata exception will not permit Ch III judges 
to mediate.
  
 
6 This argument recognises that mediation is not an exclusively judicial 
function,7 and reasons that mediation would be incompatible with the co-exercise of 
judicial functions because it threatens the ‘bubble of impartiality’ that surrounds the 
judiciary.8 Accepting the first part of this argument, but rejecting the second, it has, 
alternatively, been argued that the persona designata exception could provide 
opportunities for judges to mediate, as ‘the important characteristic of impartiality is 
an attribute required of both roles’.9
                                                 
3 Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Boilermakers Case’, in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Landmarks (2003), 166. 
4 Patrick Lane, A Manual of Australian Constitutional Law (6th ed 1995), 215. 
5 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577; Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 
CLR 57; Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
6 Phillip Tucker, 'Judges as mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition?’ (2000) 11 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 84. 
7 Ibid 88, 89. 
8 Ibid 68-70. 
9 David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 2’, above n 1, 190. 
 Both of these propositions assume that mediation 
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cannot be vested in Ch III courts as an incidental judicial function, and in Chapters 3 
and 4 it was shown that this assumption is unfounded. This conclusion is supported by 
Justice Michael Moore, who has questioned whether the persona designata exception 
provides the only means by which judges can mediate.10
Incompatibility 
 This Chapter agrees that the 
persona designata exception may theoretically allow mediation to be carried out by 
judges in their private capacity (and that this may even permit the use of evaluate 
techniques that would otherwise be prohibited), but argues, nevertheless, that it is 
preferable (and more in tune with the historically administrative nature of persona 
designata appointments) for judicial mediation to evolve as an incidental judicial 
function. 
 
 
It has already been noted that an alternative mechanism by which to limit the 
functions that may be vested in Ch III courts was offered by Dixon and Evatt JJ in 
Lowenstein 11  and Williams J in the Boilermakers’ Case. 12  Whereas strict power 
separation excludes the vesting in Ch III courts of all non judicial (or incidental) 
functions, the incompatibility doctrine would have permitted the vesting in Ch III 
courts of functions falling outside this classification, provided that they were 
‘compatible’ with judicial power. The incompatibility doctrine was ultimately cast-off 
in favour of the second limb of the separation doctrine, 13
                                                 
10 Justice Michael Moore ‘Judges as Mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition or Accommodation?’ (2003) 
14 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 188, 193. 
11 R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556, 588 – 589. 
12 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 313 (Williams J). 
13 Although, according to Fiona Wheeler, ‘in the 1970’s and 1980’s it appeared that the High Court 
might overturn the second limb and replace it with an incompatibility test’. ‘Due Process, Judicial 
Power and Chapter III in the new High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal law Review 205, 211. 
 but notions of 
incompatibility have enjoyed resurgence in recent years, and now affect the legislative 
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powers of the Commonwealth and State parliaments in two distinct ways; as an aspect 
of the persona designata exception (preventing the vesting of certain non-judicial 
functions in federal judges in their private capacity); and as an aspect of the Kable 
doctrine (limiting the vesting of non-judicial functions in State and territory courts).  
 
The Kable doctrine, and its implications for judicial mediation in the States and 
territories, is examined in the following Chapter. It is important to note from the 
outset, however, that the implications of incompatibility may differ between these 
discrete doctrinal spheres. In Kable, Gaudron J recognised that the incompatibility 
concept was ‘closely related’ in both contexts, but cautioned that the 
 
limitation on State legislative power is more closely confined [than the 
incompatibility condition which limits the persona designata exception] and 
relates to powers or functions imposed on a State court, rather than its judges 
in their capacity as individuals, and is concerned with powers or functions 
that are repugnant to or incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth.14
Dawson J dissented in Kable,
  
 
15
 
 but His Honour’s analysis also provides a valuable 
insight into the essential distinction between the application of the incompatibility 
concept in the federal and State realms:   
                                                 
14 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 104. Brennan CJ also stated, at 68, that the 
‘incompatibility qualification applied to the persona designata doctrine has no counterpart in the 
context of possible limitations on the power of a State Parliament to invest courts of the State with non-
judicial powers’. His Honour’s was, however, in dissent on the principle issue in the case, applying, at 
67, the traditional approach that the Commonwealth Parliament must take State court as it finds them. 
See also Kristen Walker, ‘Persona Designata, Incompatibility and the Separation of Powers’ (1997) 8 
Public Law Review 153, 165-66. 
15 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 83. 
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What is incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth by a Ch III court may not be incompatible with the exercise 
of the judicial power of the Commonwealth by a court which is not restricted 
by any separation of powers. As Grollo makes clear, the concept of 
incompatibility [as a limitation on the persona designata exception] is 
derived from the separation of powers and does not have a life of its own 
independent of that doctrine.16
Subsequent authority indicates that the requirements of incompatibility are not 
uniform.
 
 
17 While in a sense the ‘incompatibility doctrine’ may have ‘become a “free-
standing principle,’” 18  therefore, no simple translation can be made between the 
application of that doctrine in a persona designata context and its implications for 
State courts and judges under the Kable doctrine. This point is not always appreciated 
in practice.19
 
 
The Persona Designata Exception 
 
Kristen Walker has explained that ‘the doctrine of persona designata is not a new 
invention. It appears in the Australian legal context as early as 1874, and in the 
federal context in 1904 in Holmes v Angwin’.20
                                                 
16 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 85. 
17 See below Chapter 6 n 135-216 and accompanying text. 
18 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary 
and Materials, (3rd ed 2002), 1296. 
19 For example, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 
169 FCR 241, [93]- [119] (Weinberg, Bennett and Edmonds JJ) appeared to view incompatibility as a 
single overarching concept. 
20 Walker, above n 14, 154; citing Ex parte Jones; Re Jones v Bates (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 284; 
Siddons v New South Wales Shale & Oil Co Ltd (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 364. 
 In both contexts the persona designata 
exception recognises the fact that judges have long engaged in certain functions on 
behalf of government (such as conducting Royal Commissions and Special 
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Commissions of Inquiry, and issuing administrative warrants). 21
While there exist strong views in the states on these matters [the performance 
by judges of non judicial functions], the propriety of the assumption by 
federal judges (that is, judges of the High Court and the federal courts created 
by the Commonwealth Parliament) of non judicial functions has always been 
a question not just of the conventions or ethics of judicial office but also of 
the demands of positive constitutional law. The High Court has held that the 
Commonwealth Constitution impliedly incorporates a doctrine of the 
separation of federal judicial power from legislative and executive power.
 The operation of 
persona designata in the States and territories is considered later in this Chapter. The 
appropriate starting point for analysis, however, given the specific requirements of the 
separation doctrine, is the development of persona designata as an exception to 
second limb of that doctrine. This is because: 
 
22
The persona designata doctrine was identified as an exception to the second limb in 
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.
 
 
23 At issue was whether Davies J 
(a Federal Court judge) could constitute an Administrative Appeals Tribunal; an 
appointment which involved ‘the exercise of administrative functions which are quasi 
judicial in character’. 24
                                                 
21 Justice Robert French, ‘Executive Toys – Judges and Non-judicial Functions (speech presented at the 
District Court Judges’ Conference, Joondalup, 11th April 2008), [63]-[64].  
22 Fiona Wheeler, ‘The use of federal judges to discharge executive functions: the Justice Mathews case 
[Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs]’ (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration 10, 10. 
23 (1979) 24 ALR 577 
24 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577, 583 (Bowen CJ and Deane 
J). 
 The appellant argued that the second limb of separation 
doctrine logically extended to judges appointed under s71, and that the relevant 
provisions of the Act were therefore unconstitutional. The Federal Court disagreed, 
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finding that the second limb was concerned only with the conferral of non-judicial 
functions on Ch III courts, and not with the conferral of non-judicial functions on 
Federal Court judges acting in their private capacity. Part II of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 did not confer an administrative jurisdiction on a Ch III 
court, but on a discrete administrative body (the AAT) designed for that purpose. As 
Davies J’s appointment to that body was in his personal capacity,25
 There is nothing in the Constitution which precludes a justice of the High 
Court or a judge of this or any other court created by Parliament under Ch III 
of the Constitution from, in his personal capacity, being appointed to an 
office involving the performance of administrative or executive functions 
including functions which are quasi judicial in their nature. Such an 
appointment does not involve any impermissible attempt to confer upon a Ch 
III court functions which are antithetical to the exercise of judicial power. 
Indeed, it does not involve the conferring of any functions at all on such a 
court.
 the second limb 
had no application: 
 
26
The High Court expanded the federal persona designata exception in Hilton v 
Wells.
 
 
27
                                                 
25 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577, 583 – 584 (Bowen CJ and 
Deane J). 
26 Ibid 584 (Bowen CJ and Deane J). 
27 (1985) 157 CLR 57. 
 In that case, the appellant argued that a provision of the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Act 1979 (Cth), which authorised Federal Court judges to issue 
telecoms interception warrants, was invalid as it conferred an executive function on a 
Ch III Court. Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ held (Mason and Deane JJ dissenting) 
that the provision was valid, despite the fact that the function in question was 
234 
 
 
irrefutably executive in nature, because it conferred the function upon Federal Court 
judges in their personal capacity and the function in question was ‘not incompatible 
with their status and independence or inconsistent with the exercise of their judicial 
powers’.28 In what Peter Hanks has described as an ‘interesting example of inverted 
reasoning,’29
[T]he question is one of construction. Where the power is conferred on a 
court, there will ordinarily be a strong presumption that the court as such is 
intended. Where the power is conferred on a judge, rather than on a court, it 
will be a question whether the distinction was deliberate, and whether the 
reference to “judge” rather than to “court” indicates that the power was 
intended to be invested in the judge as an individual. [T]he nature of the 
power conferred is [also] of importance in deciding whether the judge on 
whom it is conferred is intended to exercise it in his capacity as a judge or as 
a designated person. If the power is judicial, it is likely that it is intended to 
be exercisable by the judge by virtue of that character; if it is purely 
administrative, and not incidental to the exercise of judicial power, it is likely 
that it is intended to be exercisable by the judge as a designated person.
 the majority found further support for this conclusion in the nature of the 
function itself:  
 
30
This extract is worrying in two respects. First of all, to say that if a function is judicial 
in nature it is ‘likely’ that Parliament intended it to be exercised by a judge acting in 
his/her formal capacity, is misleading. If a function is judicial in nature it cannot be 
vested in a judge in his/her private capacity by virtue of the first limb of the separation 
doctrine (because judicial functions can only be vested in Ch III courts). Thus, the 
 
 
                                                 
28 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 74 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ). 
29 Peter Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (1991) 486. 
30 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 72-73 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).  
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conclusion that a judicial function is intended to be exercised by a judge (but vested in 
a Ch III court) is not just ‘likely’, it is essential – or the provision in question will be 
invalid.31
Second of all, the proposition that Parliament may vest powers in federal judges 
directly (as opposed to non-judicial bodies comprising Ch III judges) is a considerable 
expansion on the principle expounded in Drake. In the latter, the Federal Court had 
allowed the appointment of a federal judge to an administrative body, on the basis that 
the Boilermakers’ Case was concerned only with the activities of Ch III Courts. As 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act established a non-judicial tribunal, the 
second limb of the separation doctrine simply did not apply. In contrast, the 
provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act upheld by the majority in 
Hilton did not establish a new non-judicial body to issue warrants, but vested them 
directly in Federal Court judges (potentially sitting in a Ch III court). Needless to say, 
the decision has been criticised for its potential to ‘undermine the doctrine in the 
Boilermakers’ Case’.
  
 
32
[T]he Court [in Hilton] showed little appreciation of the interests and values 
served by the separation of judicial power … A fundamental interest of 
citizens is that the judicial function – the adjudication of controversies in 
terms of law – should be in the hands of a branch of government which 
 According to Denise Meyerson: 
 
                                                 
31 This point is made explicitly by the majority judgment in O’Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 
599, 626 [61] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). This is subject, however, to the 
exception identified which allows certain judicial functions to be exercised by court officers. See above 
n 1. 
32 (1985) 157 CLR 57, 81 (Mason and Deane JJ). See also: Leslie Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution (5th ed 2008), 263; Suri Ratnapala, ‘Australian Constitutional Law (2nd ed 2007), 176. 
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makes its decisions impartially and is both actually and apparently 
independent of domination or manipulation by the political branches.33
To the intelligent observer, unversed in what Dixon J accurately 
described — and emphatically rejected — as ‘distinctions without 
differences’ it would come as a surprise to learn that a judge, who is 
appointed to carry out a function by reference to his judicial office and 
who carries it out in his court with the assistance of its staff, services and 
facilities, is not acting as a judge at all, but as a private individual. Such 
an observer might well think, with some degree of justification, that it is 
all an elaborate charade.
 
 
Indeed, the potential of Hilton to undermine the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary was a danger not lost on the minority in the case. Mason and Deane JJ noted 
that: 
 
34
Given these difficulties, but accepting (for the sake of argument) the public interest 
served by having judges issue intercept warrants, it might be wondered why the 
majority in Hilton did not simply hold that the provision of intercept warrants was 
incidental to the exercise of judicial power.
 
 
35  While previous authorities had 
characterised this function as administrative in nature,36
                                                 
33 Denise Meyerson, ‘Extra-judicial service on the part of judges: constitutional impediments in 
Australia and South Africa’ (2003) 3(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 181, 185. 
34 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 84. 
35 Ratnapala, above n 32, 177. 
36 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Brewer v Castles (1984) 52 ALR 571. 
 the ‘purposes for which the 
functions were characterised [by these authorities] was very different to the purpose 
for which the function was considered in Hilton v Wells, [and] in none of these cases 
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was the character of the power seriously investigated’.37 Even if such functions are 
properly to be regarded as administrative in nature, however, their historical 
association with the exercise of judicial power provides ample grounds for the 
conclusion that they are incidental to its exercise – just as committal proceedings, 
though non-judicial, may be vested in Ch III courts.38
In any event, a series of cases in the 1990’s have confirmed the place of the persona 
designata exception in Australian law.
 
 
39 In Grollo v Palmer – a case which Phillip 
Tucker has described as the ‘high-watermark’ of permitting judges to exercise non-
judicial power 40  – the High Court at once affirmed the doctrine and limited its 
application to the conferral of functions which are not ‘incompatible’ with the 
performance of judicial functions.41 Grollo concerned the power to issue interception 
warrants under the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) as amended 
following Hilton. 42 On the facts, Heerey J (a Federal Court judge) had issued an 
intercept warrant relating to a Federal Police investigation involving the Appellant. 
His Honour subsequently heard matters at trial concerning the appellant and certain of 
his companies. In accordance with the Act, 43
                                                 
37 Ratnapala, above n 32, 177. 
38 Pearce v Cocchiaro (1977) 137 CLR 600, 609 (Gibbs CJ; Stephen, Jacobs and Aickin JJ agreeing); 
R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596, 614-616 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson 
JJ). See Chapter 3 generally. 
39 But see Jones v Commonwealth (1987) 71 ALR 497. 
40 Tucker, above n 6, 87. 
41 (1995) 184 CLR 348. 
42 Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth), as amended by the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Amendment Act 1987 (Cth). Section 39(1) of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 
1979 (Cth) had been amended following Hilton so as to apply only to ‘eligible judges’. Section 39 (2) 
requires the judge to provide consent. 
43 The Full Court accepted that this was a requirement of the Act. Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 
366 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 381 (McHugh J). 
 Heerey J did not disclose his 
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involvement in issuing the intercept warrant, as would ordinarily be necessary to 
dispel apprehended bias.44
The Full Court confirmed that the provision of interception warrants was an 
administrative function,
  
 
45 but five members of the Court concluded that the Act’s 
conferral of that function on Federal Court judges was nevertheless valid.46 Brennan 
CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ accepted that bias could be apprehended by virtue 
of the requirement that judges not disclose their involvement in the issue of 
interception warrants, especially given the ‘large proportion of Federal Court judges 
who are eligible judges and who, if not involved in the issue of the warrant in the 
particular case, would have formed a view about the manner in which the power to 
issue an intercept warrant should be exercised’.47 Nevertheless, their Honours held 
that this risk could be eliminated in practice, because a ‘judge who has issued a 
warrant in a particular matter can ensure that he or she does not sit on any case to 
which the warrant relates’.48
would not extend to the discharge by the "eligible Judge" of functions as a 
judge exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth. In so far as it 
rested upon an equitable obligation of confidence under the general law, such 
 In other words, the majority applied a presumption in 
favour of legislative validity, finding that the legislation could have been performed 
judicially, even although, on the facts, it was not. Gummow J adopted slightly 
different reasoning to achieve the same result. In His Honour’s view, the impugned 
provisions 
 
                                                 
44 See below Chapter 8 nn 150-165. 
45 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 360 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 369, 378 
(McHugh J), 389 (Gummow J). 
46 Ibid 368-69 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 398 (Gummow J). 
47 Ibid 366. 
48 Ibid. 
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an obligation would be formulated in a manner which observed necessary 
statutory or, in this case, constitutional constraints ... [T]he ambit of the duty 
stops short of impeding discharge of the higher duty flowing from Ch III.49
It will be recalled that the technique of ‘reading down’ legislation has been favoured 
in respect of statutory provisions affecting Ch III courts,
  
 
50 and as demonstrated in the 
following Chapter, the same is true of State or territory legislation affecting State or 
territory courts.51 The policy reason advanced in support of this approach in Grollo, 
as with the more recent case of Thomas v Mowbray (considered in Chapter 3),52
[I]t is precisely because of the intrusive and clandestine nature of interception 
warrants and the necessity to use them in today's continuing battle against 
serious crime that some impartial authority, accustomed to the dispassionate 
assessment of evidence and sensitive to the common law’s protection of 
privacy and property (both real and personal), be authorised to control the 
official interception of communications. In other words, the professional 
experience and cast of mind of a judge is a desirable guarantee that the 
appropriate balance will be kept between the law enforcement agencies on 
the one hand and criminal suspects or suspected sources of information about 
crime on the other.
 was 
the view that judges are better suited to making decisions affecting individual rights 
than the executive: 
 
53
                                                 
49 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 397, 398. 
50 See above Chapter 3 nn 108-127, Chapter 4 nn 226-250, and accompanying text. 
51 See below Chapter 6 nn 223-246 and accompanying text. 
52 See above Chapter 3 nn 118-130 and accompanying text. 
53 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 367 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 398 
(Gummow J). 
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Recognising that the ‘“designated person principle” could operate to undermine the 
doctrine of the separation of powers unless confined in some way,’54
1. Conferral must be made with the consent of the judge in question 
 however, and 
drawing on the view expressed by the minority in Hilton, the majority identified two 
limitations on Parliament’s power to confer functions on judges as designated persons:  
 
 
2. Performance of the function must be compatible with the judge’s judicial 
functions.55
 
  
The first of these requirements reflects the concern, raised by Mason and Deane JJ in 
Hilton, that judges must not be compelled by the government to undertake non-
judicial functions. 56
1. [S]o permanent and complete commitment to performance of non-
judicial functions by a judge that the further performance of substantial 
judicial functions by that judge is not practicable. 
 As to the second, the majority established three situations in 
which the conferral of non-judicial functions on a judge in his/her personal capacity 
might be incompatible with the exercise of judicial functions: 
 
 
2. [T]he performance of non-judicial functions of such a nature that the 
capacity of the judge to perform his or her judicial functions with 
integrity is compromised or impaired. 
 
                                                 
54 Wheeler, ‘The use of federal judges to discharge executive functions: the Justice Mathews case’ 
above n 22, 11. 
55 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 364-65. 
56 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 85. 
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3. [T]he performance of non-judicial functions of such a nature that public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as an institution or in the 
capacity of the individual judge to perform his or her judicial functions 
with integrity is diminished.57
 
 
McHugh J, in dissent, found it impossible to accept that the issuing of interception 
warrants in private and without review was a function suited to the judiciary. In His 
Honour’s view, not only was judicial involvement in the ‘exercise of invasive power 
by members of the executive government’ contrary to the Constitution’s clear 
demarcation of judicial power,58
Under the Act, approval of a warrant is not dependent upon compliance with 
objective conditions precisely formulated. The persona designata is given a 
discretion to approve or disapprove the issue of the warrant, and the grounds 
to be considered are very general. Essentially, the legislation puts the persona 
designata in the uniform of the constable.
 but the manner in which that function was to be 
performed was incompatible with the judicial function: 
 
59
Thus, for McHugh J, the major difficulty with the Act lay in its requirement that 
judicial officers perform functions in the manner of the executive;
 
 
60 contrary to the 
strict separation of judicial and non-judicial functions required by the second limb.61
                                                 
57 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365. 
58 Ibid 378. 
59 Ibid 379. 
60 Ibid 378. 
61 Ratnapala, above n 32, 128. See also Zines, above n 32, 254. 
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Of the three scenarios/limbs identified in Grollo, only the third has ever been 
considered by the High Court in detail. In Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs (‘Wilson’),62 Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh 
and Gummow JJ considered that s10(1)(c) of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) did not permit the appointment of 
Matthews J (a Federal Court judge) to the role of Ministerial reporter. The 
appointment reflected the requirement, incumbent upon the Minister for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders (the ‘Minister), to obtain a report by a nominated person 
before making a declaration,63 ‘for the preservation or protection of a specified area 
[of Aboriginal Land] from injury or desecration’.64 The majority began by restating 
that Ch III ‘advances two constitutional objectives: the guarantee of liberty and, to 
that end, the independence of Ch III judges’. 65
The performance of such a function by a judge places the judge firmly in 
the echelons of administration, liable to removal by the Minister before 
the report is made and shorn of the usual judicial protections, in a 
position equivalent to that of a ministerial adviser ... The function of 
reporting is therefore incompatible with the holding of office as a Ch III 
judge.
 On this basis, and applying the third 
limb of Grollo, the majority concluded that Matthews J’s appointment was 
incompatible with the performance of her judicial functions: 
  
66
                                                 
62 (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
63 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) s 10(1)(c), 10(4). 
64 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) s 10 (1)(a). 
65 Wilson v Minster for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
66 Ibid 18-19. 
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In so finding, the majority outlined the process of reasoning to be applied in order to 
determine whether ‘public confidence’, for the purposes of the third limb in Grollo, 
had been diminished:  
 
The statute or the measures taken pursuant to the statute must be 
examined in order to determine, first, whether the function is an integral 
part of, or is closely connected with, the functions of the Legislature or 
the Executive Government. If the function is not closely connected with 
the Legislature or the Executive Government, no constitutional 
incompatibility appears. Next, an answer must be given to the question 
whether the function is required to be performed independently of any 
instruction, advice or wish of the Legislature or the Executive 
Government, other than a law or an instrument made under a law … If an 
affirmative answer does not appear, it is clear that the separation has been 
breached. The breach is not capable of repair by the Ch III judge on 
whom the function is purportedly conferred, for the breach invalidates 
the conferral of the function. If the function is one which must be 
performed independently of any non-judicial instruction, advice or wish, 
a further question arises: Is any discretion purportedly possessed by the 
Ch III judge to be exercised on political grounds – that is, on grounds that 
are not confined by factors expressly or impliedly prescribed by law?67
The majority also identified the requirements of procedural fairness as a factor of 
‘relevance’ to the determination of compatibility under the third-limb,
 
 
68
                                                 
67 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17. 
68 Ibid. 
 but this is not 
because of the effect that such a function may have upon independence and 
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impartiality, but because ‘if a judicial manner of performance is not required, it is 
unlikely that the performance of the function will be performed free of political 
influence or without the prospect of exercising a political discretion’.69
Kirby J, in dissent, disagreed with the majority that the function of ministerial reporter 
was analogous with that of a ministerial advisor; suggesting that it was, in fact, more 
comparable with the role of royal commissioners.
 In other words, 
if a function need not be performed in accordance with judicial standards of 
procedural fairness, it is more likely to be classified as inherently legislative or 
executive in nature, indicating a legislative intention to confer the function upon a 
judge persona designata. 
 
70 Proceeding on this basis, His 
Honour found the ‘activities of a federal judge, secretly and anonymously authorising 
telephonic intercepts, [to be] ... much closer to the functions of the other branches 
than are those of a statutory reporter’.71 Ultimately, however, His Honour’s views 
were informed by the belief, held by majority in Grollo, that ‘the special qualities of 
experience, reputation and integrity that a judge can bring to the office’ make judges 
the most suitable persons for the position.72
                                                 
69 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17. 
70 Ibid 38. 
71 Ibid 49-50. 
72 Kristen Walker has observed that there ‘seems to be an assumption in Grollo that judges will act so 
as to safeguard the rights of the individual, so that judges are not being borrowed to give an appearance 
of neutrality; and any problems are to be overcome by an “appropriate practice.” In Wilson, on the 
other hand, it is said that the separation of powers doctrine “cannot be avoided by a judge choosing to 
adopt a procedure designed to erect a cordon sanitaire between the judge and the Legislature or the 
judge and the Executive Government.”... I would suggest that the two judgments are hard to reconcile 
in so far as the application of principle is concerned. These issues leave me the suspicion that the 
majority is applying an “I know it when I see it” test – or, more charitably, that there has been a change 
of approach since Grollo that simply has not been acknowledged by the court’. Above n 14, 160-61. 
 Thus, Kirby J’s dissent in Wilson can be 
seen as an endorsement of the approach adopted by the majority in Grollo, whereas 
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the majority’s approach in Wilson can be seen as an endorsement of McHugh J’s 
dissent in Grollo.73
The precise meaning of the third limb must now be reconsidered in light of a series of 
cases which discredited ‘public confidence’ as an appropriate measure of legislative 
validity in respect of federal
  
 
74 or State legislation.75 These cases confirm that public 
confidence is merely an indicator of ‘integrity’. However, this does not appear to have 
made a substantial difference to the operation of the incompatibility condition in 
practice. For example, in Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (‘Hussain’), 76 the 
Full Federal Court considered whether the appointment of a Ch III judge to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal was incompatible with the nature of proceedings at 
security appeals hearings. These hearings, the appellant contended, allowed ‘for 
significant interference by the Attorney-General, as the relevant Minister, in the 
outcome’. 77  Having assayed the relevant authorities, and by analogy with ‘other 
purely administrative functions that Ch III judges routinely exercise,’ 78
There is plainly a danger that judges will have certain functions conferred 
upon them as designated persons so that the Government can benefit from the 
veneer of impartiality that they bring to the task in politically sensitive or 
controversial areas. If the perception arises that a judge is acting as a tool of 
 Weinberg, 
Bennett and Edmonds JJ held that:  
 
                                                 
73 Walker, above n 14, 158-59. 
74 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 197 [37] (Brennan CJ), 275 [242] (Hayne J). See above 
Chapter 4 nn 203-10 and accompanying text. 
75 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 593 [23] (Gleeson CJ), 617-18 [102] 
(Gummow J), 629-30 [144] (Kirby J). Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 519-20 [6] (Gleeson 
CJ), 542 [79] (Kirby J); Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 
122 [194] (Kirby J), 149 [274] (Heydon J). See below Chapter 6 nn 177 – 211 and accompanying text. 
76 (2008) 169 FCR 241 (Weinberg, Bennett and Edmonds JJ). 
77 Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241, [52]. 
78 Ibid [151]. 
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the executive, respect for the court and the rule of law will be diminished. 
However, we doubt that ordinary members of the community would regard a 
Ch III judge who presides over an appeal to the Security Appeals Division of 
the Tribunal as having compromised his or her integrity merely by following 
the procedures laid down in ss 39A and 39B. The Tribunal operates 
independently of the executive ... Further, the individual judge may exercise 
his or her discretion whether or not to preside over such an appeal. 79
The relevance, if any, of the ‘somewhat elusive criterion of “public confidence”’
  
 
80 to 
judicial mediation, is considered in Chapter 8.81
In the years since Wilson was decided the High Court has twice skirted the limits of 
the persona designata exception in relation to the appointment of federal and State 
magistrates in extradition proceedings.
  
 
82
In Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (‘Vasiljkovic’), the appellant was a naturalised 
Australian citizen subject to an extradition request by the Croatian government, 
stemming from alleged criminal offences committed during the Kosovo conflict. The 
appellant argued that certain provisions of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), which 
conferred a range of administrative powers on federal magistrates, were invalid. 
 On neither occasion has the High Court 
added significantly to our understanding of the incompatibility condition or the 
persona designata exception generally, but these decisions do emphasise the broad 
range of administrative functions that may be vested in judges without offending the 
requirements of Ch III.  
 
                                                 
79 Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241, [165]-[166]. 
80 Rafael Cezan v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 358, 380-81 [71]-[72] (French CJ). 
81 See below Chapter 8 nn 191-96 and accompanying text. 
82 Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614; O’Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 599. 
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Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ (Kirby J dissenting) rejected the appeal. 
All of the judges began by accepting, as has already been determined in Pasini v 
United Mexican States, 83  that extradition proceedings were an inherently 
administrative function.84 As Gleeson CJ explained, extradition is ‘removal by an 
executive act undertaken with legislative authority; not removal by judicial 
decision’.85 However, validity was not impugned on the basis that the conferral of this 
administrative function was incompatible with the performance of judicial functions 
by the magistrate in question. Rather, the crux of the appellant’s argument was that 
the Act failed to ‘interpose judicial consideration of the sufficiency of evidence 
warranting surrender prior to depriving a requested person of his or her liberty’.86 The 
key issue for determination, therefore, was the scope of the Commonwealth’s external 
affairs power under s 51 (xxix) and its relationship with the Ch III. Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, found that extradition proceedings fell entirely 
within the external affairs power, and that the implications of Ch III therefore had no 
application.87 For Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ this view was bolstered by the 
continued availability of judicial review as a check upon the exercise of the power 
granted.88 Gummow and Hayne JJ concluded that:89
To the extent that there is no prior adjudication of guilt by a domestic court, 
and the detention is not with a view to the conduct of such a trial by a 
domestic court, it may be said that the necessity and occasions for detention 
pending determination of surrender of the person requested to the requesting 
 
 
                                                 
83 (2000) 200 CLR 442. 
84 Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614, 636 [58] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 657 [145] 
(Kirby J); 676 [222] (Heydon J).  
85 Ibid 630 [35], 631 [38].  
86 Ibid 665 [170] (Kirby J). 
87 Ibid 621 [40] (Gleeson CJ), 649 [116] (Gummow and Hayne J) 676 [222] (Heydon J). 
88 Ibid 646 [100]-[101] (Gummow and Hayne J), [222] (Heydon J). 
89 Ibid 659 [149] Kirby J. 
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State and its judicial processes stand outside Ch III, rather than as an 
exception to its application.90
This conclusion may be sufficient to justify the proposition that the judicial process 
does not apply to extradition proceedings – the principal question which their 
Honours were required to answer.
 
 
91 A similar approach was traditionally adopted, and 
has since been rejected, as regards Parliament’s territory power under s 122. 92
The separation of powers works in more than one direction. It prevents the 
legislature and the executive from exercising judicial power. It also prevents 
the judiciary from exercising legislative power. Where, as here, the 
legislation is so obviously with respect to external affairs, and where it 
offends no express or implied provision of the Constitution, a conclusion that 
the legislation is not the method of dealing with extradition that has the least 
impact on human rights does not result in invalidity.
 
However, the conclusion that Ch III has no application to extradition proceedings 
does not mean that Grollo and Wilson are powerless to prevent the conferral on Ch III 
judges of administrative functions under s 51 (xxix). As Gleeson CJ recognised: 
 
93
Gleeson CJ had earlier concluded that the Act provides for the performance of 
‘administrative functions by a judicial officer acting as persona designata’.
 
  
94
                                                 
90 Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614, 649 [116] (Gummow and Hayne J), 676 
[222] (Heydon J). 
91 Ibid 639 [70]. Kirby J dissented. In His Honour’s opinion, at 659 [150], the involvement of the 
courts in extradition proceedings was in fact ‘extremely limited’. His Honour went on to state, at 670 
[195], that with ‘respect to those who have expressed a contrary view, it is not irrelevant to examine the 
incidents of the detention, its circumstances and duration when deciding its actual character for 
constitutional purposes’.  
92 See below Chapter 6 nn 49-134. 
93 Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614, 633 [41]. 
94 Ibid 627 [28]. 
 Thus, it 
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is implicit in His Honour’s reasoning that the s 19 of the Extradition Act satisfies the 
incompatibility condition.  
 
Section 19 of the Extradition Act was reconsidered in O’Donoghue v Ireland 
(‘O’Donoghue’).95 In that case, the High Court heard three appeals to the effect that s 
19(1), (9) and (10) constituted an unconstitutional attempt on behalf of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to impose administrative functions on State statutory 
office holders. 96  Put simply, it was alleged that s 19 imposed a duty on State 
magistrates to perform certain functions without the consent of the relevant State 
parliament. Gleeson CJ (in a single judgment), Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan 
and Kiefel JJ (in a joint judgment) found the impugned provisions valid. Their 
Honours found it unnecessary to determine whether the Commonwealth had the 
power to impose administrative obligations on State officers,97 because s 46 of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) established a valid ‘intergovernmental arrangement’ for the 
appointment of State magistrates in the same capacity as federal magistrates.98 The 
validity of the conferral therefore turned upon the whether s 19 fell within the scope 
of this arrangement. Section 4AAA of the Crimes Act imposed a number of 
limitations upon the Commonwealth’s power, including, inter alia, that such functions 
may only be conferred on the magistrate ‘in a personal capacity,’ 99  and that 
magistrates cannot ‘be appointed to an office that does not include any judicial 
functions without his or her consent’. 100
                                                 
95 (2008) 234 CLR 599. 
96 Contra Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, Re Australian Education 
Union; Ex parte Victoria (1955) 184 CLR 188, and Austin v The Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185. 
97 O’Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 599, 623-626 [47 – 57] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ). Gleeson CJ followed a similar approach at 617 [2]. 
98 Ibid 629 [75]. 
99 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 4AAA(2). 
100 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 4AAA(4). 
 The joint judges (Gleeson CJ in 
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agreement) 101  concluded that each ‘magistrate, as a matter of federal law, is not 
obliged to accept the performance of the functions of a magistrate under the Act’.102 
Thus, on its proper construction, s 19 merely conferred a power – it did not impose a 
duty.103 At no point, however, was it suggested, by the appellant or by the majority, 
that s 19 might be incompatible with the exercise of judicial power. This does not 
necessarily mean that s 19 is compatible with Ch III, but this seems a reasonable 
inference to draw.104
Can federal judges mediate in their private capacity? 
 
 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate that judicial mediation can be carried out by Ch III 
courts without offending against the requirements of Ch III. As such, the question 
whether judges can or cannot engage in judicial mediation in their private capacity is 
essentially moot. Is it possible, though, that the persona designata exception could 
offer an alternative vehicle for the transfer of mediation functions to judges?  
 
Phillip Tucker has argued that judicial mediation falls foul of the third limb of Grollo, 
because it involves processes – and has the potential to place judges in positions – 
which pose a ‘very real threat to the “bubble of impartiality” that surrounds the 
judiciary and which is essential in maintaining the legitimacy of its decisions’.105
                                                 
101 O’Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 599, 629 [75]. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 623[47], 626 [57], 627 [628]. 
104 The Federal Court appears to have reached this conclusion in Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(2008) 169 FCR 241 (Weinberg, Bennett and Edmonds JJ), [116]-[118]. 
105 Tucker, above n 6, 94. 
 He 
points, in particular, to the lack of appellate review, the compellability of mediators as 
witnesses, mediator liability, the confidentiality of mediations, and the use of private 
caucuses, as aspects of mediation which conflict with the values inherent in the public 
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court system.106
First of all, although mediation is not an exclusively judicial function (because it does 
not involve a ‘binding and authoritative decision’),
 On this basis he concludes that mediation is a non-judicial function, 
that is must therefore be exclusively legislative or executive, and that it is 
incompatible with the performance of judicial functions. This reasoning is flawed for 
two reasons. 
 
107
Accepting, then, that mediation functions may notionally be vested in federal judges 
as persona designata, the second flaw in Phillips Tucker’s argument is his conclusion 
that mediation falls foul of the third limb in Grollo. In none of the cases in which the 
persona designata exception has been raised in a Ch III context has an impugned 
function been held invalid, considered, or even mentioned because of an association 
with any source of influence other than the government. In Drake, it was the conferral 
of quasi-judicial administrative functions on Davies J that led the Federal Court to 
recognise the persona designata exception.
 neither is it inherently non-
judicial. That being so the power to mediate may be vested in a Ch III court as an 
incidental function (subject to the judicial process implication). Chapter 8 
demonstrates that the dangers identified by Phillip Tucker can be remedied in this 
context. However, because mediation is not an exclusively judicial function, it is 
accurate to state that mediation functions may (theoretically) also be vested in a judge 
in his/her private capacity.  
 
108
                                                 
106 Tucker, above n 6, 90-94. 
107 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ). 
108 (1979) 24 ALR 577, 583 (Bowen CJ and Deane J). 
  In Hilton and Grollo it was the 
conferral of ‘purely administrative’ functions (the issue of intercept warrants) on 
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Federal Court judges that was in issue. 109  In Wilson, it was the appointment of 
Matthews J to a position ‘firmly in the echelons of administration’ that led to 
incompatibility.110 Indeed, the majority in Wilson explicitly ‘confined incompatibility 
to the area of government activity:’111
The separation that is relevant here is separation in the performing of the 
particular non-judicial functions; the principle does not touch personal 
relationships or relationships outside the area of governmental activity 
between judges and those who perform legislative or executive 
functions.
 
 
112
In Hussain, the Federal Court found the appointment of a Ch III judge to an executive 
tribunal to be permissible under Grollo,
 
 
113 and in Vasiljkovic and O’Donoghue the 
appellants did not even attempt to contend that judicial involvement in extradition 
proceedings (an inherently administrative function) was incompatible with the co-
exercise of judicial power.114
If follows that the third-limb of Grollo (if not the incompatibility condition in its 
entirety) has nothing to say about processes which undermine impartiality in the 
manner threatened by mediation because, as Justice Moore has noted, it ‘appears to be 
self-evident that when a judge acts as mediator he or she does not enter a domain 
 
 
                                                 
109 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 72-73 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); Grollo v Palmer 
(1995) 184 CLR 348. 
110 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 18-19 
(Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
111 Gerard Carney, ‘Wilson & Kable: The Doctrine of Incompatibility – An Alternative to Separation of 
Powers?’ (1997) 13 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 175, 181. 
112 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 16 (Brennan 
CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
113 Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241, [165]-[166]. 
114 Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614; O’Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 599. 
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which involves, of its nature, an inappropriate melding of judicial, legislative or 
executive power’.115
Unlike Wilson, where there was a close connection with the statutory 
discretion of the Minister to consider the report by the judicial officer, the 
appointment of judicial mediators would appear to not be an integral part 
of, or have no such close connection with, the legislature or executive.
 David Spencer has arrived at the same conclusion: 
 
116
There may be situations, as Phillip Tucker suggests, in which the government is party 
to a dispute, and in such situations a judge may appear to be partial towards the 
government.
 
 
117 However, this does not make judicial mediation an administrative 
function, to be evaluated in accordance with the third limb of Grollo. Any such 
danger can therefore be remedied, as the joint judgment in Grollo acknowledged, by 
the withdrawal of the judge from the final hearing.118
If it is assumed for the sake of argument, however, that the third limb does extend to 
sources of influence other than the government, will judicial mediation undermine the 
third limb in these circumstances? Kristen Walker has described the third limb of 
Grollo as ‘public confidence incompatibility’; reflecting the fact that it operates to 
protect the integrity of the system as a whole. As noted, public confidence is no 
longer a discrete test of constitutional validity, but notions of public confidence are 
nevertheless subsumed within the requirements of impartiality and integrity.
 
 
119
                                                 
115 Moore, above n 10, 193. 
116 Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 1’, above n 9, 137. 
117 Tucker, above n 6, 94-95. 
118 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 366 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
119 Walker, above n 14, 159. 
 
Whether judicial mediation has the potential to undermine the integrity of the 
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judiciary in this broader sense is a highly complex question, and best addressed 
following an analysis of that concept as it applies in the States and territories. This 
analysis is undertaken in the following Chapter. Chapter 8 draws together the analysis 
of the integrity concept undertaken in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and demonstrates that 
judicial mediation is highly unlikely to undermine integrity in any doctrinal context. 
 
The second limb of Grollo may be referred to as ‘judicial integrity incompatibility;’120 
reflecting the fact that it operates to protect the integrity of individual judges. The 
High Court’s use of the term integrity in this context is unfortunate, as it suggests a 
connection between the second limb of Grollo and the integrity concept as it has 
developed in respect of Ch III Courts (reflected in the third limb of Grollo).121 A 
natural reading of the second limb suggests that this is not the case, however, and that 
its purpose is merely to incorporate the rules governing individual judicial conduct 
(procedural fairness). It cannot be assumed, although it seems likely, that the 
restriction applicable to the third limb (that it ‘does not touch personal relationships or 
relationships outside the area of governmental activity’),122
                                                 
120 Walker, above n 14, 159. 
121 See above Chapter 4 nn 188-210. 
122 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 16 (Brennan 
CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
 extends to the second limb. 
That being so it is possible that the second limb will prohibit the performance of 
functions that raise a reasonable apprehension of bias by virtue of any association 
(governmental or otherwise). The relationship between judicial mediation and the rule 
against bias is examined at length in Chapter 8. For the reasons offered at that stage, 
however, it is highly unlikely that any incompatibility would arise by the virtue of the 
second limb either. 
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What then, and finally, of the first limb of Grollo? As noted above, this limb has 
never been applied in practice, so there is simply no way to know how ‘permanent 
and complete’ a commitment to the performance of non-judicial functions would be 
required to activate this limitation. If natural meaning is attributed to these words, 
though, might the first limb have implications for judicial mediation? In answering 
this question, it is necessary to begin by reiterating the fact that judicial mediation, as 
defined in Chapter 1, is an ‘integrated’ prehearing process.123 Whether this integration 
is achieved by vesting mediation as an incidental function, or by conferring mediation 
functions on judges persona designata, it is not suggested that judges should be 
encouraged or permitted to mediate for personal financial reward. Not only would this 
be likely to undermine judicial integrity by raising a palpable conflict of interest 
between the performance of their judicial functions and their personal financial 
interests, it could effectively sap from the judiciary the exclusive power, ‘to decide 
controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects’.124
 
 This point is 
returned to below. 
 
The only concern as regards the first limb, therefore, is that the performance of 
judicial mediation as a prehearing function might result in so permanent and complete 
a commitment to non-judicial functions as to render the ‘further performance’ of a 
judge’s ‘substantial judicial functions’ impracticable. This is also unlikely to occur, 
for two reasons. The first reason is that judicial mediation is only one of many devices 
in the judiciary’s prehearing arsenal; it is not a substitute for the existing judicial 
process. According to Chief Justice Black: 
                                                 
123 See above Chapter 1 nn 30-36. 
124 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ). 
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The short- to medium-term future is not ... in my opinion, likely to involve a 
radical change in the system of ADR used by the Court ... I take this view 
about the likely future of ADR in the Court because, to my mind, the existing 
system has served well the interests of the litigants who have agreed to take 
part in it. It has assisted them and it has assisted the Court.125
is probable that for any particular judge, the time that would be devoted to 
mediation would be limited ... because of pressure within courts to resolve by 
traditional determination, the ordinarily lengthy list of cases which are not 
settled (whether by mediation or otherwise) ... [E]ven if, as I believe is the 
case, there is no constitutional impediment to judges acting as mediators, 
there will not be a wholesale assumption of that role by the judiciary. It is a 
role that is likely to be taken up sparingly.
  
 
This proposition is supported by Justice Moore, in whose view it 
 
126
Of course, judicial mediation may become so popular, and/or effective, as to prove 
these learned opinions wrong. A court may also choose to assign certain judges to 
judicial mediation for practical reasons.
 
 
127 As pointed out in Chapter 8, it is common 
for a court’s judicial mediation functions to be kept rigidly separate from its 
adjudicative functions, in order to ensure confidentiality. 128  This may lead to a 
division of judges in a given registry between mediation and non-mediation roles, 
with the former engaging ‘permanently and completely’ in judicial mediation.129
                                                 
125 Chief Justice Michael Black; ‘ALJ Forum: Mediation’ (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal 941, 941. 
126 Moore, above n 10, 195, 197. 
127 Tucker, above n 6, 88. 
128 See below Chapter 8 nn 144-54 and accompanying text. 
129 Tucker, above n 6, 88. 
 Even 
if this occurs, however, it may be hard to rationalise the conclusion that judicial 
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mediation is incompatible with the first limb for this reason, when judges have 
historically taken what are, in effect, full time positions in non-judicial roles. Kristen 
Walker has argued that: 
 
[I]f we are to take serious this form of incompatibility, then we must surely 
question the validity of the appointment of a Federal Court judge to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the National Crime Authority, the Social 
Security Appeals Tribunal and other administrative tribunals which involve a 
judge detaching from her court and operating as a full-time tribunal head. 
Furthermore, lengthy Royal Commissions may also fall foul of practical 
incompatibility, as would overseas postings such as those accepted by Dixon 
and Latham during World War II.130
Such distinctions may offer little resistance in practice, given that the majority in 
Wilson simply glossed over the analogy drawn by Kirby J between ministerial 
advisors and royal commissioners.
 
 
131
                                                 
130 Walker, above n 14, 162. 
131 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 18-19 
(Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh), 38 (Kirby J). 
 Nevertheless, it seems extremely doubtful that 
any of the three limbs in Grollo will prevent Australian judges from engaging in 
judicial mediation in their private capacity. Indeed, it is possible that the 
incompatibility doctrine would be permissive of a wider array of mediation activities 
than would the separation doctrine (because the separation doctrine excludes all non-
judicial (or incidental) functions). 
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Does Grollo apply to State or territory legislation? 
 
It has been noted that the persona designata doctrine has a long history at the State 
level, and that the incompatibility condition developed in Grollo applies only to Ch III 
courts. In Kable v DPP, however, McHugh J expressed the view that, following the 
ruling in that case, the incompatibility condition may have implications for State 
judges acting in their private capacity (contrary to the traditional view that the 
Constitution has no effect upon the power of State parliaments in this regard).132
although nothing in Ch III prevents a State from conferring executive 
government functions on a State court judge as persona designata, if the 
appointment of a judge as persona designata gave the appearance that the 
court as an institution was not independent of the executive government of 
the State, it would be invalid.
 In 
His Honour’s view,  
 
133
No doubt there are few appointments of a judge as persona designata in the 
State sphere that could give rise to the conclusion that the court of which the 
judge was a member was not independent of the executive government. 
Many Chief Justices, for example, act as Lieutenant-Governors and Acting 
Governors. But, given the long history of such appointments, it is impossible 
 
 
Consistent with the narrow application of the limits placed upon the persona 
designata exception in Grollo, however, McHugh J went on to confine this aspect of 
Kable to the area of government activity: 
 
                                                 
132 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 117-18. 
133 Ibid. 
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to conclude that such appointments compromise the independence of the 
supreme courts or suggest that they are not impartial. Similarly, a law that 
provided for a judge of a State court to be appointed as a member of an 
Electoral Commission fixing the electoral boundaries of the State would not 
appear to suggest that the court was not impartial. However, a State law 
which purported to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to be a 
member of the Cabinet might well be invalid because the appointment would 
undermine confidence in the impartiality of the Supreme Court as an 
institution independent of the executive government of the State.134
McHugh J was the only judge in Kable to make this suggestion, but in any event the 
doctrine is unlikely to significantly affect the ability of State parliament’s to vest 
mediation functions in State judges acting as persona designata. If the analysis in the 
preceding section is correct, and federal judges can engage in judicial mediation in 
their private capacity, then there is even less reason why State judges should not do 
so.
 
 
135 Kristen Walker has concluded that ‘the incompatibility condition is different 
from that applied to federal judges and is extremely weak’. 136  Likewise, Peter 
Johnston as Rohan Hardcastle have observed that McHugh J appeared to assume ‘a 
more relaxed incompatibility test for State judges than that applied to federal 
judges’.137
                                                 
134 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 117-18. 
135 The same reasoning applies to Territory judges: North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc 
v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
136 Walker, above n 14, 166. 
137 Peter Johnston and Rohan Hardcastle, ‘State Courts: The Limits of Kable’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law 
Review 216, 230. 
 Justice French (as he then was) has also suggested extra-curially that any 
finding of incompatibility in this context would ‘no doubt have to be an extreme case 
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in terms either of the nature of the function or the extent to which it impaired the 
capacity of the judge to carry out a judicial function’.138
These views are supported by State authority. In Kotzmann v Adult Parole Board 
Victoria,
  
 
139 the appellant contended that a provision of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) 
was invalid on the grounds, inter alia, that it required the appointment of a judge of 
the Supreme Court of Victoria to the Victorian Parole Board.140 This position, the 
appellant argued, was, ‘incompatible with the office of a judge of such a court’.141 
Judd J noted that the ‘persona designata doctrine, as an answer to the constraints on 
legislative power under the Boilermakers’ doctrine, is a uniquely federal doctrine 
which has only limited application in the present case’.142 That being so, His Honour 
explained, the only question is ‘whether the doctrine of “incompatibility”, which 
imposes constraints on the federal doctrine of persona designata, precludes a judge of 
the Supreme Court from serving as a member of the Board’.143 His Honour accepted a 
number of propositions, which in his view ‘emerged’ from the existing authorities.144 
In particular, Judd J accepted that incompatibility would arise at the State level, ‘if a 
discretion is to be exercised by a judge on political grounds, that is, grounds that are 
not confined by factors expressly or impliedly prescribed by law’.145
                                                 
138 French, above n 21, [95]. 
139 [2008] VSC 356 (Unreported, Judd J, 15 September 2008). 
140 Kotzmann v Adult Parole Board Victoria [2008] VSC 356 (Unreported, Judd J, 15 September 2008), 
[11]. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid [31]. 
143 Ibid [33]. 
144 Ibid [43]. 
145 Ibid. 
 In answering this 
question, His Honour explained, ‘a relevant consideration is the extent to which the 
function is to be performed without bias and by a procedure that gives each interested 
261 
 
 
person an opportunity to be heard’.146 While Judd J accepted the limitations imposed 
by Kable, however, on the facts he identified a number of factors that pointed to the 
conclusion that the impugned provision did ‘not give the appearance that this court, as 
an institution, is not independent of the executive government’.147
Should Australian judges engage in judicial mediation in their private 
capacity? 
 
 
 
Insofar as the incompatibility condition established in Grollo, ‘is not a total 
prohibition but catches only those non-judicial functions which are incompatible with 
or repugnant to the judicial function in some way,’148 the persona designata exception 
may allow a broader range of mediation functions to be carried out by Ch III judges 
than could be vested in Ch III courts. State and territory judges may also be permitted 
to engage in a wider variety of mediation functions in their personal capacity than 
could be vested in State or territory courts by virtue of the Kable doctrine.149
First of all, the doctrinal basis of the persona designata exception is dubious; both 
theoretically and practically. It undermines the separation doctrine, and pays lip 
 It is 
submitted, nevertheless, that it is preferable to adopt an approach to judicial mediation 
which sees the practice developed as an incidental judicial function. There are two 
interconnected reasons for this submission. 
 
                                                 
146 Kotzmann v Adult Parole Board Victoria [2008] VSC 356 (Unreported, Judd J, 15 September 2008), 
[43]. 
147 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365, [50]. 
148 Walker, above n 14, 165. 
149 Kristen Walker observes that ‘Kable can be contrasted with Grollo: in the former, we cannot use 
judges because of the public perception of the judiciary, notwithstanding the role the judge may play in 
the protection of individual rights; in the latter, we can use judges because of the need to protect 
individual rights, notwithstanding the effect this may have on public perception of the judiciary and the 
potential problems that may arise from the way the power is exercised’. Above n 14, 167.  
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service to values served by it. This view is supported extra-curially by the current, and 
at least one former, Chief Justice of Australia. 150
The concept of persona designata has a distinctly artificial flavour about it. 
The concept, which would have appealed to mediaeval schoolmen, has been 
criticised on the ground that it contemplates the judge acting in his character 
at large, detached from the court of which he is a member. The concept has 
little to commend it.
 Sir Anthony Mason has expressed 
the view that:  
 
151
Justice French (as he then was) has also observed that ‘the boundary line dividing 
functions compatible with the exercise of a federal judicial commission and functions 
incompatible is not informed by any particular coherent body of principle’.
 
 
152
This proposition underlines the second reason that judicial mediation should not be 
conferred on judges in their personal capacity. Not only is judicial mediation not an 
inherently administrative function, it is a form of dispute resolution, and the power to 
 In light 
of these views, and from the standpoint of principle and practicality, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the persona designata exception should, at the very least, 
be applied cautiously (and by confining its application to the conferral of certain 
administrative functions).  
 
                                                 
150 Kristen Walker has similarly commented critically on ‘the deleterious impact’ that the exception has 
‘on the constitutional separation of powers and thus the outcome that that doctrine is intended to 
achieve’. Above n 14, 162. 
151 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘A New Perspective on Separation of Powers’ (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration 1, 5. 
152 French, above n 21, [85]. 
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resolve disputes is, historically at least, an exclusively judicial function. 153  Chief 
Justice Spigelman was undoubtedly correct when he stated that ‘it is not appropriate 
to assess the judicial system as if it was merely a publicly funded provider of dispute 
resolution services,’154 but it is through the resolution of disputes that the judiciary’s 
broader social and governmental functions are realised (such as regulating the 
boundaries of federalism, developing the common law, and regulating social norms 
and procedures)155 A similar argument was raised in Vasiljkovic, albeit rejected on the 
basis that, as the function in question (participation in extradition proceedings) fell 
exclusively within Parliament’s external affairs power, it fell outside the reach of Ch 
III judicial power. However, no such disjunction exists between Ch III and 
Parliament’s legislative power under ss 51 (xxiv) and (xxxix), and it is from this head 
of legislative power that judicial mediation will spring.156
                                                 
153 See above Chapter 3 nn 7-18 and accompanying text. Ultimately, of course, judicial power is the 
power to finally determine disputes (not merely to assist in their resolution), but the judicial function 
cannot be determined solely by reference to the final judicial act. This simple truism was recognised by 
Windeyer J in R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd  (1970) 123 CLR 
361, 398. It is still accurate to state in more general terms, therefore, that at ‘the heart of the judicial 
functions is the resolution of disputes and controversies’. Moore, above n 10, 190. 
154 Chief Justice James Spigelman, (An untitled speech delivered to the Compensation Court Annual 
Conference, Sydney, 7 May 1999). See also John Leubsdorf  ‘The myth of civil procedure reform’ in 
Sergio Chiarloni, Peter Gottlwald and Adrian Zuckerman (ed), Civil justice in crisis: Comparative 
perspectives of civil procedure (1999), 67. 
  
 
155 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System’ Report No 89 (2000), [1.101]. The ALRC stated that court ‘rulings provide statements of 
“social purpose ... the proper meaning to our public values”’. The legal system affords mechanisms by 
which society monitors and regulates its incessant change. See also Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘Farewell to 
the Honourable Sir Gerard Brennan AC, KBE’ (1998) 5 Australian Bar Gazette 1, 7. For an analysis of 
the perceived and actual effect of court ruling on the development of social norms, see: Justice Ronald 
Sackville, ‘Courts and Social Change’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 373, 373; Justice Kenneth Hayne, 
‘Concerning Judicial Method – 50 Years On’ (Paper presented  at the Fourteenth Lucinda Lecture, 
Monash University Law School, 17 October 2006). From a US perspective, see: Marc Galanter ‘The 
radiating effects of courts’ in Keith Boyum and Lynn Mather (eds) Empirical theories about courts, 
(1983) 121, 124-27; Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(1991); Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for 
Racial Equality (2004); Robert L Carter, ‘The Warren Court and Desegregation’ (1968) 67 Michigan 
Law Review 237; Aryeh Neier, Only Judgment: The Limits of Litigation in Social Change (1982). 
156 See above Chapter 2 nn 216-19 and accompanying text. 
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It might be argued in response that the courts do not provide the most appropriate,157 
or even the most widely used, 158 forum for the vast majority of dispute resolution. But 
the fact remains that the judiciary has jealously preserved the ability to regulate 
private dispute resolution through, amongst other things, the exercise of supervisory 
jurisdiction.159 In a similar vein, the second limb of the separation doctrine protects 
the inherent jurisdiction of the courts and reflects the need to insulate the judicial 
process from Parliamentary interference. 160
                                                 
157 Stephen Crawshaw, ‘The High Court of Australia and advisory opinions’ (1977) 51 Australian Law 
Journal 112, 123. 
158 See above Chapter 1 nn 185-208 and accompanying text. 
159 See above Chapter 2 nn 51-76 and accompanying text. 
160 See above Chapter 4 nn 166-69 and accompanying text. 
 Judicial mediation raises fundamental 
questions about the nature of the judicial process, and its limits are properly to be 
determined in this context. If judicial mediation were implemented by Parliament in a 
manner that circumvents the judicial process (and the protections afforded by it) the 
opportunity for the judiciary to determine these important issues – and for the High 
Court to secure its Constitutional imperatives – would be lost. Indeed, if judicial 
mediation were to prove successful, the persona designata exception could effectively 
transfer an important part of the judicial function (ergo judicial power) to Parliament. 
265 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
CH III IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS 
 
The High Court has traditionally adopted the view that the Commonwealth Parliament 
must take State court as it finds them.1 The Constitution does not require a separation 
of power in the States, and there is authority ‘in nearly every State that no binding 
doctrine of separation of powers [can] be derived from their respective State 
Constitutions.2 As a result (and with certain exceptions), the implications drawn from 
Ch III have not been seen to limit the functions that may be vested in State courts by 
State parliaments. Territory courts have also been considered immune to the 
implications of Ch III on the basis that they are constituted and governed solely within 
s 122 (the ‘territories’ power), which is contained in Ch V.3
                                                 
1 Federated Sawmill, Timberyard and General Woodworkers’ Employees’ Association (Adelaide 
Branch) v Alexander (1912) 15 CLR 308. 
2 Gerard Carney, ‘Wilson & Kable: The Doctrine of Incompatibility – An Alternative to Separation of 
Powers?’ (1997) 13 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 175; citing NSW: Clyne v East 
(1967) 68 SR(NSW) 385, 395, 400; Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers 
Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 381, 407, 
410, 419 - 420. Victoria: Collingwood v Victoria (No 2) [1994] 1 VR 652. South Australia: Gilbertson 
v South Australia (1976) 15 SASR 66, 85; Grace Bible Church v Reedman (1984) 36 SASR 376. 
Western Australia: JD & WG Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168. 
3 Buchanan v Commonwealth (1913) 16 CLR 315; R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629, 635 (Griffith 
CJ); 640 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ); Mitchell v Barker (1918) 24 CLR 365. 
 This state of affairs was 
always a threat to the High Court’s role as the guardian of the Constitution. It 
provided the High Court with no power to compel the maintenance of appropriate 
standards in State supreme courts (so as to ensure their fitness for the exercise of 
federal judicial power), and guaranteed no avenue of appeal from the territories to the 
High Court.  
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In recent years, however, this threat has been assuaged by the convergence of two 
streams of High Court precedent.4 The first stream asserts the High Court’s power (as 
an implication of Ch III) to strike-down legislation which is ‘incompatible’ with the 
vesting of federal judicial power in State courts (the ‘Kable doctrine’).5 The second 
stream brings territory courts within the general umbra of Ch III (the Spratt stream) 
and the Kable doctrine.6
This Chapter examines these convergent streams of precedent, and the 
interrelationship between them. It demonstrates that the Kable doctrine is highly 
unlikely to impede the implementation of judicial mediation in the States and 
territories. While initially there may have been a belief that the Kable doctrine 
established a free-flowing conduit for the transfer of Ch III implications to State and 
territory courts, the High Court has so narrowed the circumstances in which 
incompatibility will arise (principally by applying a presumption in favour of validity) 
that all but the most extreme usurpations of judicial power will be permitted. It is 
argued, in light of the High Court’s expansive interpretation of s 122, and having 
regard to the conclusions reached in Chapter 4 as to the importance of maintaining 
certain features of inherent jurisdiction,
 
 
7
                                                 
4 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146 (Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
5 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
6 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226. There are a few specific exceptions to this proposition. In 
particular, it would appear that ss 72 and 80 still have no application to the supreme courts of the 
territories: R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629; Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226; Re Governor, 
Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322. 
7 See above Chapter 4 nn 188-210. 
 that the overriding object of Kable was, in 
fact, to secure the effective operation of the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  
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The Kable doctrine 
 
In Kable, the High Court adopted a test of incompatibility to strike down an Act of the 
New South Wales Parliament on the basis that it compromised the integrity of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales and, in turn, the institutional integrity of the 
Australian judiciary. 8
(1) The object of this Act is to protect the community by providing for the 
preventive detention (by order of the Supreme Court made on the application 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions) of Gregory Wayne Kable. 
 Kable concerned the validity of s 5(1) of the Community 
Protection Act 1994 (NSW), which purported to facilitate the continued detention of a 
prisoner who, whilst incarcerated for the manslaughter of his wife, had written letters 
threatening to harm his children and his deceased wife’s sister. Section 5(1) provided 
that: 
 
(2) In the construction of this Act, the need to protect the community is to be 
given paramount consideration. 
(3) This Act authorises the making of a detention order against Gregory Wayne 
Kable and does not authorise the making of a detention order against any 
other person. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, Gregory Wayne Kable is the person of that 
name who was convicted in New South Wales on 1 August 1990 of the 
manslaughter of his wife, Hilary Kable. 
 
The appellant argued that s 5(1) amounted to a legislative usurpation of judicial power. 
However, as this argument was predicated upon a constitutional separation of powers 
                                                 
8 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
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that did not exist in NSW9 – a point made clear by the NSW Supreme Court in 
Building Construction Employees’ and Builders’ Labourers’ Federation of NSW v 
Minister for Industrial Relations10 – no such argument could be maintained. In any 
event, as Gummow J explained, the case was not ‘one of incarceration by legislative 
or executive fiat’.11 Instead, by a majority of four to two (Brennan CJ and Dawson J 
dissenting),12 the High Court held that the function purportedly vested in the Supreme 
Court by the Community Protection Act was incompatible with its exercise of Chapter 
III judicial power. 13  In other words, the majority drew upon the incompatibility 
doctrine – rejected in the Boilermakers Case and rejuvenated under the auspices of the 
persona designata exception14
represents the worst of both worlds by placing severe limitations on State 
courts without any corresponding limitations on State parliaments (except to 
the extent they may wish to confer powers on the courts in question). The 
result is that the States have judiciaries which are half-independent, and that 
half is the less important half.
 – as a means of controlling the functions that may be 
vested in State courts. Elizabeth Handsley has argued that this approach 
 
15
In the event, and as demonstrated below, the limitations imposed on State courts have 
not proven to be ‘severe’. What, then, was the High Court’s rationale in adopting this 
approach? It has already been suggested that one explanation for the Kable doctrine is 
 
 
                                                 
9 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 65 (Brennan CJ), 77-80 (Dawson J), 92 – 94 (Toohey J), 
109 (McHugh J). 
10 (1986) 7 NSWLR 372. See also Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (2004), 758-
59.  
11 Ibid 131 (Gummow J). 
12 Brennan CJ and Dawson J applied the traditional approach that the Commonwealth Parliament must 
take State court as it finds them. Ibid 67 (Brennan CJ), 83 (Dawson J).  
13 Ibid 89-99 (Toohey J), 99-108 (Gaudron J), 108-24 (McHugh J), 124-45 (Gummow J).  
14 See above Chapter 2 nn 112-21, Chapter 5 nn 11-73, and accompanying text. 
15 Elizabeth Handsley ‘Do Hard Laws Make Bad Cases? The High Court’s Decision in Kable v 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)’ (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 171, 171. 
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the need to maintain the inherent and appellate jurisdictions of the High Court. In 
order to demonstrate this proposition, however, it is necessary to start by examining in 
more detail the reasoning adopted by the majority in that case. 
 
An integrated Australian judiciary 
 
Fundamental to the majority’s finding in Kable was the notion of an integrated 
Australian judicial system. In Gaudron J’s view: 
 
Neither the recognition in Ch III that State courts are the creatures of the 
States nor its consequence that, in the respects indicated, the Commonwealth 
must take State courts as it finds them detracts from what is, to my mind, one 
of the clearest features of our Constitution, namely, that it provides for an 
integrated Australian judicial system for the exercise of the judicial power of 
the Commonwealth ... That follows from covering cl 5, which provides that 
the Constitution is “binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State 
and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the 
laws of any State”, and from s 106, by which the Constitution of each State is 
made subject to the Australian Constitution.16
Her Honour went on to outline two ‘matters of significance’
  
 
17  which led to the 
conclusion that State parliaments could not vest functions in State courts ‘repugnant 
to or incompatible with’ the exercise of federal judicial power.18
                                                 
16 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 102. 
17 Ibid 103. 
18 Ibid. 
 The first matter 
related to the quality of federal justice. Her Honour found, ‘nothing anywhere in the 
Constitution to suggest that it permits of different grades or qualities of justice, 
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depending on whether judicial power is exercised by State courts or federal courts 
created by Parliament’. 19 The second matter (previously noted by Her Honour in 
Leeth) related to the ‘role and status’ of State courts as recipients of federal 
jurisdiction.20 Gaudron J found s 3 of the Act to be ‘the antithesis of the judicial 
process’. 21
The integrity of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and, because that 
court is not simply a State court but a court which also exists to exercise the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth, it also has the effect of compromising 
the integrity of the judicial system brought into existence by Ch III of the 
Constitution.
 As such, it compromised: 
 
22
Under the Constitution ... the State courts have a status and a role that extends 
beyond their status and role as part of the State judicial systems. They are 
part of an integrated system of State and federal courts and organs for the 
exercise of federal judicial power as well as State judicial power. Moreover, 
the Constitution contemplates no distinction between the status of State 
courts invested with federal jurisdiction and those created as federal courts. 
There are not two grades of federal judicial power. Thus, neither the 
Parliament of New South Wales nor the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
   
 
McHugh J adopted similar language and reasoning, explaining that covering clause 5 
and Ch III envisaged an integrated judicial system with the High Court at ‘the apex:’ 
 
                                                 
19 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 103. 
20 Her Honour made reference to her earlier statement in Re Nolan (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496, that Ch 
III implies a fair hearing. See Chapter 4. 
21 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 106. 
22 Ibid 107. 
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can invest functions in the Supreme Court of New South Wales that are 
incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power.23
Gummow J similarly found that, ‘the Constitution itself is rendered, by covering 
clause 5, binding on the courts, judges and people of every State’.
  
 
24
The judicial power is not to be confessed and avoided by an attempt at 
segregation of the courts of the States into a distinct and self-contained 
stratum within the Australian judicature. Rather, there is an integrated 
Australian legal system, with, at its apex, the exercise by this Court of the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth.
 As such: 
 
25
Unlike Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, Toohey J confined his analysis to the 
exercise by State courts of functions incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial 
power.
  
 
26  As such, His Honour did not find it necessary to extend constitutional 
principles on the basis of an integrated judicial system that takes account of the ‘role 
and status’ of State Courts,27 and saw no basis for an new doctrine that extended the 
reach of Ch III beyond State courts exercising federal jurisdiction.28
 
  
Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ’s recognition of an ‘integrated’ judicial system 
(and the need to maintain the ‘institutional integrity’ of the Australian judiciary) 
establishes a conduit for the transfer of certain Ch III limitations from the federal 
                                                 
23 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114 – 115. 
24 Ibid 143 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 94. 
27 Peter Johnston and Rohan Hardcastle, ‘State Courts: The Limits of Kable’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law 
Review 216, 218. 
28 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 94. 
272 
 
 
realm to the State realm.29 This conduit potentially limits the functions that may be 
vested in certain State courts, to be determined by a test of ‘incompatibility’. There 
will also be a certain amount of ‘backwash’ from the Kable doctrine to the ‘judicial 
process’ implication discussed in Chapter 4.30 Ch III courts must be limited by the 
procedural implications drawn in a purely State/territory context because, were it 
otherwise, the (weaker) incompatibility doctrine could impose greater demands on 
State/territory courts than the (stricter) separation doctrine imposes on Ch III courts. 
This is a theoretical impossibility.31 It does not follow, however, that the limitations 
placed on Ch III courts will necessarily apply to State courts (although it may be a 
useful indicator). 32  More importantly, a function which does not offend against 
judicial power in a Ch III court could never offend against Kable.33
Even in its discrete doctrinal context, however, the scope of Kable was, and still is, 
uncertain in at least two important respects. First of all, the majority provided limited 
guidance as to which courts the doctrine was intended to apply to (the ‘integration 
component’). Second of all, no clear vision emerged from the majority judgments as 
to the functions (other than detention without adjudgment of criminal guilt) which 
  
 
                                                 
29 Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the new High Court’ (2004) 32 
Federal law Review 205, 217. 
30 Fiona Wheeler’, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process 
in Australia’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248, 259. 
31 It is worth emphasising the fact, of course, that the principles identified in respect of State courts 
exercising federal jurisdiction will be ‘equally applicable to the issue whether a law has 
unconstitutionally attempted to interfere with the judicial process of the federal courts’. Leslie Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution (5th Ed 2008), 278.  
32 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 614 (86) (Gummow J), 630 [144] (Kirby J). 
Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 534 [50] (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
33 HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v The State of Queensland (1998) 195 CLR 547, 561-62 [14] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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might in fact be incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power (the 
‘incompatibility component’).34
The following two sections explore the integration and incompatibility components of 
Kable in detail, in order to determine what (if any) limits the doctrine might place 
upon the capacity of State (and territory) courts to engage in judicial mediation. The 
first section begins by examining in closer detail the judgments of the majority in 
Kable itself, and then goes on to analyse various judgments which cast further light 
upon the scope of the doctrine. This analysis demonstrates that the High Court has 
interpreted the integration component of Kable expansively, but that this expansion 
must be viewed in the context of a broader ‘integration principle’. It is argued that this 
broader principle (the seeds of which were sown long before the judgment in Kable 
was delivered) is rooted in the need to preserve the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
The second section demonstrates that while the Kable doctrine has (in effect) become 
jurisdictionally ubiquitous, the High Court has so narrowed the circumstances in 
which incompatibility will arise as to all but ‘define the Kable doctrine out of 
existence’.
 
 
35
 
 It is submitted, on this basis, that Kable does not, and never did, reflect a 
desire on the part of the High Court to engage in any detailed judicial management of 
State and territory legal systems; merely the capacity to protect the inherent 
jurisdiction of any Australian court. 
 
 
                                                 
34 See Patrick Keyzer, ‘Preserving Due Process of Warehousing the Undesirables: To What End the 
Separation of Judicial Power of the Commonwealth?’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 101, 102. 
35 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 578 [106] (Kirby J). 
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Which Courts does Kable apply to? 
 
The first issue to be addressed is which courts the Kable doctrine applies to. Is the 
doctrine confined to supreme courts, or does it also apply to other State courts? 
Assuming the latter, does the doctrine apply only to State courts when exercising 
federal judicial power, or always in the case of State courts invested with federal 
judicial power? What about State courts which are merely capable of being invested 
with federal judicial power? And, does Kable also apply to territory courts? The 
answers to these questions are critical to this thesis, as they will determine the extent 
to which the Kable doctrine has the capacity to limit the development of judicial 
mediation in the States and territories. 
 
A convenient starting point in this inquiry is Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ’s agreement in Kable that the Constitution ensures an avenue of appeal 
from State supreme courts to the High Court.36 As McHugh J explained, ‘s 73 of the 
Constitution implies the continued existence of the supreme courts by giving a right 
of appeal from the Supreme Court of each State to the High Court’.37 By parity of 
reasoning, McHugh J explained, s 73 also prevents State legislatures from stripping 
all non-federal jurisdictions from State supreme courts (so as to effectively remove 
that right of appeal).38
                                                 
36 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 95 (Toohey J), 101 (Gaudron J), 111 (McHugh J), 141-42 
(Gummow J). 
37 Ibid 103 (Gaudron J), 111 (McHugh J), 139 (Gummow J)). 
38 Ibid 111 (McHugh J). McHugh J did not see this reasoning as extending to all State Courts. However 
in His Honour’s view, leaving ‘aside the special position of the supreme courts of the States, the States 
can abolish or amend the structure of existing courts and create new ones. However, the Constitution 
requires a judicial system in and a Supreme Court for each State and, if there is a system of State courts 
in addition to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court must be at the apex of the system’.  
 While the majority judges agreed that the doctrine would apply 
to supreme courts when exercising federal jurisdiction, however, they differed as to 
how far they would see the doctrine extend into State court systems.  
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Toohey J focussed exclusively on supreme courts, although he did not exclude the 
possibility that the doctrine might extend to other State courts exercising federal 
jurisdiction. By avoiding the ‘integrated’ approach adopted by Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ,39 however, His Honour appeared to limit the application of the Kable 
doctrine to State courts when exercising federal judicial power.40 On this view, even 
supreme courts could exercise functions incompatible with federal judicial power – 
provided that they do not exercise federal jurisdiction in the same matter.41
In contrast, and consistent with their vision of an integrated Australian judicial system, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ agreed that the Kable doctrine would apply to all State 
courts vested with federal judicial power, whether exercising that power or not. 
According to Gaudron J, ‘Chapter III requires that the parliaments of the States not 
legislate to confer powers on State courts which are repugnant to or incompatible with 
their exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth’.
  
 
42
It is a necessary implication of the Constitution’s plan of an Australian 
judicial system with State courts invested with federal jurisdiction that no 
government can act in a way that might undermine public confidence in the 
impartial administration of the judicial functions of State courts.
 Likewise, according to 
McHugh J:  
 
43
                                                 
39 See above nn 16-25 and accompanying text. 
40 Gummow J explained that if ‘the Act operated on a category of persons and a defence to an 
application for a preventive detention order was confined to a challenge that the criteria in s5(1) had 
not been met, different questions might arise. In that situation the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
might not be involved; that is something on which it is unnecessary to comment’. Kable v DPP (NSW) 
(1996) 189 CLR 51, 99. 
41 This approach was criticised by Dawson J for leading to ‘artificial’ results. Ibid 87.  
42 Ibid 103. 
43 Ibid 118 (emphasis added). 
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Gummow J agreed with Gaudron and McHugh JJ that the Kable doctrine was not 
restricted to State courts exercising federal jurisdiction, but reached this conclusion on 
the basis that all, ‘decisions of the State courts, whether or not given in the exercise of 
invested jurisdiction, yield “matters” which found appeals to this Court under 
s73(ii)’. 44  While this approach leads to substantially the same outcome as the 
approach adopted by Gaudron and McHugh JJ, it would not (as Gummow J noted) 
limit State courts on the rare occasion that no right of appeal existed.45 Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ’s approach has since won favour with the High Court,46
Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ did not clarify whether Australia’s integrated 
judiciary (and thus the scope of Kable) included the courts of the territories. A literal 
approach to the doctrine suggests that it should, because ‘public confidence’ is 
presumably blind to a citizen’s place of residence.
 but it is essential 
to acknowledge that both approaches reflect the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
 
47 At the time that Kable was 
decided, however, a significant ‘problem of interpretation [which had] vexed judges 
since the earliest days of federation’ 48
                                                 
44 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 142. 
45 Ibid 142-43. See also Johnston and Hardcastle, above n 27, 226. 
46 R v Moffatt (1997) 91 A Crim R 557, 577 (Hayne JA); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid 
Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 171 [61] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ). 
47 Historically, differential treatment has nevertheless been afforded to the citizens of certain territories. 
See Peter Hanks, Patrick Keyzer and Jennifer Clarke, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and 
Commentary (7th ed 2004), [12.3.5]. These differences are the subject of this section. See also Gerard 
Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and territories (2006), 2. 
48 Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 331 (Gleeson 
CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ). For similar earlier pronouncements, see: Re Wakim Ex parte McNally 
(1999) 198 CLR 511, 594 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 274 
(Windeyer J). 
 stood in the way of this conclusion. This 
problem has now been substantially removed by the High Court’s decision in 
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NAALAS v Bradley, discussed below. 49
The ‘integration’ principle 
 An examination of the issues involved 
remains pertinent to the current analysis, however, as it illustrates the changing 
relationship between the territories and the Commonwealth, and demonstrates why 
Kable must apply to all Australian courts capable of exercising judicial power, 
whether actually vested with that power or not.  This examination also contextualises 
the broader jurisprudential foundation upon which the integration component of Kable 
rests, which in turn provides one possible explanation for the High Court’s reluctance 
to expand the incompatibility component of the doctrine. Understood in these terms, it 
is highly unlikely that judicial mediation will be considered incompatible with the 
exercise of federal judicial power.  
 
 
 
The chief obstacle to the extension of Kable to territory courts is that the doctrine 
applies to ‘such other courts as [Parliament] invests with federal jurisdiction’ under s 
71 (Ch III),50 whereas territory courts are vested with federal judicial power under s 
122 (the ‘territories power’), which is contained in Ch VI of the Constitution. For this 
reason, the territories have traditionally been considered outside the scope of Ch III 
and the separation of powers established by Ch’s I, II and III.51 This ‘early doctrine’52
                                                 
49 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
50 HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v The State of Queensland (1998) 195 CLR 547, 561-562 [14] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
51 Buchanan v Commonwealth (1913) 16 CLR 315. See also Stephen McDonald, ‘Territory Courts and 
Federal Jurisdiction’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 57, 90; Tom Pauling and Sonia Brownhill, ‘The 
territories and Constitutional Change’ (2007) 28 Adelaide Law Review 55, 59.  
52 McDonald, above n 51, 61. 
 
was expressed by Griffith CJ in R v Bernasconi (‘Bernasconi’): 
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In my judgment, Chapter III is limited in its application to the exercise of the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth in respect of those functions of 
government as to which it stands in the place of the States, and has no 
application to territories. Sec. 80, therefore, relates only to offences created 
by the Parliament by Statutes passed in the execution of those functions, 
which are aptly described as ‘laws of the Commonwealth’. The same term is 
used in that sense in sec. 5 of the Constitution Act itself, and in secs. 41, 61 
and 109 of the Constitution.53
Thus, the territories (and their courts) were not considered part of the ‘federal 
compact,’
 
 
54 but rather ‘creatures of the Commonwealth’;55 constituted and governed 
solely within the jurisdictional bubble of s 122. Territory courts could not be vested 
with federal judicial power, and none of the restrictions placed upon that power 
extended to the territories. 56 Earlier it was explained that Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ identified covering clause 5 of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 (UK) as the foundation for their theory of an integrated 
Australian judiciary in Kable. If the view expressed by Griffith CJ in Bernasconi was 
(or is still) correct, this would necessarily exclude territory courts from the scope of 
the Kable doctrine, because the ‘laws of the Commonwealth’ referred to in covering 
clause 5 would not include legislation governing territory courts passed under s 122.57
                                                 
53 (1915) 19 CLR 629, 635 (Griffith CJ); 640 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ). See also Mitchell v Barker 
(1918) 24 CLR 365; Ffrost v Stevenson (1937) 58 CLR 528. 
54 Patrick Keyzer, ‘The “Federal Compact”, The territories and Chapter III of the Constitution’ (2001) 
75 Australian Law Journal 124. 
55 Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and territories, above n 47, 1. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Chief Justice Griffith’s view has now been formally overruled by Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 
237 CLR 309. See below nn 109-15. 
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Because the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court is contained in s 73(ii), the 
proposition that Ch III had no application whatsoever to territory courts was always a 
threat to the High Court’s place at the apex of an integrated Australian judiciary. 
However, the High Court’s initial response to this threat was characteristically 
legalistic and confined. In Porter v The King; Ex Parte Yee,58 it was argued for the 
Crown (by Owen Dixon KC, as he then was) that, following Re Judiciary and 
Navigation Act (which restricted the ‘matters’ that could be determined by federal 
courts to those provided in s 75 of the Constitution)59 no right of appeal from the 
territories could be vested in the High Court.60 By a majority of four to two the High 
Court rejected this argument and allowed the appeal, but for inconsistent reasons. 
Isaacs and Rich JJ considered that Re Judiciary and Navigation Act applied only to 
‘the Commonwealth proper’, that is to say, ‘the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
consisting of the States’.61 Higgins J distinguished Re Judiciary and Navigation Act 
on the basis that it applied only to the original jurisdiction of the High Court and did 
not prevent the grant of appellate jurisdiction under s 122,62 and Starke J believed that 
Re Judiciary and Navigation Act applied only to judicial power as conferred by Ch 
III.63
                                                 
58 (1926) 37 CLR 432. 
59 Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257. See above Chapter 2 nn 122-26 and 
accompanying text. 
60 Porter v The King; Ex Parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 (Isaacs, Higgins, Rich and Starke JJ; Knox CJ 
and Gavan Duffy J dissenting). 
61 Ibid 448 (Rich J), 441 (Isaacs J). 
62 Ibid 447. This conclusion is dubious. As Stephen McDonald has pointed out: ‘If … the High Court 
may hear appeals outside s 73 of the Constitution, there would seem to be no reason why the 
Parliament could not provide for an appeal to the High Court from a judicial determination that did not 
constitute a “matter”. Appeals under s 73 are limited to appeals from “judgments, decrees, orders, and 
sentences”, but if the Parliament may create appeals outside s 73, it could provide that the Court should 
hear appeals from an advisory opinion’. Above n 51, 69. 
63 Porter v The King; Ex Parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432, 449. 
 The approach of Isaacs and Rich JJ was later endorsed by the Privy Council in 
the Boilermakers’ Case, in whose view the ‘legislative power in respect of the 
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territories is a disparate, non-federal matter’.64 As such, the Privy Council found ‘no 
reason why the Parliament having plenary power under s 122 should not invest the 
High Court or any other court with appellate jurisdiction from the courts of 
territories’.65
In Spratt v Hermes (‘Spratt’), Barwick CJ ‘took the opportunity ... to explode the 
early doctrine,’
 
 
66 finding that Bernasconi was authority only for the proposition that s 
80 had no application to the territories67 (principally for the reason that jury trials 
would be logistically infeasible in certain territories) 68
There does not seem to me to be any single theme running throughout Chap. 
III which requires it to be treated so much all of one piece that if any part of it 
relates only to federal matters, every part of it must likewise be restrained. 
Thus, the mere presence of s. 80 in Chap. III does not, in my respectful 
opinion, require that it [the remainder of Ch III] be inapplicable to territories 
and therefore to non-federal offences ... [Indeed] parts of Chap. III [including 
ss 74, 75, 76]  are clearly “applicable to the territories”
 and not necessarily the 
remainder of Ch III: 
 
69
                                                 
64 Porter v The King; Ex Parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432, 449. 
65 Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 545. McHugh J later described 
these views as ‘constitutional heresies’: Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 427 (McHugh J). 
66 McDonald, above n 51, 61. 
67 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 242. 
68 Ibid 244. Barwick CJ observed, that ‘the disclosed intention of the Constitution [that s80 requiring 
trial by jury, ergo Ch III, does not apply to the territories] might be derived from the unlikelihood that it 
could have been thought that juries would be found in such potential territories of the Commonwealth 
as might have been within contemplation at the foundation of the Commonwealth’. 
69 Ibid 245. See also Windeyer J, at 273.  
 
 
281 
 
 
The Full Court held that s 72 had no application to the ACT Court of Petty Sessions. 
Keen to recognise the ‘essential unity and singleness of the Commonwealth,’ 70 
however, whilst remaining broadly faithful to the traditional disparate approach,71 
Barwick CJ drew a distinction between ‘federal’ powers (which applied only within 
the ‘federal compact’) 72 and ‘non-federal’ powers (‘not shared any wise with the 
States’).73
It is crucial to appreciate that Barwick CJ did not deny the existence of separate and 
distinct category of ‘territorial’ jurisdiction. Indeed, in His Honour’s view, territorial 
courts were still to be considered non-federal in nature, and could not be vested with 
federal judicial power.
  The supposed benefit of this rather confusing dichotomy was to allow 
certain parts of Ch III to be applied to the territories (because they were created by, 
but were not exclusive to, the relationship between the States and the Commonwealth).   
 
74 The trick to Barwick CJ’s approach was not to redefine the 
nature of s 122, but rather the nature of Ch III and its effect upon s 122. To return to 
the metaphor adopted above, the jurisdictional bubble of s 122 remained intact, but 
the nature of the ‘federal compact’ was reconceptualised so that certain aspects of Ch 
III could permeate that bubble. This approach was unanimously endorsed in Capital 
TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer,75
                                                 
70 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 247. 
71 McDonald, above n 51, 61. Barwick CJ adopted the same reasoning in Teori Tau v Commonwealth, 
and later in Capital TV & Appliances v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR, 600, finding that the Supreme Court 
of the ACT was ‘neither a federal court within the meaning of s. 71 or s. 73 of the Constitution as 
interpreted by the decisions of this Court nor a Court invested with “federal” jurisdiction’. 
72 Stephen McDonald observes that the word ‘federal’ has ‘several different usages’, and that Barwick 
CJ’s reference was to the ‘dual system of government, central and provincial’, generated by Chapters I, 
II and III. McDonald, above n 51, 62.  
73 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 242. 
74 Ibid 242-43. 
75 (1971) 125 CLR 591. 
 and the conclusion that s 72 does not extend 
to territory courts was affirmed in Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex 
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parte Eastman (‘Eastman’).76
The disparate approach (and Barwick CJ’s federal/non-federal dichotomy in particular) 
has been heavily criticised, both in theory and in practice. The notion that a ‘federal 
compact’ can generate a jurisdiction that is ‘non-federal’ is, to say the least, counter-
intuitive. Moreover, as Patrick Keyzer has pointed out, ‘it simply is not true to say 
that the Commonwealth’s power over the territories is not shared with the States ... 
The true position is that the States share power over the territories through their 
representation in the Senate’.
 Despite subsequent criticism (discussed below), Spratt 
was an important step in the recognition of an integrated Australian judicial system, 
and for this reason the line of authority following it is referred to here as the ‘Spratt 
stream’. 
 
77
The biggest problem that arises as a result of the decision in Spratt v Hermes 
is not the desirability or otherwise of the decision but the impossibility of 
predicting future decisions of the High Court in relation to s 122 because of 
the wide diversity of opinion by members of the Court on fundamental 
principles.
 It is submitted that Leslie Zines was correct, however, 
when he concluded that: 
 
78
In addressing this problem, it is instructive to consider the changing status of the 
territories (and territory courts) in the years since Professor Zines made this 
  
 
                                                 
76 (1999) 200 CLR 322 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).  
77 Keyzer, ‘The Federal Compact’, above n 56, 129-30.  
78 Leslie Zines, ‘Laws for the Government of any Territory” Section 122 of the Constitution’ (1966) 2 
Federal Law Review 72, 94. 
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observation.79 The disparate approach to the relationship between s 122 and Ch III (as 
modified by Spratt et al), reflects the view, expressed by Isaacs J in Bernasconi, that 
in the early days of federation the fledgling territories were, ‘not yet in a condition to 
enter into the full participation of Commonwealth constitutional rights and powers’.80 
By current standards, certain of Isaacs J’s remarks in Bernasconi are, at best, 
paternalistic.81 Nevertheless, as long as the territories remained ‘dependent upon’, and 
under the ‘tutelage’ of, the Commonwealth Parliament, the conclusion that they 
remained outside the federation was a pragmatic one. Territory courts were not 
required to satisfy the strict standards of tenure and procedure required of courts 
exercising federal jurisdiction;82 territory laws were created by the Commonwealth 
Parliament; and the High Court exercised appellate control over territory courts by 
virtue of a jurisdiction granted under 122 (albeit at the direction of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, as opposed to the Constitution itself).83
Under a federal system comprising self-governing territories, however, the disparate 
approach became less tenable. Self-government was granted to the Northern Territory 
in 1978,
  
 
84 Norfolk Island in 1979,85 and the ACT in 1988.86
                                                 
79 This is the central thesis of Tom Pauling and Sonia Brownhill’s article, ‘The territories and 
Constitutional Change’, above n 51. 
80 R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629, 637 – 638. Tom Pauling and Sonia Browning argue that the; 
‘“disparate view’, that territories are outside Chapter III and the federation, which consists of the 
Commonwealth and the States, was founded, we suggest, on the then characteristics of territories 
highlighted by Isaacs J in Bernasconi’. Pauling and Browning, above n 51, 59.  
81 His Honour appeared to be of the view that Germans and Polynesians had no need of jury trials, on 
the basis that ‘Parliament’s sense of justice and fair dealing is sufficient to protect them’. R v 
Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629, 638. See generally the discussion in Hanks, Keyzer and Clarke, above 
n 47, [12.5.5].  
82 In addition to acknowledging that s 80 does not apply to Territory courts, Spratt v Hermes (1965) 
114 CLR 226 determined that s 72 of the Constitution had no application to Territory courts. 
83 Capital TV & Appliances v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591. 
84 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth). 
85 Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth) 
86 Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth). 
 Upon the grant of self-
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government the supreme courts of these territories were either re-constituted by,87 or 
transferred under the jurisdiction of,88 the territories themselves. Thus, the possibility 
arose that the self-governing territories could effectively remove any right of appeal to 
the High Court by stripping all non-federal jurisdictions from territory courts. The 
jurisdictional bubble created by s 122 was no longer firmly tethered to the 
Commonwealth, and could (in theory) be detached at the discretion of the self-
governing territories. The fact that a right of appeal may be granted under s 122 is a 
far cry from the assurance of a general right of appeal from territory courts under s 
73(ii). 89
If the avenue of appeal from territory courts to the High Court could be 
blocked, an ‘evident purpose’ of the Constitution, to create an integrated 
national system of law, would be defeated; a rogue territory court could 
develop the common law in a manner which was inconsistent with the 
common law of Australia laid down by the High Court, leaving it powerless 
to correct any error. More unthinkable still, if appeals to the High Court were 
not constitutionally entrenched in matters involving the interpretation of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, it could receive non-uniform interpretation in 
some territories. This would undermine the Court's role as the ‘guardian of 
the Constitution’ at the apex of a judiciary ‘functionally charged with 
upholding the rule of law’.
 The danger posed by this incongruity to Australia’s constitutional integrity is 
patent: 
 
90
                                                 
87 Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT). 
88 Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth), s59; ACT Supreme Court (Transfer) Act 1992 (Cth). 
89 This was the finding of the High Court in Capital TV & Appliances v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591. 
At the time, the Supreme Court of the ACT was conferred jurisdiction by the Australian Capital 
Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 – 1968 (Cth), passed by the Commonwealth Parliament under s 122. 
90 McDonald, above n 51, 70.  
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Were no right of appeal to the High Court to be guaranteed from the territories this 
would also, of course, undermine the notion that the Kable doctrine applies to 
territory courts because, as noted above, the starting point for the reasoning adopted 
by the majority in Kable was that a right of appeal from the State supreme courts to 
the High Court is guaranteed by s 73 (ii). If no right of appeal were guaranteed from 
the supreme courts of the territories established by self-governing territories, it would 
be difficult to contend that those courts formed part of Australia’s integrated judicial 
system.  
 
However, an alternative approach (fostered principally by Sir Owen Dixon)91 had 
begun to ‘break down the doctrine’ established in Bernasconi, and to reinterpret s 122 
as an integrated part of the Constitution, long before the High Court’s decision in 
Kable.92 In Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth,93 Dixon J (as he 
then was) saw no difficulty in ‘interpreting the Constitution as a whole,’94 and added 
that, ‘I have always found it hard to see why s. 122 should be disjoined from the rest 
of the Constitution, and I do not think that [Bernasconi] really meant such a 
distinction’.95 Subsequently, in Lamshed v Lake, His Honour rejected the argument 
that a ‘law of the Constitution’ as referred to in s 109 of the Constitution excludes 
laws created under s 122.96
 
 In effect, Dixon CJ  
                                                 
91 In addition to the cases cited below, see: Owen Dixon, ‘The Common Law as an Ultimate 
Constitutional Foundation’, (1957) 31 Australian Law Journal 240. Sir Owen was not, of course, the 
first to advocate an approach to constitutional interpretation that focussed on the Constitution as a 
whole. See, for example, the view of Williams J in R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of 
Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 307, that, ‘the Constitution like any other written instrument must be 
construed as a whole’. 
92 McDonald, above n 51, 59.  
93 (1945) 71 CLR 29 
94 Ibid 84. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132. Dixon CJ made similar observations in Attorney-General (Cth) 
v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361, 370-72. 
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upheld the power of the Parliament, in reliance upon s 122 of the Constitution, 
to legislate with effect outside the geographical limits of a territory and 
within the area of the whole of the Commonwealth ... [This reasoning] 
politely but forcefully discountenanced the then recent assertion by the Privy 
Council in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v The Queen 
that: “the legislative power in respect of the territories is a disparate, non-
federal matter.”’97
Dixon CJ was not alone in his preference for an integrative approach to constitutional 
interpretation. In Spratt, for example, Windeyer J expressed the view (while still 
affirming the ‘workable anomaly’ created by s 122), that the ‘special position and 
function of this Court under the Constitution require that it should be able to declare 
the law for all courts that are within the governance of Australia’.
 
 
98
To me, it seems inescapable that territories of the Commonwealth are parts of 
the Commonwealth of Australia and I find myself unable to grasp how what 
is part of the Commonwealth is not part of the ‘the Federal System’; see the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s 5, which refers not only to 
every State but to ‘every part of the Commonwealth’.
 In the same case, 
Menzies J had noted (with reference to Barwick CJ’s judgment) that: 
 
99
The ‘integrated’ approach to the interpretation of s 122 has gained increasing 
momentum in recent years, principally as a means of securing the High Court at the 
apex of Australia’s judicial system through the extension of Ch III (the ‘Spratt 
 
 
                                                 
97 Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 383 [175] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
98 (1965) 114 CLR 226, 277.  
99 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 270. 
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stream’), 100
In Teori Tau v Commonwealth (Teori Tau),
 but also as a means of limiting Parliament’s legislative power under Ch I. 
The growth of this aspect of the integration principle is illustrated by the High Court’s 
changing attitude to the question whether laws made under s 122 must comply with 
the requirement of s 51 (xxxi) (that property be acquired on ‘just terms’). 
 
101 the Full Bench of the High Court 
unanimously held that ‘the power to make laws providing for the acquisition of 
property in the territory of the Commonwealth is not limited to the making of laws 
which provide just terms of acquisition’.102 This conclusion, which was ‘totally at 
odds with that of Dixon CJ and Kitto J in Lamshed v Lake,’ 103
In Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth, three High Court judges (Gaudron, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ) rejected the view of the Full Bench in Teori Tau, and held 
that certain proclamations made by the Governor-General under s 7 of the 
Conservation Act 1975 (Cth) were at odds with the requirement of s 51 (xxxi) that 
 was a powerful 
endorsement of the disparate approach favoured in Bernasconi, and permitted 
Parliament a plenary power in the exercise of s 122 that was entirely unencumbered 
by the legislative limits enshrined in Ch I. 
 
                                                 
100 This development corresponds with the onset of self-government in the territories. Hanks, Keyzer, 
and Clarke explain that the ‘full integrationist approach to s 122 is probably best exemplified by Justice 
Gummow’s judgment in Newcrest Mining v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513. This case was 
decided after the ACT, the NT and Norfolk Island had been granted territorial self-government’. Above 
n 47, 1084-85. Likewise, Tom Pauling and Sonia Brownhill have stated that, as ‘the three self-
governing territories (particularly the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory) ... 
approached self-government, and then achieved it, the High Court incrementally moved away from the 
'disparate view' to where it has now, practically, accepted the view that these territories have achieved 
an integration into the federation comparable in many respects to that of the States’. Above n 51, 60. 
This has since been confirmed in Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, discussed below. 
101 (1969) 119 CLR 564 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies, Windeyer, Walsh and Owen JJ). 
102 Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564, 570  
103 Leslie Zines, ‘The Nature of the Commonwealth’ (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 83, 83. 
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property be acquired ‘on just terms’. 104  Toohey J agreed that the proclamations 
violated the requirements of s 51 (xxxi), but based this conclusion on the finding that 
the Act was created under s 51 and s 122 (and was therefore a ‘law of the 
Commonwealth’ by virtue of the former).105 Gummow J (with whom Gaudron and 
Kirby JJ broadly agreed)106 went further. In His Honour’s view, it could ‘hardly be 
suggested that s 122 operates other than subject to the Constitution and, in particular, 
that it is not to be read with the Constitution as a whole’.107 In His Honour’s opinion, 
s 122 ‘is not to be torn from the Constitutional fabric’.108 As Gummow, Gaudron and 
Kirby JJ were not in the majority on this issue, Teori Tau remained authority for the 
general proposition that s 51(xxxi) had no application to s 122. Newcrest was 
nevertheless a significant milestone in the development of the integration principle, 
and has since won majority approval in Wurridjal v Commonwealth (‘Wurridjal’).109
In Wurridjal, a bare majority the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne 
JJ) overturned Teori Tau,
  
  
110 and ruled that the acquisition of property in the territories 
(under s 122) must be ‘on just terms’. For various reasons, Heydon, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ found it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue regarding the 
relationship between s 122 and s 51 (xxxi), 111
                                                 
104 (1997) 190 CLR 513 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ in dissent). 
105 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 561. Gaudron J also expressed 
the view, at 568, that, it is ‘one thing to read down s51(xxxi) so that it does not apply to a law enacted 
pursuant to s122 of the Constitution. It is another to treat it as not applying to a law which has two 
purposes, one of which falls within the terms of s51(xxxi)’. 
106 Ibid 568 (Gaudron J), 662 (Kirby J). 
107 Ibid 606 (Toohey J). 
108 Ibid 598. 
109 (2009) 237 CLR 309. 
110 Ibid 359 [86] (French CJ), 388 [189] (Gummow and Hayne J), 419 [287] (Kirby J). 
111 Ibid 427 [318] Heydon J, 437 [355] Crennan J, 469 [460] Kiefel J. 
 but none of the minority judges 
appeared to prefer the disparate approach. In French CJ’s opinion:  
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An integrated approach to the availability of legislative powers and limits on 
them throughout the Commonwealth is to be preferred where the language of 
the Constitution so permits. That conclusion favours, although it is not 
determinative of, the proposition that s 122 is subject to limitations on 
legislative powers which are of general application.112
Gummow and Hayne observed that, ‘the tenor of decisions since Teori Tau indicates a 
retreat from the “disjunction” seen in that case between s 122 and the remainder of the 
structure of government established and maintained by the Constitution’.
 
 
113  The 
proper approach, their Honour’s explained, was to view s 122 as ‘but one of several 
heads of legislative power given to the national legislature of Australia’. On this view, 
‘a law which is made under s 122 is made in exercise of the legislative power of the 
Parliament and operates according to its tenor throughout the area of the Parliament's 
authority’.114
It would be to adopt an extremely artificial interpretation of the Constitution 
to accept that Australian nationals and electors of the Commonwealth who 
live in the territories are, for constitutional purposes, somehow disjoined 
from the Commonwealth. Likewise, it would be very artificial to regard the 
arrangements which the Constitution puts in place for the integrated 
Judicature of the nation as suggesting that territory courts are linked to this 
Court by statute only and that territory courts might be validly removed from 
the integrated Judicature provided for in Ch III.
 Finally, in Kirby J’s view: 
 
115
                                                 
112 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 353-54 [74]. 
113 Ibid 387-388 [188]. 
114 Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 387-88 [188]. 
115 Ibid 419 [286]. 
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Wurridjal confirms that s 122 must be exercised in accordance with s 51 (xxxi), and 
also stands for the broader proposition that s 122 is generally subject to the legislative 
limitations imposed by Ch I. The latter of Kirby J’s reasons in Wurridjal connects this 
aspect of the integration principle with the second (Ch III) aspect of the integration 
principle; viz. the assurance of the High Court’s place at the apex of the Australian 
judiciary. This aspect of the integration principle had previously been emphasised in 
respect of s 122 by Gummow J in Kruger v Commonwealth:  
 
It is fundamental that the Constitution creates an ‘integrated system of law’, 
and a ‘single system of jurisprudence’. The entrusting by Ch III, in particular 
by s 73, to this Court of the superintendence of the whole of the Australian 
judicial structure, its position as ultimate interpreter of the common law of 
Australia and as guardian of the Constitution are undermined, if not 
contradicted, by acceptance, as mandated by the Constitution, of the 
proposition that it is wholly within the power of the Parliament to grant or 
withhold any right of appeal from a territorial court to this Court.116
If it is accepted that territory courts must form part of Australia’s integrated judicial 
system for the Constitution to function effectively, and that a right of appeal must 
therefore be guaranteed from territory courts to the High Court, it follows that the 
supreme courts (if not all courts) of self-governing territories must (contrary to the 
disparate view) be either ‘federal courts’ created by Parliament, or ‘other courts’ in 
which Parliament has vested judicial power under s 71.
 
 
117
                                                 
116 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 175. A majority of the High Court nevertheless held 
that the legislative power conferred by s 122 was not restricted by certain implied rights (including 
equality before the law): 44 (Brennan CJ), 63 (Dawson J), 142 (McHugh J), 153 (Gummow J). The 
dissenting judges did find s 122 to be so restricted: 95 (Toohey J), 112 (Gaudron J). 
117 Pauling and Browning, above n 51, 60, 64. 
 If they can be classified 
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within one these categories, then a right of appeal will be guaranteed by s 73 (ii). Case 
law in this respect has been inconsistent and conflicted,118 but since the courts of the 
three self-governing territories are now constituted by territory legislation (and can no 
longer be considered creatures of the Commonwealth), logic suggests that they should 
be considered ‘other courts’ for the purposes of s 73; bringing them within Ch III on 
the same footing as State courts.119
The High Court does not appear to have concerned itself with whether the territories 
are or are not self-governing.
  
 
120 Indeed, it is now ‘generally accepted that the courts 
of [all of] the territories may, and do, exercise federal jurisdiction’.121
Given the terms of s71 and the purpose of s77(iii) of the Constitution, there 
is, in my view, no reason to read “such other courts as it invests with federal 
jurisdiction” in s71 as if it read “such other State courts as it invests with 
federal jurisdiction”. And once those words are given their natural and 
ordinary meaning, they are clearly capable of including non-federal courts 
created under s122 of the Constitution. To read s71 in this way is simply to 
 Such was the 
conclusion, for example, of Gaudron J in Northern Territory v GPAO: 
 
                                                 
118 McDonald, above n 51, 79. 
119 Pauling and Browning, above n 51, 60-64. 
120 It is uncertain whether it is appropriate to distinguish between classes of Territory. In Spratt v 
Hermes 114 CLR 226, 240, for example, Barwick CJ stated that, ‘I draw no distinction between the 
Australian Capital Territory and any other of the territories of the Commonwealth for I think that none 
can or should be drawn’. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the citizens of certain territories have 
historically been treated unequally. See Hanks, Keyzer and Clarke, above n 47 [12.3.5]. 
121 McDonald, above n 5, 79; citing (in addition to Northern Territory v GPAO, below): Re Governor, 
Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 339–40 [33] (Gaudron J), 348-
9 [63]-[67] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 518-19 
[18]-[19], 530 [51]-[54], 532 [58] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Putland v 
The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 174, 178-179 [4] (Gleeson CJ), 187-188 [33] (Gummow and Heydon JJ; 
Callinan J agreeing), 199 [73] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley 
(2004) 218 CLR 146, 326 [28] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).   
292 
 
 
put courts created under s122 on a constitutional footing comparable with 
State courts.122
It remains unclear whether the jurisdiction of territory courts is to be considered 
entirely federal in nature,
 
 
123  but that they exercise federal jurisdiction at all is 
sufficient to found the conclusion that they form part of Australia’s integrated judicial 
system, and that the incompatibility component of the Kable doctrine will therefore 
apply to them.124 This conclusion was confirmed by the Full Bench of the High Court 
in NAALAS v Bradley (‘Bradley’).125
Bradley concerned the validity of the appointment of Hugh Bradley to the position of 
Chief Magistrate in the Northern Territory. Mr Bradley had been appointed until the 
age of 65 in accordance with s 7 the Magistrates Act (NT). However, and in 
accordance with s 6 of the Act, Mr Bradley had negotiated certain terms of 
employment directly with the government. The resultant package included a luxury 
car and a salary higher than his predecessor, but was limited, crucially, to a term of 
two years. The appellants argued that, by placing the subsequent remuneration of 
magistrates in the hands of the executive government, the ‘legislation failed to 
provide a minimum characteristic of an independent and impartial tribunal for the 
  
 
                                                 
122 Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 604 – 605 [128]-[133] (Gaudron J) 
123 Zelmen Cowen and Leslie Zines argue in the affirmative, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (3rd ed, 
2002) 187-8. As does McDonald, above n 51. In contrast, Pauling and Browning argue, inter alia, that 
‘to suggest that Territory courts are courts which always and only exercise federal jurisdiction is...to 
drag self-governing territories, and their courts, back into the Boilermakers’ case era, a time when self-
governing territories had not yet been conceived’. Above n 51, 68.  
124 McDonald, above n 51, 90. 
125 (2004) 218 CLR 146 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). For 
an in-depth analysis of this aspect of the decision see Patrick Keyzer, ‘Judicial Independence in the 
Northern Territory: Are Undisclosed Remuneration Arrangements Repugnant to Ch III of the 
Constitution?’ (2004) 32 University of Western Australia Law Review 30. 
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adjudication of adversary litigation’.126
it is implicit in the terms of Ch III of the Constitution, and necessary for the 
preservation of that structure, that a court capable of exercising the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth be and appear to be an independent and 
impartial tribunal.
 It followed, so the appellant contended, that 
the relevant provisions of the Act (and thus Mr Bradley’s appointment) were invalid 
as they were incompatible with that Court’s capacity to exercise Commonwealth 
judicial power. Thus, the appellants sought to extend the Kable doctrine in two ways; 
first, they contended that the doctrine applied to territory courts and, second, they 
contended that the doctrine controlled the constitution of courts (by applying a test of 
incompatibility). The second of these contentions was rejected, and is considered in 
the following section. As to the first contention, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, 
Callinan and Heydon JJ accepted in a joint judgment that 
 
127
The Full Bench’s acceptance of this proposition confirmed that the Kable doctrine 
was to extend to all courts vested with federal judicial power, whether State or 
territory,
  
 
128 and whether actually exercising federal judicial power or not.129 It also 
confirmed that territory courts were generally to be considered part of Australia’s 
integrated judicial system (although the broader implications of this principle will not 
necessarily be identical in the territories and the States because, for one, there is no 
requirement that the supreme courts of the territories remain in existence).130
                                                 
126 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 171 [61].  
127 Ibid 163 [29]. 
128 Wheeler, ‘The Kable doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State Courts’ (2005) Australasian 
Parliamentary Review 15, 21. 
129 Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and territories, above n 47, 357. 
130 McDonald, above n 51, 91; Wheeler, ‘The Kable doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State 
Courts’, above n 128, 21, 23. 
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Whether the term ‘capable of exercising’ might, in fact, have further extended the 
jurisdictional reach of the integration principle was not clear at this stage. At least one 
commentator had suggested that this reference was limited to courts actually vested 
with Commonwealth judicial power, ‘rather than to any court which might be vested 
in the future’.131 However, shortly after Bradley, in Baker v The Queen, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ reached the opposite conclusion, stating that the 
‘doctrine in Kable is expressed to be protective of the institutional integrity of the 
State courts as recipients and potential recipients of federal jurisdiction’. 132 In K-
Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (‘K-Generation’), Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ applied this broader interpretation, refusing to ‘deny 
to [the South Australian Liquor Licensing Court] the character of a court of a State 
within the meaning of s 77(iii) of the Constitution’.133
Consistently with Ch III, the States may not establish a “court of a State” 
within the constitutional description and deprive it, whether when established 
or subsequently, of those minimum characteristics of the institutional 
independence and impartiality identified in the decisions of this Court.
 This was despite the fact that 
the Liquor Licensing Court was established by State legislation and was not vested 
with federal judicial power. Once again the decision concerned the application of 
Kable. In Their Honours’ view:  
 
134
                                                 
131 Carney, above n 47, 357. 
132 (2004) 223 CLR 513, [51] (emphasis added). 
133 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471, 497 [131]. Section 77(iii) 
confers upon Parliament the power to make laws ‘investing any court of a State with federal 
jurisdiction’. 
134 Ibid 501 [153]. French CJ agreed with this aspect of the joint judgment, at 491 [99]. 
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The preceding section has endeavoured to demonstrate two points. The first point is 
that the integration component of Kable cannot be viewed in isolation. Certainly, 
Kable was a significant milestone in the recognition of Australia’s integrated judicial 
system, but it was not the progenitor of it. Moreover, it reflects only part of it; 
asserting the High Court’s place at the apex of the court system established by Ch III. 
Notions of integration have been developing for decades under the auspices of s 122, 
in order to secure two objectives: to restrict Parliament’s legislative power under s 
122 to the general requirements of Ch I, and to ensure an avenue of appeal to the High 
Court from the territories (the ‘Spratt’ stream). Bradley merges the Kable doctrine 
with the Spratt stream, and funnels both streams towards ensuring the High Court’s 
role at the apex of Australia’s integrated judicial system (thereby securing its 
appellate jurisdiction).135
The second point flows from the first, and can be stated directly: whatever the 
incompatibility component of the Kable doctrine requires, it will require it of all 
courts, whether, federal, State or territory, whether exercising federal judicial power 
or not, and whether actually vested with federal judicial power or not. However, and 
as Patrick Keyzer has observed, while ‘the High Court has been willing to accept 
these novel and controversial jurisdictional extensions of Ch III, it seems to have been 
quite unable to develop convincing principles to support the ‘institutional integrity’ of 
Australian Courts’.
  
 
136
                                                 
135 Judicial mediation is examined in light of this objective below, in Chapter 8 nn 206-14 and 
accompanying text. 
136 See Patrick Keyzer, ‘“Preserving Due Process of Warehousing the Undesirables”: To What End the 
Separation of Judicial Power of the Commonwealth?’ above n 30, 102. 
 It follows that although the Kable doctrine will notionally limit 
the ability of all Australian courts to engage in judicial mediation, the extent to which 
it will do so in practice is far from certain.  
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When will incompatibility arise under Kable? 
 
The following section examines the development of the incompatibility component of 
Kable, and demonstrates that the criteria of incompatibility (originally framed in 
broad notions of public confidence) have now been reframed by reference to (equally 
broad) notions of independence and impartiality. It is concluded that a function will 
rarely if ever be incompatible with institutional integrity, and that Kable is therefore 
unlikely to hinder the development of judicial mediation in the States and territories. 
 
Again, the starting point for this argument is the reasoning of the majority in Kable. 
Gaudron J was of the opinion that, the ‘integrity of the courts depends on their acting 
in accordance with the judicial process and, in no small measure, on the maintenance 
of public confidence in that process’.137 This extract suggested two distinct measures 
of integrity; compliance with the ‘judicial process’ and the maintenance of ‘public 
confidence’. It is worth making explicit the fact, however, that Gaudron J’s references 
to judicial process were not intended to import the full ambit of procedural limitations 
applicable in a federal context to State courts.138
                                                 
137 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107. 
138 These limitations were discussed at length in Chapter 4 above, nn 50-209 and accompanying text. 
The same term was previously adopted by Her Honour in Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 
CLR 501, 703-04, and Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 501-02.  The reach of the judicial 
process implication in a procedural fairness context was subsequently clarified by Her Honour in Re 
Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496; Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173; Ebner v 
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, [79]; and Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 
198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
 By grounding the doctrine in the 
need to maintain Australia’s integrated judicial system, Gaudron J implicitly restricted 
the scope of the doctrine to those requirements of the judicial process necessary to 
maintain the integrity of the federal system (which may differ between courts and 
jurisdictions, as do the requirements of due process generally): 
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Public confidence cannot be maintained in the courts and their criminal 
processes if, as postulated by s 5(1), the courts are required to deprive 
persons of their liberty, not on the basis that they have breached any law, but 
on the basis that an opinion is formed, by reference to material which may 
not be admissible in legal proceedings, that on the balance of probabilities 
they may do so ... [Moreover, public] confidence in the courts requires that 
they act consistently and that their proceedings be conducted according to 
rules of general application. That is an essential feature of the judicial process. 
It is that feature which serves to distinguish between palm tree justice and 
equal justice.139
Thus, for Gaudron J, it was the need to maintain public confidence in Australia’s 
judicial system that mandated an adherence to minimum judicial standards. However, 
and significantly, Gaudron J did not express any particular view (beyond the facts) as 
to what those minimum standards were or should be.
  
 
140 As pointed out in Chapter 4, 
Gaudron J’s references to equal justice must now also be reconsidered in light of the 
joint judgment in Leeth, 141
                                                 
139 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107. 
140 Nor was Her Honour directly concerned by the need to protect individual rights. As Fiona Wheeler 
has observed; ‘Mr Kable was freed from the continuing threat of civil detention because of a finding 
that the Act damaged the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court. In accordance with the Kable 
doctrine, it was the effect of the Act on the Supreme Court, rather than on Mr Kable, which was the 
source of invalidity’. Wheeler, ‘The Kable doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State Courts’, 
above n 128, 19. This approach is consistent with Gaudron J’s definitional approach to implied rights 
in a federal context, which, in the absence of any specific constitutional recognition of the rights 
themselves, draws upon the nature of the ‘judicial process’. See above Chapter 4 nn 37-39 and 
accompanying text. 
141 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 469 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ). The 
majority found ‘no basis for the proposition that substantive equality is constitutionally guaranteed’. 
See above Chapter 4 nn 60-64 and accompanying text. 
  and (in a s 122 context) the view of the majority in 
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Kruger.142 The majority opinion in the joint judgment in Baker v The Queen affirms 
that this conclusion applies equally State legislation.143
McHugh J also considered the requirements of the judicial process and public 
confidence to be key indicators of institutional integrity. Having established that 
neither State parliaments nor the federal Parliament could ‘legislate in a way that 
might alter or undermine the constitutional scheme set up by Ch III of the 
Constitution,’
  
 
144
in a way that permits the Supreme Court while exercising federal judicial 
power to disregard the rules of natural justice or to exercise legislative or 
executive power. Such legislation is inconsistent with the exercise of federal 
judicial power.
 His Honour reasoned that State and federal parliaments were also 
prevented from legislating 
 
145
These comments were, of course, confined to the exercise of federal judicial power, 
and were not intended to limit State legislative power or the functions that may be 
vested in State courts when exercising State judicial power alone. Indeed, and as 
discussed in more detail below, McHugh J’s subsequent comments in Fardon suggest 
 
 
                                                 
142 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 175. A majority of the High Court held that there was 
no implied right of equality within s 122: 44 (Brennan CJ), 63 (Dawson J), 142 (McHugh J), 153 
(Gummow J). The dissenting judges did find s 122 to be so restricted: 95 (Toohey J) , 112 (Gaudron J). 
See above Chapter 4 n 64 and accompanying text. 
143 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 533 [45]. With reference to a potentially discriminatory 
provision in the Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW), McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ noted that the 
appellant had not attempted ‘to imply a restriction upon State legislative power akin to the express 
provision proscribing denial of “the equal protection of the laws” found in s 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Such an attempt, at a federal level, respecting the 
powers of the Parliament, would have to overcome the reasoning of the majority in Leeth v The 
Commonwealth.. That reasoning gives no encouragement to the implication of a constitutional 
restriction upon State legislative power’. 
144 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 115. 
145 Ibid 116. 
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that State courts/legislatures can very easily disregard the rules of natural justice 
without undermining institutional integrity.146 However, McHugh J considered that 
the need to maintain ‘public confidence in the impartial exercise of federal judicial 
power’147 did impose two broad limitations on State legislative power. First of all, in 
His Honour’s view, public confidence required that State supreme courts could not be 
vested with non-judicial functions in respect of non-federal matters if ‘that might lead 
ordinary reasonable members of the public to conclude that the Court was not 
independent of the executive government of the States’.148 Secondly, State supreme 
courts could not be vested with non-judicial functions ‘so extensive or of such a 
nature that the Supreme Court would lose its identity as a court’.149
Gummow J adopted similar reasoning to Gaudron and McHugh JJ, noting, as a 
preliminary matter, that the power to order incarceration without a prior determination 
of criminal guilt ‘could not be conferred by a law of the Commonwealth upon this 
Court, any other federal court, or a State court exercising federal jurisdiction’.
 Thus, for McHugh 
J as for Gaudron J, it was the maintenance of public confidence that was critical to 
institutional integrity; not any specific vision as to how the judicial process should 
operate in the States. 
 
150
                                                 
146 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 600 [40]. 
147 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116. 
148 Ibid 119. 
149 Ibid 117. 
150 Ibid 132. 
 
Accepting that this would not always prevent the conferral of non-judicial functions 
on the NSW Supreme Court by the NSW legislature, however, His Honour found that 
s 5(1) jeopardised ‘the integrity of the federal or State court in question in the exercise 
in other cases of the judicial power of the Commonwealth ... [because it] saps the 
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appearance of institutional impartiality and the maintenance of public confidence’.151
Consistent with his narrow approach,
 
As with Gaudron and McHugh JJ, Gummow J offered little guidance as to which 
other functions might be incompatible with the judicial process and institutional 
integrity, but it is clear that His Honour’s reasoning flowed from the status of the 
federal judiciary as opposed to the integrity of State courts per se. 
 
152 Toohey J drew on the third limb of the 
incompatibility test in Grollo to find that s 5(1) was a non-judicial function, ‘because 
it requires the Supreme Court to participate in the making of a preventive detention 
order where no breach of the criminal law is alleged and where there has been no 
determination of guilt’.153
The function exercised by the Supreme Court under the Act offends Ch III 
which, as I said in Harris v Caladine,
 As such, in His Honour’s view: 
 
154 reflects an aspect of the doctrine of 
separation of powers, serving to protect not only the role of the independent 
judiciary but also the personal interests of litigants in having those interests 
determined by judges independent of the legislature and the executive.155
Whether Grollo incompatibility can properly be applied in a State court context is 
debatable,
  
 
156
                                                 
151 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 133. 
152 See above nn 39-41 and accompanying text. 
153 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98. 
154 (1991) 172 CLR 84, 135. ‘In the end it is personal interests rather than structural interests that 
demand protection; but the two are interdependent and to weaken the latter is inevitably to damage the 
former’.  
155 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98. 
156 See above Chapter 5 nn 14-19 and accompanying text. 
 but the fact remains that the pivotal requirement for Toohey J was, as 
with Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, the need to maintain public confidence in 
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the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. 157  That being said, it is the 
‘integrated’ approach adopted by Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ (subsequently 
endorsed by Kirby J in Gould v Brown)158 which emerges as the proper foundation of 
the Kable doctrine (albeit a ‘fragile’ one).159
The High Court has tended to explore the question whether a function or 
arrangement is incompatible with the institutional integrity of a state court on 
a case-by-case basis, focussing on the specific features of the legislation 
under challenge. While this incremental approach is consistent with 
traditional judicial method, it provides limited guidance for state law-makers 
concerned to ensure the validity of their legislative schemes.
 
 
Given the divergent approaches adopted by the majority judges in Kable, it is difficult 
to discern a test for the future application of the doctrine or, indeed, the circumstances 
(other than detention without adjudgment of criminal guilt) which might enliven it. 
This piecemeal approach to the scope of Kable incompatibility has continued to 
characterise High Court precedent in this area. As Fiona Wheeler has observed: 
 
160
The majority judgments indicate that ‘the underlying concern [in Kable] was to 
maintain public confidence in the independence of State courts’.
 
 
161
                                                 
157 It is generally accepted that, ‘the underlying concern [in Kable] was to maintain public confidence 
in the independence of State courts’. Johnston and Hardcastle, above n 27, 220.  
158 (1998) 193 CLR 346, 485-86.  
159 Johnston and Hardcastle, above n 27, 221. 
160 Wheeler, ‘The Kable doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State Courts’, above n 128, 22. 
 This ‘underlying 
161 Johnston and Hardcastle, above n 27, 220. Elizabeth Handsley has stated that the ‘majority judges' 
repeated claim that the basis of the incompatibility doctrine is the necessity of public confidence to the 
effective exercise of the judicial power is a very concrete one, so it is not unreasonable to expect some 
concrete evidence to back it up. Even if it cannot be questioned whether public confidence is necessary 
to the effective exercise of judicial power, the High Court should be willing to offer some clear 
evidence of the effect its doctrine seeks to avoid before it strikes down legislation which is otherwise 
within power. Of course there are severe doubts as to whether the High Court has the resources needed 
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concern’ rested upon the suggestion that the integrity of State courts reflected upon 
the integrity of the federal judicial system (‘institutional integrity’). Thus, a function 
was to be considered incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power if it 
undermined public confidence in the integrity of a court belonging to the Australian 
judiciary.  
 
Subsequent challenges under the Kable doctrine demonstrate that public confidence is 
no longer the touchstone of incompatibility, and that the doctrine will seldom result in 
the invalidity of State/territory legislation.162 Indeed, since its inception the Kable 
doctrine has only been successfully applied in two instance; first by the Queensland 
Court of Appeal in Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (‘Re Criminal 
Proceeds’),163 and more recently by the Supreme Court of South Australia in Totani v 
South Australia (Totani). 164  All other attempts have failed, prompting Kirby J to 
question whether Kable was ‘a constitutional guard-dog that would bark but once’.165
                                                                                                                                            
to gather such information. However, the answer to this observation is not to dispense with the 
information but to dispense with the doctrine. A doctrine which requires the production of information 
which the High Court is institutionally incapable of gathering simply has no place in the High Court's 
arsenal’. Above n 15, 176. 
162 According to Peter Johnston and Rohan Hardcastle, ‘a high degree of incompatibility is required to 
undermine public confidence in the independence of State courts’. Above n 27, 232. In Nicholas v The 
Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 255 [201], Kirby J stated that ‘The separation and integrity of the judicial 
power, universally regarded as essential to the independence of the judicial function generally, is 
specially important in a federal system of government. There the judiciary, especially in the courts 
constituted or invested with jurisdiction under the Constitution, must regularly determine disputed 
questions concerning constitutional power and large questions affecting the life of the nation as a whole. 
This is why the separation of the judicial power has been described as “a vital constitutional 
safeguard”‘. 
 
It might be wondered, on this basis, whether the term public confidence was not in 
163 [2004] 1 Qd R40. Although other legislative provisions have been impugned. For example, in 
Burnett v Director of Public Prosecutions (2007) 21 NTLR 39, it was argued that ss 46(2), 49(4) and 
154(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) were invalid on the basis that they 
substantially impaired the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory by 
requiring that court to undermine procedural fairness. The Northern Territory Court of Appeal accepted 
that the Kable doctrine had implications for Territory courts, but nevertheless held the legislation to be 
valid. 
164 [2009] SASC 301. 
165 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 535 [54] (Kirby J). 
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fact a proxy for some other constitutional purpose. Elizabeth Handsley has suggested 
that: 
 
The better conclusion is that the incompatibility doctrine [or the 
incompatibility component of the Kable doctrine] is not about maintaining 
public confidence in the judiciary at all. It is about limiting legislative and 
executive power, by preventing those branches from avoiding political 
responsibility for their actions.166
Accepting the first part of this conclusion, an alternative (or complementary) 
explanation for the second part is that Kable is about limiting legislative and 
executive power in matters affecting the inherent jurisdiction of Australian courts and, 
thereby, the effectiveness of the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This conclusion 
would be consistent with the conclusions reached in Chapter 4, where it was shown, 
inter alia, that the integrity component of the judicial process implication (originally 
measured by reference to public confidence) has never resulted in invalidity in federal 
jurisdiction.
   
 
167  One possible explanation for this underperformance, offered in 
Chapter 4, is that the judiciary are not directly concerned with ‘civil liberties, but 
about the limits of legislative and executive power and supremacy of the judiciary in 
deciding such questions’.168
                                                 
166 Handlsey, above n 15, 179. 
167 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 222 [115] (McHugh J), 208 [73] (Gaudron J), 255 [201] 
(Kirby J). 
168 Brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court (1987), 203. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme 
Court of South Australias’ recent decision in Totani v South Australia [2009] SASC 301. In that 
instance, the fatal defect in s 14(1) of the Serious and Organised Crime Control Act (SA) lay in the fact 
that it removed judicial discretion entirely, replacing it with an executive declaration. See below n 222-
224 and accompanying text. 
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The following section develops the proposition that the object of Kable is, in fact, to 
maintain the legitimacy of the federal judicial system by asserting the High Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction over all Australian Courts, and, to the extent necessary, the 
inherent jurisdiction of those courts (as opposed to any particular view as to the 
minimum judicial standards permissible in the States and territories). 169  This 
proposition is demonstrated by an examination of two factors of particular 
significance to the undermining of the Kable doctrine. The first factor is continuing 
uncertainty as to the criteria by which incompatibility is to be determined. The second 
factor is the High Court’s commitment to a presumption in favour of legislative 
validity. This necessarily lengthy section is essential to the question whether State and 
territory judges can mediate because, as will be seen, judicial mediation legislation is 
highly unlikely to be interfere with the inherent jurisdiction of State/territory courts. It 
has already been explained that judicial mediation will not interfere with the appellate 
jurisdiction of the High Court.170
                                                 
169 This has been recognised on numerous occasions, In Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 
CLR 575, 586 [2], for example, Gleeson CJ observed that the ‘constitutional objection to the legislative 
scheme is not based, or at least is not directly based, upon a suggested infringement of the appellant's 
human rights. The objection is based upon the involvement of the Supreme Court of Queensland in the 
process. It is the effect of the legislation upon the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, rather 
than its effect upon the personal liberty of the appellant, that is said to conflict with the requirements of 
the Constitution’.  Kirby J similarly noted in Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(2006) 228 CLR 45, 133 [225], that laws protecting individual rights (such as disqualification for 
apprehension of bias) exist ‘to repair individual infractions in particular cases’, whereas the Kable 
doctrine operates to remedy complaints that are more ‘fundamental in character and concerned [with] 
the validity of institutional arrangements’. These views in turn reflect the doctrine of ‘responsible 
government’, which rejects entrenched individual constitutional rights in favour of a system of 
parliamentary democracy whereby the judiciary protects the democratic process as opposed to 
protecting individual rights per se. See Attorney General (Commonwealth); Ex rel McKinley v 
Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1; Stephen Gageler, ‘Foundations of Australian Federalism and the 
Role of Judicial Review’ (1987) 17 Federal Law Review 162, 188. 
170 See above Chapter 3 nn 91-93. 
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What are the ‘criteria’ of incompatibility? 
 
Re Criminal Proceeds concerned the validity of certain provisions of the Criminal 
Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld), Chapter 2 of which set out procedures for the 
issue of an interim order restraining persons in possession of illegally acquired goods 
(whether convicted in respect of those goods or not) from dealing further with those 
goods. Section 30 of the Act required, inter alia, that on the application for such an 
order by certain listed persons (principally law enforcement):  
 
the court must hear the application -  
(a) in the absence of a person whose property is the subject of the 
application; and  
(b) without the relevant person having been informed of the 
application.171
Having established that s 30 constituted ‘a legislative command to the judge of the 
Supreme Court hearing the application to proceed “in the absence of”’ affected 
parties,
 
 
172 which clearly ‘abrogated’ the principles of natural justice, Williams JA 
turned to consider whether the Act was invalid by virtue of the Kable doctrine.173 
Placing particular emphasis upon the ‘essential characteristics of the judicial process’ 
identified by Gaudron J in Nicholas v The Queen,174 His Honour found that s 30 
constituted an unconstitutional interference with the judicial process ‘repugnant to or 
incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth:’175
 
 
                                                 
171 Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld), s 30 (3). 
172 Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40, 45 [11]. 
173 Ibid 50 [39]. 
174 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73 – 74]. 
175 Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40, 55 [58] 
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Asking a judge to make a decision on such issues in those circumstances 
makes a mockery of the exercise of the judicial power in question. The 
statutory provision removes the essential protection of the citizen inherent in 
the judicial process. Effectively the provision directs the court to hear the 
matter in a manner which ensures the outcome will be adverse to the citizen 
and deprives the court of the capacity to act impartially.176
It is apparent that the fatal flaw in s 30 lay in its directive nature, which precluded a 
broad interpretation of s 30 acknowledging the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction 
to ensure fairness in legal proceedings and to avoid an abuse of process. The 
legislation also struck at the heart of the Kable doctrine by undermining procedural 
fairness in a criminal context. Thus, while Re Criminal Proceeds would appear to 
have been correctly decided given the nature of the provision in question,
 
 
177
render the magistracy of the Territory or the office of the Chief Magistrate 
inappropriately dependent on the legislature or executive of the Territory in a 
way incompatible with requirements of independence and impartiality. It 
 it offers 
little guidance as to the broader circumstances in which incompatibility will arise. 
 
In Bradley (the facts of which are set out above), the Full Bench of the High Court 
rejected the appellants argument that s 6 the Magistrates Act (NT) undermined the 
institutional integrity of the NT Magistrates Court by placing the future remuneration 
of Mr Bradley in the hands of the executive government. According to McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ, the Act did not                 
 
                                                 
176 Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40, 55 [57]. 
177 But see the comment of Bleby J in Totani v South Australia [2009] SASC 301, 76, that the ‘case 
must be now regarded as doubtful authority given the formulation of the Kable principle adopted by 
Williams J in that case, and subsequent High Court authority.’  
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does not compromise or jeopardise the integrity of the Territory magistracy 
or the judicial system. Nor is it apt to lead reasonable and informed members 
of the public to conclude that the magistracy of the Territory was not free 
from the influence of the other branches of government in exercising their 
judicial function.178
The joint judgment accepted the view, expressed by Gaudron J in Ebner, that 
impartiality ‘and the appearance of impartiality are necessary for the maintenance of 
public confidence in the judicial system,’
 
 
179
discernment of the relevant minimum characteristic of an independent and 
impartial tribunal exercising the jurisdiction of the courts over which the 
Chief Magistrate presides. No exhaustive statement of what constitutes that 
minimum in all cases is possible.
 but made no direct comment as to the 
suitability of public confidence as a criterion of integrity. Their Honours also avoided 
any prescriptive analysis of the circumstances that might give rise to incompatibility 
under the Kable doctrine. The difficulty, the joint judges explained, is that such 
questions require 
 
180
In Chapter 4 it was explained that, following Kable but prior to Bradley, public 
confidence had been all but debunked as a measure of constitutional validity in 
respect of functions vested in Ch III courts.
  
 
181
                                                 
178 (2004) 218 CLR 146, 172 [65]. 
179 Ibid 162 [27]; citing Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363 [81]. 
180 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [30]. 
181 See above Chapter 4 nn 194-98. 
 Any lingering concern that the 
maintenance of public confidence represented a free standing constitutional principle 
was resolutely disposed of by the High Court in Fardon v Attorney General 
308 
 
 
(‘Fardon’),182 Baker v The Queen (‘Baker’),183 and Forge v Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (‘Forge’).184
In Fardon, the High Court considered a legislative scheme similar to that invalidated 
in Kable. Part 2, Div 3 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) 
provided that the Supreme Court of Queensland could order the continued and 
indefinite detention of persons previously convicted of serious sexual offences, and 
who had already served their sentences. The appellant (the subject of a continued 
detention order) argued that this function was incompatible with the institutional 
integrity of the Court. For reasons set out in the following section, the High Court 
rejected the appeal. As a separate matter, Gleeson CJ stated (in accordance with 
Brennan CJ and Hayne J’s earlier comments in Nicholas)
  
 
185
Nothing that was said in Kable meant that a court's opinion of its own standing 
is a criterion of validity of law. Furthermore, nothing would be more likely to 
damage public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of courts than 
judicial refusal to implement the provisions of a statute upon the ground of an 
objection to legislative policy.
 that  
  
186
                                                 
182 (2004) 223 CLR 575. 
183 (2004) 223 CLR 513. 
184 (2006) 228 CLR 45. 
185 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 197 [37] (Brennan CJ), 275 [242] (Hayne J). 
186 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 593 [23]. 
 
 
Gummow and Kirby J also dismissed public confidence as a discrete criterion in 
determining the validity of a given statute or provision. According to Gummow J: 
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Although in some of the cases considering the application of Kable, 
institutional integrity and public confidence perhaps may have appeared as 
distinct and separately sufficient considerations, that is not so. Perception as to 
the undermining of public confidence is an indicator, but not the touchstone, of 
invalidity; the touchstone concerns institutional integrity.187
All of the majority judges appeared to agree with Gummow J that the appropriate test 
was one of ‘institutional integrity’; to be informed by (but not dictated by) notions of 
public confidence and compatibility with the requirements of the judicial process. 
 
 
188 
Once again, however, no general unifying principle was offered by which to 
determine when a function would be incompatible with institutional integrity. 
Gummow J (with whom Hayne J agreed)189 reiterated the view of the High Court in 
Bradley, explaining that, as ‘with Kable and the present case, the critical notions of 
repugnancy and incompatibility are insusceptible of further definition in terms which 
necessarily dictate future outcomes’.190
It is a serious constitutional mistake to think that either Kable or the 
Constitution assimilates State courts or their judges and officers with federal 
courts and their judges and officers. The Constitution provides for an 
integrated court system. But that does not mean that what federal courts 
cannot do State courts cannot do ... nothing in Ch III prevents a State, if it 
 However, McHugh J did attempt to narrow 
the circumstances in which incompatibility might arise under the Kable doctrine. His 
Honour warned that: 
 
                                                 
187 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 617-18 [102], 629 -30 [144] (Kirby J). 
188 Ibid 591 [15] (Gleeson CJ), 617 [101] McHugh J, 652-53 [212]-[213] (Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
While Callinan and Heydon JJ said little of the constitutional principles involved, they appeared to 
accept that institutional integrity was the overarching principle to be applied.   
189 Ibid 647 [195]. 
190 Ibid 618 [104]. 
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wishes, from implementing an inquisitorial, rather than an adversarial, system 
of justice for State courts ... State legislation that requires State courts to act 
in ways inconsistent with the traditional judicial process will be invalid only 
when it leads to the conclusion that reasonable persons might think that the 
legislation compromises the capacity of State courts to administer invested 
federal jurisdiction impartially according to law.191
This conclusion is broadly compatible with McHugh J’s judgment in Kable, but in 
one respect it is troubling. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, the inquisitorial 
model does not adhere to common law notions of due process and natural justice, 
because in civil law countries ‘fairness is inherent in the system’.
 
 
192 Thus, were a 
State court directed to conduct proceedings in an inquisitorial manner, this may very 
well (contrary to McHugh J’s suggestion) undermine the judicial process and prevent 
the court from acting impartially. 193  Granted, legislation enacting an inquisitorial 
system would almost certainly involve an increase in discretionary power, as opposed 
to the removal of that power (as in Re Criminal Proceeds Act 2002). 194 It is also 
highly unlikely that any such legislation would be directive in nature (as demonstrated 
by the statutory provisions comprising the LAT process discussed in Chapter 6).195
                                                 
191 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 598 [36], 600 -01[40]-[42]. 
192 Alison Creighton, ‘An Adversarial System: A constitutional requirement’ (1999) 74 Reform 65, 6. 
193 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73]-[74] (Gaudron J). 
194 See, for example, the discretions (discussed in Chapter 4) which were upheld in Cominos v Cominos 
(1972) 127 CLR 588; Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248; Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v 
Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617; Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365; Crestin v Crestin (2008) 
39 Fam LR 420.  
195 But see Totani v South Australia [2009] SASC 301, where the South Australian Supreme Court held 
s 14(2) of the Serious and Organised Crime Control Act (SA) to be invalid, as it prevented the court 
from examining the basis of a declaration by the Attorney-General when issuing a control order.  As 
such, s 14(2) purported to graft ‘non-judicial powers onto the judicial process in such a way that the 
outcome is controlled to a significant and unacceptable extent, by an arm of the Executive Government 
which destroys the court’s integrity as a repository of Federal Jurisdiction.’ [157] (Bleby J). 
 
Nevertheless, if judges were required to participate in an inquisitorial manner, it 
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seems likely that a reasonable apprehension of bias would arise and that this would be 
incompatible with the exercise of Ch III judicial power.  
 
Shortly after Fardon196 the High Court once again confirmed that public confidence 
was an inappropriate measure of legislative validity. 197 In Baker (the facts of which 
are set out in detail the following section), the appellant (convicted of murder and the 
subject of a non-release recommendation by the sentencing judge) argued 
unsuccessfully that certain provisions of the Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW) were 
incompatible with the NSW Supreme Court’s role as a repository of federal judicial 
power. As explained in more detail below, a majority of the High Court rejected Mr 
Baker’s appeal on the basis that the discretionary power vested in the court was 
capable of being performed judicially.198
In some of the judgments in Kable, references were made to public 
confidence in the courts. Confidence is not something that exists in the 
abstract. It is related to some quality or qualities which one person believes to 
exist in another. The most basic quality of courts in which the public should 
have confidence is that they will administer justice according to law.
 As regards the role of public confidence as 
an indicator of incompatibility, Gleeson CJ stated that: 
 
199
                                                 
196 In fact Baker was listed before Fardon, but the judgments in the former make numerous references 
to the latter. 
197 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ; Kirby J in dissent) 
198 See below nn 231-35 and accompanying text. 
199 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 519 [6]. 
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Kirby J disagreed with the majority that the contested provisions of the Act were 
valid,200
Although a common element in the reasoning of the majority in Kable was 
the reference to the danger of losing public confidence in the integrated 
Judicature of Australia, I do not consider that this amounts to a separate, or 
sufficient, criterion for invalidating a State law. A court is not well placed to 
estimate with precision the impact if any, of particular legislation upon public 
opinion. At most, the reference to this consideration constitutes a legal fiction, 
constructed by judges in an attempt to explain and objectify their 
conclusions.
 but agreed with Gleeson CJ that public confidence was not an appropriate 
measure of validity:  
 
201
Kirby J conceded, in language recycled from his earlier judgment in Nicholas, that ‘it 
is impossible to frame criteria that are “at once exclusive and exhaustive.”’
 
 
202 
However, in His Honour’s view, the difficulty of phrasing conclusive criteria should 
not prevent the High Court from adopting an approach ‘that is vigilant to defend the 
integrity of the branch of government which the Constitution places in their 
charge’. 203
                                                 
200 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 561 [143]. 
201 Ibid 542 [79]. His Honour’s comments regarding the court’s inability to estimate public opinion 
reflect the concerns raised by Elizabeth Handsley, above n 161.  
202 Ibid 543 [81]; citing Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 256 [201]. This phrasing is in turn 
borrowed from R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 366 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J). 
203 Ibid, 543 [81]. 
 The approach posited by Kirby J (which seeks to refine the tools of 
statutory interpretation as opposed to the specific criterion of validity) is considered in 
the penultimate section of this Chapter. 
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In Forge, 204
Gleeson CJ (with whom Callinan J agreed)
 the High Court once again considered the application of the Kable 
doctrine; this time in relation to the appointment of acting judges. The Honourable 
Michael Leader Foster had been appointed to the NSW Supreme Court as an acting 
judge in accordance with s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). It was argued 
that Foster AJ’s appointment was invalid because the appointment of acting judges 
was so extensive as to undermine the integrity of the Supreme Court (because it led to 
a reasonable apprehension of general judicial bias towards the government). Thus, the 
appellants sought to apply the Kable doctrine to the composition of courts (as in 
Bradley), as opposed to the functions vested in those courts (as in Kable, Re Criminal 
Proceeds, Baker and Fardon). The High Court held by a majority of six to one (Kirby 
J again dissenting) that s 37 was valid. Insofar as Forge concerned the appointment of 
acting judges much of the reasoning applied by the High Court is tangential in the 
current context. Forge nevertheless highlights the centrality of impartiality (and the 
appearance thereof) to the application of the Kable doctrine, and attempts (albeit 
unsuccessfully) to clarify the criteria of Kable incompatibility.  
 
205  thought it unlikely that legislation 
providing for the appointment of acting judges would enliven the Kable doctrine. His 
Honour accepted that State courts must meet the description of ‘courts’, and that an 
essential part of being a court is ‘that it must satisfy minimum requirements of 
independence and impartiality’.206
                                                 
204 (2006) 228 CLR 45. 
205 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 136 [238]. 
206 Ibid 67 [41]. 
  However, in His Honours’ opinion, not only do 
those requirements ‘take account of considerations of history’, but there ‘are sound 
practical reasons why State governments might need the flexibility provided by a 
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power to appoint acting judges’.207 In His Honour’s view, an abuse of power under s 
37 might ‘in extreme cases’ undermine the integrity of the court, but those 
circumstances had not been demonstrated in the case at hand.208
In a joint judgment, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ explained that ‘the relevant 
principle is one which hinges upon maintenance of the defining characteristics of a 
‘court’, and that institutional integrity will be distorted if a court ‘no longer exhibits in 
some relevant respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from 
other decision-making bodies’.
 
 
209  The joint judges rejected the idea that a 
‘quantitative criterion for marking the boundary or permissible appointments’ 210 
provided a sound basis upon which to determine whether a court had ceased to satisfy 
this definition. As such, the appellant had failed to establish that an ‘informed 
observer’ might ‘reasonably conclude that the institution no longer is, and no longer 
appears to be, independent and impartial’.211
The approach adopted by the joint judges in Forge invites further speculation and 
uncertainty as to which judicial ‘characteristics’ are in fact ‘defining’ of  a court – in 
much the same way as the Boilermakers’ Case led to ‘excessive subtlety and 
technicality’ in the identification of ‘judicial power’.
 
 
212
                                                 
207 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 68 [42]. 
208 Ibid 69 [46]. 
209 Ibid 76 [63] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
210 Ibid 85 [90]. 
211 Ibid 86 [93]. 
212 R v Joske; Ex parte Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (1974) 
130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick CJ). See generally, Patrick Lane, ‘The Decline of the Boilermakers 
Separation of Powers Doctrine’ (1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 6. 
 Perhaps in an attempt to avoid 
sterile debate on the issue, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ stated that: 
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It is neither possible nor profitable to attempt to make some single all-
embracing statement of the defining characteristics of a court. The cases 
concerning identification of judicial power reveal why that is so. An 
important element, however, in the institutional characteristics of courts in 
Australia is their capacity to administer the common law system of 
adversarial trial. Essential to that system is the conduct of trial by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.213
With the greatest of respect, to state that ‘institutional integrity’ is to be determined by 
reference to the minimum constitutional requirements of ‘courts’; that an important 
element in the character of Australian courts is the capacity to administer an 
‘adversarial trial’; and that adversarial trials are characterised by an ‘independent and 
impartial tribunal’; is simply to define one nebulous term by reference to another in an 
endless conceptual loop.
 
 
214
Criticisms levelled at the Kable doctrine — that it is an imprecise test that 
fails to adequately define notions of ‘integrity, independence and 
impartiality’ — are equally applicable to a new test that seeks to ascribe a 
core constitutional meaning to the word ‘court’.
 As Anna Dziedzic has observed: 
 
215
After more than ten years, therefore, the best that can be said by way of a general or 
unifying principle for Kable incompatibility is that a function may undermine 
 
 
                                                 
213 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 78 [68] (Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan JJ). This explanation reflects the earlier judgment of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 343 [3]. 
214 The term ‘adversarial’ is notoriously difficult to define, and Australia does not have a ‘purely’ 
adversarial system. See, for example, Mark Nolan, ‘The Adversarial mentality versus the Inquisitorial 
mentality’, (2004) 16 (3) Legaldate 7, 7.  
215 Anna Dziedzic, ‘Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission: The Kable Principle 
and the Constitutional Validity of Acting Judges’ (2007) 35 Federal Law Review 129, 141. 
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institutional integrity if it prevents a court from acting independently and impartiality. 
As pointed out at the very beginning of this Chapter, the underlying object of the 
incompatibility doctrine (and, for that matter, the separation doctrine) is the 
maintenance of judicial independence and impartiality. 216
As to the particular circumstances that might give rise to Kable incompatibility, 
Bradley and Forge make it clear that legislation affecting the constitution of State or 
territory courts will rarely invoke the doctrine; except in the most ‘extreme cases’.
 Thus, the High Court’s 
answer simply restates the question.   
 
217 
Kable, Re Criminal Proceeds, Baker, and Fardon all concerned ‘functions’ vested in 
courts as opposed to the constitution of those courts, and are therefore of more 
immediate relevance to the question whether mediation functions may be vested in 
State and territory courts. It is far from trivial to observe, however, that all of these 
cases concerned functions vested in courts exercising criminal jurisdiction, where ‘the 
guarantee involved in the vesting of judicial power ... is at its most important’.218
                                                 
216 Wilson v Minster for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers adn 
Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process’, above n 30, 253; Suri Ratnapala, Australian Constitution 
Law: Foundations and Theory (2nd ed 2007), 162; Zines, above n 21, 217. 
217 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 69 [46] (Gleeson 
CJ). 
218 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 581 (Deane J). 
 
Given the general failure of Kable in criminal matters it seems highly doubtful that it 
would ever impede the development of civil procedures in State and territory courts. 
Interestingly, though, the joint judgment in Forge does not rule out this possibility. 
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ drew attention to the majority judgment in Ebner, 
and the 
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fundamental importance which is attached to the principle that a court must 
be independent and impartial by the development of the apprehension of bias 
principle. Even the appearance of departure from the principle that the 
tribunal must be independent and impartial is prohibited lest the integrity of 
the judicial system be undermined.  
 
The joint judgment went on to state that ‘judicial independence refers not only to 
independence from the Executive, it refers to independence from any other source of 
influence’.219 As such, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ suggested that the Kable 
doctrine might (in contrast with the third limb of the incompatibility condition 
applicable to the persona designata exception)220
No unthinking translation can be made from the detailed operation of the 
apprehension of bias principle in particular cases to the separate and distinct 
question about the institutional integrity of a court. But the apprehension of 
bias principle is one which reveals the centrality of considerations of both the 
fact and the appearance of independence and impartiality in identifying 
whether particular legislative steps distort the character of the court 
concerned.
 be invoked if the character of a 
court is distorted by virtue of apprehended bias in circumstances which do not involve 
an association with the other branches of government (albeit with a caveat): 
 
221
Thus, and although no court (State, territory or federal) has yet taken this step, the 
joint judgment in Forge (building on the judgment in Bradley) might be seen as 
  
 
                                                 
219 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 77 [66] (Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
220 See above Chapter 5 nn 108-14. 
221 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 77 [66] (Gummow 
Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
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authority for the proposition that the Kable doctrine transfers the impartiality 
principles enunciated in Ebner to those State and territory courts capable of exercising 
federal judicial power. This may in turn provide an obstacle to the development of 
judicial mediation (because the mediation process may, in certain circumstances, give 
rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias). This possibility in considered in Chapter 8. 
 
Recent case law suggests that the Kable doctrine will continue to mark the outer 
boundaries of State/territory legislative power vis-à-vis State/territory courts, but it 
does not fundamentally extend the circumstances that will enliven it. In Totani, a 
majority of the Supreme Court of South Australia held that s 14(1) of the Serious and 
Organised Crime Control Act (SA) – which authorised the making of a control order 
preventing a subject from associating with members of a ‘declared authorisation’ – 
was invalid as it required the Court to ‘act without question on a declaration which 
represents the finding of the Attorney-General.’222
unnaceptable grafting of non-judicial powers onto the judicial process in 
such a way that the outcome is controlled to a significant and unacceptable 
extent, by an arm of the Executive Government which destroys the court’s 
integrity as a repository of Federal Jurisdiction.’
 Other provisions of the Control Act 
prevented the Court from examining the basis for this declaration in accordance with 
the fair hearing rule. As such, in Bleby J’s view, s 14(1) constituted an an 
 
223
As in Re Criminal Proceeds, and Kable itself, the fatal flaw in 14(1) was that it 
entirely removed the power of the court to conduct proceedings in a judicial manner. 
  
 
                                                 
222 Totani v South Australia [2009] SASC 301, [167]. 
223 Ibid, [157]. 
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However, and as explained in Chapter 4, procedural discretions (such as would be 
necessary to implement judicial mediation) will seldom (if ever) be held invalid, 
because in interpreting those discretions the courts will, wherever possible, assume 
that ‘Parliament did not intend to pass beyond constitutional bounds. 224  Thus, in 
Forge, even if the number of acting judges appointed under s 37 had been so great as 
to undermine the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, the majority would have 
applied the presumption that the Supreme Court would apply this discretion judicially 
(as observed in the joint judgment, the exercise of the Act proceeded ‘from an 
unstated premise about what constitutes a “court.”’)225
The following section demonstrates that, by applying the presumption in favour of 
validity to State and territory legislation, 
 Any failure to maintain the 
constituent features of the Supreme Court would therefore have been deemed to flow 
not from any unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, but from the wrongful 
exercise of the discretion granted by s 37.   
 
226 the High Court has effectively rendered 
the Kable doctrine impotent where an element of judicial discretion remains. While it 
would be wholly inappropriate for the judiciary to interfere with the ‘true expression 
of the national will,’227 this approach permits that the minimum requirements of an 
independent and impartial tribunal may be all but erased by State or territory 
legislation. Thus, far from leading to any ‘confusion of public business,’228
                                                 
224 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J). See also A-G (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 
CLR 237, 267 (Dixon J). 
225 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 79 [73] (Gummow 
Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
226 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (‘Second BIO Case’) (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J). 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
 the High 
Court’s ‘timorous refusal to “run” at all with an expansive and generous interpretation 
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of the Kable principle’229 has (ironically) ratified the validity of radical legislation that, 
for all intents and purposes, usurps the exercise of judicial power.230
‘Reading Down’ Kable 
 Kirby J dissented 
in all bar one of the judgments analysed in the preceding section, and for this reason 
His Honour’s judgments are examined separately. 
 
 
The strength of the presumption in favour of legislative validity is illustrated in each 
of the unsuccessful attempts to apply Kable, discussed above. In Fardon, the High 
Court considered a legislative scheme similar to that invalidated in Kable.231 Part 2, 
Div 3 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) provided that 
the Supreme Court of Queensland could order the continued and indefinite detention 
of persons convicted of serious sexual offences. The appellant (the subject of a 
continued detention order) argued that this function was incompatible with the 
institutional integrity of the Court. By a majority of six to one232
                                                 
229 Oscar Roos, ‘Baker v The Queen & Fardon v Attorney General for the State of Queensland’ (2005) 
10(1) Deakin Law Review 271, 279. 
230 This is especially alarming in a punitive context. As Patrick Keyzer explains, to ‘allow legislatures 
to imprison people without the predicate commission of a fresh crime and without a criminal trial 
breaks the nexus between crime and punishment that is part of the fundamental logic of our system of 
law. The function of punishment is to communicate the censure an offender deserves for his or her past 
crime. One is not punished in advance, except where the rule of law, as we have always known it, does 
not apply. The focus of judicial power on past events is not accidental. Judicial power is characterised 
by the application of the law to past events or conduct. But in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) the 
High Court effectively overruled Kable, and decided by majority that State parliaments can validly 
enact legislation that enables a court to re-incarcerate a prisoner after their sentence of imprisonment 
has ended, in circumstances where the prisoner has committed no new crime, and after a hearing that 
bears no real resemblance to a criminal trial’. ‘“Preserving Due Process of Warehousing the 
Undesirables”: To What End the Separation of Judicial Power of the Commonwealth?’, above n 29. 
110 
231 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575. 
232 Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
 (Kirby J dissenting), 
the High Court rejected the appeal. For reasons substantially reflected in the other 
321 
 
 
majority judgments, 233
The Act is a general law authorising the preventive detention of a prisoner in 
the interests of community protection. It authorises and empowers the 
Supreme Court to act in a manner which is consistent with its judicial 
character. It does not confer functions which are incompatible with the proper 
discharge of judicial responsibilities or with the exercise of judicial power. It 
confers a substantial discretion as to whether an order should be made, and if 
so, the type of order. If an order is made, it might involve either detention or 
release under supervision. The onus of proof is on the Attorney-General. The 
rules of evidence apply. The discretion is to be exercised by reference to the 
criterion of serious danger to the community. The Court is obliged, by s 13(4) 
of the Act, to have regard to a list of matters that are all relevant to that 
criterion. There is a right of appeal. Hearings are conducted in public, and in 
accordance with the ordinary judicial process. There is nothing to suggest 
that the Supreme Court is to act as a mere instrument of government policy. 
The outcome of each case is to be determined on its merits.
 Gleeson CJ distinguished the legislative scheme from the 
scheme considered in Kable: 
 
234
In short, the majority held that Part 2, Div 3 of the Act was not incompatible with the 
exercise of federal judicial power because it could be interpreted in a manner 
 
 
                                                 
233 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575. According to Gummow J, at 614 [90], and 
615 [93], ‘the nature of the process for which the Act provides assumes particular importance. This 
process may ameliorate what otherwise would be the sapping of the institutional integrity of the 
Supreme Court ...[t]here is nothing in the Act to exclude rules of natural justice from the process of the 
Supreme Court’. Callinan and Heydon JJ, at 658 [234], concluded that the Act was ‘designed to achieve 
a legitimate, preventative, non-punitive purpose in the public interest, and to achieve it with due regard 
to a full and conventional judicial process, including unfettered appellate review’. McHugh J did not 
adopt this approach. In His Honour’s view, at 601 [42], the ‘pejorative phrase – “repugnant to the 
judicial process” – is not the constitutional criterion. In this area of constitutional discourse, it is best 
avoided, for it invites error. That which judges regard as repugnant to the judicial process may be no 
more than a reflection of their personal dislike of legislation that they think unjustifiably affects long 
recognised rights, freedoms and judicial procedures’. 
234 Ibid, 592 [19]. 
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consistent with the judicial process. Moreover, Part 2, Div 3 did not bring into 
question the independence of Supreme Court from the Queensland government. In 
Gummow J’s opinion, ‘the reputation of the judicial branch of government ... [was not] 
borrowed by the legislative and executive branches “to cloak their work in the neutral 
colors of judicial action.”’ 235
Similar reasoning was applied by the majority in Baker. Allan Baker was convicted in 
1974 with his co-accused (Kevin Crump) for murder and conspiracy to murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. In sentencing Mr Baker and Mr Crump, Taylor J, 
stated that ‘I believe that you should spend the rest of your lives in gaol and there you 
should die. If ever there was a case where life imprisonment should mean what it says 
— the imprisonment for the whole of your lives — this is it’.
 As such, it did not undermine the integrity of the 
Supreme Court or, by virtue thereof, the institutional integrity of the Australian 
judiciary.  
 
236
A person who is the subject of a non-release recommendation is not eligible 
for the determination of a minimum term and an additional term under this 
  In 1989, Legislative 
changes to the parole system in NSW permitted prisoners sentenced prior to the 1989 
Act to apply to the NSW Supreme Court for a review and determination of their 
sentence in line with the new system (allowing persons imprisoned for life to seek a 
minimum term order). Mr Crump so applied and was successful, prompting the NSW 
government to amend the legislation prior to Mr Baker’s application. The Sentencing 
Legislation Further Amendment Act 1997 (NSW) amended the Sentencing Act 1989 
(NSW), and S 13A(3A) of the revised Act provided that: 
  
                                                 
235 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 615 [91], citing Mistretta v United States 
488 US 361, 407 (1989). 
236 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 527 [26]. 
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section, unless the Supreme Court, when considering the person's application 
under this section, is satisfied that special reasons exist that justify making 
the determination. 
 
Item 1 of Schedule 1 defined a non-release recommendation as a ‘recommendation or 
observation, or an expression of opinion, by the original sentencing court that (or to 
the effect that) the person should never be released from imprisonment’. Thus, by 
virtue of Taylor J’s remarks at sentencing, Mr Baker fell within the remit of s 
13A(3A). Mr Baker argued that s 13A(3A) was in effect ad hominem in nature, as 
there were only ten persons (including himself) subject to such a recommendation. 
Moreover, and in accordance with Kable, he argued that the criterion by which the 
discretion vested by s 13A(3A) was to be determined (‘special reasons’) was 
incapable of judicial application, and was therefore incompatible with the its role as a 
repository of federal judicial power. The High Court rejected the appeal. Callinan J 
held that there was ‘real content’237
There is nothing unusual about legislation that requires courts to find “special 
reasons” or “special circumstances” as a condition of the exercise of a power
 in this criterion, and Gleeson CJ found that: 
 
.. 
This is a verbal formula that is commonly used where it is intended that 
judicial discretion should not be confined by precise definition, or where the 
circumstances of potential relevance are so various as to defy precise 
definition238
                                                 
237 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 574 [177]. 
238 Ibid 523 [13]. 
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McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ flatly rejected the appellant’s contention 
that the legislation was, in effect, ad hominem in nature,239
is a qualification to which meaning not only can, but must, be given in the 
context of the facts advanced in any particular case as warranting the 
description “special reasons”. The fact that reasons identified as "special" 
may (indeed almost certainly would) be relevant to the exercise of the power 
of determination does not strip the expression “special reasons” of 
meaning.
 and agreed with Gleeson 
CJ and Callinan J that the word ‘special’ 
 
240
Moreover, and unlike s 5(1) of the Community Protection Act struck down in Kable, 
the majority did not consider that s 13(3A) brought the Supreme Court within too 
close a relationship with the executive or legislature.
 
 
241
It is necessary to point out that, although the term ‘special reasons’ ostensibly vests a 
broad discretionary power in the Supreme Court, the effect of s 13A(3A) is in fact to 
place a condition upon the Supreme Court’s ability to exercise judicial power. Only if 
‘special reasons’ exist may the Court issue a minimum term order. Thus, while there 
is no question that s 13(3A) amounts to a legislative ‘usurpation’ or ‘direction,’
  
 
242
                                                 
239 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 534 [50]. 
240 Ibid 532 [41]. 
241 Ibid 532 [42]. 
242 This is in direct contrast with the view of Kirby J (discussed in more detail below): Baker v The 
Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 547 [94]-[95]. 
 it 
does amount, in effect, to an interference with the exercise of judicial power. This was 
the basis of Kirby J’s dissenting judgment, considered in the following section. 
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The presumption in favour of legislative validity was applied again in Gypsy Jokers 
Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (‘Gypsy Jokers’). 243
The appellants contended that s 76(2) denied them procedural fairness as it 
compromised the Supreme Court’s ability to ascertain the facts, provide proper 
reasons for its judgments, or otherwise conduct proceedings in accordance with its 
requirements as a Ch III court.
 Gypsy Jokers 
concerned Pt 4, Div 6 of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA). The 
Act provided the Commissioner of Police with the power in certain circumstances to 
issue ‘fortification warning notices’ (requiring the removal of devices preventing 
lawful access to premises by law enforcement), and limited the power of the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia to review the Commissioner’s exercise of that power. The 
appellants argued that s 76(2) of the Act was invalid as it vested in the Supreme Court 
of Western Australia a function repugnant to the judicial process and, thus, 
institutional integrity. Section 76(2) of the Act provided that, on review by the 
Supreme Court, the Commissioner of Police could identify as confidential certain 
information that would ordinarily be disclosed to the applicant.  
 
244
As a general proposition, it may be accepted that legislation which purported 
to direct the courts as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of their 
jurisdiction would be apt impermissibly to impair the character of the courts 
 By removing the Supreme Court’s discretion in 
these matters, the appellants also argued that the Commissioner was effectively 
directing the exercise of judicial power. By a majority of five to one, the High Court 
dismissed the appeal. Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ stated that: 
 
                                                 
243 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532. 
244 Ibid, 592 [166] (Crennan J). 
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as independent and impartial tribunals. However, as indicated by the result in 
Nicholas v The Queen, upholding the validity of s 15x of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth), there is no impermissible interference with the exercise of judicial 
power even by such a significant evidentiary provision displacing the 
common law formulated in Ridgeway v The Queen.245
should not be read as an attempted legislative direction as to the manner of 
the outcome of any review application made under s 76. The words are no 
more than an attempt at exhortation and an effort to focus attention by the 
Court to the prejudicial effect disclosure may have.
 
 
Their Honour’s concluded that s 76(2) 
 
246
One final case confirms that the High Court’s application of the presumption in 
favour of legislative validity has all but erased the incompatibility component of the 
Kable doctrine. K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (‘K-Generation’) 
 
 
247
                                                 
245 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 560 [39]. 
246 Ibid 561 [44]. 
247 (2009) 252 ALR 471. 
 
is also significant in that it is the first and only occasion upon which the High Court 
has considered Kable vis-à-vis a non-criminal function. The appellants (applicants for 
a liquor license) submitted that s 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) was 
invalid as it required the Liquor Licensing Court to accept in evidence ‘criminal 
intelligence’ tendered by the Commissioner of Police without disclosing that 
information to the applicants. Section 28A (5)(a) of the Act provided that the Court  
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must, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, take steps to 
maintain the confidentiality of information classified by the Commissioner of 
Police as criminal intelligence, including steps to receive evidence and hear 
argument about the information in private in the absence of the parties to the 
proceedings and their representatives. 
 
The applicants contended that this provision undermined the principles of open justice 
(by requiring proceedings to be held in private) and required the court to conduct 
itself in a manner contrary to procedural fairness (by considering evidence in the 
absence of one of the parties). The High Court unanimously rejected the appeal. 
Having found that the Kable doctrine applied to the Liquor Licensing Court (as 
explained above), the Full Bench held that s 28A was nevertheless a valid exercise of 
State legislative power. In a joint judgment, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ, held that s 28A, ‘properly construed’, neither removed from the court the 
power to reject the Commissioner’s classification,248 nor obliged the court to hear 
arguments in private to the exclusion of the applicants. Rather, s 28A marked ‘out the 
limits of the range within which the Licensing Court may act in particular cases when 
determining how to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 249
Section 28A infringes upon the open justice principle that is an essential part 
of the functioning of courts in Australia. It also infringes upon procedural 
fairness to the extent that it authorises and effectively requires the Licensing 
Court and the Supreme Court to consider, without disclosure to the party to 
 French CJ 
agreed, noting that the ‘constructional choice [adopted] applies the presumption in 
favour of legislative validity consistent with the principle of legality’: 
 
                                                 
248 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471, 500 [144]. 
249 Ibid 500 [147]. 
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whom it relates, criminal intelligence information submitted to the Court by 
the Commissioner of Police. However, it cannot be said that the section 
confers upon the Licensing Court or the Supreme Court functions which are 
incompatible with their institutional integrity as courts of the States or with 
their constitutional roles as repositories of federal jurisdiction. Properly 
construed the section leaves it to the courts to determine whether information 
classified as criminal intelligence answers that description. It also leaves it to 
the courts to decide what steps may be necessary to preserve the 
confidentiality of such material. The courts may, consistently with the section, 
disclose the material to legal representatives of the party affected on 
conditions of confidentiality enforced by undertaking or order. It leaves it 
open to the courts to decide whether to accept or reject such material and to 
decide what if any weight shall be placed upon it.250
Even Kirby J was unwilling to find that s 28A vested an incompatible function in the 
Licensing Court. His Honour drew a distinction between the quasi-directive 
legislation of the kind passed in Gypsy Jokers, and the ‘more facultative’ provisions 
of the Liquor Licensing Act.
 
 
251
[T]he provisions of s 28A(5) of the Act, properly construed, do not offend the 
Kable principle. As was intended, the provision diminishes the role of a court 
to decide claims to privilege with respect to “criminal intelligence”. However, 
it does not involve the State Parliament or the Police Commissioner 
impermissibly “instructing” a court on a particular case. It does not prevent a 
court from performing traditional judicial functions. It does not diminish the 
 He concluded that:  
  
                                                 
250 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471, 486 [73]. 
251 Ibid 531 [257]. 
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integrity and independence of a court in a constitutionally impermissible 
way.252
                                                 
252 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471, 531-32 [258]. 
 
 
Given that all but one member of the High Court has consistently applied a 
presumption in favour of legislative validity, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
Kable will rarely if ever result in an Act or provision being struck down. Even if a 
provision ‘effectively requires’ a court to disregard the principles of open justice and 
procedural fairness, it will be valid provided that it does not explicitly remove that 
court’s discretion to disregard that ‘effective requirement’ when the circumstances of 
the case demand it. Neither the object of the legislation nor the effect of cumulative 
provisions will have any bearing upon this enquiry, nor will it be relevant how narrow 
the remaining discretion is (indeed, it may be ‘effectively’ non-existent).  
 
The High Court’s attachment to this interpretive approach ‘bodes well’ for judicial 
mediation, but is the application of this approach consistent with the object of Ch III 
in respect of legislation that, in pith and substance, directs the exercise of judicial 
power? Could not a different interpretive approach be adopted in respect of legislation 
that removes or limits the discretionary power of judges (securing a specific 
governmental agenda), on the one hand, and legislation that increases the procedural 
discretionary power of judges (facilitating the provision of novel judicial procedures), 
on the other?  
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Justice Kirby’s approach: ‘The character of the Law’ 
 
In Fardon, Kirby J disagreed with the majority that Part 2, Div 3 of the Dangerous 
Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) was valid. His Honour lamented the 
failure of the High Court to take up the opportunity presented by Kable, 253
Kable is especially important when the rights of unpopular minorities are 
committed to the courts. That is when legislatures may be tempted to exceed 
their constitutional powers, involving the independent judiciary in 
incompatible activities so as to cloak serious injustices with the semblance of 
judicial propriety. Against such risks, Ch III of the Constitution stands guard. 
This Court should be vigilant to uphold such protection. That is what the 
principle in Kable requires.
 and 
explained that: 
 
254
Rather than adhere to traditional techniques of interpretation, Kirby J advocated an 
approach which places a ‘heavy burden of persuasion’
 
 
255 on legislatures, and which 
takes account of an act’s ‘cumulative effect’. 256  In such matters, His Honour 
explained, ‘attention is addressed to actuality, not appearances. Were it otherwise, by 
the mere choice of legislative language and the stroke of a pen, the requirements of 
the Constitution could be circumvented’. 257 Ultimately, His Honour explained, it is a 
question of ‘the character of a law’.258
                                                 
253 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 626 [134]-[135]. 
254 Ibid 626 [135]. 
255 Ibid 630 [144]. 
256 Ibid 632 [149]. In this respect Kirby J’s approach has flavours of the High Court’s integrated 
approach to s 122 of the Constitution (discussed above); which views the ‘Constitutional as a whole’. 
Kristen Walker has identified similar concerns. ‘Persona Designata, Incompatibility and the Separation 
of Powers’ (1997) 8 Public Law Review 153, 163-64. 
257 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 634-35 [157]. 
258 Ibid 635 [159]. 
 And: 
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Despite the attempts in the Act to dress up the jurisdiction and powers given 
to the Supreme Court of Queensland as a measure for the protection of the 
public, a close analysis of its features confirms the impression which is 
derived, at the threshold, from its short title. This is an Act to make provision 
for the continuous punishment of prisoners who have already served 
punishment previously imposed upon them by the judiciary for specified 
sexual offences.259
Kirby J applied similar reasoning in Baker to find s 13(3A) of the Sentencing Act 
1989 (NSW) invalid. In His Honour’s view, the Act was, in effect, ad hominem in 
nature,
 
 
260 and was to be determined by ‘arbitrary and discriminatory criterion’.261 
Kirby J also considered that the Act sanctioned retroactive punishment,262 undermined 
basic human rights,263 and (in effect) usurped judicial power264 (the Parliamentary 
debates clearly indicated that the Act was intended to operate as a bill of attainder, in 
object if not in form).265
A constitutional rule ... requires a court to look at the legislation impugned 
from the standpoint of substance, not mere form. Being a constitutional 
doctrine, the rule in Kable requires the measurement of the challenged 
legislation as it could operate in fact; not a narrow approach befitting 
consideration of the validity of regulations made under a Dog Act.
 As a matter of principle, His Honour opined: 
 
266
                                                 
259 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 631 [147]. 
260 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 547 [94]-[95]. 
261 Ibid 552-54 [112]-[119]. 
262 Ibid 548 [100]. 
263 Ibid 558-60 [133-[140]. 
264 Ibid 548-49 [101]. 
265 Ibid 535-39 [59]-[66]. 
266 Ibid 536 [56]. 
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In Gypsy Jokers, Kirby J again expressed concern that the Kable doctrine was being 
construed too narrowly.267
impugned legislation rendered the Supreme Court “no longer a court of the 
kind contemplated by Ch III.” If that were indeed the criterion to be applied, 
it would be rare, if ever, that constitutional incompatibility could be shown. 
Kable's constitutional toothlessness would then be revealed for all to see.
 His Honour also refuted the suggestion (adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia), that the ultimate question was whether the  
 
268
Kirby J accepted the ‘purpose of adopting’ a presumption in favour of validity,
  
 
269 but 
acknowledged Fiona Wheeler’s observation that the ‘“the [Kable] principle may be 
operating prophylactically;”’270 suggesting that, one ‘manifestation of this could be 
the reading down of State legislation so as to avoid inconsistency with the Kable 
principle’.271
the sub-section involves an impermissible legislative direction to the 
Supreme Court. Effectively, it imposes the decision of an officer of the 
Executive Government upon the Supreme Court. That officer, in law or in 
 Finding it impossible, in any event, to construe the provision in favour 
of validity, Kirby J concluded that 
 
                                                 
267 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532. 
268 Ibid 578 [105]. His Honour went to on to explain, at 578 [105]-[106], that the ‘fact is that, whatever 
the outcome of this case, the Supreme Court would continue to discharge its regular functions. 
Overwhelmingly, it would do so as the Constitution requires. A particular provision, such as s 76 of the 
Act, will rarely be such as to poison the entire character and performance by a Supreme Court of its 
constitutional mandate as such or alone to result in a complete re-characterisation of the Court. 
Adoption of such an approach would, in effect, define the Kable doctrine out of existence. This should 
not be done. Kable recognised an important principle arising from the unique features of the Judicature 
of Australia. Such features necessitate vigilant protection of the State courts and their processes’.  
269 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 575 [95]. 
270 Ibid 572 [84]; citing Wheeler, ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power over State Courts’, 
above n 128. 
271 Ibid 572 [84]. 
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substance, thereby controls the discharge of the judicial process, the effective 
participation of the Supreme Court in that process and the capacity of the 
Supreme Court to explain the reasons for its decision to the parties and the 
public. The judge may appear in robes to pronounce what shall be done. But 
the hand that directs the process is elsewhere, outside the courtroom, and 
actually belongs to the respondent party.272
In contrast (as discussed above), Kirby J did not find it necessary to avoid the 
presumption in favour of legislative validity applied by the majority in K-Generation. 
In that instance, His Honour held that s 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) 
was valid, as in his view it was neither directive in nature nor incompatible with the 
judicial process.
 
 
273 It is submitted that in reality, however, the difference between K-
Generation and cases such as Kable, Baker, Fardon and Gypsy Joker’s is merely one 
of fact and degree. 274 The jurisdiction in K-Generation was regulatory in nature. 
Section 28A did not affect the court’s power to ensure fairness in criminal matters, 
where ‘the guarantee involved in the vesting of judicial power ... is at its most 
important’. 275  Nor was K-Generation a case in which ‘the rights of unpopular 
minorities’ were concerned, 276 or in which Parliament sought to undermine basic 
human rights. 277
                                                 
272 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 563 [52]. 
273 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471, 531-32 [258]. 
274 Fiona Wheeler previously made this observation relation to the differences between Kable and 
Fardon, which; ‘highlights the subtle distinctions that the Gleeson Court is inclined to drawn in its 
constitutional reasoning’. ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power over State Courts’, above n 
128, 25. 
275 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 581 (Deane J). 
276 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 626 [135]. 
277 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 558-60 [133]-[140]. 
 Perhaps more importantly, s 28A was not supported by an overriding 
objective indicating Parliament’s intention to secure a particular outcome in 
individual cases. Thus, looking ‘at the legislation impugned from the standpoint of 
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substance’278 s 28A did not amount to an ‘impermissible legislative direction’ in the 
exercise of judicial power. 279
Conclusion 
 In the circumstances, the remaining discretion was 
sufficient to ensure the fairness of proceedings.  
 
 
This Chapter has attempted to traverse the constitutional principles which limit the 
power of State and territory legislatures to affect the judicial process in State and 
territory courts. It has also attempted to breathe life into these principles by framing 
them within their broader jurisprudential context. Four conclusions emerge from this 
analysis, which are of particular relevance to this thesis.280
First of all, the Kable doctrine has never been applied successfully in respect of a 
purely civil function. Indeed, on only one occasion has Kable even been considered in 
this context.
  
 
281 Of course, the opportunity remains for the High Court to expand the 
incompatibility component of Kable so as to limit the development of novel civil 
procedures. However, ‘the guarantee involved in the vesting of judicial power’ is 
generally considered more important in criminal matters,282 and even Kirby J was 
unwilling to find incompatibility in a civil context were individual liberties were not a 
factor. 283
                                                 
278 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 536 [56]. 
279 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 563 [52]. 
280 Judicial mediation is examined in light of these factors in Chapter 8, below nn 188-214. 
281 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471 
282 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 581 (Deane J). 
283 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471, 531-32 [258]. 
 To the current writer’s knowledge, the only Australian court to have 
considered procedures that are in any way comparable to judicial mediation has been 
the Family Court vis-à-vis the LAT Process, and that Court has twice found those 
procedures to be valid by applying the same principles of statutory interpretation as 
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the High Court.284
Second of all, even if a function is notionally incompatible with institutional integrity, 
State or territory parliaments can simply draft legislation in a manner capable of being 
read down in accordance with the presumption in favour of legislative validity. 
Despite Kirby J’s often strident objections, Bradley, Baker, Fardon, Forge, Gypsy 
Jokers and K-Generation demonstrate that State or territory legislation that vests in 
courts functions that undermine the capacity of a court to ensure fairness in 
proceedings ‘will seldom, if ever, compromise the institutional integrity of the court 
to the extent that it affects that court’s capacity to exercise federal jurisdiction 
impartially and according to federal law’.
 Since the incompatibility doctrine theoretically permits the vesting 
of a wider array of non-judicial functions than the separation doctrine, the Kable 
doctrine is even less likely to impede the development of similar procedures in the 
States and territories.  
 
285
Nevertheless, and for the reasons assayed in the preceding section, it would seem 
preferable to apply an interpretive approach that is sensitive to the differences 
between legislation that increases the procedural discretionary power of judges, on the 
one hand, and legislation that removes of impedes it, on the other. A clear distinction 
 Applying the presumption in favour of 
legislative validity it is almost inconceivable that State or territory legislation which 
purports to increase the discretionary power of a court (as would be necessary to 
implement judicial mediation) would ever be held invalid under the Kable doctrine. 
This will be so even if legislation encompasses an overriding object that ‘essentially 
required’ courts to abandon the adversarial process.  
 
                                                 
284 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365; Crestin v Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420. 
285 Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 601 [41] (McHugh J). 
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in this area would allow the controlled development of novel judicial functions (such 
as judicial mediation), whilst prohibiting the governmental hijacking of judicial 
proceedings. However, Kirby J’s repeated calls to adopt an interpretive mechanism 
which takes account of substance as well as form have gone unheeded, and it seems 
likely that this approach will join His Honour in retirement. This point is reconsidered 
in the concluding Chapter to this thesis. 
 
Thirdly, and despite early indications, the authorities suggest that it may never truly 
have been intention of the High Court to engage in the detailed policing of the 
functions vested in State or territory courts. Kable proceeds from the recognition that 
State Courts may affect the integrity of the federal judiciary. It does not entrench any 
particular view as to how State courts should operate (or how they should be 
constituted). Indeed, the High Court’s continued refusal to provide any general 
criteria of incompatibility and its superficial reliance on the presumption in favour of 
legislative validity make more sense if Kable is itself reconceptualised as a 
component part of a broader integration principle. This broader principle has two 
objects; to limit Parliament’s legislative power vis-à-vis the territories, and to secure 
the effectiveness of the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Kable serves the latter of 
these objects by asserting the power to strike down legislation affecting the judicial 
process in Ch III courts (and by extension other State courts). The Spratt stream 
serves the same object by bringing territory courts within Ch III. These streams were 
connected in Bradley and Baker, at which point the collective object was realised. Of 
course, the importance of High Court’s role would be reinforced if it did actually 
apply and/or expand the incompatibility component of Kable (especially in relation to 
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effective usurpations of judicial power), but this is not essential to the ultimate object 
of integration; what is essential is the possibility that the High Court may apply Kable.  
 
Finally, even if, as seems likely, the Kable doctrine permits the vesting of mediation 
functions in State or territory courts, this does not mean that State or territory courts 
can necessarily mediate. It simply means that a legislative discretion facilitating 
judicial mediation is unlikely to be held invalid by virtue of the Kable doctrine. As 
with Ch III courts what is important (and what will ultimately shape judicial 
mediation in practice) is how that discretion is exercised, and which practices 
appellate courts consider to be within the boundaries of acceptable judicial conduct. 
This question is the subject of the following two Chapters. 
 
Summary of findings: federal, State and territory 
 
The object of Chapters 2 through 6 has been to unpack the requirements of Ch III, in 
order to determine whether, or to what extent, the Constitution imposes limits upon, 
or liberates opportunities for, judicial mediation. These Chapters have isolated a 
number of implications of relevance to the development of judicial mediation in Ch 
III, State and territory Courts.286
                                                 
286 In Chapter 1, judicial mediation was defined as ‘a prehearing process in which an active judge (the 
“judicial-mediator”) attempts to guide opposing parties towards an outcome to which they can both 
assent. The judicial mediation process takes place as part of the formal court process, but does not 
involve the provision of a binding determination by the judicial-mediator’. In Chapter 4 it was 
explained that the fair hearing rule is unlikely to affect judicial mediation as it simply requires that 
parties be given the opportunity to make submissions and to cross-examine witnesses; Bass v 
Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ), and that judicial mediation will not affect this right. It was also explained that 
the ‘demands of open justice apply only to the hearing proper’. Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice: A 
critique of the open trial (2002) 65. 
 The relationship between these implications, and the 
constitutional imperatives (or essential jurisdictions) which inform them, can be 
expressed diagrammatically as follows:   
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The broken arrows connecting the judicial process implication with the 
incompatibility component of the Kable doctrine are intended to reflect the fact that 
the relationship between these concepts remains uncertain.  
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Figure 1: Applicable Ch III Implications 
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While the High Court has frequently justified the implications reflected in Figure 1 by 
recourse to the separation of powers doctrine, and in particular the need to ensure the 
independence of the judiciary because of the role of the High Court in interpreting the 
Constitution, the preceding Chapters demonstrate that it is, ultimately, the need to 
maintain judicial impartiality that lies at the heart of Ch III. Impartiality is the life-
blood of the judicial process implication, the Kable doctrine, and the incompatibility 
condition applied to persona designata appointments. It is this requirement which 
necessitates the constitutional protection of exclusive, inherent, appellate and 
supervisory jurisdiction. This conclusion tallies with what Martin Shapiro has 
described as the ‘logic of the triad’: 
 
The root concept employed here is a simple one of conflict structured in 
triads. Cutting across cultural lines, it appears that whenever two people 
come into a conflict that they cannot themselves solve, one solution 
appealing to common sense is to call upon a third for assistance ... A 
substantial portion of the total behaviour of courts in all societies can be 
analyzed in terms of attempts to prevent the triad from breaking down into 
two against one.287
Judicial independence describes a set of arrangements designed to promote 
and protect the perception of impartial adjudication. The arrangements will 
differ according to the age and the society, and they may be more or less 
  
 
With more specific reference to Australian jurisprudence, Stephen Parker draws upon 
Martin Shapiro’s model to conclude that: 
 
                                                 
287 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and political analysis (1986) 1-2.  
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effective in achieving the ends to which they are directed. The core concept 
with which we should be concerned, however, is perceived impartial 
adjudication. Judicial independence is only a derivative concept which 
describes the conditions designed to preserve such adjudication.288
 
  
 
It follows that the question whether judges can mediate is, in the final analysis, an 
enquiry into whether judicial mediation can be carried out impartially. This 
overarching question is the focus of the following two Chapters.  
                                                 
288 Stephen Parker, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’, in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds) The 
Australian Federal Judicial System (2000), 71. 
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CHAPTER 7  
MEDIATION AND ADJUDICATION:  
A PROCEDURAL CONTINUUM 
 
Two key points emerge from the preceding Chapters. The first point is that the High 
Court has consistently read down legislative provisions affecting judicial procedures 
in favour of validity, and that, applying this approach, statutory provisions or rules of 
court will only be held invalid if they explicitly and unambiguously require a court to 
proceed in a non-judicial manner.1 As a result of this approach, the Kable doctrine has 
been all but erased as a limitation on the functions that may be vested in State or 
territory courts. The second point is that the implications drawn from Ch III may limit 
the development of judicial mediation in Australian courts, but that they will only do 
so to the extent that judicial mediation activates the rule against bias, or undermines 
the requirements of judicial integrity as they apply in a federal or State/territory 
context.2
It follows that, regardless of jurisdiction, two questions must be asked in order to 
determine whether (or to what extent) judicial mediation can be implemented in 
accordance with Ch III. The first question is how, precisely, the power to mediate is, 
or will be, transmitted to courts. (Will the relevant provision/s be introduced by 
statute or in the form or court rules? Will those provisions yield a specific mediation 
process, or will this be left to the discretion of individual judges?). The second 
question is whether, in light of the answer to the first question, judicial mediation can 
 These requirements flow from the need to maintain judicial impartiality. 
 
                                                 
1 See above Chapter 4 nn 212-47, Chapter 6 nn 220-46, and accompanying text. 
2 See above Chapter 4 nn 50-146, 187-209, Chapter 6 nn 169-217, and accompanying text. 
342 
 
 
be exercised in a manner consistent with the rule against bias and the requirements of 
judicial integrity. The answers to these questions will not at once determine whether 
judicial mediation complies with the requirements of Ch III (because the Constitution 
controls what judges can do, not vice versa) but the implications drawn from Ch III 
must be interpreted in light of judicial practice or we risk isolating Ch III 
jurisprudence ‘completely from the social context within which it exists’.3
This Chapter lays the theoretical foundations necessary to answer these questions. The 
Chapter begins by demonstrating that the Australian judicial role has undergone a 
transformation in recent years, and that it is no longer realistic (assuming that it ever 
was) to define what courts and judges ‘do’ by reference to static notions of the 
traditional judicial process. This proposition is developed by returning to the ‘wave’ 
model developed by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth (outlined in Chapter 1), and 
by appraising two overlapping trends which flow from the access to justice movement: 
the integration of ADR and the formal justice system; and the increase in judicial 
control of the civil trial process.
  
 
4
                                                 
3 Judith N Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (1964), 2. This extract was not directed 
at Ch III, but the point expressed is equally applicable in the current context. This point is examined in 
more detail below, nn 262-69. 
4 Tania Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’ (1996) 14 
Australian Bar Review 185, 185. 
 Building on these theoretical foundations it is 
submitted that mediation and adjudication represent theoretical archetypes at 
opposing ends of the same procedural spectrum, with the reality of both lying 
somewhere in between. On this basis, it is argued that the question is not whether 
judicial mediation ‘will’ result in apprehended bias or undermine judicial or 
institutional integrity, but how far towards the mediation end of the procedural 
spectrum judicial conduct can travel before the rule against bias is activated or 
judicial integrity is undermined. 
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In the course of this analysis the likely form and structure of judicial mediation is also 
anticipated by reference to various third-wave reforms, which (to continue the 
metaphor) represent the crest of the third-wave in Australia. A comparative analysis 
of these reforms serves to contextualise how judicial mediation does and/or will 
operate in practice, and further demonstrates that formal definitions can be of limited 
utility as a means of distinguishing between seemingly disparate dispute resolution 
processes. 
 
One final point should be stressed. Frequent reference is made throughout this 
Chapter to the practices and procedures adopted in overseas legal systems; most 
notably the US. These references are not intended to uncover fresh constitutional 
perspectives, or to ground a detailed comparative study of court-connected ADR and 
civil justice trends in the jurisdictions identified. Rather, general comparisons are 
made with these legal systems in order demonstrate general and multi-jurisdictional 
trends in civil justice, irrespective of the constitutional principles controlling those 
trends. In addition, the theoretical approach adopted in this Chapter to the relationship 
between mediation and adjudication is rooted in American theory, and specific 
reference is therefore made to US judicial practice on this basis. Again, however, 
these references should not be interpreted as an attempt to import and apply the 
substantive findings of overseas research in an Australian context. 
 
The Integration of ADR and the Formal Justice System 
 
Earlier it was noted that common law countries have accommodated ADR 
mechanisms at the periphery of the formal court system for years (notably through the 
344 
 
 
regulation of arbitration). 5  It was also pointed out that the taxonomy of ADR 
processes is imprecise, 6  and that various methodological approaches have been 
adopted in an attempt to delineate between dispute resolution models.7 One of the 
approaches identified involves classifying processes according to whether they are 
facilitative, evaluative or determinative in nature.8
The ‘alternative’ quality attributed to ADR reflects an early tendency to define ADR 
processes ‘in contradistinction – sometimes in opposition to – litigation and the 
formal justice system’.
 Although in practice models will 
frequently exhibit features from more than one category, this approach provides a 
useful framework for analysis. 
 
9 To an extent this tendency persists, and ADR mechanisms are 
commonly employed as a result of perceived deficiencies in formal litigation; the 
objectives being, inter alia, reduced costs, speedier resolutions, increased disputant 
satisfaction, community cohesion, relationship transformation, and accessibility.10 In 
reality, however, it has probably always been inaccurate to classify ADR processes as 
alternatives to adjudication.11 This is partly because adjudication ‘has always been an 
exceptional way of dealing with disputes’12
                                                 
5 See above Chapter 2 nn 51-76 and accompanying text. 
6 Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2005), 4-6; Hillary Astor and 
Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, (2nd ed, 2002), 135; Tania Sourdin, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (2005), 26; David Spencer and Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and Practice 
(2006), 4. 
7 See above Chapter 1 nn 5-21 and accompanying text. 
8 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute Resolution Terms (AGPS, 
Canberra, September 2003), 4. 
9 Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, 3-6. 
10 Boulle, above n 6, 69-74. See above Chapter 1 nn 69-99. 
11 Boulle, above n 6, 139. ADR proponents have sought to redefine the ADR acronym as ‘assisted’ or 
‘additional’ dispute resolution. The ‘alternative’ designation has now ‘passed so firmly into common 
parlance’, however, that these efforts have been largely ineffective (Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, (n. 
1)). 
12 Boulle, above n 6, 139. See also David Weisbrot, ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System and Economic 
Growth: Australian Experience’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 235, 245; Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Civil Justice Reform: Report, Report No 98 (2008) [6.53].  
 (as illustrated in Chapter 1), and partly 
because, in practice, courts and/or judges will often engage in processes commonly 
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associated with these supposed alternatives. The latter proposition is exemplified by 
the development of court-connected and court-integrated ADR.13
Court-Connected ADR 
  
 
 
The origins of modern ADR in ‘western industrialised societies’ are often traced to 
the development of neighbourhood justice centres in the early late 1960’s and early 
1970’s, 14  but the proliferation of court-connected ADR (in the sense referred to 
here)15 began in earnest following the Pound Conference in 1976.16 In the US, the 
Federal Court became the first appellate court to introduce court-connected mediation 
in 1981. The ‘Pre-Argument Conference’ was a confidential mediation service 
provisioned by ‘staff mediators,’17 and according to Robert Rack, today ‘every federal 
circuit court except the Federal Circuit has a mediation program’.18 In Canada, by 
way of contrast, it was not until the 1990’s that the provinces of Ontario19, Alberta20 
and Manitoba21
                                                 
13 The term ‘court-connected’ is adopted here as a reference to all ADR services or processes 
specifically referred to or operated by the courts, and as a sub-category of ‘court-associated’ ADR, 
which includes all forms of ADR (including private negotiation) associated with the formal court 
system. Tania Sourdin draws a further distinction between ‘court-connected ADR’ and ‘court-
integrated ADR’, the latter of which she defines as an ‘integration strategy...involving judicial and 
quasi-judicial officers within courts and tribunals using ADR processes to resolve and manage disputes 
(processes may vary from settlement conferences, mediation or concurrent evidence approaches)’. 
Tania Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’ (2004) Law In Context 64, 66. Court-integrated ADR is 
considered in the following section, under the heading ‘increased judicial control of the trial process’. 
14 Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, 5; Boulle, above n 6, 57 – 59, 287; Judge Dorothy Wright Nelson 
‘ADR in the Federal Courts - One Judge's Perspective: Issues and Challenges Facing Judges, Lawyers, 
Court Administrators, and the Public’ (2001) 17(1) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 1, 2. 
15 Above n 13. 
16 Jeffrey Stempel ‘Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multidoor Courthouse at Twenty: Fait 
Accumpli; Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood’ (1996) 11 Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 297, 309; Wright Nelson, above n 14, 1. 
17 Robert Rack, ‘Thoughts of a Chief Circuit Mediator on Federal Court-connected Mediation’ (2002) 
17 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 609, 609-10. 
18 Ibid 610. 
19 Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, r 24, Regulation 194. 
20 Mediation Rules of the Provincial Court, Civil Division for Alberta, 1997. 
21 The Queen’s Bench (Mediation) Amendment Act SS 1994 c.9. 
 introduced procedural amendments requiring parties in certain actions 
to attend mandatory mediation subsequent to filing. The institutionalisation of 
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mediation has occurred even more recently in England and Wales, following the 
introduction of a non-mandatory ADR referral scheme in 1999.22 The English Court 
of Appeal has since introduced a voluntary court-connected mediation scheme, and 
similar programs are, or have been, trialled in the Central London, Leeds, Manchester, 
Reading and Exeter County Courts. Court-connected mediation has also been trialled 
in Scotland in the Edinburgh Sherriff Court.23
Compared to Canada and the UK, the expansion of court-connected ADR in Australia 
is at a relatively advanced stage, and it is not uncommon (unlike court-connected 
ADR in the UK) for referral to be mandatory.
  
 
24 Whether mediation can or should ever 
be mandatory is a complex and contentious issue, 25  but as shown in Chapter 8, 
judicial mediation is unlikely to be mandatory in any event. 26
                                                 
22 Following the recommendation of Lord Woolf (Lord Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report 
(1996)), disputants in England and Wales must now follow pre-action protocols in certain instances, 
and may face cost orders if they do not. Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales), r 44.3(a)). 
Judges may also encourage parties to attend ADR during a preliminary case management conference 
(Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales), s 1.4(2)(e). 
23 Elaine Samuel, Supporting Court Users: the In-court, (2002).  
24 In NSW, for example, s 26 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 provides that if ‘it considers the 
circumstances appropriate, the court may, by order, refer any proceedings before it, or part of any such 
proceedings, for mediation by a mediator, and may do so either with or without the consent of the 
parties to the proceedings concerned’. See also: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rr 323, 334; 
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O29A, r 3(2) (j) – (k); Supreme Court General Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (Vic), s 50.07 (1); Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), reg 518; Supreme Court 
Rules (NT) s 48.13; Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), r 11.01; Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as 
amended) O 10, r 1(2)(a)(xx); Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, reg 27.01. See, in contrast, 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 220, which states that the ‘power to appoint a mediator is not 
to be exercised by a Master without the consent of the parties affected by the proposed mediation’. 
25 See for example, Laurence Boulle, above n 6, 23-28; Bobette Wolski, ‘Voluntariness and 
Consensuality: Defining Characteristics of Mediation?’ (1997) 15(3) Australian Bar Review 213; Nadja 
Alexander, ‘Mediation on Trial: Ten Verdicts on Court-related ADR’, in Tania Sourdin, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and the Courts (2004), 8; Magdalena McIntosh, ‘A step forward – mandatory 
mediations’ (2003) 14 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 280. 
26 See below Chapter 8 nn 9-31 and accompanying text. 
 John Wade has 
described the introduction of court-connected ADR in Australia (and in particular 
court-connected mediation) as a ‘legislative avalanche’ that began in the early 1980’s 
with the Community Justice Centres (Pilot Projects) Act 1980 (NSW), and notes that 
by 1998, in Queensland alone, there were some 28 Acts or Regulations providing for 
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court-connected ADR (and mediation in particular).27 In 1999, the Council of Chief 
Justices of Australia and New Zealand adopted the Declaration of Principles on Court 
Annexed Mediation, which states, inter alia, that mediation ‘is an integral part of the 
courts adjudicative processes and the ‘shadow of the court’ promotes resolution’.28 
Court-connected ADR remains an integral feature of Australian litigation at the State, 
territory and federal level, and is typically ordered (or encouraged) by judges or 
registrars as an aspect of case management.29
The contextual relevance of court-connected ADR to judicial mediation is obvious 
(because mediation is usually classified an ADR process) but, as explained in the 
preceding Chapters, it is only when judges are themselves engaged in the provision of 
such processes that the relevant implications of Ch III are enlivened. To what extent, 
then, has the advent of court-connected ADR actually affected the way in which 
Australian judges carry out their judicial functions, either during prehearing or at trial? 
There does not appear to have been any specific research undertaken on this point. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that Australian judges can and do engage in 
processes more commonly associated with ADR than adjudication, and that this may 
occur at various stages of the litigation process. This research is examined in detail 
later in this Chapter.
   
 
30
                                                 
27 John Wade, “Current Trends and Models in Dispute Resolution, Part II”, (1998) 9 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 59, 61. 
28 Council of Chief Justices Australia and New Zealand Council of Chief Justices: Position Paper and 
Declaration of Principle on Court-connected Mediation (1999). 
29 See above n 24. 
30 See especially, Annesley DeGaris, ‘The Role of Federal Court Judges in the Settlement of Disputes’ 
(1994) 13 University of Tasmania Law Review 217. 
 The following section demonstrates that there is an inherent 
overlap between court-connected mediation and prehearing conferences (including 
directions hearings and settlement/conciliation conferences). This overlap is widely 
acknowledged in the US, where settlement conferences often amount to a form of 
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judicial mediation in practice. Building upon this analysis, this Chapter demonstrates 
that the Australian judicial role has also been transformed since the onset of case 
management, and through the provision of prehearing conferences in particular.  
 
Increased judicial control of the civil trial process 
 
Legal scholars and practitioners are in general agreement that, parallel to the increase 
in court-connected ADR, there has been a multi-jurisdictional trend towards greater 
judicial control over the civil trial process.31
A general conclusion seems justified for both civil and common law 
jurisdictions: that behind and beyond the many remaining differences, 
powerful and multi-faceted converging trends are gaining momentum … and 
that at the origin of these converging trends there is a common need to 
entrust more law-making responsibilities to the judges than was the case in 
other times … [I]t is generally recognized that one feature common to many 
modern societies has been a tremendous growth of the judicial power … [the 
two principle components of which are] … the administrative procedural 
component and the substantive one’.
 One of the earliest and most authoritative 
formulations of this trend was provided by Mauro Cappelletti:  
 
32
                                                 
31 See generally: Marc Galanter, ‘The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’ (1986) 
69 Judicature 257; Judith Resnik, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication: A Glimpse at 
Changes in the US’(Paper prepared for the Litigation Reform Commission Conference Civil Justice, 
Reform: Streamlining the Process, 1996, Brisbane); Ipp, ‘Judicial Intervention in the Trial Process’ 
(1995) 69 The Australian Law Journal 365; Adrian Zuckerman, `Justice in crisis: Comparative 
dimensions of civil procedure' in Adrian Zuckerman (ed) Civil justice in crisis: Comparative 
perspectives of civil procedure (1999); Hugh F. Landerkin and Andrew J Pirie, ‘Judges as Mediators: 
What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?’ (2003) 82(2) Canadian Bar Review 
249. 
32 Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989), 56-61.  
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The continuing poignancy of this proposition is demonstrated throughout the 
following analysis. The extent to which judges can or should actually ‘make law’, 
however, as opposed to merely interpreting it, is the subject of a classic (and ongoing) 
jurisprudential debate dominated by two broad and conflicting schools of thought: 
‘legalism’ 33  and ‘legal realism’. 34
                                                 
33 Legalism (or ‘legal formalism’ in US idiom) defends the traditional view that the determination of 
disputes by reference to non-legal or political factors (referred to in the pejorative as ‘judicial activism’) 
is antithetical to the judicial process, and that the rule of law, the separation of powers and stare decisis 
restrict the judicial role to the interpretation and incremental expansion of existing legal principles. 
‘Activist’ judges, legalists argue, are guilty of ‘wilfully distorting the Constitution’, (Greg Craven, ‘The 
High Court of Australia: A Study in the Abuse of Power’ (1999) 22 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 216, 217) politicising the judicial function, and blurring the (un-drawn) line between the 
legitimate progression of the common law and the usurpation of legislative power. The foundations of 
formalism are typically attributed to the writings of Christopher Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the 
Law of Contract (2nd ed, 1879), and were initially brought to life (ironically) by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ trenchant criticisms of Langdell’s ‘abstract’ legal reasoning, in The Common Law (1881) and 
‘The Path of Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457. Legalism represented the orthodoxy of the 
High Court prior to the Mason CJ era, and reflects the view held by the majority of the current High 
Court. See Jason Pierce, Inside the Mason Court Revolution (2006), 109. 
34 Proponents of legal realism argue that strict legalism embraces the ‘phantasy of a perfect, consistent, 
legal uniformity’, (Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930), 253) that judges must often make 
value judgments between competing outcomes, and that judicial decisions cannot be immunised from 
political considerations. Legal realism reflects a number of related movements in sociological 
jurisprudence, including American realism (in particular Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, 
Benjamin Cardozo, Wesley Hohfield, Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank) Scandinavian realism (see, eg, 
Axel Hägerström, Philosophy and Religion, (1964)) and critical legal theory (see, eg, Roberto Unger, 
‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561)). The common object of 
these movements is the empirical study of law and legal practice ‘as it is’, as opposed to how 
(according to strict legal doctrine) ‘it should be’. The High Court during the Mason CJ era was 
commonly identified as being predominantly ‘realist’ (or alternatively, by its critics, of being highly 
activist). According to Jason Pierce, ‘the aim of appellate litigation [in Mason CJ’s High Court] moved 
away from emphasizing dispute resolution toward a public model, in which High Court litigation [was] 
conceived as both a legal and political exercise’. Jason L. Pierce, ibid 145. 
 As judicial mediation does not result in a 
determination, however, and does not therefore affect the content of substantive laws, 
it is the procedural component of judicial power with which the current examination 
is concerned. Subsequent analyses of the trend towards greater judicial control of the 
trial process (at least within common law jurisdictions) have tended to focus on this 
aspect of the judicial function as opposed to the law-making powers of judges in a 
substantive sense. Adrian Zuckerman, for example, has recognised: 
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A general tendency towards judicial control of the civil process. Both 
common law countries and civil law countries display a shift towards the 
imposition of a stronger control by judges over the progress of civil 
litigation … The USA has been leading the trend amongst common law 
countries. A culture of managerial judges is now well established there. In 
England and Australia the move towards judicial control is more recent, but 
it is equally dramatic.35
Theoretical approach to analysis: the American experience 
 
 
For Adrian Zuckerman, therefore, the primary evidence of a shift towards greater 
judicial control of the trial process is the growth of case management. This 
phenomenon has been developing in the US for decades (discussed immediately 
below), and it is largely through the expansion of case management practices (and the 
prior development of settlement conferencing) that the procedural boundaries between 
ADR and traditional litigation in the US have been eroded. The following section 
reviews the primary commentaries and empirical studies which support this 
hypothesis in a US context. These materials, and the process of change in American 
courts (both State and federal), provide the theoretical approach by which the 
relationship between mediation and adjudication in Australia is examined later in this 
Chapter. 
 
 
Professor Galanter has distinguished between ‘two recurrent themes [the ‘warm’ 
theme and the ‘cool’ theme] which impel and justify judicial involvement in the 
                                                 
35 Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Justice in crisis: Comparative dimensions of civil procedure’, above n 31, 47-48.  
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settlement process’. 36  The warm theme emphasises the perceived qualitative and 
social benefits of conciliation and settlement vis-à-vis adversarialism. 37  The cool 
theme, in contrast, ‘emphasizes not a more admirable process but efficient 
institutional management’.38
It is uncontroversial to state that the ‘USA has been leading the way amongst common 
law countries’ in the judicial promotion of settlement (the warm theme).
 These themes are adopted in this section to distinguish 
between the development of settlement conferencing (the warm theme), on the one 
hand, and the subsequent development of case management (the cold theme), on the 
other. 
 
39 However, 
and as noted later in this Chapter the option (or obligation) to seek settlement has a 
long history in certain civil law countries, and settlement conferences in common law 
systems may initially have developed in response to the perceived benefits of 
Continental style settlement models.40
In the 1920s, that court had devised procedures for untangling a chancery 
docket congested by mechanic’s liens (produced by the 1920s building boom) 
and had extended them to mortgage foreclosures after the 1929 crash. In 
August 1930, those procedures were extended to the law side and a 
“Conciliation Docket” was set up.
 According to Marc Galanter, the first US Court 
to adopt ‘something like a settlement conference’ was the Circuit Court of Wayne 
County, Michigan: 
 
41
                                                 
36 Marc Galanter, ‘The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’, above n 31, 257. 
37 Ibid 257. 
38 Ibid. The relationship between qualitative and quantitative justice is examined in Chapter 1, above nn 
159-81 and accompanying text. 
39 Ibid 258. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Marc Galanter, ‘The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’, above n 36, 258. 
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The ‘Conciliation Docket’ developed in Wayne County (which, it is worth 
emphasising, was a direct response to a perceived overburdening of the courts) was 
reciprocated in various other US jurisdictions before prehearing conferences were 
federalised by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.42
The US has also led the way in the development of case management (the cool 
theme).
  
 
43  Amongst other things, case management systems have embraced pre-
existing settlement/conciliation conference models and retuned them with a view to 
increasing quantitative efficiency. In an early and influential article on the topic, 
Judith Resnik wrote critically of the transformation of US judges into ‘mediators, 
negotiators, and planners – as well as adjudicators,’44 and argued that the increasing 
case management role of judges (which, in Judith Resnik’s view, focussed on 
quantitative efficiency to the exclusion of qualitative justice) 45  threatened the 
foundations of the adversarial system.46 Whatever opinions are held regarding the 
merits of managerial judging or the judicial promotion of settlement, however, 
commentators generally agree that there has been a ‘move by [US] judges into 
mediator forms and functions and beyond solely adjudicative tasks’.47
                                                 
42 Mark Galanter, ‘A settlement judge, not a trial judge: judicial mediation in the United States’ (1985) 
12(1) Journal of Law and Society 1, 2. 
43 Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, 238. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’ (Paper 
presented at the 17th AIJA Annual Conference, Adelaide, 7 August 1999) 4. 
44 According to Judith Resnik, managerial ‘judges frequently work beyond the public view, off the 
record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of reach of appellate review’. 
Judith Resnik ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982-83) 96 Harvard Law Review 374, 378. 
45 Ibid 422. 
46 Ibid 445.  
47 Landerkin and Pirie, above n 31, 250. Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Process Trends’, above n 4, 187. 
 If these views 
are correct, then it is simply no longer possible (assuming it ever was) to define 
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mediation and adjudication in the US in dichotomous terms. Marc Galanter drew this 
conclusion as long ago as 1985, observing that,   
 
on the contemporary American scene at any rate, the negotiated settlement of 
civil cases is not a marginal phenomenon; it is not an innovation; it is not 
some unusual alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say 
that it is litigation. There are not two distinct processes, negotiation and 
litigation; there is a single process of disputing in the vicinity of official 
tribunals that might fancifully be called LITIGOTIATION.48
Marc Galanter has repeated this proposition on a number of occasions in the years 
since,
  
 
49 and was one of the first commentators to suggest that the judicial function can 
be represented on an ‘adjudication matrix’. 50  This matrix suggests ‘a series of 
contrasts and polarities’ between adjudicative processes, which ‘represent points on a 
set of continua’.51
The conclusions drawn by the US commentators cited above reflect primary research, 
which indicates that a high proportion of US judges (State and federal) have adopted 
facilitative and evaluative techniques for some time. In 1980, John Paul Ryan, Allan 
Ashman, Bruce D Sales and Sandra Shane-Dubow surveyed in excess of 2500 State 
 The final section of this Chapter draws upon this model in order to 
construct a ‘procedural continuum’; representing the relationship between mediation 
and adjudication in the Australian judicial function.  
 
                                                 
48 Mark Galanter, ‘A settlement judge, not a trial judge: judicial mediation in the United States’, above 
n 42, 1. 
49 See especially: Marc Galanter, ‘The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’, above 
n 36;  Marc Galanter and Maria Cahill, ‘“Most Cases Settle” Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements’ (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1339. 
50 Galanter, ‘Adjudication, Litigation and Related Phenomena’, in Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler 
(eds), Law and Social Sciences (1986), 151. 
51 Ibid 153. 
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trial judges. They reported that nearly 70% intervened subtly ‘through the use of 
cues/suggestions’, more than 10 percent intervened by applying ‘direct pressure’, and 
that less than 22% considered themselves to be non-interventionist.52 It is necessary 
to point out, however, that the accuracy of this survey data has since been brought 
into question, both for its failure to adequately define terms (such as ‘direct 
pressure’)53 and because the phrasing of the survey questions may have suggested to 
participants that it was confined to settlement conferences (as opposed to the 
litigation process more generally).54
One critic of this study, Herbert Kritzer, conducted a separate survey of federal court 
judges and lawyers in 1982 on behalf of the Civil Litigation Research Project 
(established by the Universities of Wisconsin and South Carolina). He found 
‘substantial variations in the level of intensity,’
  
 
55 but concluded that while ‘judges do 
presently tend to intervene in the nonadjudicative aspects of case processing, [they do 
not do so] in an intensive manner’.56
                                                 
52 John Paul Ryan et al, The American Trial Judge (1980) 177. 
53 Herbert Kritzer, ‘The judges’ role in pre-trial case process’ (1982) 66 Judicature 28, 30. 
54 Galanter and Cahill, “Most Cases Settle’, above n 49, 1342 (n 180).   
55 Ibid. 
56 Kritzer, above n 53, 35.  
 The federal context of the study makes direct 
comparison with John Paul Ryan et al’s study of State trial judges difficult. While 
Herbert Kritzer uncovered less evidence of ‘high intensity’ intervention than John 
Paul Ryan et al, however, both of these studies reported high levels of low intensity 
(or ‘subtle’) interventions. Both accounts therefore support Marc Galanter’s 
suggestion that judicial practice can be plotted on an ‘adjudication matrix’. What 
differs is where on the various continua comprising that matrix these studies would 
have placed the practice of US State and federal judges respectively in the early 
1980’s.  
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One final study deserves mention. In a series of papers published in the early 1980’s, 
James Wall, Lawrence Schiller, and Ronald Ebert surveyed lawyers and judges 
operating at the US State and Federal level to ascertain which settlement techniques 
were commonly employed by judges during prehearing,57 whether those techniques 
were considered ethical by lawyers and judges,58 and how successful lawyers and 
judges considered each of those techniques to be in promoting settlement. 59 The 
survey identified some 71 techniques in total, including suggesting that parties ‘split 
the difference’, ‘channelling discussion to areas which have the highest probability of 
settlement’, and setting ‘inexorable trial dates to raise pressure’.60 The authors also 
identified various evaluative techniques (such as pointing out to a party ‘the strengths 
and weaknesses of his case’).61
Assuming that US judges have not become less interventionist in the period since the 
aforementioned studies were conducted, it may reasonably be concluded that US 
judges engage in facilitative settlement techniques prior to and during the final 
hearing. As explained in Chapter 1, the classic mediation model is purely facilitative 
in nature, and theoretically involves similar facilitative techniques to those identified 
by Wall et al, and/or the ‘low intensity’ interventions identified by Herbert Kritzer. If 
these studies are accurate, then a facilitative model of judicial mediation is generally 
consistent with US judicial practice. While the research suggests that US judges are 
  
 
                                                 
57 James A. Wall and Lawrence F Schiller, ‘Judicial Settlement Techniques’ (1981) 5 American 
Journal of Trial Advocacy 39. 
58 James A. Wall and Lawrence F Schiller, ‘Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial Settlement: A Judge is 
Not a Bump on a Log’ (1982) 6 American Journal of Trial Advocacy 27.  
59 James A. Wall, Lawrence F Schiller and Ronald J. Ebert, ‘Should Judges Grease the Slow Wheels of 
Justice? A Survey on the Effectiveness of Judicial Mediation Techniques’ (1984) 8 American Journal 
of Trial Advocacy 83. 
60 Ibid 96-100. 
61 Ibid. The authors referred to all of these techniques as ‘settlement techniques’, but were referring 
primarily to the object of intervention, as opposed to the nature of that intervention. 
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generally less inclined to engage in evaluative processes during settlement, it also 
indicates ‘an expansive range of approaches to settlement work by judges,’62
The settlement conference process as I usually manage it bears little 
resemblance to classic mediation (facilitative or transformative). Structurally 
(not in fact or philosophically), I am at the centre and the parties are not. 
Instead of the parties assuming the primary roles in the mechanics of the 
process and accepting primary responsibility for the course, character, and 
outcome of the proceedings, I take up much of this space ... And, in the 
private caucuses, I talk too soon and too much. I interrupt. I often direct the 
subject-matter course of the discussions. Sometimes I interact more with the 
lawyers than with their clients. I do not devote a lot of effort to searching for 
subtle underlying interests or needs. But I do try to identify what is most 
important to the parties – which, much more often than not in judicially 
hosted settlement conferences, is money. And most of the time in our 
negotiating sessions we are attending to (or at least looking repeatedly over 
our shoulders at) two 800 pound gorillas: the evidence and the law.
 and it is 
apparent that a number of US judges do intervene in such a manner. Indeed, 
Californian Federal Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has stated candidly that: 
 
63
In summary, the US literature reveals a considerable variation in judicial practice, and 
demonstrates that what American judges do cannot be wholly conceptualised within 
the rubric of ‘determinative’ functions. The impression of scholars and jurists alike is 
 
 
                                                 
62 Wayne Brazil, ‘Professionalism and Misguided Negotiating’, in Andrea Schneider and Christopher 
Honeyman (eds), The Negotiator’s Fieldbook: The Desk Reference for the Experienced Negotiator 
(2006) 697, 699. ‘Magistrate judges’ are appointed under Title 28 of the United States Code and 
exercise powers delegated to them by District Court judges. 
63 Wayne Brazil, above n 62.  
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that there has been a general migration towards facilitative and evaluative 
interventions.  
 
To what extent, then, as Adrian Zuckerman states, has the move toward judicial 
control of the trial process been equally as ‘dramatic’ in Australia? Is it also possible 
to plot Australian judicial practices on an adjudication matrix? In the remainder of 
this Chapter it is argued that the answer to both of these questions is ‘yes’, but that the 
process of change does not appear to have shifted the boundaries of acceptable 
practice quite as far in Australia as it has in the US. This is significant because the 
implications drawn by the High Court from Ch III reflect flexible concepts such as 
due process and inherent jurisdiction, which are applied in accordance with 
contemporary mores.64
What do Australian judges do? 
 
 
 
The process of procedural reform in Australia has been well documented.65
While the core functions discharged by the judiciary remain intact, the 
manner in which those functions are discharged has been transformed.  
Moreover, the transformation has occurred over a very brief period of time.  
The courts have responded to insistent demands for greater “access to 
justice” by accepting responsibility for tasks that would have seemed alien to 
 According 
to Justice Ronald Sackville, for example: 
 
                                                 
64 See below nn 259-63 and accompanying text. 
65 Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin state that in ‘the 1990’s a plethora of initiatives in state and 
federal courts progressively introduced measures designed to increase further court control over the 
progress of cases with the objectives of reducing backlogs and delays. Australian courts followed those 
in the United States (US) that had moved earlier towards a more activist role for judges and where 
judges were increasingly willing to direct the progress of cases’. Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, 238.  
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the judicial role only two or three decades ago. Indeed the extent of change 
has been such that its significance is not fully appreciated within the 
judiciary itself.66
It is difficult to authoritatively establish a trend towards greater judicial control of the 
civil trial process in Australia (because the historical data is insufficient to accurately 
determine how past judges have carried out their judicial functions), but whether there 
has truly been a transformation of the judicial function or not, there is sufficient 
empirical and anecdotal evidence to conclude that Australian judges now engage in 
techniques commonly associated with mediation. As in the US, the adoption of these 
techniques has (ostensibly) been made possible by the introduction of case 
management systems and the development of settlement conferencing. More recently, 
legislatures have also introduced ‘less adversarial trials’ in certain jurisdictions, which 
might be viewed as an expansion upon case management principles, and which 
involve a ‘blending’ of adversarial and inquisitorial techniques.
 
 
67
                                                 
66 Sackville, ‘From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the Judicial Role’, 
above n 66, 1. Tania Sourdin has also stated that it ‘is beyond dispute that courts now practice a form 
of judicial management that would have been unimaginable in earlier years. Indeed, the trend towards 
the adoption of judicial management techniques and ADR processes has been viewed as somewhat 
urgent and necessary by many courts. As one judge as remarked: “Unless that trend continues and 
further reforms are adopted, the legal system as practised in Australia, and in other countries with a 
similar jurisprudential foundation, is likely to collapse.”’ Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’, above n 4, 187, citing Justice James Wood, ‘Litigation 
Through the 1900s: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Case Management’ (Paper presented at the 
International Legal Conference, Whistler, Canada, January 1993), 3. The proposition that common law 
systems are or were in danger of ‘collapse’ is addressed in Chapter 1. At that stage it was concluded 
that this proposition is probably an overstatement, but that substantial improvements may nevertheless 
be made. 
67 Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’, above n 13, 77. 
 The following 
section examines these developments in detail, and demonstrates that, in reality, the 
precise nature of these processes has more to do with what judges perceive their role 
in the settlement process to be, than it does any rigid structural distinction between the 
rules supporting them.  
359 
 
 
 
Case management 
 
Two important preliminary points should be made about case management in 
Australia. The first point is that case management has been developed largely by the 
Australian judiciary itself.68 This is in contrast with other common law countries (and 
the UK in particular)69 where case management is the product of (relatively recent) 
legislative action, or a response to external scrutiny.70 The second point is that case 
management has been a sine qua non of the Australian civil trial process for some 
time.71
Some form of case management has always existed. The question for 
decision by each court [therefore] is who should assume the responsibility for 
management, when it should apply to any particular case, and what form or 
forms it should take.
 As Justice Wood has observed: 
 
72
In part, the judicial development of case management in Australia can be attributed to 
the (federal) introduction of judicial self governance in 1979,
 
 
73
                                                 
68 Pierce, above n 33, 13.  
69 Peter Sallmann and Richard Wright, ‘Going to Court: A Discussion Paper on Civil Justice in Victoria 
(Civil Justice Review Project (1999)), 67-68. 
70 Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘Courts in Transition: An Australian View’ (Paper presented at the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal/High Court Judges and Masters Conference, Mt Ruapehu, 20 – 23 March 
2003), 15. Justice Sackville states that: ‘In contrast to the United Kingdom, case management has not 
generally been imposed on the courts in consequence of recommendations by external bodies, such as 
independent reviews of the judicial system, but has been implemented by the courts themselves over a 
long period of time’. See also, Sallmann and Wright, ibid. 
71 Justice Ronald Sackville. ‘Some Thoughts on Access to Justice’ (Paper presented to the First Annual 
Conference on the Primary Functions of Government, Wellington, November 2003), 14; Chief Justice 
Murray Gleeson, ‘Managing Justice in the Australian context’ (2000) 77 Reform 62, 64. 
72 Justice James Wood, ‘The changing face of case management: the New South Wales experience’ 
(1995) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 121, 123. Justice Wood went on to express his belief that it 
‘cannot be gainsaid that case management challenges established work practices and beliefs and calls 
for a fundamental change in the judicial role’. 
73 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth). 
 which saw the 
360 
 
 
legislative transfer of ‘responsibility for the administration of the High Court from the 
Attorney-General’s Department to the Court itself’. 74 Similar legislation has since 
granted self-governance to the majority of State and federal courts,75 although (as 
explained below) the Federal Court has effectively practised case management since 
its inception in any event.76 One outcome of self-governance is that Australian courts 
are able to determine for themselves how best to balance the interests of individual 
justice and the availability of resources. In fact, and as was explained in Chapter 4, 
Australian courts have always enjoyed an element of self-governance in procedural 
matters through the exercise of incidental or inherent jurisdiction. Thus, although the 
courts may now have more direct control over their finances, self-governance was not 
an essential pre-requisite to the development of case management. The important 
point, though, is that the development of case management is more readily attributable 
to judicial pragmatism in the face of wide-spread concerns regarding excessive delays 
in litigation,77 than it is to direct judicial reform by government. 78 State and federal 
parliaments may have provided the courts with broad case management objectives, 
but it is the courts themselves that have developed case management in practice.79
                                                 
74 Sackville, ‘From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the Judicial Role’, 
above n 66, 8.  
75 The Courts and Tribunals Administration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) granted self governance to the 
Family Court, Federal Court and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. See also the States Courts 
Administration Act 1993 (SA). 
76 Justice Bryan Beaumont, ‘Managing litigation in the Federal Court’ in Brian Opeskin and Fiona 
Wheeler (eds) The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000), 163. 
77 Sallmann and Wright, above n 69, 67; Sackville, ‘Courts in Transition: An Australian View’ above n 
70, 16-17.  
78 Pierce, above n 33, suggests that case management can be attributed to the activism of a ‘group of 
entrepreneurial High Court judges’ during the Mason CJ era. However, it might also be argued that it 
resulted from a period of judicial policy making spearheaded by Brennan CJ.  
79 This conclusion must be qualified. The general principles espoused by case management are also 
evident in various over-arching statutes, including the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which provides judges 
with wide-ranging discretions in relation to the admission, timing and presentation of evidence. Section 
26 of the Evidence Act, for example, allows the Court to ‘make such orders as it considers just, in 
relation to: (a) the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and (b) the production and use of 
documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and (c) the order in which 
parties may question a witness; and (d) the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with 
the questioning of witnesses’.  
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This observation adds strength to the conclusion drawn in Chapter 8; that judicial 
mediation is likely to develop principally within the incidental/inherent jurisdiction of 
the courts. 
 
What is case management? 
 
Case management is an umbrella term for a variety of approaches ‘to the control of 
litigation in which the court assumes responsibility for the progress of cases through 
pre-trial stages’.80
• Court supervision and control from filing to disposition 
 Certain features of case management are common to all systems. 
The American Bar Association (ABA), for example, has stated seven ‘necessary 
ingredients’ of case management: 
 
• Time and clearance standards for overall disposition 
• Times for conclusion of critical steps in litigation, including things like 
discovery 
• Early identification of long or otherwise potentially problematic cases 
• Trial setting policy which schedules an appropriate number of cases to 
ensure the efficient use of judge time, while minimising the need to re-
fix cases as a result of over scheduling 
• Commencement of trials on the original date scheduled with adequate 
advance notice 
• Firm consistent adjournment policies81
 
 
                                                 
80 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (3rd ed, 2004), 63. 
81 American Bar Association Judicial Administration Division, Standards Relating to Trial Courts, 
(1992). See also, Maureen Solomon and Douglas Somerlot, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court: 
Now and for the Future (1987); Wood, ‘The changing face of case management: the New South Wales 
experience’, above n 72, 3. 
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While there is general agreement as to the underlying features of case management, 
however, it ‘has always been acknowledged that each jurisdiction, and often each 
individual court, must make its own arrangements based upon the particular needs of 
the jurisdiction or court in question’.82 There are, consequently, various models of 
case management in operation in Australia and internationally, ‘which may involve 
judges and/or other court officials such as masters or registrars controlling the 
progress of litigation from the time of commencement’. 83  According to Peter 
Sallmann and Richard Wright, models vary in terms of the ‘type and level of court 
supervision involved’, ‘the method of listing cases’, and in the ‘streaming of cases’.84 
Various overarching case management techniques and philosophies have also passed 
in and out of favour (or ignominy) 85  over the years, including ‘individualised 
justice,’ 86  ‘differential case management’ 87  (DCM) and, more recently, 
‘proportionality’.88
An increasingly popular model of case management internationally is the individual 
docket system (‘IDS’), whereby each case is assigned to a single judge from 
commencement to disposition.
 
 
89
                                                 
82 Sallmann and Wright, above n 69, 72. 
83 Justice Robert French, ‘Managerial Judging in the Federal Court’ (2005) 32(8) BRIEF 5, 7. 
84 Sallmann and Wright, above n 69, 72-73. 
85 DCM was criticised by the President of the NSW law society who argued, inter alia, that it would 
increase the costs of litigation. See Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Process Trends’, above n 4, 192; Jeremy Badgery-Barker and Joanne Harrison, ‘A short way down the 
track: differential case management in the Supreme Court’ (1995) 33(5) Law Society Journal 34. 
86 Patrick Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism, (1978); Chief Justice Murray Gleeson 
‘Individualised justice -- The holy grail’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 421, 430. 
87 See, eg: Valerie Simmons, ‘Differentiated Case Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution – 
TheWestern District’s Plan to Reduce Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation’ (1993) 72 Michigan Bar 
Journal 1010; Tania Sourdin states that in ‘Australia, the movement towards differential or 
differentiated case management although not driven by any edict has been driven by the truism “justice 
delayed is justice denied.”’ Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process 
Trends’, above n 4, 192. 
88 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A review of the federal civil justice system, 
ALRC Report No 89 (2000), [1.95]. 
89 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 88, 78. 
 IDS can be contrasted with the more traditional 
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Master Calendar System (‘MCS’), whereby a court’s case load is managed by 
registrars and other court personnel, and cases are not assigned to a single judge.90 
The majority of Australian court registries operate under the MCS model,91 but the 
Federal Court has adopted the IDS model. While the benefits of IDS (in terms of 
reducing costs and delays whilst balancing the interests of qualitative justice) remain 
empirically untested, 92 there is widespread support for IDS in preference to other 
models, such as MCS.93 The model of case management employed is not critical to 
the success of judicial mediation but, as explained (and disputed) in Chapter 8, it is 
generally accepted that a judge who has mediated should excuse him or herself from 
subsequent adjudication. 94  Thus, it may not be possible to maintain a truly 
‘individual’ docket if judicial mediation fails to result in settlement. This does not 
undermine the essential nature of IDS, however, as it is well recognised that judges 
should recuse themselves in cases of apprehended bias.95
How, then, does case management work? How do courts and judges actually manage 
the process of litigation? It is crucial to appreciate that case management systems 
merely provide the ‘scaffolding upon which [judges, registrars or masters] can 
construct, in conjunction with the parties, the plan that best suits the efficient and 
economical and fair conduct of any particular proceeding’.
  
 
96
                                                 
90 Sallmann and Wright, above n 69, 75. 
91 Stephen Colbran et al, Civil Procedure: Commentary and Materials (3rd Ed 2005), 31-32. 
92 Sackville, ‘Courts in Transition: An Australian View’, above n 70, 19-20. 
93 Sallmann and Wright, above n 69, 79-83; Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A 
Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89, (2000), [6.9], [7.6]. 
94 See below Chapter 8 nn 159-74 and accompanying text. 
95 R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 258–63 Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ). Note that judges should also be careful not to recuse themselves too readily, however, as 
this could allow litigants to ‘shop’ for their own judge. See, Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 
352 (Mason J); Attorney General of New South Wales v Klewer [2003] NSWCA 295 (Unreported, 
Mason P, Meagher JA and Davies AJA, 15 October 2003); and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy 
(2000) 205 CLR 337, 348 [19] – [23] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
96 French, above n 83, 8. 
 Consequently, case 
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management systems cannot be reduced to the level of binary rules. Rather, case 
management systems provide courts with broad procedural discretions in relation to 
the conduct of proceedings, the evidence that can be presented at trial, and the 
provision of court-connected ADR. 97  It is in the interpretation of these broad 
discretions that the blending of ADR and adjudication has taken place. 98
Directions Hearings and Prehearing Conferences 
 The 
following section analyses a selection of prehearing events (comparable in many 
respects with judicial mediation) which exemplify this proposition, in order to 
demonstrate that infringements of Ch III are unlikely to occur as a result of novel 
prehearing processes. 
 
 
Case management is ordinarily facilitated by a combination of statute, delegated 
legislation (in the form of court rules), practice notes and ‘strategic plans published by 
Australian Courts’99 In the majority of Australian jurisdictions, directions hearings 
(known variously as procedural hearings or prehearing conferences) provide the 
springboard for the adoption of other prehearing events, and ‘the general framework 
within which judicial case management operates’. 100
                                                 
97 For example, Order 1(8) of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended), states that ‘The 
Court may dispense with compliance with any of the requirements of the Rules, either before or after 
the occasion for compliance arises’.  
98 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146, 169 (Kirby J). Ronald Dworkin describes 
‘discretion’ as ‘an area left over by a surrounding belt of restriction’. The discretionary nature of court 
rules is emphasised by the fact that the judges may ordinarily choose not to apply them (Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 31). Keith Hawkins has similarly defined legal discretion, 
‘as the space, as it were, between legal rules in which legal actors may exercise choice’. (Keith 
Hawkins, ‘The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science’ in Keith Hawkins 
(ed), The Uses of Discretion (1992), 11). 
99 Sackville, ‘From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The Transformation of the Judicial Role’, 
above n 66, 13. 
100 French, above n 83, 8. 
 Directions hearings are 
themselves a product of third-wave reform, and (as explained below) may amount to a 
limited form of judicial mediation in certain circumstances.  
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The proposition that directions hearings constitute the ‘source of power’101 for case 
management is well illustrated by the Federal Court model. In the interests of clarity 
and brevity the current analysis is restricted to this model, but the general function of 
the directions hearing is comparable in most Australian jurisdictions.102 In the Federal 
Court, case management is supported by the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976,103 
and implemented in practice by the Federal Court Rules 1979 (made by a judicial 
committee in accordance with S59 of that Act). Order 10 of the Federal Court Rules 
1979 provides that in the course of a directions hearing the Court (including a Court 
comprising a single judge)104
                                                 
101 French, above n 83, 8. 
102 Subtle differences may be identified between directions hearings in the Federal Court and other 
Australian Courts (for example, on the basis that the Federal Court operates an individual docket 
system), but this fact does not alter the fundamental nature of directions hearings. The Family Law 
Rules 2004 set out the Court’s general case management powers (including the power to order various 
prehearing conferences). The Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 provide magistrates with the 
power to make pre-trial directions (reg 10.01), refer matters to mediation or arbitration (pt 27), or direct 
that the parties attend a conciliation conference (reg 10.05). The same principles apply to a greater or 
lesser degree at the State level. For example, regs 415 and 549 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) 
provide the source of power for Supreme Court directions hearings and ‘pre-trial conferences’ 
respectively. Order 29 rr 5- 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) facilitate directions 
hearings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Directions hearings in the Supreme Court of 
Victoria are supported by O 23.06 of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2008 
(Vic), and Practice Note 1 of 1996: Civil case management. Following the introduction of the Supreme 
Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), the Supreme Court of South Australia no longer holds prehearing 
conferences as such. These have been replaced by ‘status hearings’ (r 125) and ‘settlement 
conferences’ (r 126), which amount to essentially the same thing. In NSW a relatively high degree of 
case management guidance is provided by primary legislation, in order to rationalise procedure 
throughout the system. The case management principles supported by the Civil Procedure Act 2005 
(NSW) (which applies to all NSW courts) are implemented in practice by the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules (NSW) (created by judicial committee in accordance with s 9 of that Act), but directions hearings 
are facilitated by ss 61-62 of the Act. In contrast, s 118 the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 
provides only limited guidance in terms of case management, and leaves the form of directions 
hearings to court rules and practice directions. The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (which 
applies to the Queensland Supreme Court, District Court and Magistrates Court) merely state that 
courts may hold ‘directions hearings’ in respect of a costs assessment, or otherwise make ‘directions’ 
(rr 299, 366-68). Case-flow management in the Supreme Court of Queensland is premised instead upon 
the overriding objective in r 5, and facilitated by the provision of timelines (as opposed to directions 
hearings as such) by practice direction (Practice Direction No 4 of 2002: Case Flow Management – 
Civil Jurisdiction).   
103 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 53A(1).  
104 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended) O 10 r 1 (2) (a). 
 may ‘give such directions with respect to the conduct of 
the proceeding as it thinks proper’. More specific guidance as to the exercise of this 
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general discretion is provided throughout the remainder of Order 10, and includes the 
discretionary provision of orders in relation to, inter alia: 
 
1. The production, admission and inspection of all documents, 
interrogatories and affidavits. 
2. The timing, admission and format of evidence to be presented 
(including expert evidence).  
3. The costs to be borne by the parties.  
4. The mode of hearing.  
5. The mandatory use of mediation and arbitration in respect of all or 
part of the dispute.  
6. The referral of the parties to a settlement conference (conducted by a 
Registrar), or a case management conference (conducted by a Judge 
or a Registrar).105
 
 
In most jurisdictions judges may conduct directions hearings themselves (and in 
certain limited cases do so exclusively), 106  but it is more common that they be 
conducted by a master or registrar, and transferred to a judge if the matter falls within 
a specialist list or presents particular management problems. This is the case in the 
Federal Court107 and the Supreme Court of Western Australia,108
                                                 
105 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended) O 10 r 1(2). 
106 The Supreme Court of Victoria, for example, operates a number of specialist lists in respect of 
which a ‘Judge-in-Charge … gives directions to parties form the early stages of each proceeding’. 
Stephen Colbran et al, above n 91, 37-38. Lists currently operate in respect of cases falling within the 
following specialisms: Admiralty, Building Cases, Commercial, Corporations, Intellectual Property, 
Judicial Review and Appeals, Major Torts, Personal Injuries, Valuation Compensation and Planning, 
Victorian Taxation Appeals. Similarly. In Western Australia, judges may conduct prehearing 
conferences in cases that fall within the Commercial and Managed Cases List (Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Practice Direction No 4 of 2006).   
107 Chief Justice Michael Black, ‘The Courts Tribunals and ADR’ (1996) 7 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 138; Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’, above n 13, 70. 
 and the Family Law 
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Rules 2004 provide that, a ‘procedural hearing’109 may be held by a court officer if a 
conciliation conference fails to resolve the case.110
In addition to the provision of formal directions hearings, certain Australian case 
management systems also provide judges or court officers with the option to order 
less formal prehearing conferences. In the Family Court, for example, mandatory 
registrar led case management conferences are conducted during the prehearing 
determination stage, in order ‘to enable the parties to attempt to resolve the case, or 
any part of the case, by agreement’.
 The purpose of directions hearings 
in all instances is to streamline cases prior to the trial event, and not (directly at least) 
to encourage settlement before that stage.  
 
111 In the Federal Court, as noted above, case 
management conferences may be conducted by a judge or a registrar, and are intended 
to provide an alternative forum in which to ‘consider the most economic and efficient 
means of bringing the proceedings to trial and of conducting the trial’.112 However, 
the informal nature of the case management conference means that judges in the 
Federal Court may theoretically promote settlement or compromise between parties, 
evaluate parties’ positions, and/or facilitate negotiations between parties. Such 
interventions may be subtle, and may take place in the shadow of the available power 
(or order) as well as in the exercise of it. 113
                                                                                                                                            
108 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Practice Direction No 6 of 2005 ‘Case Management in the 
Supreme Court’; now contained in the Supreme Court Consolidated Practice Directions (Jan 2009). 
109 Family Law Rules 2004, r 12.04. 
110 Family Law Rules 2004, r 12.03 (3). 
111 Family Law Rules 2004, r 12.03. See also Family Court of Australia, Case Management Directions, 
Practice Direction 3 of 2004, 6.6. 
112 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended) O 10, r 1(2)(h)(i). 
113 Boulle, above n 6, 132. 
 As Justice French (as he then was) 
explained, case management conferences in the Federal Court: 
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involve the judge sitting around a conference table with the parties and their 
advisers to discuss the best way to approach prehearing management and the 
conduct of the trial. Whilst in the formal sense it is still a prehearing 
conference and formal orders will be made at the end of it, the ‘psychological 
landscape’ is less adversarial than that which exists in a courtroom. There is 
more scope for the parties and their advisers to take a reasonably practical 
approach to ensuring the case gets on expeditiously and narrows down to the 
real issues. In a sense, it is a kind of procedural mediation or discussion 
chaired by the trial judge.114
A strict application of ADR theory would dictate that case management conferences 
cannot be a form of mediation.
 
 
115 For one thing, judges must ultimately make orders 
which (depending upon the success of the conference) may be determinative in nature 
and, as noted in Chapter 1, it is generally agreed that mediators have no authoritative 
decision-making power. 116  Moreover, the primary object of all prehearing 
conferences (however formal or informal) is to organise the presentation of 
substantive arguments during mediation or the final hearing.117 A judge’s substantive 
knowledge of the dispute is also (ideologically) minimal at this stage, and so, 
correlatively, is his or her ability to facilitate in a substantive sense. 118
                                                 
114 French, above n 83, 9. 
115 Sir Laurence Street, ‘The Courts and Mediation – A Warning’ (1991) 2 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 203; (1993) 67 (7) Australian Law Journal 491, 492. 
116 Boulle, above n 6, 65; Sourdin, above n 6, 28; National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council, Dispute Resolution Terms, above n 8.  
117 Paragraph 4.1.2 (7) of the Supreme Court Consolidated Practice Directions (Jan 2009) (WA), for 
example, states that the ‘general objective of the CMC List is to bring cases to the point where they can 
be resolved by mediation or tried in the quickest, most cost effective way, consistently with the need to 
provide a just outcome’. 
118 Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’, above n 13, 77. 
 
Correspondingly, Order 10 of the Federal Court Rules does not (directly) envisage 
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judges holding settlement conferences or judicial mediations. According to Justice 
Mansfield: 
 
A case management conference is [not] a form of mediation. That is a 
different matter. The case management conference is not to induce settlement 
of the dispute between the parties (that is a matter for the parties, whether or 
not assisted by mediation). It is to ensure that the dispute between the parties 
is properly defined and is addressed at the hearing by relevant evidence as 
efficiently and fairly as possible.119
Whilst prehearing conferences are primarily intended to simplify issues, 
make suitable amendments to the pleadings, limit the number of expert 
witnesses, obtain admissions of facts and generally prepare cases for trial, 
they are instrumental in effecting a large number of settlements at once or 
shortly after they are held.
 
 
From a purely taxonomical perspective these views have merit, but it is nevertheless 
possible that case management conferences will result in settlement, and that judges 
may intentionally utilise prehearing conferences to this end. Some 30 years ago, in a 
comparative study of court processes in Los Angeles funded by the NSW Law 
Reform Commission, John Bishop observed that: 
 
120
As noted earlier, the processes adopted during prehearing conferences prior to the 
provision of orders may vary greatly, and are not formally prescribed by rules of court 
  
 
                                                 
119 Justice John Mansfield, ‘Opportunities and Challenges: Evidence in cases under the Trade Practices 
Act 1974’ (Paper presented to the Competition Law Conference, 24th May 2008, Sydney), 29. 
120 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Studies in Comparative Civil and Criminal 
Procedure: Volume 2 - Innovations in Civil and Criminal Procedure, Consultants Paper by John 
Bishop (1978), 19. 
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or statute. Rather, prehearing conferences are facilitated by the provision of broad 
procedural discretions. This discretionary framework provides general authority for 
the court to engage in the hearing, and may also indicate the procedural issues that 
might be determined in the course of the hearing. However, substantive decision-
making may also take place during prehearing conferences, even although the power 
to do so does not spring (in a formal sense) from rules of court or statute. Although 
prehearing conferences are ideologically procedural in nature, therefore, and will not 
ordinarily amount to a form of mediation in the sense defined in Chapter 1, they may 
constitute ‘a kind of procedural mediation’ in practice.  
 
In any event, various options also now exist for courts to engage with disputants in a 
substantive sense prior to the commencement of trial. Procedures such as settlement 
conferencing and conciliation conferencing can be classified as ‘prehearing assisted 
decision-making processes’ in that, although judges or court officers may facilitate 
negotiations concerning the substantive rights and interests of the parties, they do not 
formally adjudicate an outcome and the process does not take place during the final 
hearing. As James Wall et al have explained, ‘agreement cannot generally be forced, 
because either side can refuse to settle and can take the case to trial’.121
Settlement Conferences 
  
 
 
Earlier it was noted that US judges have conducted settlement (or conciliation) 
conferences since (at least) the early 1920’s,122
                                                 
121 James A. Wall, Lawrence F Schiller, Ronald J. Ebert, ‘Should Judges Grease the Slow Wheels of 
Justice?’, above n 59, 89. 
122 Galanter, ‘A settlement judge, not a trial judge: judicial mediation in the United States’, above n 42, 
2. 
 and that case management developed 
much later – towards the end of the 1970’s. In Australia the opposite is true, and 
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settlement conferences first developed as an aspect of case management during the 
1980’s and 1990’s.123 Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin suggest that Victoria was 
one of the first States to introduce settlement conferences in 1984 (described as pre-
trial conferences), 124
Rule 126 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) expands upon s 65, and 
provides for compulsory settlement conferences during which the Court is ‘to explore 
the possibility of reaching a settlement of the action [or] the appropriateness of 
referring the action or certain aspects of it for alternative dispute resolution’.
 and South Australia introduced a similar process in 1996. 
Section 10 of the Statutes Amendment (Mediation, Arbitration and Referral) Act 1996 
(SA) amended the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 65 of which now provides that: 
 
(4) The court may itself endeavour to achieve a negotiated settlement of a 
civil proceeding or resolution of any issues arising in a civil proceeding. 
 
(5) A judge or master who attempts to settle a proceeding or to resolve any 
issues arising in a proceeding is not disqualified from taking further part in 
the proceeding but will be so disqualified if he or she is appointed as a 
mediator in relation to the proceeding.  
 
125 It will 
be noted that s 65 also provides South Australian judges with the capacity to engage 
in judicial mediation; a possibility examined in Chapter 8.126
The settlement models established in Victoria and South Australia remain the 
exception to the rule in Australia. In most jurisdictions, court rules stop short of 
 
 
                                                 
123 Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, 237. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), s 126. 
126 See below Chapter 8 nn 10-13. 
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positively endorsing or requiring the promotion of settlement before trial.127
Today, in the United States the virtue of active judicial participation in 
settling civil cases is part of the received wisdom. As has been said, 
“[j]udicial activism in the trial settlement process appears to have received 
quasi-official sanction within the judicial family.” … The hallmark of change 
is that mediation is not regarded as radically separate from adjudication but 
as part of the same process. Litigation and negotiation are not viewed as 
distinct but as continuous ... In Australia, apart perhaps from some fairly 
generalised platitudes about costs and the stresses of litigation, generally 
speaking, judges have refrained from the role accepted by their Brethren in 
the United States. 
 In this 
respect Australia differs significantly from the US where, as noted above, the 
promotion of settlement by judges preceded the advent of case management. In an 
early recognition of this distinction, Justice Andrew Rogers explained that: 
 
128
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that Justice Roger’s article has also become ‘part 
of the received wisdom’ in Australian dispute resolution theory.
 
 
129
                                                 
127 Nadja Alexander, Walther Gottwald and Thomas Trenczek, ‘Mediation in Germany: The Long and 
Winding Road’ in Nadja Alexander (ed), Global Trends in Mediation (2006) 223, 250. 
128 Justice Andrew Rogers, ‘Judges in Search of Justice’ (1987) 10 University of NSW Law Journal 93, 
104; citing Judge Charles Renfrew, ‘Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil and 
Criminal Anti Trust Cases’ (1975) 57 Chicago Bar Record 130, 131. 
129 See, eg, Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’, above 
n 4, 199; Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 6, 104; Boulle, above n 6, 132. 
 It should be borne 
in mind, however, that this extract is now over 20 years old, and (as demonstrated 
later in this Chapter) judicial attitudes in Australia towards the judicial promotion of 
settlement would appear to have softened in recent years. For the reasons outlined in 
the preceding section, it is also now difficult to draw firm distinctions between 
directions hearings (which are notionally procedural in nature), and settlement 
373 
 
 
conferences (which involve judges in the promotion of settlement or resolution). The 
formal title afforded to a process is not necessarily a reliable indicator as to the nature 
of the process adopted in practice, and the statutory provisions, rule/s of court or 
practice direction upon which these processes are constructed will often be broad 
enough to support the judicial promotion of either outcome (especially since the near-
universal introduction of overriding objectives in civil rules).130 For example, and as 
noted above, Federal Court judges may engage in case management conferences, 
whereas settlement conferences are formally restricted to registrars. However, Federal 
Court judges have also engaged in a limited number of Federal Court mediations,131 
which are more comparable to settlement conferences than they are directions 
hearings. Likewise, NSW judges are only formally authorised to conduct directions 
hearings, 132  but judicial mediations have taken place in the NSW District Court 
pursuant to the general overriding objectives contained in the Civil Procedure Act 
2005 (NSW).133
Inquisitorialism 
 The proposition that judicial mediation is comparable to settlement 
conferences is developed further in the following Chapter.  
 
 
Earlier it was stated that notions of inquisitorialism have surfaced in common law 
countries as an aspect of the access to justice debate. 134
                                                 
130 Most Australian jurisdictions have now introduced ‘overriding objectives’ in their rules of civil 
procedure, instructing judges to a balance between quantitative-efficiency and qualitative-justice. See: 
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O1 r 4B; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure Rules 1996 
(Vic), r 1.14; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 56; 
Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA), r 3. 
131 Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’, above n 4, 199. 
132 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 61-62. 
133 Judge Margaret Sidis, ‘Judicial Mediation in the District Court’ (2006) 18(9) Judicial Officers 
Bulletin 74. 
134 See, eg: Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Adversarial System of Litigation: 
Rethinking the Federal Civil Litigation System, Issues Paper No. 20 (1997) 134-35. Mason, ‘The 
Future of Adversarial Justice’, above n 43. 
 The following section 
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examines the correlation between inquisitorialism and case management, and 
illustrates the influence that inquisitorial style processes have had upon the nature of 
the Australian judicial function.  
 
While the trend toward greater judicial control over the trial process is multi-
jurisdictional in nature, the extent to which there will be a ‘need to entrust more law-
making responsibilities to … judges’135 varies between jurisdictions. In procedural 
terms, the range of this variation is generally at its widest between common and civil 
law systems, because civil law judges have traditionally played a more active role in 
proceedings than their common-law counterparts. The more active role of civil law 
judges represents an important ideological distinction between the inquisitorial (or 
‘continental’ style) procedural model developed in civil law jurisdictions, and the 
adversarial procedural model developed in common law jurisdictions.136
The principal reason why the European system has attractions for some 
critics of the adversarial system is that control lies more in the hands of the 
judges and because the European courts are said to have as their object the 
investigation of the truth. Within the adversarial system, despite some 
statements to the contrary, the function of the courts is not to pursue the truth 
but to decide on the cases presented by the parties.
 According to 
Sir Anthony Mason: 
 
137
                                                 
135 Mauro Cappelletti, above n 32. 
136 For present purposes, the terms adversarial and inquisitorial are intended to refer only to the 
predominant nature of the judicial process in a given system, as opposed to the structure of that legal 
system. 
137 Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’, above n 43.  
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In the continental system judges typically manage trial proceedings and engage in 
fact-finding (inquisition) so as to obtain an ‘accurate and fair’ representation of the 
facts.138 In adversarial systems, on the other hand, it is the litigants themselves who 
manage the trial process through the presentation of arguments designed to persuade 
the court or judge as to the veracity of their version of the facts.139
In the system of trial we have developed in this country, the judge sits to hear 
and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation 
or examination on behalf of society at large, as happens, we believe, in some 
foreign countries … The judge's part … is to hearken to the evidence … If he 
goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of a judge and assumes the role of an 
advocate, and the change does not become him well. Lord Chancellor Bacon 
spoke right when he said that: `Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential 
part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. 
 Active judicial 
involvement in the adversarial trial process by way of questioning is traditionally 
prohibited. This restrictive view of the judicial role has formed the sub-strata of 
common law procedural theory for the majority of its history. As Denning LJ 
famously remarked in Jones v National Cole Board: 
 
140
Because it is a judge’s job to ‘hearken to the evidence’, an adherence to the principles 
of procedural fairness (and judicial impartiality in particular) has been deemed critical 
to ensure the legitimacy of judicial decision-making in the adversarial model. In 
 
 
                                                 
138 Alison Creighton, ‘An Adversarial System: A Constitutional Requirement?’ (1999) 74 Reform 64, 
64; Mark Nolan ‘The Adversarial mentality versus the Inquisitorial mentality’ (2004) 16(3) Legaldate 
7, 7. 
139 Alison Creighton, above n 138. 
140 Jones v National Cole Board [1957] 2 QB 55, 65. 
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contrast, these principles are theoretically redundant in civil law. As Alison Creighton 
has explained:  
 
In civil law countries such as France and Germany, fairness is inherent in the 
system. A judge who conducts the investigation, assists the parties to clarify 
the issues and pleadings or questions the witnesses is not necessarily 
proceeding unfairly. However, in an adversarial system, to be fair, a judge 
must be independent of the State, be impartial, and be seen to be impartial. 
Procedural fairness is also preserved through party control of investigation 
and proceedings. These are elements that an adversarial system seeks to 
uphold.141
The differences between inquisitorialism and adversarialism are often over stated,
 
 
142 
and may encourage inaccurate assumptions to be drawn regarding the nature and 
uniformity of the judicial role throughout the various continental and common-law 
style systems.143 In reality, the judicial role is not defined solely by the classification 
of the system within which it operates, but also by various constitutional, political, 
and social influences unique to each legal system:144
                                                 
141 Creighton, above n 138, 6. 
 
 
142 Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’, above n 43; Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton and 
Michael Wilson, ‘Stranded between Partisanship and the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of Legal 
Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice’ (2005) Melbourne University Law 
Review 14. Justice Geoffrey Davies, ‘The reality of civil justice reform: why we must abandon the 
essential elements of our system’ (Paper presented at the 20th Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Annual Conference, Brisbane, 13 July 2002) 2; Justice David Ipp, ‘Judicial Intervention 
in the Trial Process’ (1995) 69 The Australian Law Journal 365, 368; Mirjan Damaška, ‘Structures of 
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure’ (1975) 84 Yale Law Journal 480, 481. 
143 Bronitt and Mares, ‘The History and Theory of the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Law’ 
(2004) 16(3) Legaldate 1; Nolan, above n 138. 
144 Taylor and Pryles, ‘The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia’, in Michael Pryles (ed), Dispute 
Resolution in Asia (1997), 3; Sackville, ‘Courts in Transition: An Australian View’, above n 70, 4. 
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In the legal systems of today there is no pure example of either the civil 
law or common law system. All relevant legal systems in the western 
world are to greater or lesser degrees hybrids of these two models or of 
other legal families.145
In most continental style systems, for example, ‘it is only in criminal law that we can 
truly speak of an inquisitorial system,’
 
 
146 and inquisitorial techniques have long been 
common to various ancillary civil and criminal legal processes in common law 
countries such as Australia.147 Moreover, even if it was once the case that common 
law judges merely sat to ‘hear and determine the issues raised by the parties,’148
It has become more common for judges to take an active part in the conduct 
of cases than was hitherto conventional. In part, this change is a response to 
the growth of litigation and the greater pressure of court lists ... In part, it 
arises from a growing appreciation that a silent judge may sometimes 
occasion an injustice by failing to reveal opinions which the party then 
affected has no opportunity to correct or modify. In part, it is simply a 
reflection of the heightened willingness of judges to take greater control of 
 
modern case management systems no longer permit judges to remain so detached 
from proceedings. There would also appear to be an increasing willingness on the part 
of common law judges to intervene in the civil trial process in certain circumstances, 
whether as a matter of case management or simply in the interests of justice. As Kirby 
P (as he then was) explained:  
 
                                                 
145 Colbran et al, above n 91, 16. 
146 Antoine J Bullier, ‘How the French Understand the Inquisitorial System’ (2001) 29 Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law Forum 40, 41; Nagorcka, Stanton and Wilson, above n 142. 
147 Examples include coronial inquests, parole board inquiries, and ‘a range of tribunal systems other 
than the Australian criminal and civil courts’. Nolan, above n 138. 
148 Jones v National Cole Board [1957] 2 QB 55, 65 (Denning LJ). 
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proceedings for the avoidance of injustices that can sometimes occur from 
undue delay or unnecessary prolongation of trials.149
While the differences between continental and adversarial systems should not be 
embellished, there is evidence to suggest that the former are generally less susceptible 
to excessive costs and delays than the latter.
 
 
150 German courts in particular have a 
reputation for efficiency, accessibility, and low costs.151 There are numerous possible 
explanations for the low costs associated with adjudication in Germany, many of 
which are unrelated to the conduct of judges. 152
that when English, American and other non-Continental jurisdictions began 
to collapse under their own weight there was a concerted move towards the 
adoption of Continental, interventionist judging techniques [such as the 
promotion of settlement] that had previously been the mainstay of non-
adversarial jurisdictions.
 One general distinguishing feature 
between common law and civil law judges, however, which may increase efficiency 
and reduce costs, is the active role of civil law judges in the trial process, and in 
particular the promotion of settlement. Indeed, according to Tania Sourdin there is no 
doubt 
 
153
 
 
                                                 
149 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263, 281–82 (Kirby P) 
150 Héctor Fix-Fierro, Courts, Justice and Efficiency: A Socio-legal Study of Economic Rationality in 
Adjudication (2003). 
151 Alexander, Gottwald and Trenczek, above n 127. 
152 Ibid. The authors identify a number of reasons for the accessibility and low cost of the German court 
system, including the wider availability of ‘legal costs insurance and legal aid’, and the fact that 
litigation costs are based on ‘a percentage of the value of the dispute’ as opposed to an hourly rate. 
Another factor may be the tendency in civil law courts to develop specialist courts as opposed to courts 
of general jurisdiction as in common law (although, as noted above, certain Australian jurisdictions 
now do this as well), and the absence of a ‘single trial event’. See James G Apple and Robert P Dyling, 
A Primer on the Civil Law System, 37. 
<http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf.> at 14 October 2009. 
153 Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’, above n 4, 187. 
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In Denmark and Norway, for example, the majority of civil disputes have been 
channelled through the forliksråd (‘settlement council’ in ‘Old Norwegian’) since 
1795154 and 1797 respectively.155 The forliksråd, which is essentially a council staffed 
by elected local officials, remains the court of first instance for all interest-based 
industrial actions in Denmark 156  and for all civil disputes in Norway where the 
dispute regards a monetary sum (or can be calculated as a sum) of less than NOK 
125000 (AUD 25000). 157
                                                 
154 Forordning om Forligelses-Commissioners Stiftelse overalt i Danmark, samt i kjøbstæderne i Norge 
1795 (Denmark/Norway) (‘Act about the Settlement Council everywhere in Denmark, as well as in 
Cities in Norway’) 
155 Forordning om Forligelses-Indretninger paa Landet i Norge 1795 (Norway) (‘Act about the 
Settlement Councils in the Country in Norway’). The 1795 Danish/Norwegian Act extended to 
Norwegian cities, but rural areas were not included in Norway until 1797. This was prior to the ceding 
of Norway to Sweden, and Norway’s subsequent declaration of independence in 1814.  
156 Lov om mægling i arbejdsstridigheder (the ‘Public Conciliator Act)’ 1910 (Denmark). 
157 Tvisteloven 2008) (‘Civil Litigation Act’) (Norway), Chapter 6. The legal foundation for the 
forliksråd as an institution is now Domstolloven (the Court's Act) 1915 (Norway) ss 1, 27. 
 In Denmark, forliksråd is now formally referred to as 
Statens Forligsinstitution (‘conciliation board’), and in Norway the current official 
translation of forliksråd is ‘conciliation council’. This subtle change in designation 
reflects the fact that, although these councils have the power to make judgments on 
certain matters, their role is predominantly non-determinative in nature. Although 
conciliation boards/councils remain the first port of call in most civil matters, the 
extent to which they may be considered ‘judicial’ (in a common law sense) is 
debatable, as they are staffed not by tenured judges but elected officials. Thus, any 
comparisons between forliksråd, Statens Forligsinstitution and common law 
prehearing processes should be made with caution. Nevertheless, it would appear that 
these settlement council’s directly influenced the development of settlement 
conferencing in the US during the 1920’s and 1930’s and that, as such, the ‘the 
adoption of Continental, interventionist judging techniques’ began long before 
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perceptions of a crisis in civil justice sparked the access to justice reforms 
implemented from the 1970’s onward.158
The obligation to seek settlement (as opposed to the option to do so) also has ‘a long 
tradition in Germany and other civil law countries’.
  
 
159 Indeed, this obligation is now 
recognised in s 278 of the German Code of Civil Procedure. In contrast, according to 
Alexander, Gottwald and Trenczek, ‘no such legal requirement exists in common law 
jurisdictions, although judicial attempts to encourage parties to settle may occur in 
some common law jurisdictions as a matter of case management practice rather than 
law’.160 This statement holds true in Australia, insofar as Australian judges are never 
positively obliged to seek settlement prior to or during trial. 161 Recent procedural 
amendments in the Family Court and the Federal Magistrates Court nevertheless 
engage judges in the provision of less adversarial (or inquisitorial) trials, which go 
beyond the provision of traditional case management techniques, and ostensibly 
generate a trial process in which judges are effectively able to promote settlement in a 
manner comparable with judges in certain civil law jurisdictions.162
                                                 
158 Galanter, ‘The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’, above n 36, 258. 
159 Alexander, Gottwald and Trenczek, above n 127, 250. Other civil law systems encourage the early 
promotion of settlement but do not typically oblige judges to pursue it. For example, the Quebec Civil 
Code of Civil Procedure provides judges at ‘every level and in virtually every area of law’159 with the 
power to preside over a ‘settlement conference’ at the request of the parties: Quebec Civil Code of Civil 
Procedure, RSQ 2009 c-25. 
160 Alexander, Gottwald and Trenczek, above n 127, 250. 
161 Ibid. As the authors point out, however, it is common for judges to divert disputes to non-
adjudicative processes ‘where appropriate’. See, eg, the Family law (Shared Parental Responsibility) 
Act 1996, s 697Q (f). 
162 The Family law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 1996 (Schedule 3), and the Federal 
Magistrates Act 1999.  
 These procedures 
are the focus of the following section. 
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Less Adversarial Trials 
 
An early example of a less adversarial trial process was introduced in 1998 in the 
NSW Children’s Court. S 93 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and 
Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) (the ‘CYP Act (NSW)’) states that proceedings before the 
Children’s Court are ‘not to be conducted in an adversarial manner’, and s 93 (2) 
states that proceedings ‘are to be conducted with as little formality and legal 
technicality and form as the circumstances of the case permit’. One of the most 
significant features of the CYP Act (NSW) (in terms of fostering a less adversarial trial 
process) is the purported exclusion of evidential rules by s 92 (3):  
 
The Children’s Court is not bound by the rules of evidence unless, in relation 
to particular proceedings or particular parts of proceedings before it, the 
Children’s Court determines that the rules of evidence, or such of those rules 
as are specified by the Children’s Court, are to apply to those proceedings or 
parts.    
 
One year after the introduction of the CYP Act (NSW), the Commonwealth Parliament 
introduced the Federal Magistrates Act 1999, s 42 of which states that in 
‘proceedings before it, the Federal Magistrates Court must proceed without undue 
formality and must endeavour to ensure that the proceedings are not protracted’. 
Section 63 also provides the Federal Magistrates Court with the power to question 
witnesses in certain circumstances; a hallmark of inquisitorialism. Unlike the CYP Act 
(NSW), however, the Federal Magistrates Act does not attempt to curtail the 
application of evidential rules.  
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A more recent legislative example of less adversarial trials is contained in the new Pt 
VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), as amended by Schedule III of the Family Law 
(Shared Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth). The procedures enshrined in Pt VII are 
colloquially referred to as the less adversarial trial (or ‘LAT’) process,163 and apply in 
all ‘child-related proceedings’ 164  (or any other proceedings to which the parties 
consent) 165
The LAT process itself is not formally prescribed by statute, but is enabled by a 
number of discretionary powers conferred by the revised Pt VII. Section 697N 
establishes five ‘principles for conducting child-related proceedings,’
 within the Commonwealth family law jurisdiction. The LAT process 
essentially mirrors the procedures established by the CYP Act (NSW) at the federal 
family law level, and shares many commonalities with these procedures as a result.  
 
166 to which the 
court is to have ‘regard’ when applying the LAT process. In particular, the court is to 
‘actively direct, control and manage the conduct of the proceedings’,167 and, ‘without 
undue delay and with as little formality, and legal technicality and form, as 
possible’.168 These principles are supplemented by eight ‘general duties’169 and three 
‘powers,’170 which are comparable in many respects to the orders available to judges 
during prehearing conferences. S697 Q states that a judge ‘must:’171
 
 
                                                 
163 This is the expression currently adopted by the Family Court. See, for example; Margaret Harrison, 
‘Finding a better way: A Bold Departure from the Traditional Common Law Approach to the Conduct 
of Legal Proceedings’ (April 2007). 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/resources/file/ebc70645b58cf92/Finding_Better_Way_April
2007.pdf> at 14 October 2009.  
164 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697M (1). 
165 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697M (5). 
166 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 69ZN. 
167 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697N (4). 
168 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697N (7). 
169 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 69ZQ. 
170 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 69ZR. 
171 Although  the Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697 Q states 
that judges ‘must’ carry out the duties set out therein, a failure to do so does not invalidate an order 
hence the duties are essentially discretionary.  
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(a) decide which of the issues in the proceedings require full investigation and hearing 
and which may be disposed of summarily; and  
(b) decide the order in which the issues are to be decided; and  
(c) give directions or make orders about the timing of steps that are to be taken in the 
proceedings; and  
(d) in deciding whether a particular step is to be taken—consider whether the likely 
benefits of taking the step justify the costs of taking it; and  
(e) make appropriate use of technology; and  
(f) if the court considers it appropriate—encourage the parties to use family dispute 
resolution or family counselling; and  
(g) deal with as many aspects of the matter as it can on a single occasion; and  
(h) deal with the matter, where appropriate, without requiring the parties’ physical 
attendance at court. 
 
In addition, and analogous to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) 
Act 1998 (NSW), the LAT process excludes the application of various evidentiary 
provisions ordinarily imposed by the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 unless the 
court so directs.172 When these provisions of the Evidence Act are not applied, the 
court itself may make such directions and/or orders as it sees fit in relation to the 
admission and timing of evidence.173
                                                 
172 Section 697T of the Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility)Amendment Act 2006 excludes: (a) 
Divisions 3, 4 and 5 of Part 2.1 (which deal with general rules about giving evidence, examination in 
chief, re-examination and cross-examination), other than sections 26, 30, 36 and 41; (b) Parts 2.2 and 
2.3 (which deal with documents and other evidence including demonstrations, experiments and 
inspections); (c) Parts 3.2 to 3.8 (which deal with hearsay, opinion, admissions, evidence of judgments 
and convictions, tendency and coincidence, credibility and character).  
173 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697X. 
 Presumably in an attempt to remove any doubt 
as to the object of the exclusion, Pt VII clarifies that the exclusion of the 
aforementioned provisions of the Evidence Act does not ‘revive the operation of a 
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rule of common law … or a law of a Sate or territory’.174 Thus, it would appear that 
any common law rules of evidence subsumed within the Evidence Act are not 
intended to be reinstated to fill the vacuum created by Pt VII.175 The removal of 
formal evidential rules represents a significant step towards the inquisitorial model in 
which judges request evidence, as opposed to determining the admissibility of 
evidence presented by counsel. 176
the judge operates extremely differently from the way a judge would 
normally do in a superior court of record. The judge very much determines 
the way the proceedings will run, what evidence will be presented, how that 
evidence will be presented and when it will be presented.
According to the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department, during the LAT process,   
 
177
As noted earlier, and discussed in more detail below, it is impossible to confirm 
whether judges do in fact operate ‘differently’ during the LAT process, but it was 
clearly the intention of Parliament that they should. Indeed, the Family Court of 
Appeal has itself stated that ‘the changes brought about by the LAT process not only 
authorise but positively encourage judges to depart further still from the adversarial 
model’.
 
 
178
                                                 
174 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697T (5). 
175 It is worth noting, however, that the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 that the LAT 
process purports to exclude may already be waived in ordinary civil proceedings by virtue of s 
190 of the Evidence Act, if ‘The parties to the proceedings consent’, if ‘the matter to which the 
evidence relates is not genuinely in dispute’, or if ‘the application of those provisions would 
cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay’. 
176 According to the Revised Explanatory Statement to the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill 2005, 70, ‘the waiving of the specified provisions of the Evidence Act is an integral 
element of the active judicial management necessary to achieve less adversarial court processes’.   
177 Commonwealth, Evidence to House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Commonwealth Parliament, Canberra, 4 July 2005, 26-29 (Kym Duggan, Assistant Secretary, Family 
Law Branch, Attorney-General’s Department), 27. 
178 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365, 7 (Bryant CJ, Kay and Thackray JJ). 
  In a sense, then, the LAT process might be described as an expanded form 
of case management; reflecting the fact that both concepts derive from continental 
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style judging techniques.179 However, the LAT process represents an expansion upon 
existing case management systems insofar as judges applying the LAT process may 
‘make determinations, findings and orders at any stage of proceedings’. 180  Case 
management systems, on the other hand, are generally confined to the management of 
litigation prior to the final hearing. Moreover, the making of a determination, finding 
or order does not exclude the judge who made it from ultimately determining the 
dispute.181 Thus, a judge may notionally instruct the parties (before any evidence has 
been presented) that he/she has determined an issue in argument (such as, for example, 
‘allowing a child to leave the jurisdiction during the course of the proceedings’)182 
before later making a final determination as to the ultimate issue (such as, for 
example, a parenting order). 183
It is important to note, however, that although the LAT process notionally applies 
during the final hearing, it does not apply automatically in all family law proceedings. 
During the passage of the LAT process though the House of Representatives, the 
Commonwealth Attorney General’s department provided evidence to the House Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee that the ‘more inquisitorial … approach to 
decision-making [may not constitute] an exercise of judicial power under the 
 This is in direct contrast to the format predicted 
(although not, as will be seen, endorsed) for judicial mediation, discussed in the 
following Chapter. 
 
                                                 
179 Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’, above n 13, 77.  
180 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697R. 
181 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697R (3). 
182 In Truman v Truman, 2008] FamCAFC 4, [93]-[94], the Family Court of Appeal confirmed that 
decisions ‘of great importance may therefore be made at the early or intermediate stages ... It is also 
important to keep in mind that orders made during the early and intermediate stages of a LAT are not 
restricted to interim orders made pending a final determination. They may be the final decision in a 
matter of importance – for example, allowing a child to leave the jurisdiction during the course of the 
proceedings’. 
183 Family Law Act 1975, s 60cc. In order to determine a child’s best interests in respect of a parenting 
order, a judge may take into account a variety of factors including a ‘child’s wishes’ (s 60cc 3(a)).  
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Constitution’.184 In order to mitigate these uncertainties, the Amendment Act draws a 
distinction between ‘child related proceedings’185 and ‘other proceedings’.186 While 
the LAT process applies automatically to child-related proceedings, it only applies to 
‘other proceedings’ with the consent of the parties – which may be obtained during a 
case-assessment conference187 or a prehearing procedural hearing.188 This differential 
treatment is predicated on the understanding that ‘in the special context’189 of child-
related proceedings (in which a child’s ‘best interests’ are the paramount 
consideration) the court ‘is performing a different function than it would be if it was 
making a determination as to [for example] a property settlement’, and that the 
procedural rights of litigants do not therefore arise. 190  The accuracy of this 
presumption may be doubted in light of recent case law, in which the Family Court of 
Appeal appears to have ignored any such distinction.191
Whatever process for adjudication of cases is adopted by the Court, 
procedural fairness must be accorded to the parties ... The process adopted in 
the LAT, particularly on Day 1, gives no warrant to compromise issues of 
fairness and the usual requirements must be met. These are that 
 In Crestin v Crestin, a Full 
Court of the Family Court stated that: 
 
                                                 
184 Commonwealth, Evidence to House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above 
n 177, 26. 
185 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697M (1). 
186 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697M (5). According to the 
Attorney General’s department, the LAT process does not apply automatically to non child-related 
proceedings, as whether the ‘extension of the less adversarial provisions to other proceedings under the 
Act, such as property proceedings which involve the more usual judicial role of adjudicating on 
existing rights and altering those rights [would be a legitimate exercise of Ch III power], is more open 
to doubt … [T]his is why the less adversarial approach will only apply to such proceedings by consent’. 
Commonwealth, Evidence to House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 
177, Attachment 3 (Précis of Advice Received from the Australian Government Solicitor). 
187 Family Law Rules 2004, r 12.03. 
188 Family Law Rules 2004, r 12.04. 
189 Commonwealth, Evidence to House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above 
n 177, Attachment 3 (Précis of Advice Received from the Australian Government Solicitor). 
190 Ibid. 
191 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365; Crestin v Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420. 
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determinations be made impartially, on the basis of all relevant material that 
the parties were able to put before the trial judge, without any pre-judgment 
and that the parties were given an adequate opportunity to be heard.192
Thus, while the removal of evidential rules and the clear parliamentary intention that 
judges should ‘depart further still from the adversarial model’
 
  
193
Concurrent Expert Evidence (‘Hot-Tubbing’) 
 might appear to 
undermine procedural fairness, the Family Court has read own the provisions of the 
LAT process in favour of validity. Were a discretion provided by the LAT process to 
be exercised in a non-judicial manner, therefore, that exercise would flow not from 
the vesting of a non-judicial function in the court but from the court’s own failure to 
exercise that discretion in accordance with judicial power and the implications of Ch 
III.    
 
 
One final development associated with inquisitorialism deserves mention. Various 
Australian courts, including the Federal Court and the NSW Supreme Court194
                                                 
192 Crestin v Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420; citing Re Ludeke; Ex parte Customs Officers Association 
of Australia (1985) 155 CLR 513; Re: JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342; J v Lieschke (1987) 
162 CLR 447. 
193 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365, [7] (Bryant CJ, Kay and Thackray JJ). 
194 Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) Pt 36, r 13CA. 
 now 
provide for the provision of concurrent expert evidence as an aspect of case 
management. Colloquially referred to as ‘hot-tubbing’, concurrent expert evidence is 
a process in which judges facilitate discussions between competing expert witnesses. 
The catalyst for hot-tubbing is the age-old concern that expert witnesses may in effect 
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become the ‘hired champion of one side’.195
Expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts. Men of 
outstanding eminence in their field. Today they are in practice hired guns. 
There is a new breed of litigation hangers on, whose main expertise is to craft 
reports which will conceal anything that might be to the disadvantage of their 
clients.
 As Lord Woolf lamented in his Final 
Report on access to justice: 
 
196
In Australia, concurrent expert evidence was pioneered by the Australian Competition 
Tribunal (ACT),
 
 
197  and has since been adopted in the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT).198 Neither the ACT nor the AAT are bound by common law rules of 
evidence, thus the extent to which hot-tubbing in these administrative tribunals is 
comparable to the process adopted in Ch III Courts is uncertain.199
                                                 
195 Learned Hand, ‘Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony’, (1901) 15 
Harvard Law Review 40. 
196 Woolf, above n 20, 183. 
197 Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘Expert evidence in the managerial age’ (Paper presented to the Forensic 
Accounting Conference, Sydney, 14 March 2008). 
198 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 33(1). 
199 Justice Downs has described the concurrent expert evidence procedure in the AAT as follows: 
‘Expert witnesses should arrive in time to confer before evidence is taken; The Tribunal welcomes and 
swears the expert witnesses; At the outset of the expert evidence, the Tribunal summarises orally, or in 
writing, the agreed and disagreed facts; The applicant's expert witness gives a brief oral exposition; The 
respondent's expert witness then gives a brief oral exposition; Alternatively, the Tribunal may proceed 
to ask questions of the expert witnesses; The respondent's expert is invited to ask the applicant's expert 
witness questions, without the intervention of counsel; The process is then reversed, so that a brief 
colloquium takes place; Each expert witness is invited to give a brief summary (including his or her 
view on what the other expert has said and identifying areas of agreement and disagreement); The 
parties' representatives may then ask any relevant or unanswered questions of the expert witnesses. At 
any appropriate time in the process the Tribunal may intervene and ask questions’. Justice Garry 
Downs, ‘Concurrent Expert Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: The New South Wales 
Experience’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Conference of Planning and Environment Courts and 
Tribunals, Hobart, 27 February 2004). The Trade Practices Tribunal outlined a similar process in Re 
Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 225, 232. 
 However, Justice 
John Mansfield has described hot-tubbing in the Federal Court as follows: 
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In essence, concurrent evidence involves the collaboration of experts to 
identify the key issues in dispute at a pre-hearing stage followed by the 
concurrent examination of experts at trial, ensuring all parties have an 
opportunity to respond to the opinions and concerns raised by the experts.200
In the Federal Court, hot-tubbing is supported by a Practice Direction (which advises 
expert witnesses of their obligations)
 
 
201 and O 34A of the Federal Court Rules which 
allow judges to direct expert witnesses where two or more witnesses are to present 
evidence on the same issue, 202  and to require evidence to be given by experts 
concurrently.203
Third-wave Comparisons 
 The resultant process constitutes an alternative means of facilitating 
informed judgment, and is unlikely to interfere with procedural fairness in a manner 
comparable with judicial mediation. As intimated earlier and demonstrated further in 
Chapter 8, judicial mediation is also likely to take place exclusively during prehearing, 
and in a process generally divorced from the formal rules of trial evidence. As such, 
the relevance of hot-tubbing in the present context is merely contextual; reinforcing 
the proposition that Australian judges have gained increasing control over the civil 
trial process. 
 
 
There are obvious parallels and overlaps between the growth of ADR and the 
development of case management (including less adversarial trials).204
                                                 
200 Justice John Mansfield, above n 119, 18-19. 
201 Practice Direction, ‘Guidelines for Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of 
Australia, Version 6 (5th May 2008).  
202 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended), O 34A r 3(2). 
203 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended), O 34A r 3(2)(i). 
204 As noted above, the LAT process can be described as an expansion upon existing case management 
principles, and for the purposes of the immediate analysis these concepts can be adjoined. 
 At the most 
basic level, these trends share a number of common values and objectives stemming 
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from perceived deficiencies in the traditional legal process and, more directly, the 
large body of theory developed in the wake of the Pound Conference and the Florence 
Project.205 As illustrated in Chapter 1, these objectives can be generally defined in 
quantitative efficiency terms such as a reduction in litigation costs and increased 
settlement rates (the cool theme). 206 The underlying values supported by ADR are 
also broadly compatible with case management. One value commonly attributed to 
mediation, for example, ‘is its responsiveness to client needs and interests’. 207 
Mediators are able to respond directly to the interests of the parties as they are not 
bound by rigid rules and procedures. Similarly, case management allows judges to 
provide a level of individualised justice via a framework of broad procedural 
discretions (the warm theme).208
On the other hand, while ADR and case management are generally credited with 
reducing the adversarial nature of proceedings, the manner in which they do so differs. 
Case management serves non-adversarial values by increasing judicial control of the 
trial process and by relaxing rules of procedure and evidence.
 Case management systems also provide the ‘source 
of power’ from which court-connected ADR services are ordered or encouraged. 
 
209
                                                 
205 By way of contrast, as discussed in the following Chapters, the objectives of the common law 
judicial function stem primarily from underlying constitutional concepts such as the separation of 
powers doctrine and the rule of law values which it serves. 
206 Laurence Boulle identifies five mediation objectives; ‘effectiveness in achieving settlement’, 
‘efficiency’, ‘accessibility’, ‘individual and relationship transformation’, and ‘social transformation’, 
above n 6, 69-74. 
207 Ibid 63. 
208 Atiyah, above n 86, 430.  
209 Astor and Chinkin, above n 6, 238. 
 ADR processes also 
typically rebuke formal rules of procedure and evidence, and serve non-adversarial 
values by seeking to reduce the competitive nature of proceedings. However, 
increased third-party control is at odds with the notion of ‘self determination and 
party autonomy’, which is promoted in certain forms of ADR (including mediation) 
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‘by allowing the parties scope to take control of their dispute through direct 
participation’. 210
almost all judicial techniques used during the settlement process are off the 
record either because there are no stenographers or recording devices at the 
pretrial or settlement conferences, or because judges seldom allow their 
overtures to become part of the court record.
 Put simply, case management advocates an increase in judicial 
control over the process, ADR encourages a combination of party and third-party 
control over process, and adversarialism assumes that the parties control the process. 
It follows that care must be taken to avoid unwarranted comparisons between ADR 
and case management when asking how (if at all) the adversarial process has evolved. 
 
Structural commonalities can also be identified in the various processes analysed in 
the preceding section. Prehearing conferences, settlement conferences and the LAT 
process are all implemented by the provision of broad discretionary powers. This is so 
whether (as in the case prehearing hearings and settlement conferencing) a single 
broad discretion leaves the process to be adopted entirely in the hands of judges, or 
whether (as in the case of the latter) a series of smaller discretions are implemented in 
place of more formal, prescriptive trial procedures. The same is true in the US. 
According to James Wall et al, rules of court in the US will generally provide no 
‘guidance relative to formal procedures’ to be adopted by judges in the settlement 
process, and 
 
211
                                                 
210 Boulle, above n 6, 65. 
211 Wall, Schiller, and Ebert, ‘Should Judges Grease the Slow Wheels of Justice?’, above n 59, 89. 
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Thus, in Australia as in the US, it is through the increase in procedural discretionary 
power, and the expansion of prehearing events, that lawmakers have sought to 
stimulate change in the judicial process. As more and more judicial work migrates 
away from the final hearing, it becomes subject to fewer and fewer formal procedures. 
The next question, therefore, is whether the increase in discretionary power and the 
proliferation of prehearing processes has in fact led to a transformation of the 
Australian judicial function.  
 
Has the Australian Judicial Function been ‘Transformed’? 
 
In Johnson v Johnson, the High Court expressed the view that: 
 
The rules and conventions governing ... [judicial] practice are not frozen in 
time. They develop to take account of the exigencies of modern litigation. At 
the trial level, modern judges, responding to a need for more active case 
management, intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise 
a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of 
pronouncement of judgment, as inscrutable as the Sphinx.212
The High Court’s jurisprudence is replete with similar views.
 
 
213
                                                 
212 (2000) 201 CLR 488. 
213 In Kirby J’s view, for example, although ‘“some form of case management has always existed”, the 
role of judges in Australia has increased greatly in recent years. Such functions are now regarded as a 
necessary and orthodox part of the judicial function’. Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 
CLR 146, 168-69. 
 However, and as 
intimated earlier, it is impossible to authoritatively establish a trend towards greater 
judicial control of the Australian litigation process. The perennial difficulty, supported 
by the preceding analysis, is that while ‘a judge’s role in dispensing justice is usually 
specifically defined, a judge’s role in the settlement of disputes is often determined by 
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that judges own conceptions of his or her role in the settlement process’.214
The litigant gets managerial judging only if, by the fortuity of the case-
assignment wheel, he draws a managerial judge … If you draw a traditional 
federal district judge, you get old style adversary domination of the pre-trial 
process.
 The extent 
to which the objectives of case management are implemented therefore depends in no 
small measure upon what individual court officials and judges actually do within the 
framework provided (as opposed to what that framework ostensibly allows or 
requires). As John Langbein has noted (from the perspective of the IDS case 
management scheme operated in the US Federal Court):  
 
215
Even among court officials and judges who are ‘management minded’, some are 
likely to take a broader view of the means by which case management objectives may 
be realised than others. To determine whether Australian judges control the progress 
of civil litigation more than they did, say, 50 years ago, would therefore require some 
measurable criteria of past and present judicial attitudes and behaviour, and this kind 
of data cannot be gathered reliably post hoc (if at all). Thus, while the near universal 
adoption of court-connected ADR, case management systems and the recent 
introduction in Australia of so-called ‘less adversarial trials’
 
 
216
                                                 
214 DeGaris, above n 30, 217. 
215 John Langbein, ‘The German Advantage in Civil Procedure’ (1985) 52(4) University of Chicago 
Law Review 823, 860-61. 
216 Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006. 
 may ostensibly 
demonstrate an increase in judicial control of the civil trial process, whether this is in 
fact the case is difficult to establish conclusively. Put differently, there may be an 
394 
 
 
immeasurable divergence between what courts and judges are or were ‘supposed’ to 
do, and what, in practice, they actually do or did.217
Hugh Landerkin and Andrew Pirie have argued that the US Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1983 (which encourage greater judicial control over prehearing 
procedures), ‘most likely [represent] the way it has always been within legal systems, 
and therefore the United States Federal Court system is but an exemplar of this 
reality’.
  
 
218
In practice the [Federal] court has accepted, from its establishment under 
Chief Justice Bowen in 1977, that there is no laissez-faire option: the size 
and complexity of litigation brought to the court for resolution is such that a 
fair, but firm, control of every stage of proceedings in each matter is essential 
if litigation is to be properly dealt with.
 This would also appear to be true of judicial practice in the Australian 
Federal Court. According to Justice Bryan Beaumont: 
 
219
This does not necessarily mean, of course, that judicial practice and attitudes have not 
changed in the Federal Court since its inception. Nor does it mean that the promotion 
of settlement has always had wide-spread judicial support. As noted above, Justice 
Andrew Rogers expressed the view in 1987 that Australian ‘judges have refrained 
from the [settlement] role accepted by their Brethren in the United States.
 
 
220
                                                 
217 This difficulty was well expressed by Herbert Kritzer: ‘[The] discussion suggests that proposals for 
the judge to become more actively involved in the non-adjudicative aspects of adjudication would 
sharply alter the traditional role of the judge. But this assumes that the proposed changes do in fact 
represent changes’. Kritzer, above n 53. 
218 Landerkin and Pirie, above n 37, 266. 
219 Beaumont, above n 76, 163. 
220 Rogers, ‘Judges in Search of Justice’, above n 128. 
 In 1994, 
Annesley DeGaris conducted a survey of Federal Court judge’s attitudes towards 
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their role in the production of settlement. 221
In general, Federal Court judges do not perceive a prominent role for 
themselves in the settlement process, nor do they perceive that they have no 
role at all. They state, however, that compared to 20 years ago, they are more 
involved in the settlement process .... When asked whether they would favour 
legislation increasing their role in the settlement process 53 % answered ‘no’ 
and 27 % were ‘not sure’.
 While the survey data is also now 
relatively old, it provides empirical support for the proposition that the judicial role 
has evolved. Annesley DeGaris found that: 
 
222
73 % of judges feel that they should not become involved in the settlement 
process unless asked by the parties. However, 60% state that a judge should 
attempt to facilitate a settlement although not asked to do so by either party. 
The distinction between these seemingly contradictory findings appears to be 
based on the use of the word ‘involved’ (implying participation) ... and the 
word ‘facilitate’ (implying encouragement). Thus ... Federal judges are 
willing to encourage or facilitate settlement, but do not feel that they should 
participate or become involved [substantively] in settlement discussions.
  
 
Moreover, Annesley DeGaris found that ‘some judges favour an increased role in the 
settlement process’, and observed that judges were more likely to facilitate than to 
evaluate: 
 
223
                                                 
221 DeGaris, above n 30, 225. 
222 Ibid 225. 
223 Ibid 225-26. 
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This finding mirrors the US studies outlined above, and is highly significant in the 
current context. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the classic mediation model is 
ideologically facilitative (not evaluative) in nature. If Annesley DeGaris’ 
interpretation of the survey data is correct, then (even as long ago as 1994) a majority 
of Federal Court judges would have viewed a facilitative mode of judicial mediation 
as an appropriate exercise of judicial power. Indeed, Annesley DeGaris quoted one 
judge (who ‘best summarised’ the majority view) as saying that: 
 
I think that all Australian judges, certainly all members of this Court, are very 
much aware of the desirability of parties achieving settlements. The policy 
which I adopt is to foster the idea of settlement discussions as an when this 
seems appropriate. In some cases it will be entirely pointless; it may be 
obvious that there is a substantial issue which has to be resolved by a court. 
In other cases the parties may be sophisticated and well represented; an 
enquiry or hint from time to time may be useful, but anything more may be 
counter-productive. In other cases ... more direct intervention may be 
justified. I am not adverse [sic] to saying quite bluntly that I think that the 
parties ought to become more involved in negotiations. However, I would 
never get involved with the details of those negotiations except with the 
consent of the parties and having first informed them that I would regard 
myself as being disqualified from hearing the case if it in fact proceeds.224
Annesley DeGaris’ survey remains the only one of its kind in Australia, but numerous 
anecdotal reports can be cited to the effect that Australian judges attempt to facilitate 
settlement between disputants. In a recent article, Chief Justice French personally 
 
 
                                                 
224 DeGaris, above n 30, 228-29.  
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recalled utilising O 27 of the Federal Court Rules (that parties seek leave before a 
subpoena may be issued)225
In some cases of a complex nature, I have invited the potential respondents to 
subpoenas to be present at the leave application in order that there may be 
sensible negotiation of the scope of documents being sought, the way in 
which they may be produced and any confidentiality conditions that may be 
necessary.
 as a mechanism to facilitate negotiations between the 
parties: 
 
226
ADR commentators have made similar observations. Laurence Boulle has concluded 
that ‘judges ... often attempt to promote compromises between the parties, either by 
suggesting or intimating that they attempt to negotiate a settlement or by constructing 
orders which give something to each side,’
 
 
227
Judges may use facilitative processes when encouraging settlement – these 
may vary from a discussion of the ‘issues’ and a suggestion that settlement 
be attempted to judges providing a preliminary view (an evaluation) on 
issues that have been raised and the evidence that may be required. Other 
judges may use facilitative processes and techniques of summary and 
reframing when conducting concurrent evidence (‘hot tub’) processes or 
when involved in specialist ‘problem-solving’ courts.
 and Tania Sourdin has stated that: 
 
228
                                                 
225 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended). 
226 French, above n 83, 9. 
227 Boulle, above n 6, 132. 
228 Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’, above n 13, 66. 
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Whether or not the judicial function in Australia has or has not actually evolved, 
therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that Australian judges do regularly engage 
in facilitative processes (and to a lesser extent evaluative processes) with a view to 
securing settlement. Of course, this fact alone does not necessarily mean that the 
judicial promotion of settlement accords with the requirements of Ch III. Such a 
conclusion would confuse cause and effect because, as noted earlier, the Constitution 
controls what judges can do, not vice versa. That being so, what are the notional 
limits of judicial discretion in these matters, and by whom are these limits determined? 
This question is addressed in the final section of this Chapter. 
 
A ‘Procedural Continuum’ 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that what judges and courts ‘do’ cannot be 
reduced to binary rules, and that what is considered judicial will fluctuate in 
accordance with the changing social, political and economic demands placed upon the 
judiciary. It also indicates that the expansion of court-associated ADR and case 
management (and less adversarial trials) has influenced the nature of the judicial role 
and the judicial process more generally. While this influence has been especially 
apparent in the US, it has not been exclusive to that jurisdiction.229 Australia has also 
witnessed a blending of dispute resolution models, processes and ideologies, and the 
maintenance of strict typological boundaries between these models, processes and 
ideologies has become increasingly untenable. 230
                                                 
229 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146, 168 (Kirby J). 
230 As Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin explain, constructing ‘the choice as one between ADR or 
litigation … carries the erroneous assumption that both ADR and the formal system are homogenous’. 
Above n 6, 52. 
 It is widely accepted that judges 
engage in facilitative processes and techniques, and that (in certain jurisdictions at 
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least) they may have done so for some time. A smaller proportion of judges would 
also appear to engage in evaluative techniques in certain instances. The use of these 
processes and techniques may be subtle, and may take place in the shadow of an 
available power, order or function, as well as in the exercise of it.  
 
In procedural terms, therefore, it is simply not possible to delineate absolutely 
between the processes comprising adjudication and mediation. Martin Shapiro has 
recognised this reality, and proposed that  
 
it would be wise to begin over, employing a root concept of “courtness” but 
more freely accepting the vast variety of social institutions and behaviours 
loosely related to that concept without worrying about where “true courtness” 
ends and something else begins.231
It is suggested, on this basis, that adjudication and mediation are more aptly described 
as theoretical archetypes which occupy opposing ends of the same ‘procedural 
continuum’.
  
 
232
                                                 
231 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and political analysis (1986), 1-2. 
232 This diagram draws upon two sources in particular. The first source is the ‘adjudication matrix’ 
developed by Marc Galanter, discussed above. See: Marc Galanter, ‘Adjudication, Litigation and 
Related Phenomena’, above n 50. The second source is the ‘mediation abacus’ developed by John 
Wade, Sue Gribben and Laurence Boulle at Bond University’s Dispute Resolution Centre, which 
recognises a number of variable features in mediation. The mediation abacus does not attempt to 
correlate the features identified with formal adjudication, but it does anticipate the use/adoption by 
mediators of techniques/processes more commonly associated with formal adjudication. In a sense, 
therefore, the ‘procedural continuum’ envisaged here is simply an expansion upon this model: John 
Wade, ‘Mediation  – The Terminological Debate’ (1994) 5 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 204. 
 The mediation end of the continuum may be further extended so as to 
range from purely facilitative to evaluative in nature, encompassing both the variety 
of mediation models that exist in practice and the range of interventions adopted by 
judges. So expressed, the procedural relationship between adjudication and mediation 
in the judicial role may be represented diagrammatically as follows: 
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Whether a particular discretionary function has been exercised in accordance with the 
rule against bias (ergo the requirements of Ch III) will depend where on the 
procedural continuum the boundaries of acceptable judicial practice lie in the 
circumstances. 233  These boundaries will be estimated in the first instance by 
individual judges, having regard to any relevant practice directions and his/her own 
personal views as to the nature of the judicial function. Ultimately, however, the 
boundaries of acceptable practice will be determined by appellate courts. 234
 
 By 
sanctioning or condemning specific exercises of case management discretion, 
appellate courts are able (if they wish) to place markers on the procedural continuum 
as indicators to judges in subsequent cases (and as a means of managing the flow of 
subsequent appeals). This conclusion reinforces the importance of appellate 
jurisdiction to the rule of law. 
                                                 
233 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146, 169 (Kirby J). 
234 According to Sir Anthony Mason; ‘appellate courts should ensure that the correct approach [to case 
management] is adopted’. ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’, above n 43. 
Adjudication 
  Archetype 
Facilitative Evaluative 
     Mediation 
    Archetype 
Less judicial participation    More judicial participation
  
Figure 2: Procedural Continuum 
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Appellate Guidance in the Exercise of Discretion? 
 
What guidance, then, have appellate courts (and the High Court in particular) 
provided in the exercise of case management discretion? Unsurprisingly, given the 
presumption that the judiciary should only decide legal issues (and especially 
constitutional issues) when necessary on the facts, 235 they have provided very little. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that case management concerns (such as the availability of 
resources) will be a legitimate consideration. In Sali v SPC Ltd (‘Sali v SPC’),236 the 
appellant contended that a Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria had erred in 
failing to grant him an adjournment, and that this refusal had in effect denied him a 
right of appeal, because (as the listing master was fully aware) his Counsel was 
unable to commence preparation due to other commitments.237 A bare majority of the 
High Court (Toohey and Gaudron JJ dissenting, Mason CJ not sitting)238
entitled to consider claims by litigants in other cases awaiting hearing ... as 
well as the interests of the parties ... What might be perceived as an injustice 
to a party when considered only in the context of an action between parties 
may not be so when considered in a context which includes the claims of 
other litigants and the public interest in achieving the most efficient use of 
court resources. 
 found no 
such error and dismissed the appeal. Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ also confirmed 
that judges are: 
  
239
 
 
                                                 
235 (1908) 6 CLR 469, 590. See also: Lambert v Weichelt (1954) 28 ALJR 282, 283 (Dixon CJ), Cheng 
v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248, 270 [58] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ), Re Patterson; Ex 
parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 473-74 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
236 (1993) 116 ALR 625. 
237 Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625, 627. 
238 Ibid 636. 
239 Ibid, 629. 
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On the other hand, in State of Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd, (‘JL Holdings’), the 
High Court emphasised that the judiciary’s ‘ultimate aim’ is to ensure individual 
justice, irrespective of case management objectives.240 On the facts, the trial judge 
had denied the respondents request to amend documents after the commencement of 
proceedings, but before the hearing date, pursuant to a discretion provided under the 
Federal Court Rules 1979. 241  Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ held that case 
management principles (and in particular the efficient operation of the court system) 
‘should not have been allowed to prevail over the injustice of shutting the applicants 
out from raising an arguable defence, thus precluding the determination of an issue 
between the parties’.242
Case management is not an end in itself. It is an important and useful aid for 
ensuring the prompt and efficient disposal of litigation. But it ought always to 
be borne in mind, even in changing times, that the ultimate aim of a court is the 
attainment of justice and no principle of case management can be allowed to 
supplant that aim. 
 Their Honours warned that: 
 
243
                                                 
240 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146. 
241 Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), Order 13 Rule 2. 
242 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146, 155 [5] (Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh 
JJ). 174, (Kirby J). 
243 Ibid 154. 
 
 
Thus, while the expediency of trial procedures will ordinarily be a legitimate 
consideration in the exercise of case management discretion, in the circumstances at 
hand the refusal to allow the respondents to submit evidence amounted to a breach of 
procedural fairness. Kirby J agreed with the joint judgment, and added that: 
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Alterations to the judicial role have been accommodated within the broad 
discretions conferred by Rules expressed in unqualified terms. Whilst such 
Rules may not be limited by particular language, they do imply parameters 
which must be understood by reference to the conventional requirements of 
justice ... [O]bviously in respect of federal courts, and possibly State courts, 
constitutional considerations establish the outer limits of permissible 
managerial practices.244
Sali v SPC and JL Holdings establish the ‘outer limits’ of acceptable judicial practice 
as regards the weight to be attached to case management objectives.
 
 
245 Neither of 
these decisions provides any concrete guidance, however, as to where the appropriate 
balance between quantitative-justice and qualitative-efficiency will lie in specific 
circumstances.246 Both of these cases also concerned the fair hearing rule, and it is 
primarily in this context (and more specifically the limits of the discretionary power 
to refuse amendments after filing or to adjourn proceedings) that the limits of case 
management discretion have since been considered.247
                                                 
244 Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146,168-69. 
245 In Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172, [40] (a case involving the exercise of discretion to 
overturn orders made in absentia when acceptable reasons for absence are subsequently presented) 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ applied Sali and confirmed that ‘the rights of the public in 
the efficient discharge by courts of their functions must be weighed against unreasonable delay in 
concluding litigation’.  
246 In Sir Anthony Mason’s view, it ‘may be that J.L. Holdings has been misinterpreted by some judges 
as an authority for excessive leniency. If so, appellate courts should ensure that the correct approach is 
adopted as a counter to the tendency already mentioned’. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Future of 
Adversarial Justice’, above n 43; citing Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189, 220; Lord 
Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report, Lord Chancellor’s Department, London (1995), 154. 
 It is also in this context (and 
247 This is unsurprising. As explained in Chapter 1, the primary impetus behind case management has 
been the need to reduce the costs and length of litigation. Allowing claims to be amended after filing or 
to grant adjournments will often add considerably to both. Recent examples include: Black & Decker 
(Australasia) Pty Ltd v GMCA Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1623 (Unreported, Finkelstein J, 26 October 2007), 
[2]; Cassar v Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1386, (Unreported, Rothman J, 23 
December 2008). [18] – [24]; Chameleon Mining NL v Murchison Metals Ltd [2009] FCA 137 
(Unreported, Jacobson J, 5 February 2009), [9] – [15]; Finerty v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 
[2008] FCA 1136 (Unreported, Spender J, 23 July 2008), [29] – [31]; Smolle v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2008] FCA 1065 (Unreported, Jessup J, 18 July 2008), [68]; Williams v 
Calivil Park Holsteins Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 31 (Unreported, Schmidt AJ, 12 February 2009), [20] – 
[21]; Thoo v Kelly (2008) 169 FCR 470 [52] (Lindgren J); Curtin v University of New South Wales 
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more specifically the exclusion of rules of evidence) that the limits of the LAT 
process have been considered.248
During the course of argument a judge will often follow the common, and 
sometimes necessary, course of formulating propositions for the purpose of 
enabling their correctness to be tested, and as a general rule anything that a 
judge says in the course of argument will be merely tentative and exploratory. 
However, a fair-minded observer would have been justified in thinking that 
the remarks of the learned trial judge in the present case were not of that 
description. He expressly said that he thought it might assist counsel in 
handling the matter to know that he would not accept the evidence of either 
party – or even an admission – unless it were corroborated. He repeated, and 
gave reasons for, his rejection of the credit of both parties. He adhered to his 
statements even after it had been submitted that he should decline to hear the 
  
 
What, though, of the rule against bias? What guidance, if any, has the High Court 
provided as to the boundaries of judicial conduct in this context? As explained 
previously, it is this rule which presents the primary obstacle to the development of 
judicial mediation. It is self-evident that case management objectives are also 
incapable of supplanting the rule against bias, but the outer limits provided by the 
High Court are extremely broad. The High Court sketched these boundaries in Re 
Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (‘Re Watson’); finding a reasonable apprehension of bias 
to have arisen by virtue of statements made by the trial judge during an interlocutory 
hearing: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
[2009] NSWSC 269 (Unreported, Hall J, 9 April 2009); Mijac Investments Pty Ltd v Graham [2009] 
FCA 303 (Unreported, Gordon J, 1 April 2009) [22] – [24] (Gordon J).  
248 Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365; Crestin v Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420. 
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proceedings further. No doubt he had read and considered the affidavits 
already filed, but he had not seen either party in the witness box, and the 
matters which led him to hold that he could not believe them had not been 
fully examined either in evidence or in argument. It hardly needs to be said 
that he was not at that stage entitled to form the settled view that neither party 
was worthy of credit, or to impose on them both the extra-legal requirement 
that their evidence must be corroborated, but a reasonable observer would 
have been justified in thinking that he had done so.249
Thus, following Re Watson, the outer limits of acceptable conduct vis-à-vis the rule 
against bias can be said to lie somewhere between the expression of ‘tentative or 
exploratory’ views, and statements of opinions that indicate a ‘settled view’. These 
general boundaries have been reaffirmed on a number of occasions,
 
 
250 as has the fact 
that a failure to intervene may ‘occasion an injustice’. 251
It seems to us that a trial judge who made necessary rulings but otherwise sat 
completely silent throughout a non-jury trial with the result that his or her 
views about the issues, problems and technical difficulties involved in the 
 In Vakauta v Kelly, the 
appellant contended that the trial judge in a personal injuries claim had made various 
comments during the hearing indicating a general distrust of medical expert testimony. 
Finding no bias (actual or ostensible) to have arisen, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ 
stated that: 
 
                                                 
249 Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 264 ((Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ).  
250 Re Judge Leckie; Ex parte Felman (1977) 52 ALJR 155, 158; Re Justice Lusink; Ex parte Shaw 
(1980) 55 ALJR 12 at 14, 16; Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-294, 300; Re 
JRL, Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 349, 351, 359, 368, 371; Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 
CLR 1, 20; Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70, 100 (Gaudron and McHugh 
JJ); Hinton v Mill (1991) 57 SASR 97, 99 (King CJ). 
251 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263, 28-82 (Kirby P). 
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case remained unknown until they emerged as final conclusions in his or her 
judgment would not represent a model to be emulated.252
More recently, in Johnson v Johnson,
 
 
253 the appellant argued that comments made by 
the trial judge during discovery raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, as they 
indicated a prejudgment as regards the credibility of witnesses (in a manner 
comparable to Re Watson).254 Rejecting the appeal, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ (Kirby and Callinan JJ agreeing in separate judgments)255
The reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered 
in the context of ordinary judicial practice ... Judges, at trial or appellate level, 
who, in exchanges with counsel, express tentative views which reflect a 
certain tendency of mind, are not on that account alone to be taken to indicate 
prejudgment. Judges are not expected to wait until the end of a case before 
they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced 
and arguments are presented. On the contrary, they will often form tentative 
opinions on matters in issue, and counsel are usually assisted by hearing 
those opinions, and being given an opportunity to deal with them.
 
explained that: 
 
256
It is worth pausing here briefly to point out that all of the preceding cases involved 
claims of actual or apprehended bias through ‘conduct’ (as opposed to interest, 
association or extraneous information).
 
 
257
                                                 
252 (1989) 167 CLR 568, 571.  
253 (2000) 201 CLR 488. 
254 Ibid 489; Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248. 
255 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 495-511 [20]-[61] (Kirby J); 511-19 [62]-[86] (Callinan J). 
256 Ibid 493 [13]. 
257 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74 (Deane J).  
 And, as explained at length in the following 
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Chapter, it is primarily in this context that the limits of judicial mediation will fall to 
be determined. It is also worth pointing out that the conduct complained of in Re 
Watson and Johnson v Johnson took place during a prehearing stage, whereas 
Vakauta v Kelly involved comments made during the final hearing. Judicial mediation 
is a prehearing function, thus Re Watson and Johnson v Johnson are of more direct 
relevance in the current context, but all of these cases indicate that the High Court is 
willing to afford judges a wide discretion to intervene (by expressing tentative 
opinions) at any stage of the litigation process.  
 
Johnson v Johnson is especially significant for three reasons, however. First of all, 
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ made it clear in that case 
that ‘ordinary judicial practice’ is to be interpreted taking ‘account of the exigencies 
of modern litigation’.258 In so doing the High Court explicitly confirmed what was 
previously only an implication of Sali v SPC; that the requirements of the rule against 
bias are susceptible to changing case management practices and, in particular, the 
‘efficient use of court resources’. 259  The range of permissible interventions has 
increased since Re Watson was decided, because the range of circumstances that 
would indicate to the fictitious bystander that a judge has reached a ‘settled view’ has 
decreased over time.260
The second reason that Johnson v Johnson is significant is that it was decided 
contemporaneous with the High Court’s decision in Ebner v Official Trustee.
 This point is returned to below. 
 
261
                                                 
258 (2000) 201 CLR 488. See also 505 [46] (Kirby J).  
259 Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625, 629. 
260 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 505-06 [46] (Kirby J). 
261 Ebner v Official Trustee had already been heard, but judgment reserved: Johnson v Johnson (2000) 
201 CLR 488, 511, fn 33 (Kirby J). 
 As 
explained in Chapter 4, Gaudron and Kirby JJ’s judgments in that case provided a 
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foothold for the rule against bias as a Ch III implication. 262  No constitutional 
argument was raised in Johnson and Johnson,263 but it seems reasonable to assume 
that their Honours’ (or at least Gaudron and Kirby JJ) were aware of the possibility 
that, by drawing a connection between the rule against bias and the requirements of 
modern litigation, they were exposing the procedural protections potentially afforded 
by Ch III to the demands of case management. In any event, NAALAS v Bradley has 
since confirmed that the rule against bias (taking account of modern litigation 
practices as per Johnson v Johnson) is a Ch III implication.264
This confirmation is of the utmost importance because it reframes the relationship 
between the rule against bias and the Constitution. Earlier it was pointed out that the 
Constitution controls what judges can do, not vice versa. The connection drawn in 
Johnson v Johnson (and to a lesser extent Sali v SPC and JL Holdings) does not 
fundamentally change this proposition (clearly that would be impossible, or judges 
could effectively re-write the Constitution), but it does clarify that the nature of 
judicial power is to be informed, in part, by what judges actually do in practice. This 
conclusion supports the proposition offered in the introduction to this Chapter; that 
the implications drawn from Ch III must be interpreted in light of judicial practice, or 
Ch III jurisprudence runs the risk of being divorced ‘completely from the social 
context within which it exists’.
  
 
265
 
 
                                                 
262 Ibid 362 [79] (Gaudron J); 382-83 [145]-[146] (Kirby J). 
263 Kirby J stated that: ‘I leave aside any requirements that may be inherent in, or implied from, the 
Constitution. The establishment of an integrated Judicature by Ch III of the Constitution undoubtedly 
carries with it various affirmative and negative requirements and implications. However, no party to 
the present appeal (or in the courts below) relied upon a constitutional argument. Without deciding that 
none is available, I put this potential source for the foundation of the Australian rule on judicial 
disqualification to one side’. Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 500 [37]. 
264 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [29] 
(McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
265 Shklar, above n 3.  
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The third reason that Johnson v Johnson is significant is that Kirby J took the 
opportunity in his reasons to summarise existing authorities, and to provide appellate 
courts with relatively detailed guidance as to how allegations of prejudgment should 
be determined.266
1. Appellate courts should apply a presumption against bias:  
 With the exception of the first point provided, Kirby J’s advice does 
not appear to expand existing authorities (some of which are assayed above). While 
expressed in the form of ‘considerations’, His Honour’s guidance may be paraphrased 
in directive form as follows:  
 
Appellate courts should ordinarily assume that judges ‘strive to be 
 independent and impartial’.267
2. Appellate Courts should accept that interventions are generally desirable: 
‘Whatever may have been the tradition in earlier times, opinions favouring 
silence on the part of an adjudicator during a hearing (which is the surest 
means of avoiding most allegations of prejudgment) [should now be seen] as 
carrying risks of an even greater injustice’.
 
 
268
 
 
3. Appellate Courts should assume that lawyers know the difference between 
tentative and inflexible opinions:  
‘Case management and other changes in the administration of justice have 
affected the boundaries of acceptable conduct, and ‘lawyers know that, in 
                                                 
266 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 504-06 [46]. 
267 Ibid 504 [46]. 
268 Ibid 504-05 [46]; citing Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568, 571; Stead v State Government 
Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141, 145. His Honour identified the decision in Re Watson; Ex 
parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 as an exemplar of the ‘tradition in earlier times’. 
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most judicial decision-making, the process is a continuous one. Preliminary 
inclinations do change’.269
4. Appellate courts should bear in mind that the contemporary adversary system 
requires judges to provide tentative opinions:  
 
 
‘The adversary system requires vigorous interaction not only between the 
parties and their representatives but also between the adjudicator and those 
persons. Where the parties are represented by trained lawyers, the latter can be 
taken to be aware of (and presumed, if necessary, to have explained to their 
clients) the character and purpose of tentative opinions that guide the direction 
of the trial and encourage its proper focus. No rule of law should be adopted in 
relation to disqualification for prejudgment which unreasonably undermines, 
or is fundamentally inconsistent with, that system’.270
5. Appellate courts should apply less weight to the importance of witness 
testimony in judicial decision-making than was formerly the case:  
 
 
‘The ‘trend of modern authority’ has been to minimise the emphasis placed on 
judicial ‘impressions of witnesses’ in favour of ‘indisputable facts, 
contemporary documents and the logic of the circumstances’. Thus, statements 
as to the credibility of witnesses or the probative value of witness testimony 
should be considered less likely to indicate bias than may previously have 
been the case’.271
                                                 
269 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 505 [46]; citing Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Judging: 
Reflections on the Moment of Decision’ (1999) 18 Australian Bar Review 4. 
270 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 505 [46]. 
 
271 Ibid; citing State Rail Authority of NSW v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (In liq) (1999) 73 ALJR 
306, 327-30 [87]-[88]; Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 599, 605-06 
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The application of these principles in the lower courts, and their bearing upon the 
development of mediation, is examined in the following Chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This necessarily lengthy Chapter has attempted to demonstrate that judicial conduct 
exists on a procedural continuum (or series of continua) between adjudication and 
mediation archetypes. In Australia, the upper limits of this continuum (that is to say, 
the extent to which judges may ‘mediate’) appear to have expanded over a relatively 
short period of time, reflecting a change in judicial attitudes toward the role and 
obligations of judges in the promotion of settlement. Where on the procedural 
continuum particular mediation functions will fall cannot be detailed prescriptively, 
but appellate courts have provided a limited amount of guidance in this respect. This 
guidance demonstrates that, insofar as the rule against bias is concerned, the 
boundaries of acceptable judicial participation lie somewhere between the expression 
of ‘tentative or exploratory’272 views and statements of opinion that indicate a ‘settled 
view’. 273
                                                                                                                                            
[29]-[35]; Lend Lease Development Pty Ltd v Zemlicka (1985) 3 NSWLR 207, 210-211; Chambers v 
Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1, 8-10. 
272 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 493 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
273 Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 264 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason 
JJ). 
 The following Chapter returns to the mediation ‘pressure points’ identified 
in Chapter 1, and examines the guidance provided by appellate courts as to the outer 
limits of judicial practice in situations comparable to judicial mediation. 
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CHAPTER 8 
IS JUDICIAL MEDIATION ‘JUDICIAL’? 
 
In this, the final substantive Chapter of this thesis, the constitutional principles 
isolated in Chapters 2 to 6 are applied to the dispute resolution theory developed in 
Chapters 1 and 7, in order to determine whether judicial mediation can be carried out 
in accordance with the requirements of Ch III. This Chapter demonstrates that 
Australian judges can and do engage in a facilitative model of mediation without 
offending Ch III, and that the extent to which judges may also engage in evaluative or 
advisory mediation techniques will depend upon the procedural latitude afforded to 
them by appellate courts. It also shows that the range of mediation functions that 
judges can engage in will be greatly increased if informed consent is obtained, and if 
steps are taken to ensure the confidentiality of proceedings. 
 
At the beginning of Chapter 7 it was explained that two questions must be asked in 
order to determine whether (or to what extent) judicial mediation accords with the 
requirements of Ch III. The first question is how, precisely, the power to mediate is, 
or will be, transmitted to courts. The second question is whether (in light of the 
answer to the first question) judicial mediation can be exercised in a manner 
consistent with the rule against bias and the requirements of integrity as they apply in 
a federal and State/territory context. This second question reflects the conclusions 
drawn in Chapters 4 and 6; that the judicial process implication and the Kable 
doctrine both operate, in part, to maintain the inherent jurisdiction of the courts.  
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In anticipation of the first question, a number of Australian processes have already 
been examined which seek to streamline cases for trial in a procedural sense,1 and 
certain less-adversarial trial procedures have been identified which aim to increase 
judicial control over the civil trial process.2 It has also been shown that Australian 
judges are able to encourage settlement between parties during the prehearing stage, 
and that this may take place formally (as a settlement conference) or informally 
(during directions hearings, interlocutory hearings etc). 3
The second part of this Chapter returns to the mediation ‘pressure points’ outlined in 
Chapter 1,
 In addition, it has been 
observed that prehearing conferences and settlement conferences (and to a certain 
extent the Family Court’s less adversarial trial process) are typically implemented by 
the provision of broad discretionary powers, and that the process to be applied during 
these conferences is ordinarily left to the discretion of individual judges. The first part 
of this Chapter demonstrates that judicial mediation has also been (and is in the future 
likely to be) implemented by broad procedural discretions, unfettered by formally 
prescribed processes.  
 
4
                                                 
1 See above Chapter 7 nn 99-110 and accompanying text. 
2 Ibid nn 163-93 and accompanying text. 
3 Ibid nn 111-33 and accompanying text 
4 See above Chapter 1 nn 58-70 and accompanying text. 
 so as to determine whether judicial mediation can be carried out in 
accordance with the rule against bias. A hypothetical judicial mediation scenario is 
constructed in order to test the procedural boundaries set in place by appellate courts, 
and to determine how, or in what circumstances, separate meetings and the 
requirements of confidentiality might undermine the rule against bias (ergo the 
judicial process implication and the Kable doctrine). By plotting the limits of 
acceptable practice on the procedural continuum developed in Chapter 7, the current 
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limits of judicial mediation are approximated, and the ramifications of conduct that 
exceeds these boundaries from a Ch III perspective are identified.  
 
The final part of this Chapter asks whether judicial mediation might undermine the 
integrity of the judiciary. Building on the analysis undertaken in Chapters 4 and 6, 
three reasons are offered as to why judicial mediation is highly unlikely to undermine 
the integrity of Australian courts (federal, State or territory); because judicial 
mediation satisfies the criterion of integrity (public confidence/impartiality); because 
the integrity concept is unlikely to be re-applied save in the most extreme 
circumstances; and because judicial mediation is, in any event, consistent with the 
underlying object of the separation doctrine and the Kable doctrine. 
 
How will judicial mediation be implemented? 
 
It will be noted, with some sense of irony, that the question posed in the title to this 
section embraces the false dichotomy exposed in the preceding chapter.5
                                                 
5 Hillary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, (2nd ed, 2002) 43. 
 To ask how 
judicial mediation will be implemented is to presuppose that judges do not already 
mediate, and as the preceding Chapter demonstrates, it is difficult to draw any rigid 
procedural distinctions between judicial mediation and the processes already 
undertaken during prehearing. The question is nevertheless a necessary one because, 
whatever the true relationship between judicial mediation and existing prehearing 
processes, judges in certain Australian courts have already engaged in (or have 
already been the afforded the opportunity to engage in) discrete processes described 
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as judicial mediation. 6
Options for the implementation of judicial mediation 
 The first matter to be determined, therefore, is how these 
ostensibly discrete processes have been implemented, and how (if at all) they expand 
the settlement role already performed by Australian judges.  
 
 
A variety of options exist for the implementation of judicial mediation. At one 
extreme, lawmakers (including judicial committees enacting rules of court, or Chief 
Justices issuing practice directions) may choose to issue judges with a series of 
narrow and guided discretions that prescribe the mediation process in detail (the 
‘hands-on’ approach). At the other extreme, lawmakers may opt to provide judges 
with a single unqualified discretion to ‘mediate’ (the ‘hands-off’ approach). Sir 
Anthony Mason has expressed a preference for a hands-on approach; at least to the 
extent of providing judges with ‘codified’ guidance in the exercise of discretion. This 
is because, in Sir Anthony’s view, judicial mediation raises the possibility,  
 
not only of coercive influence but of influence which is excessive in the light 
of the judge’s authority and the deference which will be exhibited to his 
evaluation. In any event, there is a case for codifying the principles according 
to which mediations should be conducted. Codification of principles will 
enable review to take place attended by public scrutiny.7
                                                 
6 Mediation processes have also been trialled and/or introduced in various administrative tribunals. See, 
eg, s 109 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), which established a judicial conciliation program 
in the Industrial Court of NSW. See also Monika Schmidt, ‘A Successful Experiment in Judicial 
Mediation’, (2006) 18(9) Judicial Officers Bulletin 7; Tania Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’ (1996) 14 Australian Bar Review 185, 199 (fn 68). 
7 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’ (Paper presented at the 17th AIJA Annual 
Conference, Adelaide, 7 August 1999). 
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The second half of this Chapter demonstrates that the dangers posed by judges 
exerting coercive or excessive influence can be sufficiently mitigated in practice. 
Regardless, though, and as the following section demonstrates, the approach favoured 
by lawmakers to date has been predominantly hands-off in nature.8
Existing judicial mediation processes 
  
 
 
The hands-off approach to judicial mediation is consistent with the approach adopted 
in relation to prehearing processes in general.9
(5) A judge or master who attempts to settle a proceeding or to resolve any 
issues arising in a proceeding is not disqualified from taking further part in 
the proceeding but will be so disqualified if he or she is appointed as a 
mediator in relation to the proceeding.
 As noted in Chapter 7, for example, s 
65 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) provides that: 
 
(4) The court may itself endeavour to achieve a negotiated settlement of a 
civil proceeding or resolution of any issues arising in a civil proceeding. 
 
10
In addition to being the source of power for settlement conferences in the South 
Australia Supreme Court (the (‘SA Supreme Court’), s 65 provides judges with the 
capacity to engage in ‘mediation’.
   
 
11
                                                 
8 It is not suggested that the ‘judicial mediation’ programmes discussed in this Chapter constitute an 
exhaustive summary of judicial mediation in Australia. As explained at length in Chapter 7, it is 
difficult to draw clear distinctions between various prehearing processes, thus it may be argued that 
other processes are in fact a form of judicial mediation. It is also possible that judicial mediation has 
been implemented informally, or under a different name. 
9 See above Chapter 7 nn 99-133 and accompanying text. 
10 As amended by the Statutes Amendment (Mediation, Arbitration and Referral) Act 1996 (SA), s10. 
11 Sourdin, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Trends’, above n 6, 199. 
 In neither case, however, does s 65 provide any 
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guidance as to the process to be followed. The capacity of judges to mediate is 
reinforced by r 220 (‘Mediation’) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), sub-s 
(4) of which provides that a ‘Judge or Master may be a mediator’, but again, no 
process is provided, and no practice direction appears to have been implemented in 
support of this broad discretionary power.12 It may be that the opportunity to mediate 
has not yet been taken up by any judges in South Australia, or it may be that the 
exercise of this discretion has simply taken place ‘off the record’.13
In 2002, a judicial mediation programme was trialled in the New South Wales District 
Court (the ‘NSW District Court’).
 In either event, it 
would not appear that any formal process for judicial mediation has been prescribed 
(so far at least) in South Australia. Nor have any specific principles been codified 
‘according to which mediations should be conducted’; beyond the general case 
management objectives contained in r 3. 
 
14  The pilot project is now complete, although 
judges still mediate in ‘special cases’.15 Judicial mediations are held pursuant to the 
general overriding objective contained in the s 56 of Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) 
for the ‘just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings’, the 
power to give directions under s 61 ‘for the speedy determination of the real issues 
between the parties to the proceedings’, and the power under s 26 to refer matters for 
mediation. 16
                                                 
12 This conclusion is based, in part, on a telephone conversation held with the Supreme Court Registry 
on 12th August, 2009. 
13 James A. Wall, Lawrence F Schiller, and Ronald J. Ebert, ‘Judicial Settlement Techniques’ (1981) 5 
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 39, 89. 
14 The NSW District Court has the capacity to exercise Ch III judicial power and is therefore subject to 
the implications of the Kable doctrine. See above Chapter 6 nn 117-27. 
15 Letter from Judge Margaret Sidis to Iain Field, 20th August 2009. See Appendix. 
16 Ibid. 
 No formal procedures for the conduct of judicial mediations were 
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provided.  However, according to Judge Margaret Sidis – who chaired the pilot 
project – judicial mediations are conducted according to 5 specific rules: 
 
1. All persons present, including the judge, lawyers, experts and 
parties must sign a Mediation Agreement that binds them to 
maintaining the confidentiality of everything said and done during 
the mediation. 
2. The judge does not give legal advice. 
3. The judge does not make any decisions or rulings.  The judge’s 
function is to assist the parties to come to their own resolution of 
their dispute.  
4. All notes taken by the judge are shredded at the conclusion of the 
mediation.  Only the signed agreement will remain on the court 
file as evidence of the commitment to confidentiality. 
5. The judge will not hear the case if the mediation is not successful.  
The file will be marked “Not to be Listed before Judge X” 
 
In addition the parties are required to have present at the mediation the 
persons who are responsible for the ultimate decision concerning the 
resolution of the dispute.17
In the NSW District Court, therefore, certain of ‘the principles in accordance with 
which mediations should be conducted’ are made explicit to judges. However, and 
crucially, none of these principles are codified in the form of court rules or practice 
directions. The principles encapsulated in these rules are examined below, but it is 
 
 
                                                 
17 Letter from Judge Margaret Sidis to Iain Field, 20th August 2009. See Appendix. See also, Judge 
Margaret Sidis, ‘Judicial Mediation in the District Court’ (2006) 18(9) Judicial Officers Bulletin 74.  
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worth reinforcing the fact that the process is entirely confidential, that judge-
mediators are instructed to avoid evaluating legal rights or positions (although not 
necessarily other interests), that judges cannot subsequently adjudicate a matter that 
they have mediated, and that all records of the mediation are destroyed.  
 
More recently, judicial mediation has been introduced in the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia (the ‘WA Supreme Court’). The ‘Supreme Court Mediation 
Programme’ (the ‘SCMP (WA)’) is implemented by practice direction,18 and states 
that the ‘Court may direct that a mediation be conducted by a Judge of the Court if 
warranted by the particular aspects of the case’.19 The source of authority for judicial 
mediation is Part VI of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA),20
Neither the Act nor the SCMP (WA) prescribes a process to be followed during 
mediation. A number of general directions are made in the SCMP (WA) detailing 
matters such as privilege and confidentiality,
 which authorises the 
provision of ‘judicial mediation conferences’. Section 69 of the Act permits mediation 
to be ‘carried out by a mediator under a direction of the Court and subject to the rules 
of court’. Section 69 does not explicitly authorise mediation by judges, but it does not 
prohibit it; defining a mediator as ‘a person approved by the Chief Justice to be a 
mediator under the rules of court’.  
 
21 the likely duration of the process,22
                                                 
18 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Supreme Court Mediation Programme (Practice Direction No 
2 of 2008), now contained in the Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice 
Directions (22nd January 2009), PD 4.2.1. 
19 Ibid PD 4.2.1 (3). 
20 Ibid PD 4.3.1 (5). 
21 Ibid PD 4.2.1 (5). 
22 Ibid PD 4.2.1 (18). 
 
and the obligations of counsel prior to mediation (including reality testing and doubt 
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creation – in order, presumably, to ‘soften clients up’ for compromise).23 However, 
none of these directions provide any indication as to how, exactly, judges are to 
mediate. Thus, the SCMP (WA) makes no attempt to codify ‘the principles according 
to which mediations should be conducted’.24
The possibility also exists for judges in the District Court of Western Australia (the 
‘WA District Court’) to engage in judicial mediation. Rule 24 (2) (e) of the District 
Court Rules 2005 (WA) provides the Court with the power, inter alia, to ‘direct some 
or all of the parties to confer on a “without prejudice” basis in order to settle the case 
or, failing settlement, to resolve as many of the issues between them as possible’. In 
its response to NADRAC’s Issues Paper ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Civil 
Justice System,’
  
 
25
In practice the mediation is listed before a registrar of the Court. The power is 
wide enough to allow the mediation to be listed before a Judge of the Court, 
though this has not as of yet been done ... The general framework for a 
mediation conference is the same as a pre-trial conference.
 the WA District Court stated that: 
 
26
The framework referred to is contained in rr 35-35A of the District Court Rules 2005 
(WA) which, as explained in Chapter 7, does not provide any guidance as to how 
judges should, in fact, mediate. As in South Australia, it may be that judges in the 
 
  
                                                 
23 Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions (22nd January 2009), PD 4.2.1 
(26). These techniques were explained in Chapter 1 above nn 49-51. 
24 Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’, above n 7. The extent to which techniques such as reality 
testing and doubt creation may undermine the rule against bias (and Ch III), and the extent to which 
judges actually engage in these techniques in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, is considered in 
more detail in the second half of this Chapter. 
25 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the 
Civil Justice System, NADRAC IP (2009). 
26 District Court of Western Australia, ‘Background Paper: The WA District Court’s ADR Program’ 
(Submission in response to the NADRAC Issues Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Civil 
Justice System, 15th May 2009), 5. 
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WA District Court have in fact mediated informally during prehearing, and that in 
both jurisdictions judges are reluctant to acknowledge the full extent of their 
participation during prehearing due to uncertainty as to the limits of acceptable 
practice. Tania Sourdin suggests that this uncertainty may be more pronounced at the 
State than the federal level:27
For example, Chief Justice Spigelman of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales anticipates that there will be no situations where judges of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court will be involved in mediations. This approach 
would appear to be consistent with some other jurisdictions within Australia. 
However, in contrast, in the federal jurisdictions, judges and tribunal 
members are more likely to act as mediators and there has been no policy 
direction to suggest that they should not. Indeed, the Chief Justices’ Council 
Declaration has stated that there are circumstances where it is appropriate for 
a judge to mediate.
  
 
28
This suggestion appears to draw on personal observation and experience, as opposed 
to empirical data. In any event, given that judges in NSW District Court and the WA 
Supreme Court now openly engage in judicial mediation, it may no longer be accurate 
to say that federal judges and tribunal members are ‘more likely’ to act as mediators 
than State judges (although they may be more willing to acknowledge that they do so). 
Nevertheless, it is true that Federal Court Judges have had the formal capacity to 
 
 
                                                 
27 It is worth pointing out that this proposition is not contradicted by the conclusion, drawn earlier in 
this thesis, that the implications of Ch III are generally greater at the federal level because, whether 
elevated to the level of constitutional imperative or not, the rule against bias is an integral part of the 
judicial process in all Australian jurisdictions. 
28 Tania Sourdin, ‘Facilitative Judging’ (2004) Law In Context 64, 70; citing Chief Justice James 
Spigelman, ‘Mediation and the Court’ (2001) 39(2) Law Society Journal 62; and Australia and New 
Zealand Council of Chief Justices, Position Paper and Declaration of Principle on Court-connected 
Mediation (Council of Chief Justices, 1999). 
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engage in mediations for some time and that a limited number of judicial mediations 
have been held in that Court.29
(1) A mediation conference must be conducted:  
 Order 72 r 7 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 sets out 
the following guidelines for mediation conferences conducted by court officers:  
 
(a) in accordance with any directions given by the Court or a Judge; 
and 
(b) as a structured process in which the mediator assists the parties 
by encouraging and facilitating discussion between the parties 
so that: 
(i). they may communicate effectively with each other 
about the dispute; and 
(ii). if agreement is reached and if the parties consent, the 
agreement can be included in a consent order under 
Order 35, rule 10. 
 
It will be noted that, although r 7 alludes to a ‘structured process’, it does not in fact 
prescribe one. Even if it did, r 7 does not apply to mediations conducted by a judge.30
                                                 
29 Chief Justice Michael Black, ‘The Courts Tribunals and ADR’ (1996) 7 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 138, 138. 
30 Federal Court Rules 1979, O 72 r2(1). 
 
Rather, according to Order 72 r 3, if ‘a Judge undertakes a mediation, the Judge may 
give any directions with respect to the conduct of the mediation that the Judge thinks 
fit’. Thus, in the Federal Court as the SA Supreme Court, the NSW District Court and 
the WA Supreme Court, judicial mediations are not intended to follow a prescribed 
process, and no principles are formally codified according to which mediations should 
be conducted.  
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In summary, the trend amongst lawmakers at both the State and federal level has been 
to adopt a hands-off approach to the development of judicial mediation. Unless 
concerns such as those highlighted by Sir Anthony (noted above) manifest in 
sufficiently numerous or serious abuses of discretion, it seems likely that this trend 
will continue. David Spencer has reached a similar conclusion, considering it 
‘unlikely that the appointment of judicial mediators [will] include anything beyond 
the criterion of the role and the mandate to mediate cases coming before the courts’.31
Formal distinctions between prehearing processes? 
  
 
Even if no formally structured process is provided, however, is it possible that, simply 
by describing a prehearing process as ‘judicial mediation’, lawmakers have given 
license to a broader range of prehearing techniques and processes than would 
otherwise have been available to judges? Put differently, is there an inherent 
difference between judicial mediation and, say, settlement conferences?  
 
 
Sir Laurence Street has argued that, in certain courts, ‘a re-vamp of the well-
understood and useful settlement or prehearing conference has been mis-described as 
mediation’.32 It would appear that, in Sir Laurence’s view, the fundamental difference 
between these processes is that mediation involves private meetings between the 
mediator and one of the parties.33
                                                 
31 David Spencer, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 1’ (2006) 17 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 130, 138. 
32 Sir Laurence Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’ (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 794, 
795. See also Sir Laurence Street, ‘The Courts and Mediation – A Warning’ (1991) 2 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 203. 
33 Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’, above n 32, 795. 
 It has already been intimated that this may be an 
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oversimplification,34 and this proposition is further demonstrated later in this Chapter. 
While Sir Laurence’s conclusion may assume a particular (and inflexible) definition 
of mediation, however, it does highlight the fact that theoretical distinctions between 
dispute resolution models can be blurred in practice;35 a possibility which should be 
borne in mind when examining processes described as ‘judicial mediation’. This 
raises the question: how do the statutes, court rules and/or practice directions outlined 
above define judicial mediation, and how do they distinguish between judicial 
mediation and other prehearing processes? The short answer is that they do not, 
although subtle distinctions can be drawn in certain instances by analogy and 
deduction. In demonstrating this point, it is useful to recall the three overarching 
categories of dispute resolution identified by NADRAC; facilitative, 
advisory/evaluative and determinative.36
For example, r 4 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 merely states that ‘“mediation” 
means mediation conducted under a mediation order’. Order 72 r 7 of the Federal 
Court Rules provides a more detailed definition of mediation, which (as noted above) 
draws attention to the mediator’s role in ‘encouraging and facilitating discussion’.
  
 
37 
This definition suggests a classical model of mediation. However, r 4 only applies to 
mediations conducted by registrars. 38
                                                 
34 See above Chapter 1 nn 54-57 and accompanying text.  
35 Australian National Mediator Standards, Approval Standards (2008), 5. 
36 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) Dispute Resolution Terms 
(AGPS, Canberra, September 2003), 4. See above Chapter 1 n 7 and accompanying text. 
37 The definition provided in r 7 is similar to the various broad definitions of mediation considered in 
Chapter 1. For example, Tania Sourdin states that, ‘at its simplest, mediation involves the intervention 
of a trained, impartial third party … who will assist the parties to reach their own solutions’. Tania 
Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, (2005) 26. Laurence Boulle has previously defined mediation 
as ‘a decision-making process in which the parties are assisted by a third party, the mediator; the 
mediator attempts to improve the process of decision-making and to assist the parties reach an outcome 
to which each of them can assent, without having a binding decision-making function’. Laurence 
Boulle, Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2005), 3. 
38 Federal Court Rules 1979 (no. 140 as amended), O 72 r 2. 
 Even if this definition were to apply to 
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mediations conducted by judges, the Federal Court Rules provide no definition of 
‘case management conferences’; so there is nothing to say that judges cannot also 
encourage and facilitate discussions (or indeed evaluate the parties positions) during 
these conferences. Indeed, and as explained in Chapter 7, there is evidence to suggest 
that, in practice, federal court judges will utilise case management conferences (and 
other case management machinery) to facilitate negotiation between the parties.39
                                                 
39 Justice Robert French, ‘Managerial Judging in the Federal Court’ (2005) 32(8) BRIEF 5, 9; Annesley 
DeGaris, ‘The Role of Federal Court Judges in the Settlement of Disputes’ (1994) 13 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 217, 225-26. See also: Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Studies 
in Comparative Civil and Criminal Procedure: Volume 2 - Innovations in Civil and Criminal 
Procedure, Consultant’s Paper by John Bishop (1978), 19. 
 
 
The distinction between judicial mediation and other prehearing processes is also 
uncertain in the Supreme Court of South Australia. Section 65 of the Supreme Court 
Act 1935 (SA) prevents judges who have mediated from subsequently adjudicating, 
but no such prohibition exists if a judge has merely attempted to ‘settle a proceeding 
or to resolve any issues’. Thus, s 65 draws an implicit distinction between the terms 
‘negotiated settlement’ and ‘resolution, on the one hand, and ‘mediation’, on the other. 
However, nowhere in the Act are these processes defined. Rule 4 of the Supreme 
Court Rules 2006 (SA) provides some guidance; defining mediation as ‘a process by 
which a person (the mediator) assists the parties to a dispute to reach an agreement to 
settle the dispute’. Rule 4 goes on state that: 
 
Mediation may, for example, involve -  
(a) conciliation;  
(b) suggestion of a possible basis for agreement or further negotiation.  
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However, the Rules do not define what ‘conciliation’ is. It may be, as the Australian 
National Mediator Standards suggest, that the term ‘conciliation’ incorporates ‘an 
“advisory” component, or ... the provision of expert information and advice’.40 This 
definition is supported by example (b), and would also explain why judges are 
excluded from adjudicating (because the provision of advice could indicate that a 
judge has formed a ‘settled view’, thus undermining the rule against bias).41 Were the 
Supreme Court Rules to state that settlement conferences are purely facilitative in 
nature this distinction could be highly significant. However, there is nothing in the 
Supreme Court Rules to suggest that judges conducting settlement conferences should 
not also suggest ‘a possible basis for agreement’; and as NADRAC has observed, 
‘terms such as “conferencing” and “conciliation” are used in almost as many ways as 
“mediation.”42
As judicial mediations in the NSW District Court are conducted according to the 
general objectives of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), no formal distinctions can 
be drawn between judicial mediation and the other prehearing processes established in 
that Act. However, the only prehearing processes to be formally prescribed in NSW 
are directions hearings which, as explained in the previous Chapter, are ideologically 
procedural in nature.
 
 
43
                                                 
40 Australian National Mediator Standards, above n 35, 5. 
41 In Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 264 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ), the High Court stated that the rule against bias will be undermined if a judge’s statements 
were to indicate a ‘settled view’. This point is considerd further in the second half of this Chapter. See 
also Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 493 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
42 NADRAC, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Civil Justice System, above n 25, 6 [2.21]. 
43 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 61-62. 
 Thus, it may be possible to distinguish between judicial 
mediations and other prehearing processes in the NSW District Court, on the basis 
that the former involves the facilitation of substantive issues during prehearing, 
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whereas the latter merely streamlines issues for trial. Whether any such distinction is 
or was reflected in practice is uncertain, a point returned to below. 
 
A more conceptually satisfying approach to the distinction between judicial mediation 
and other prehearing processes can be discerned from SCMP (WA). Although the 
SCMP (WA) provides no definition of mediation as such, it implicitly distinguishes 
mediation from other prehearing processes by channelling the bulk of disputes 
through mediation. PD 4.2.1 (1) states that mediation ‘is an integral part of the 
management process, and, in general, no case is to be listed for trial [viz. a final 
hearing] without the mediation process having first been exhausted,44 and PD 4.2.1 (7) 
encourages judges to engage in mediation as early as possible in the litigation 
process.45 PD 4.2.1 (13) goes on to state that, ordinarily, directions for trial are only to 
be made if the mediation process has been unsuccessful and, 46
                                                 
44 This point is reinforced throughout the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Supreme Court 
Mediation Programme (Practice Direction No 2 of 2008), now contained in the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions (22 January 2009). For example, 4.2.1 (14) states 
that mediation ‘by a Mediation Registrar is a holistic part of the management process, and, in general, 
no case is to be listed for trial without the mediation process having first been exhausted’. PD 4.2.1 (8), 
states that ‘practitioners must be able to justify a refusal to go to mediation, particularly where the 
matter is yet to be mediated or, in a case that has previously been mediated, the other side is willing to 
return to mediation. Practitioners should bear in mind that, in general, no case will be listed for trial 
without the mediation process having first been exhausted’. 
45 Research as to when in the litigation process mediation is most effective has proved inconclusive. 
Kathy Mack, Court Referral to ADR: Criteria and Research (2003) 40. However, there is evidence 
from South Australia to suggest that ‘earlier referral to mediation, particularly in cases where the 
dispute is of a short duration may assist to reduce both public and private cost expenditure’. Tania 
Sourdin, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria (2009) 146 [5.55]. The Supreme 
Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions (22nd January 2009), r 4.2.1 (7) states that 
the ‘timing of mediation is important and will vary from case to case. Many cases benefit from early 
mediation prior to substantial costs being incurred and the parties becoming entrenched in their 
positions. The Court will make mediation orders prior to the filing of pleadings or affidavits in 
appropriate cases’.  
46 The Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions (22nd January 2009), 
4.2.1 (13) states that where ‘a party is represented by a solicitor or counsel, it is not necessary for a 
party also to attend a directions hearing or other interlocutory hearing, unless required to do so by 
subpoena or other order of the Court’. 
 in such circumstances, 
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PD 4.2.1 (15) has the effect of transforming the mediation conference into a directions 
hearing.47
(1) If, pursuant to a case management direction, the parties to a case have 
conferred with a mediator, the Court may order that there is not to be a pre-
trial conference in the case. 
  
 
The same approach may be adopted in the WA District Court. The District Court 
Rules 2005 (WA) provide no definition of mediation, and do not place mediation 
conferences at the forefront of the prehearing process in a manner comparable to the 
SCMP (WA). However, r 35A states that ‘mediation may serve as a pre-trial 
conference’. Rule 35A goes on the state, inter alia, that: 
 
 
(2) An order under subrule (1) may be made –  
(a) at the conference with mediator, if the mediator is a legally 
qualified registrar; 
(b) after the conference with the mediator; 
(c) before or after the case is entered for trial; 
(d) even if notice of a pre-trial conference has been given under rule 
39; 
(e) on the application of a party or, after notifying the parties, on the 
Court’s own initiative. 
 
                                                 
47 The Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions (22nd January 2009), 
4.2.1 (15) states that where ‘it appears [to the mediator] that a matter is likely to proceed to trial, 
directions are to be made for the early preparation of the trial bundle’. 
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(3) If the Court makes an order under subrule (1) ... [the rules relating to pre-trial 
conferences] ... apply as if the conference with the mediator had occurred at, 
or as ordered in, a pre-trial conference. 
 
As noted above, it does not appear as though judges in the WA District Court have yet 
engaged in a process formally described as judicial mediation, and r 35A does not 
predict their doing so. Were District Court judges to engage in mediation, however, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that they would have the power to issue orders ‘at the 
conference’ in a manner comparable to registrars (subject to requirements of the rule 
against bias, examined below). 
 
By formulating mediation and directions hearings as different stages of a continuous 
process, the approach taken in Western Australia reflects the proposition, supported in 
Chapter 7, that litigation ‘and negotiation are [no longer] viewed as distinct but as 
continuous’.48 Indeed, it is possible that this approach is in reality ‘but an exemplar’49
We have presided over pre-trial settlement conferences for decades. What is a 
‘prehearing conference’? [What does it mean] to manage the case? You know 
 
of the prehearing process in other Australian jurisdictions. Justice Louise Otis, the 
architect of the Quebec Court of Appeal’s judicial mediation programme, made 
substantially the same point in an address to the Victorian Bar. Asked whether she 
saw any inconsistency between mediation and the ‘public’ role of judges, Her Honour 
replied that: 
 
                                                 
48 Justice Andrew Rogers, ‘Judges in Search of Justice’ (1987) 10 University of NSW Law Journal 93, 
104; citing Judge Charles Renfrew, ‘Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil and 
Criminal Anti Trust Cases’ (1975) 57 Chicago Bar Record 130, 131. 
49 Hugh Landerkin and Andrew Pirie, ‘Judges as Mediators: What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute 
Resolution in Canada?’ (2003) 82(2) Canadian Bar Review 249, 266. 
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that when you are in the chamber with the parties you try to settle the case. 
This [has existed] for decades and you do not complain. Mediation is just an 
extension of [this].50
To return to the question posed at the beginning of this section, none of the judicial 
mediation programmes examined above formally prescribe the mediation process to 
be adopted by judges, and it seems likely that in practice the majority of guidance will 
be provided in the form of mediator training (as in the NSW District Court).
 
 
Certainly, the discretionary powers afforded by the Federal Court Rules 1979, the 
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and the Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) are broad 
enough to permit judicial mediation. That being so, is it actually necessary or 
beneficial to explicate the relationship between mediation and other prehearing 
processes? Is the Western Australian model a model to be emulated? Arguably it is. 
Although the Western Australian approach does not rigidly clarify the boundaries of 
acceptable judicial conduct during prehearing, it does make it plain to judges, counsel 
and litigants that mediation is a vital feature of the judicial process, and that judges 
will generally be supported by appellate courts in the application of this function. In 
so doing, this approach removes some of the uncertainty regarding the role of judges 
during prehearing which, as noted above, may hinder the development of novel 
judicial practices (such as judicial mediation), and/or discourage candid appraisals of 
judicial practice. 
 
51
                                                 
50 Justice Louise Otis, ‘Judicial Mediation: Prospects and Issues’ (Speech delivered at the Seminar of 
the Victorian Bar, Melbourne, 14 May 2009). 
51 The same is true of judicial mediation in Quebec. Ibid. 
 It also 
remains uncertain how (if at all) these arrangements expand the settlement role 
already performed by Australian judges. It follows that the only way to determine 
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whether judicial mediation can be conducted in accordance with the requirements of 
Ch III is to determine what judicial mediators actually do (or may do) in practice.  
 
What do Judicial Mediators do? 
 
Unsurprisingly, since prehearing processes are generally held ‘off the record’, there is 
a dearth of information available as to how, precisely, Australian judges mediate in 
practice.52 As noted above, the five specific rules of mediation adopted in the NSW 
District Court state that judge-mediators are not to provide legal advice. This does not 
necessarily mean that judge-mediators should not advise on other matters or evaluate 
other interests (such as, for example, the possible psychological or financial impact of 
litigation). However, Judge Margaret Sidis states that her practice in the NSW District 
Court has been ‘to advise parties and their representatives at the very start of the 
mediation that, as a mediator, I do not judge, express any opinions, give any judgment 
or provide any advice’. 53 If the same approach is adopted in practice by other judges 
in the NSW District Court, then (barring separate meetings, which may or may not be 
held in practice) judicial mediation in the NSW District Court broadly conforms to the 
classical mediation model, in line with the definition provided by NADRAC (or 
towards the green zone of the procedural continuum developed in Chapter 7).54
Anecdotally, there would appear to be a wider variance in mediator styles in the WA 
Supreme Court, although case law in that jurisdiction also indicates that judges should 
  
 
                                                 
52 As James Wall, Lawrence F Schiller and Ronald J. Ebert have pointed out (albeit from a US 
perspective), almost ‘all judicial techniques used during the settlement process are off the record either 
because there are no stenographers or recording devices at the pretrial or settlement conferences, or 
because judges seldom allow their overtures to become part of the court record’. Above n 13. 
53 Sidis, ‘Judicial Mediation in the District Court’, above n 17, 74-75. 
54 See above Chapter 7 nn 231-32, and figure 2. 
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take care when expressing opinions.55 Judge-mediators in the SA Supreme Court have 
engaged in separate meetings, although it is unclear which techniques are employed 
during mediation, or whether judges will ever provide advice (be it legal or 
otherwise).56
Overseas programs may provide certain insights into judicial mediation practice, but 
accounts of what judges do or do not do in foreign jurisdictions must be treated with 
caution given Australia’s unique constitutional structure.
  
 
57 Theoretically comparisons 
may be useful in purely factual scenarios, but in practice it may be difficult to separate 
these disputes from disputes that have been filtered through local constitutional 
concerns. In any event, no single model of judicial mediation emerges from overseas 
examples. As explained at length in the preceding Chapter, the participation of US 
judges in the settlement process displays ‘substantial variations in the level of 
intensity,’58 which range from purely facilitative to evaluative in nature.59
                                                 
55 Ruffles v Chilman (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Kennedy, Franklin and White 
JJ, 19 May 1996).  
56 Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Alamain Investments Ltd [2003] SASC 272 (Unreported, Debelle J, 8 
August 2003). 
 In Quebec, 
judicial mediation is ostensibly limited to a purely facilitative model, and mediating 
judges are trained to avoid any evaluative input. This restriction is considered 
essential to avoid any contradiction between the evaluations made by mediating 
57 Kirby J has warned that it would be a ‘fundamental mistake to attach large significance to 
[constitutional arrangements] in non-federal countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and South Africa. The legal texts are distinguishable. The constitutional obligations are different. The 
traditions that have grown around those obligations are peculiar. One illustration will suffice. The 
combination in the United Kingdom, until recently, in one person, the Lord Chancellor, of legislative, 
executive and judicial functions, is inconceivable in an Australian constitutional context’. Forge v 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 120 [189]. 
58 Herbert Kritzer, ‘The judges’ role in pre-trial case process’ (1982) 66 Judicature 28, 30. 
59 See, especially; John Paul Ryan, Allan Ashman, Bruce D Sales and Sandra Shane-Dubow, The 
American Trial Judge (1980), Wall, Schiller and Ebert, above n 13; Marc Galanter, ‘Adjudication, 
Litigation and Related Phenomena’, in Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler (eds), Law and Social 
Sciences (1986), 151. 
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judges and the final determination of adjudicating judges.60 In contrast, according to 
Margaret Shone, it is common for Albertan judges engaged in judicial mediation to 
‘begin using one ADR [model], then flip to another and another, sometimes in a 
seemingly random way’.61
While it is impossible to state precisely or uniformly how judges will or do mediate, 
in Australia or overseas, it is possible to identify those features of mediation which 
have the greatest potential to conflict with the requirements of Ch III. In Chapter 1, 
three pressure points in the relationship between mediation and the judicial function 
were identified; the participation of the judge-mediator, the privacy of the mediation 
process, and the confidentiality of proceedings. These pressure points served as 
waypoints by which the relevant legal ‘rules’ were identified, and Chapters 2 through 
6 charted the correlation between these rules and the implications drawn by the High 
Court from Ch III. It was concluded that the fair hearing rule and the principles of 
open justice are generally restricted to the exercise of the judiciary’s core decision-
making power, 
 
 
62 and are therefore unlikely to impede the development of judicial 
mediation (because judicial mediation is by definition non-determinative). In contrast, 
it was shown that Ch III implications rooted in notions of judicial independence and 
impartiality may have an impact on prehearing events such as judicial mediation. 63
                                                 
60 Otis, ‘Judicial Mediation: Prospects and Issues’, above n 50. 
61 Margaret Shone, ‘Law Reform and ADR: Pulling Strands in the Civil Justice Web’ (Paper presented 
at the Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference, Wellington, April 13-16 2004), [34]. 
62 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice: A critique of the open trial (2002), 
65. The principles of open justice may also be of relevance to institutional integrity, however. See 
generally, Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Seen to be Done: the Principle of Open Justice – Part II’ 
(2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 378. 
63 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 68 (Deane J); Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 
205 CLR 337, 345 [7] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 361 [81] (Gaudron J); 382-83 
[145]-[146] (Kirby J). 
 
The impartiality principle is manifest in the judicial process implication and the Kable 
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doctrine, both of which, amongst other things, entrench the rule against bias64 and 
notions of integrity. 65
 
 The remainder of this Chapter demonstrates that judicial 
mediation is unlikely to undermine either of these requirements, and argues that 
obtaining informed consent, ensuring a strict policy of confidentiality, and requiring 
the recusal of judge mediators from adjudication in certain circumstances, should be 
sufficient to mitigate most, if not all, of the potential conflicts between judicial 
mediation and Ch III. 
Does Judicial Mediation offend the Rule against Bias? 
 
Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrated that the rule against bias is an implicit requirement in 
all Australian courts; federal, State and territory. 66
                                                 
64 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 361 [81] (Gaudron J), 382-83 [145]-
[146] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 
163 [29] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Forge v Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 79 [73] (Gummow Hayne and Crennan JJ), 122 [195] 
(Kirby J).  
65 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73] (Gaudron J), 222 [115] (McHugh J), 258 [201] 
(Kirby J), 272-73 [234] Hayne J.  
66 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362 [79] (Gaudron J); 382-83 [145]-
[146] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146 163 
[29] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, 
Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205, 216. See also, 
Enid Campbell, ‘Waiver of judicial disqualification for bias or apprehended bias – a constitutional 
issue’ (1999) 2 (3) Constitutional Law & Policy Review 41, 41; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution (5th ed, 2008), 278. 
 Chapter 7 showed that judicial 
practice can be plotted on a ‘procedural continuum’, and that whether a particular 
discretionary function has been exercised in accordance with the rule against bias (and 
the due process requirements implied by Ch III), will depend where on that procedural 
continuum the boundaries of acceptable judicial practice lie. The following section 
returns to the mediation pressure points identified in Chapter 1, and plots the 
boundaries of acceptable practice applicable to judicial mediation. It is argued that 
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whether bias is reasonably apprehended will depend on myriad factors specific to the 
case at hand.  
 
From the outset, it is crucial to appreciate that, when determining whether a power is 
judicial, ‘one looks at the decision, rather than the process to get there’.67 Thus, as 
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated in Ebner v Official Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, the question in cases of apprehended bias is whether, ‘a fair-minded lay 
observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind 
to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide’. 68
                                                 
67 Patrick Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed, 1998) 467. See also R v 
Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 398 (Windeyer 
J). 
68 (2000) 205 CLR 337, 382-44 [6]. 
 Since judicial 
mediation does not involve a judicial decision, the rule against bias will only be 
engaged if mediation is unsuccessful; whereupon things said or done by the judge-
mediator may require his or her disqualification. This possibility is examined in more 
detail later. For present purposes it is assumed that mediation has failed and that the 
judge-mediator is or will be conducting the final hearing. On this basis, and as the 
remainder of this section demonstrates, the procedural continuum developed in 
Chapter 7 can be customised and expanded to demonstrate the likelihood of judicial 
mediation resulting in apprehended bias as follows:  
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Judicial participation 
 
Judicial participation in mediations may range from being purely facilitative to 
evaluative in nature, and may involve the use of various techniques including reality 
testing and doubt creation. 69 As explained in the preceding Chapter, the limits of 
judicial participation (beyond which a reasonable apprehension of bias will arise) lie 
somewhere between the expression of ‘tentative or exploratory’ 70
                                                 
69 See above Chapter 1 nn 51-53 and accompanying text. 
70 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 493 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
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Figure 3: Likelihood of Judicial Mediation resulting in Apprehended Bias 
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statements of opinion that indicate a ‘settled view’. 71  The more evaluative or 
advisory a judge’s input (or the further into the red zone of the procedural continuum) 
the more likely it is that a judge’s words will be taken to indicate a settled view, and 
the more ‘reasonable’ this apprehension will be. Consider the following hypothetical 
scenario:72
 
 
 
Plaintiff (P) has suffered a complex array of physical and psychological 
injuries as a result of the Defendant’s (D) negligence. D accepts liability, but 
denies legal responsibility to the full extent of P’s injuries due to the existence 
of various pre-existing injuries and intervening tortious acts. The facts do not 
give rise to any novel issues of law. Given the complexity of the case and the 
likelihood that both sides will lodge extensive evidence, the Judge attempts to 
mediate a settlement between the parties.  
 
P is confident in his legal position and has demonstrated an unwillingness to 
make any concessions from his opening claim of $2 million. D has indicated 
that he would be willing to compensate P up to the sum of $1 million, but has 
shown a willingness to make further concessions. The judge estimates that the 
true value of the claim is somewhere in the region of $1.2 million, and is 
concerned that the parties are rapidly approaching deadlock. She considers the 
following strategies to avoid this occurring: 
                                                 
71 Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 264 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason 
JJ). 
72 This scenario was created with the assistance of the following sources in particular: Bond 
University School of Law Dispute Resolution Centre. John Wade, Laurence Boulle and Pat Cavanagh, 
The Mediation Process [videorecording]: Fletcher’s partnership dispute (1992); and Jerome Levy and 
Robert Prather, Texas Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005), Appendix A “Fly on the 
Wall”.  
438 
 
 
1. The facilitative approach 
 
‘Ok, P, if I understand correctly, you estimate that you would be awarded 
somewhere in the region of $2 million were this matter to be settled at 
trial? And, D, you estimate that P would be awarded considerably less? 
As you both know, nothing that is said here today will affect your 
prospects should you go to trial. So, P, if D were to make you an offer 
right now, just to start the ball rolling, what sort of figure might you be 
willing to consider?’ 
 
Note that in this instance the judge initially addresses herself to both 
parties, and her advice is intended merely to facilitate discussion. She does 
not reveal any opinion as to the parties’ respective positions. 
 
2. The (soft) advisory approach 
 
‘P, as a voice of reason and experience let me remind you that, were this 
matter to proceed to trial, you could walk away with a fraction of the 
amount that you claim today – or perhaps even nothing at all. I would 
advise you to consider whether you are willing to take this risk’.  
 
Note that in this instance the judge has attempted to create doubt in the 
plaintiff’s position. Her advice is advisory in a sense, in that she has 
implicitly recommended that the plaintiff seek a settlement. However, she 
has not evaluated the substantive merits of the parties’ claims.  
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3. The (hard) evaluative approach 
 
‘P, my experience as a judge is that plaintiffs in personal injury suits are 
rarely awarded an amount approaching their initial claim. That is the 
reality. There is often an assumption that figures are inflated by claimants 
to strengthen their bargaining position during the settlement process. 
Certainly, were this matter to be tried before me, I would likely take this 
view. I would strongly suggest, therefore, that you make some kind of 
concession in response to D’s earlier offers’. 
 
Note that, once again, the judge has attempted to create doubt in the 
plaintiff’s position. However, in this instance she has also expressed her 
own views on those prospects, and has indicated that she is generally 
suspicious of the amounts claimed by plaintiffs in personal injury matters. 
 
Putting aside the various mitigating strategies discussed in the following section, the 
probability of an appellate court finding a reasonable apprehension of bias increases 
as the judge moves from the facilitative model through to the (hard) evaluative model 
(from left to right on the procedural continuum). It is unlikely that a reasonable 
apprehension of bias would be sustained as a result of the facilitative approach. In 
that instance the judge has simply asked tentative or exploratory questions to enhance 
negotiation – none of what was said would appear to indicate bias. The same is 
almost certainly true of the (soft) advisory approach. While the judge’s statements are 
advisory they are not evaluative. They do not indicate any opinion whatsoever as to 
440 
 
 
the plaintiff’s prospects of success. The most that could be said is that the judge has 
formed a settled mind as to the general pitfalls of litigation.  
 
However, it is possible that the (hard) evaluative approach would give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias. 73 In this instance the judge has indicated to the 
plaintiff that she has a pre-existing negative view of personal injury claimants. 
Whether the judge’s comments would indicate a ‘settled view’ is a matter of 
contention. In Vakauta v Kelly, the trial judge had indicated a pre-existing view as to 
the reliability of expert medical testimony. In that instance the High Court found no 
bias to have arisen. As Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ explained, it ‘is inevitable that 
a judge who sits regularly to hear claims for damages for personal injury will form 
views about the reliability and impartiality of some medical experts who are frequent 
witnesses in his or her court’.74
both necessity and common sense require that a distinction be drawn between 
the case where a judge has some preconceived views about the expertise or 
reliability of the professional opinions of an expert medical witness and the 
case where a judge has preconceived views about the credit or 
trustworthiness of a non-expert witness “whose evidence is of significance 
on ... a question of fact” which “constitutes a live and significant issue” in the 
case. 
 However, their Honour’s went on to state that: 
 
75
                                                 
73 At the same time, this approach may result in more frequent settlement, and this possibility should be 
taken into account as a matter of case management. See above Chapter 7 nn 247-69. 
74 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568, 571. 
75 Ibid. 
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An example of a case in which a judge had formed a preconceived view about the 
credibility of ‘live and significant’ evidence is Ruffles v Chilman.76 In that case, the 
trial judge adjourned the trial and ordered the parties back to a prehearing mediation 
conference, to be conducted by a deputy registrar.77 During the mediation the deputy 
registrar told the appellant that the trial judge ‘had formed a negative view of the 
appellant’s credit’.78 The trial judge refused an application to recuse himself as, in his 
view, not only were the views expressed those of the deputy registrar alone, but the 
‘proposition that a judge should disqualify himself because he has formed a view of 
the credibility of a witness after the evidence of that witness has concluded, is 
untenable. The judicial process works by judges forming views of witnesses as they 
give evidence’. 79  In a judgment delivered by Kennedy J, the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia disagreed, finding that the trial judge had ‘made no attempt to 
deny’ that what the deputy registrar had said was an accurate representation of his 
views, and that these views indicated prejudgment as to a specific matter to be 
determined during trial.80
It is essential to appreciate, however, that Ruffles v Chilman turned on its own, unique, 
set of circumstances. These circumstances included the judge’s failure to assure that 
parties that he had not prejudged a live issue, and the fact that his comments attached 
to the credit of evidence pertaining to that issue. Neither of these factors is present in 
the (hard) evaluative approach posited in the hypothetical scenario above, which is 
 As these comments could be directly attributed to the trial 
judge, a reasonable apprehension of bias was found. 
 
                                                 
76 Ruffles v Chilman (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Kennedy, Franklin and White 
JJ, 19 May 1996). 
77 Ibid 6. 
78 Ibid 10.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid 13. 
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closer to the category of ‘case where a judge has preconceived views about the 
expertise or reliability of the professional opinions’.  However, such distinctions will 
not always be easy to draw. In Bidner v Queensland, 81  the Supreme Court of 
Queensland considered whether a trial judge had ‘descended into the arena’ during a 
case management conference. The defendant submitted that the judge had effectively 
evaluated the plaintiff’s case and offered suggestions on how to improve their 
claim,82
In the present case, we are not prepared to say that the primary judge 
overstepped the proper limits of case management, and, indeed, the defendant 
does not challenge what was done in that regard. There are, however, likely 
to be further difficulties and possible appeals if His Honour sits as the trial 
judge to hear and determine the plaintiff's action. Having to some extent 
participated in reformulating the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, as 
well as requests for particulars from the defendant, it is not desirable that the 
integrity of the trial process or its outcome should be placed at risk of costly 
challenge in the future.
 and that a reasonable apprehension of bias had therefore arisen. On this basis 
the defendant requested that the judge recuse himself from trial. The trial judge 
refused to do so. McPherson and Thomas JJA, and Jones J, held that: 
 
83
                                                 
81 [2000] QCA 368 (Unreported, McPherson and Thomas JJA, Jones J, 7 September 2000). 
82 The Supreme Court summarised the trial judge’s conduct as follows: ‘[T]he learned judge 
commented on the differences of approach adopted by the two specialists in the reports of their 
examination and diagnosis of the plaintiff's injury. The defendant had by then provided some further 
and better particulars, which were perused by His Honour. Having considered them, he told the 
plaintiff's solicitor that there were various matters in those particulars about which the plaintiff needed 
more information, of which he gave detailed illustrations. His Honour then commented on the damages 
claimed by the plaintiff, and on what was needed to prove economic loss in the action. He suggested 
that the solicitor make a note of what he suggested should be adopted by way of pleading negligence as 
“an allegation in relation to which causation doesn't play so great a part.”’ Ibid [4]. 
83 Bidner v Queensland [2000] QCA 368 (Unreported, McPherson and Thomas JJA, Jones J, 7 
September 2000), [10]. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court’s pragmatic solution to the possibility of apprehended bias 
or damage to the integrity of the Court was to avoid the question entirely; requiring 
simply that the judge be disqualified from further dealing with the matter: 
 
There will on occasions be some difficulties in reconciling the functions of a 
judge acting in his or her traditional role in the adversarial system with the 
more recent evolution of a role as a judicial case manager. It is not possible, 
or perhaps appropriate, here to try to determine the proper limits of that 
function. Some matters, by reason of the very nature of the issues involved or 
the condition in which they are found to be, attract the use of strong measures 
and a firm hand; others do not. It is impracticable to attempt to define the 
proper limits of judicial activism in the abstract or to do so in advance in a 
way that might in the end prove to be either too stultifying or unduly 
liberating in the development of the case management function in future.84
The Queensland Supreme Court’s judgment in Bidner accepts that the boundaries of 
acceptable judicial practice are inherently flexible, and proposes that – save in 
extreme cases – appellate courts should refrain from providing lower courts with 
explicit guidance in the exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, in light of the authorities 
analysed above and in Chapter 7,
 
 
85
                                                 
84 Bidner v Queensland [2000] QCA 368 (Unreported, McPherson and Thomas JJA, Jones J, 7 
September 2000), [9]. 
85 See above Chapter 7 nn 247-69 and accompanying text. 
 a conservative estimate would place the current 
upper limit of judicial participation somewhere to the left of the (hard) evaluative 
approach. This limit will vary between jurisdictions and in accordance with the nature 
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of the rights and interests at stake.86
Privacy: separate meetings and private communications 
 It will also be increased if informed consent is 
obtained; a point examined in more detail below.  
 
 
In Chapter 1, it was explained that separate meetings are a variable feature of 
mediation in that, while some mediators will use them as a matter of course, others 
will not. Sir Laurence Street has argued that separate meetings lie ‘at the heart of a 
mediation process’.87 In contrast, Laurence Boulle has observed that in ‘some training 
courses the separate meetings are presented as a routine and indispensable feature of 
the mediation process ... In other training systems separate meetings are presented as 
an optional variable, called only at the discretion of the mediator or at the request of a 
party’. 88  Likewise, Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin note that some mediators 
never use separate meetings, and that others consider it vital that the ‘most significant 
interchanges’ take place in the presence of all parties.89
The extent to which separate sessions are employed may also vary according to the 
experience of the mediator. John Wade has reported that a majority of experienced 
mediators ‘emphasise that the more experienced they become, the more they try to 
keep clients in joint meetings’.
  
 
90
 
 In contrast, Wayne Brazil has stated (from his 
perspective as a US settlement-judge), that he does not usually: 
                                                 
86 National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 296, 314 
(Gibbs CJ); Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 585 (Mason J). 
87 Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’, above n 32, 795. 
88 Boulle, above n 37, 209. 
89 Astor and Chinkin, above n 5, 267.See also David Spencer and Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and 
Practice (2006), 66-69. 
90 John Wade, ‘What skills and attributes do experienced mediators possess?’ (1999) 5 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Bulletin 50. 
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begin with a general session, attended by everyone, in which counsel, in 
seriatim and fairly predictable exercises, would set forth their client’s 
positions. Instead, after my opening speech (and after answering any 
questions a participant might have), we most often proceed directly to private 
caucusing. Informed in each instance by these private meetings, I decide what 
information will flow from one side to the other. 91
Mediators may also telephone or email disputants prior to the mediation session, in 
order to encourage the free flow of information, educate parties as to the nature and 
object of mediation, develop trust with the parties, and (in disputes involving multiple 
parties on either side) to discuss how decisions will be made.
 
 
92
Where time, resources and relevant protocol allows, some mediators have 
personal contact with each party individually before the mediation. This is 
more likely to occur in private mediations, and some experienced mediators 
always attempt to interview the parties in person before the mediation 
meeting.
 As with separate 
meetings, however, contact with the parties prior to mediation is not an essential 
feature of the mediation process: 
 
93
                                                 
91 Wayne Brazil, ‘Professionalism and Misguided Negotiating’, in Andrea Schneider and Christopher 
Honeyman (eds), The Negotiator’s Fieldbook: The Desk Reference for the Experienced Negotiator 
(2006), 697, 698-99. Separate meetings are a core feature of the classical mediation model, although, 
contrary to Wayne Brazil’s practice, the classical model prescribes the use of the private meetings 
towards the end of the mediation process. Spencer and Brogan, above n 89, 49, 66-69. 
92 Boulle, above n 37, 178-79. 
93 Boulle, above n 37, 178. 
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It will be recalled that neutrality (or impartiality) is a core feature of mediation,94 just 
as it is an essential quality in the exercise of judicial power.95 Thus, even in a purely 
private context separate meetings can be controversial, and mediators must take care 
to maintain trust if separate sessions are to be used. 96 Nevertheless, private mediators 
are not ordinarily subject to the formal requirements of procedural fairness. 97  In 
contrast, if a judge in ordinary trial proceedings were to hold separate meetings or 
communicate privately with one of the parties, a reasonable apprehension of bias 
might arise in the mind of the absent party.98 In such circumstances it is not what a 
judge actually says or does which is in issue (as examined immediately above), but 
whether or not such meetings or communications give rise by their very nature to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias.99 Sir Laurence Street suggests that they may do, 
because ‘private access to a representative of the court by one party, in which the 
dispute is discussed and views are expressed in the absence of the other party, is a 
repudiation of basic principles of fairness and absence of hidden influence’. 100 In 
terms, this proposition is unassailable, and well supported by the authorities.101
                                                 
94 NADRAC, Alternative Dispute Resolution Definitions (1997), 5; Landerkin and Pirie, above n 49, 
256; Boulle, above n 37, 13; Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 37, 26. 
95 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 362 [79] (Gaudron J); 382 – 383 [145 – 
146] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146 163 
[29] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
96 See, for example, John Haynes, The Fundamentals of Family Mediation (1994), 62; Boulle, above n 
37, 192. 
97 Boulle, above n 37, 149. 
98 R v Lilydale Magistrates Court; Ex parte Ciccone [1973] VR 122, 127 (‘R v Lilydale’). See also the 
comments of Wilson J in Re Baird; Ex parte Aitco Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 244, 245 [10]: ‘Certainly it 
was quite wrong, in the circumstances, for the Commissioner to go into private conference with one 
only of the parties in the course of a hearing’. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Street, above n 37, 492. Sir Laurence suggested that judicial mediation would undermine public 
confidence in the judiciary, as opposed to the rule against bias per se. Public confidence, and this 
aspect of Sir Laurence’s argument, is discussed in more detail below. The same reasoning naturally 
applies to the rule against bias (in an individual context), however, as apprehended bias is determined 
objectively. 
101 In addition to the cases analysed in this section, see Kanda v Government of the Federation of 
Malaya [1962] AC 322, 337. 
 The 
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classic expression of the relevant principle in Australia was provided by McInerney J 
in R v Lilydale Magistrates Court; Ex parte Ciccone (‘R v Lilydale’): 
 
The sound instinct of the legal profession – judges and practitioners alike – 
has always been that, save in the most exceptional cases, there should be no 
communication or association between the judge and one of the parties (or 
the legal advisers or witnesses of such a party), otherwise than in the 
presence of or with the previous knowledge and consent of the other party. 
Once the case is under way, or about to get under way, the judicial officer 
keeps aloof from the parties (and from their legal advisers and witnesses) and 
neither he nor they should so act as to expose the judicial officer to a 
suspicion of having had communications with one party behind the back of or 
without the previous knowledge and consent of the other party. For if 
something is done which affords a reasonable basis for such suspicion, 
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial officer is undermined. 102
Two important points should be made about the ‘no communication principle’ as 
expounded by McInerney J. First of all, this particular manifestation of the rule 
against bias has tended to be applied in cases that involve the parties (or third parties) 
instigating communications with judges as opposed to judges instigating 
communications with the parties. 
 
 
103
                                                 
102 [1973] VR 122, 127.  
103 In Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 346-47, Gibbs CJ stated that ‘a judge should not, in 
the absence of the parties or their legal representatives, allow any person to communicate to him or her 
any views or opinions concerning a case which he or she is hearing, with a view to influencing the 
conduct of the case. Indeed, any interference with a judge, by private communication or otherwise, for 
the purpose of influencing his or her decision in a case is a serious contempt of court’. 
 It is nevertheless explicit in McInerney J’s 
reasoning that the same principle will apply irrespective of who (the judge or one of 
the parties) actually instigates communication. Second of all, McInerney J’s 
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reasoning draws a clear distinction between communications made without the 
knowledge of the other party, on the one hand, and with the consent of the other party, 
on the other. This point in considered in more detail in the following section. If it is 
assumed for the sake of argument that parties will not be required to provide informed 
consent, however, is it necessarily the case that private meetings or communications 
will undermine the rule against bias?  
 
In R v Judge Leckie; Ex parte Felman, Gibbs J (as he then was) approved of the 
general principle as expounded by McInerney J in R v Lilydale, but clarified that it 
does ‘not mean that if a communication has been made to the judge on behalf of one 
of the parties the judge will necessarily and in all circumstances be disqualified’.104 In 
such instances, Gibbs J explained, the ‘question remains whether the fact that such a 
communication has been made would raise a reasonable suspicion that the judge will 
not or cannot deal with the case fairly and impartially’.105 The answer to this question 
will vary according to the circumstances in which the communication was made, 
including ‘the nature of the communication, the situation in which it took place, its 
relationship to the issues for determination and the nature of the disclosure made by 
the judge’. 106
                                                 
104 R v Judge Leckie; Ex parte Felman (1977) 52 ALJR 155, 158. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 351 (Mason J). 
 In other words, as with judicial participation, whether private meetings 
undermine the rule against bias will vary according to the circumstances. This 
proposition is reflected in Figure 3, above. Which factors, then, will distinguish the 
circumstances in which separate meetings are permissible from the circumstances in 
which they are not? 
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In Duke Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Alamain Investments Ltd, (‘Duke Group’),107 the 
trial judge (Debelle J) had unsuccessfully attempted to mediate a dispute between the 
Duke Group (the plaintiff) and a firm of accountants who, it was alleged, had 
negligently prepared an Australian Stock Market report for the plaintiff. The 
mediation, which took place according to the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), involved 
separate meetings between the parties and the judge. In a subsequent action, the 
plaintiff came before Debelle J in an unconnected dispute with Alamain Investments. 
The Duke Group applied to the court for Debelle J’s disqualification on the basis that 
His Honour’s ‘participation in the mediation, and in particular the fact that [he] met 
privately with some of the directors, may have resulted in [his] receiving information 
which would cause [him] to have a view upon the merits of the action against the 
directors’.108
When a judge acts as mediator, the judge sheds, as it were, the judicial mantle 
for the duration of the mediation and acts in a manner inconsistent with the 
role of a judge by seeing the parties in private. In doing so, the judge acts in a 
manner contrary to the fundamental principle of natural justice that a judge 
must not hear representations from one party in the absence of the other. It is 
for this reason that the judge will not in any respect adjudicate in that action 
except with the consent of the parties .... A reasonable bystander might 
apprehend that, in the course of meeting the directors separately, I might have 
received information which would cause me have a view about the merits of 
the claim ... In the result, I believe that what is at stake is the integrity of the 
 His Honour duly recused himself, explaining, in language reminiscent 
of the views expressed by Sir Laurence Street, that: 
 
                                                 
107 [2003] SASC 272 (Unreported, Debelle J, 8 August 2003). 
108 Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Alamain Investments Ltd [2003] SASC 272 (Unreported, Debelle J, 8 
August 2003), [21]. 
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Court engaging in two types of dispute resolution and the public interest in 
upholding the integrity of the Court and public confidence in the Court.109
A number of points should be noted about this judgment. The first is that Debelle J 
drew a clear distinction between subsequent adjudication undertaken with and 
without the consent of the parties. The second point is that Debelle J recused himself 
not only to ensure impartiality in the case at hand, but to maintain the integrity of 
Court. Both of these points are considered later in this Chapter. The third point is that, 
while the grounds for disqualification ostensibly rested on the occurrence of separate 
meetings, it was in fact the disclosure of confidential information (extraneous 
information) during these separate meetings, and the prejudicial nature of the 
information disclosed, that caused Debelle J to disqualify himself. The reference to 
separate meetings is a red-herring, drawing attention away from the real concern; that 
the judge was aware of wrongdoing on the plaintiff’s part.
  
 
110
It follows that the Duke Group case does not stand as authority for the proposition 
that separate meetings or private communications will invariably undermine the rule 
against bias; merely that they may do so if prejudicial information is revealed to the 
judge. It seems axiomatic that the threshold of ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to 
activate the rule by virtue of separate meetings will be higher during prehearing than 
trial. As explained at length in Chapter 7, the level of communication between judges 
 If the holding of 
separate meetings had been the real issue, it would have been the absent party who 
apprehended bias, not the plaintiff. The issue of confidentiality and the impact of 
extraneous information are examined in the following section.  
 
                                                 
109 Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Alamain Investments Ltd [2003] SASC 272 (Unreported, Debelle J, 8 
August 2003), [23], [28], [29]. 
110 Ibid [27]. 
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and litigants is necessarily greater during prehearing, because judges are expected, 
amongst other things, ‘to simplify issues, make suitable amendments to the pleadings, 
limit the number of expert witnesses, obtain admissions of facts and generally prepare 
cases for trial’. 111
it is not uncommon for equity judges in proceedings where there is no factual 
dispute to telephone both counsel, mention a proposition or case which has 
not been dealt with in oral submissions, and ask whether they have anything 
to say about it by filing further written submissions. As counsel are not on the 
same telephone line, of necessity, each counsel will need to be telephoned 
separately. It is usually the judge that has to do the ringing because only he or 
she knows the legal intricacies of the point on which assistance is required. 
This practice is, I believe, efficient and does not break the general rule 
provided that the judge is satisfied that both counsel are aware that the other 
has been given an identical message.
 Recently, in Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd, 
Young CJ recognised that 
 
112
Young CJ’s comments provide some support for the provision of private 
communications at the very least. However, judicial mediations are not directly 
comparable with the manner of proceedings considered by Young CJ, as mediation is 
not typically concerned with issues of law or equity. In addition, His Honour’s 
reasoning is almost certainly limited to private communications involving managerial 
matters, because subsequent disclosure is necessary to dispel apprehended bias. In Re 
JRL; Ex Parte CJL, Mason J explained that ‘the terms of a subsequent disclosure by 
the judge of the communication and a statement of its effect in some, perhaps many, 
 
 
                                                 
111 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, above n 39, 19. 
112 (2006) 65 NSWLR 400, 142. 
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situations will be sufficient to dispel any reasonable apprehension that he might be 
influenced improperly in some way or other’. 113  In this respect, the holding of 
separate meetings and the rule against bias are truly at loggerheads, as the content of 
discussions held in separate meetings cannot be disclosed to the other party (at least 
not without the disclosing party’s consent). Confidentiality is often seen as an 
important feature of the mediation process, not least because it is the assurance of 
confidentiality which encourages the disclosure of information.114
One of the central functions of mediation is to encourage the parties to speak 
candidly about their interests, needs, fears and desires. If a party has any 
concern over whether what it tells the mediator in confidence, or what it does 
in negotiations, might be revealed to its detriment, any rational party would 
not be as forthcoming – it would want to protect against revealing too much 
and hence maintain an adversarial position akin to litigation.
 As Philip Harter 
observes:   
 
115
In summary, it is by no means certain that separate meetings or private 
communications will attract the rule against bias in the absence of informed consent. 
 
 
The issues raised by confidentiality vis-à-vis impartiality are examined in the 
following section. As intimated at the beginning of this section, however, and further 
explained later in this Chapter, subsequent disclosure is not the only means by which 
the risks of apprehended bias can be minimised.  
 
                                                 
113 (1986) 161 CLR 342, 351. 
114 Ellen Deason, ‘The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or 
Crucial Predictability?’ (2001-2002) 85 Marquette Law Review 79, 80-84. 
115 Phillip Harter, ‘Neither Cop nor Collection Agent: encouraging administrative settlements by 
ensuring mediator confidentiality’ (1989) 41 Administrative Law Review 315, 324. 
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It is nevertheless preferable that informed consent be obtained as a matter of practice, 
not only as a means of mitigating the (minimal) risks posed by judicial mediation, but 
because informed consent is consistent with the concept of self-determination upon 
which mediation is founded.116
The confidentiality of proceedings 
 Obtaining informed consent will also help to ensure 
that the integrity of the judicial function is maintained. Both of these points are 
considered below. 
 
 
The final pressure point in the relationship between mediation and the rule against 
bias arises because of the confidential nature of the mediation process. While 
confidentiality is not a core feature of mediation per se, Ellen Deason has pointed out 
that: 
 
Confidentiality for mediation communications is regarded as fundamental to 
effective mediation ... Strong confidentiality protection is, in many instances, 
crucial to establishing working relationships within the mediation framework 
between the adversary parties and with the mediator.117
A mediator’s duty of confidentiality has ‘two dimensions’.
 
 
118 First of all, a mediator 
may owe a duty of confidentiality to the parties collectively, as per the terms of the 
mediation agreement. Secondly, a mediator may owe a duty of confidentiality to the 
parties individually in respect of information revealed during separate meetings.119
                                                 
116 Ruth Charlton, Dispute Resolution Guide Book (2000), 8, 14 – 15; Boulle, above n 37, 60-67. 
117 Deason, above n 114, 80. See also Harter, above n 115, 324-25.  
118 Boulle, above n 37, 542 
119 Boulle, above n 37. 
 A 
number of legal questions arise as a result of confidentiality in these areas. Most of 
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these issues are common to mediation in general, 120 but may be exacerbated in the 
case of judicial mediation. For example, is information revealed during judicial 
mediation covered by the ‘without prejudice’ privilege?121 Is information provided to 
judge-mediators covered by legal professional privilege?122
From a broader policy perspective these issues are of considerable importance to the 
question of whether judges should mediate, and it has also been argued that, if judges 
were required to appear as witnesses or directed to reveal information obtained in 
confidence, this could undermine the integrity of the judiciary.
 Can judge-mediators be 
called upon as witnesses in respect of information revealed during mediation?  
 
123
The possible disclosure of a mediator's private notes gives rise to specific 
difficulties. It is clear that in anything other than the most basic negotiations, 
 These arguments 
are addressed briefly in the following section. Insofar as the impartiality limb of the 
judicial process implication is concerned, however, the question is not whether a 
mediator’s duty to maintain confidentiality raises problems when transplanted into a 
judicial context, but whether a failure to ensure confidentiality could result in 
apprehended bias. Melinda Shirley and Wendy Harris observe that: 
 
                                                 
120 John Wade, ‘Mediation – Seven Fundamental Questions’ (2001) 86 Svensk Jurist Tidning 571. 
121 The without prejudice privilege is in fact a rule of evidence, which holds that information revealed 
‘without prejudice can only be revealed with the consent of the parties (Field v Commissioner for 
Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285). The issue for the courts has been how far to extend the 
application of the principle. Examples of an expansive approach (in which the court found that public 
policy required information revealed in mediation to remain confidential) include Lukies v Ripley (no 2) 
(1994) 35 NSWLR 283, and Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] 1 AC 1280.  The 
current position in Australia, as expressed by Rolfe J in AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ASCR 752, [6], is 
that information revealed in mediation will be admissible if it can be ascertained ‘by admissible 
evidence, a fact to which reference was made at mediation, not by reference to the statement but to the 
factual material which sourced the statement’. See also; Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of 
Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336; Fiona Crosbie, ‘Aspects of Confidentiality in Mediation: A Matter of 
Balancing Competing Public Interests (1995) 2 Commercial Dispute Resolution Journal 51, 53-59. 
122 In Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ held that legal 
professional privilege is not confined to judicial proceedings. See also Crosbie, above n 121, 59-64. 
123 Phillip Tucker, ‘Judges as Mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition?’ (2000) 11 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 84, 91. 
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a mediator needs to keep notes in some form. Some mediators emphasise the 
importance of reducing issues to a simple visual form in assisting parties to 
separate themselves from the problem and work towards a solution. In other 
cases it may simply be that the mediator needs to keep notes of reactions, 
thoughts, strategies and ideas for personal reference to aid in the negotiation 
process. It is easy to imagine how such innocent personal notes could be 
misconstrued by parties after the event, as indicating a bias or interest 
towards one side.124
It is always possible that information revealed in confidence during judicial mediation 
could be revealed. For example, a judge-mediator might inadvertently leave notes 
from a private session in the view of the other party, or notes from a joint session in 
an area of the courthouse accessible to other court-personnel. It is also possible that 
judge-mediators will discuss confidential information with other judges. For this 
reason, a rigid distinction is ordinarily maintained between a court’s mediation and 
adjudication functions. This point is returned to below. As has been pointed out 
repeatedly in the preceding Chapters, however, mediation is by definition non-
determinative in nature.
 
 
125 As long as judicial mediation results in a resolution of the 
dispute it will be immaterial whether or not a judge reveals (or hears) information that 
might prejudice his or her ability to remain impartial, because there will be no judicial 
decision in respect of which bias could be apprehended.126
                                                 
124 Melinda Shirley and Wendy Harris, ‘Confidentiality in Court-Annexed Mediation – Fact or 
Fallacy?’ (1992) 13 The Queensland Lawyer 221, 223. 223. See also Deason, above n 114, 83-84. 
125 Simon Roberts, ‘Mediation in Family Disputes’ (1986) 46 Modern Law Review 537, 546; Boulle, 
above n 37, 65; Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, above n 37, 26.  
126 Lane, above n 67, 467. See also R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty 
Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 398 (Windeyer J). 
 It might also be pointed 
out that judges are free to take notes during other prehearing processes, and for that 
matter during the trial process itself, and that these notes could just as easily indicate 
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bias if revealed. Nor are judges generally prohibited from talking to other judges in 
relation to a matter before them. As Mason J noted in Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL, the rule 
against bias does not ‘debar a judge hearing a case from consulting with other judges 
of his court who have no interest in the matter or with court personnel whose function 
is to aid him in carrying out his judicial responsibilities’.127
Nevertheless, difficulties may arise if a judge-mediator becomes privy to information 
that would not otherwise have been revealed in litigation, and which constitutes a 
‘prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance’.
  
 
128  Even if the judge-mediator 
does not subsequently adjudicate, the adjudicating judge may become aware of the 
same information in one of the ways outlined above. In either scenario, it is important 
to realise that the question is not whether a judge has, by virtue of things said or done, 
indicated to a party that he or she has prejudged the issue. Were this the complaint the 
relevant principles would be those relating to judicial participation, examined above. 
Rather, the question is whether mere knowledge of ‘extraneous information’ could 
prejudice the perception of the judge’s ability to bring an impartial mind to the 
resolution of the dispute.129
In identifying the extraneous information category of bias in Webb v The Queen,
  
 
130 
Deane J made reference to two cases in particular: Livesey v New South Wales Bar 
Association,131 and Australian National Industries v Spedley Securities.132
                                                 
127 In Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 351 (Mason J). 
128 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74 (Deane J). 
129 Ibid. See also: Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; Australian 
National Industries v Spedley Securities (1992) 26 NSWLR 411. 
130 (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74. Deane J suggested that the extraneous information category of bias will 
also ‘commonly overlap’ with the ‘association’ category; that is to say, apprehended bias that arises 
through ‘some direct or indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons interested 
in, or otherwise involved in, the proceedings’.  
131 (1983) 151 CLR 288. 
 However, 
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in neither of these cases was bias apprehended merely because a judge was privy to 
extraneous information. The salient point in both of these cases was that the decision-
maker had already decided matters related to key issues in dispute. 133
In the particular circumstances of the case (and in particular the clear objections 
lodged by the plaintiff) Debelle J’s decision to disqualify himself was a pragmatic 
and sensible one. In the absence of a specific request for disqualification by one of the 
parties, however, it seems unlikely that mere knowledge, in the absence of an opinion, 
will activate the rule against bias. Put differently, information must have the potential 
 While this 
knowledge may have been extraneous in the sense that it pertained to evidence not 
submitted, it was the spectre of prejudgment that raised an apprehension of bias. In 
contrast, in Duke Group (the facts of which were outlined above) Debelle J 
disqualified himself on the basis that potentially prejudicial information had been 
revealed during an earlier judicial mediation with the plaintiff. In Debelle J’s opinion, 
recusal was necessary despite the fact that 
 
the mediation occurred more than nine years ago. I have no memory of the 
details. I have no notes. I believe that it is most unlikely that any submission 
in the course of these applications or anything appearing in any document 
would trigger any relevant recollection. The likelihood of is even more 
remote given that the claim against the present defendants was not in 
contemplation of the parties in early 1994. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
132 (1992) 26 NSWLR 411. 
133 In Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association, the judges had decided the relevant matter in a prior 
and unconnected case: ‘The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant [was] that the views which 
their Honours had expressed in [their earlier judgments] both as to the credibility and credit of ... a 
witness ... created a situation in which a party (ie the appellant) or a fair-minded observer might 
reasonably doubt that the question involved in the proceedings against the appellant could be dealt with 
by their Honours without bias by reason of pre-judgment’. In Australian National Industries v Spedley 
Securities, the judge had indicated prejudgment during an interlocutory proceeding. 
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to be prejudicial in order to be ‘extraneous’ in the sense intended by Deane J. Judges 
will frequently have access to information (via the media, prior awareness or by word 
of mouth) relating to a matter before them that has not been formally disclosed during 
the trial process.134 The civil justice system nevertheless assumes that judges will 
bring an impartial mind to the determination of the dispute.135
Can the risk of apprehended bias be mitigated? 
  
 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that conflict between judicial mediation and the 
rule against bias is by no means a fait accompli. This realisation is significant, as it 
further discredits the notion that mediation and adjudication are somehow 
dichotomous. Nevertheless, and as is the case with the judicial process generally, 
judicial mediation could result in apprehended bias if a judge exceeds the boundaries 
of acceptable conduct. This possibility can be minimised (if not eradicated) by 
ensuring the informed consent of parties, the confidentiality of any information 
revealed and, in certain circumstances, by preventing judges from adjudicating a 
dispute that they have attempted to mediate. In Chief Justice Black’s opinion: 
 
[M]ediation takes place within a structure and according to rules that are 
obvious for all to see. There is nothing clandestine about mediation. If there 
is caucusing and private communication it occurs because the parties consent 
to it occurring in the course of a mediation to which they have consented and 
which they can terminate by withdrawing their consent. Their consent ought 
to be, and in the Federal Court is, informed consent. Part of the knowledge 
                                                 
134 In certain instances, if a fact is so notorious or well-known, it may be ‘judicially noted’ without 
inquiry. However, judicial notice cannot be applied to a matter in dispute. See David Field, Queensland 
Evidence Law (2008) 49-53; John Forbes, Forbes Law on Evidence (3rd ed 1999) 18. 
135 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 504-06 [46] (Kirby J).  
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upon which that consent is founded is the knowledge that the mediation is 
confidential, that the mediator will not adjudicate upon the case if it proceeds 
to trial and that the mediator will maintain confidentiality.136
Obtaining informed consent is arguably the single most important strategy that can be 
adopted to mitigate the risk of apprehended bias arising as a result of judicial 
mediation; a proposition endorsed by a number of the judgments already discussed. 
As McInerney J noted in R v Lilydale, for example, judicial officers should avoid 
private communications, ‘without the previous knowledge and consent of the other 
party’.
 
 
The following section examines each of these mitigating strategies in more detail, and 
suggests that it may be unnecessary, and indeed undesirable, to employ all three at 
once. Contrary to the approach generally adopted in Australia, and consistent with the 
conclusions drawn in the preceding section, it is argued that judge-mediators should 
be able to adjudicate if mediation fails; subject to the general criteria for 
disqualification. 
 
137
Where [a judge’s comments] are likely to convey to a reasonable and 
intelligent lay observer an impression of bias ... a party who has legal 
representation is not entitled to stand by until the contents of the final 
 The same principle will apply regardless of the manner in which bias is 
apprehended, and consent may be implied by a party’s failure to object to a judge’s 
continued participation. In Vakauta v Kelly, Brennan J (as he then was), Deane and 
Gaudron JJ stated that: 
 
                                                 
136 Chief Justice Michael Black, ‘ALJ Forum: Mediation’ (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal 941, 942. 
137 [1973] VR 122, 127. 
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judgment are known and then, if those contents prove unpalatable, attack the 
judgment on the ground that, by reason of those earlier comments, there has 
been a failure to observe the requirement of the appearance of impartial 
judgment. By standing by, such a party has waived the right subsequently to 
object. The reason why that is so is obvious. In such a case, if clear objection 
had been taken to the comments at the time when they were made or the 
judge had then been asked to refrain from further hearing the matter, the 
judge may have been able to correct the wrong impression of bias which had 
been given or alternatively may have refrained from further hearing. It would 
be unfair and wrong if failure to object until the contents of the final 
judgment were known were to give the party in default the advantage of an 
effective choice between acceptance and rejection of the judgment and to 
subject the other party to a situation in which it was likely that the judgment 
would be allowed to stand only if it proved to be unfavourable to him or 
her.138
A similar qualification was made by Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ 
in Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association.
 
 
139
                                                 
138 (1989) 167 CLR 568, 572.  
139 (1983) 151 CLR 288. 
 In that case, the High Court 
determined that a refusal by two judges to disqualify themselves from hearing an 
appeal in the NSW Court of Appeal led to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the 
circumstances; namely that certain of the evidence central to the appeal concerned a 
matter previously determined by those judges in an earlier (albeit unconnected) 
hearing. In a unanimous judgment, the High Court explained that: 
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[E]ach case must be determined by reference to its particular circumstances. 
It is, however, apparent that, in a case such as the present where it is not 
suggested that there is any overriding consideration of necessity, special 
circumstances or consent of the parties, a fair-minded observer might 
entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of pre-judgment if a 
judge sits to hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, 
expressed clear views either about a question of fact which constitutes a live 
and significant issue in the subsequent case or about the credit of a witness 
whose evidence is of significance on such a question of fact.140
The rule against bias, it needs to be remembered, has been developed not 
only for the benefit of the parties to litigation. It is also meant to sustain 
public confidence in the courts of justice ... In practice there could be many 
cases in which the parties will have waived their right to object to the 
participation of a particular judge in the case on the ground of the judge’s 
disqualification. Many such cases would probably not receive public notice. 
But from time to time cases will arise which, from the outset, attract 
considerable publicity .... What are members of the public likely to think 
when it then becomes known that the litigants have waived the 
   
 
These judgments indicate that consent will ordinarily be sufficient to allow a judge 
who would otherwise have been disqualified to hear a matter at trial. Of course, there 
may be cases where it is inappropriate for apprehended bias to be waived, regardless 
of the parties express or implied consent (for example, if the matter to be determined 
involves novel questions of law or matters of constitutional interpretation). As Enid 
Campbell has explained: 
 
                                                 
140 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288, 300 (emphasis added). 
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disqualification? Might not their confidence in the administration of justice 
be a little shaken? 141
Public confidence is no longer a free-standing measure of constitutional validity (a 
point made clear in Chapters 4 and 6, and examined further in the following section), 
but this does not undermine Enid Campbell’s suggestion that apprehended bias should 
be exempt from waiver in cases of public interest or cases which involve novel issues 
of law. However, no firm and fast rule can be formulated to determine when the 
public interest will be so great, or a question of law sufficiently important, to override 
an individual’s consent to waiver.
 
 
142
In addition to obtaining informed consent, any risk of bias being apprehended will be 
reduced by maintaining as rigid a separation as possible between a court’s mediation 
functions, on the one hand, and its adjudication functions, on the other. In practice, 
this strategy can involve the adoption of one or both of two distinct requirements. 
First of all, information obtained during mediation can be isolated from other court 
files during mediation and shredded upon completion. This is common practice in 
mediation generally,
 Such concerns can only be addressed by 
individual judges on a case by case basis, as already occurs as a matter of course. 
 
143  and helps to ensure both the fact and appearance of 
confidentiality and to limit the opportunity for potential adjudicators to become aware 
of information revealed during mediation. 144
                                                 
141 Campbell, above n 66, 42-43. The author notes that US legislation (28 USCA s455(e)) has been 
implemented which prohibits the waiver of disqualification for bias.  
142 Although public interest will generally be higher in criminal matters and, as Isaacs J made clear in 
Dickason v Edwards, even ‘in a public prosecution a party may waive the objection [to apprehended 
bias]’. (1910) 10 CLR 243, 260. 
143 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v McConnell (1997) (Unreported, Rolfe J, 24 July 2007); Scott 
Petterson, ‘To keep or not to keep – is that really the question?’ (2004) 6(9) ADR Bulletin 177. 
 Second of all, judges can be 
144 According to Ellen Deason, ‘when a dispute in mediation is also the subject of a lawsuit, 
confidentiality provisions perform an important role by keeping the judging function separate from the 
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automatically disqualified from adjudicating disputes that they have attempted to 
mediate. This requirement removes any possibility that things said or done by a judge-
mediator might lead to claims of apprehended bias – because he or she will have 
nothing to do with the final decision. In a presentation to the Victorian Bar, Justice 
Louise Otis explained (with reference to the judicial mediation program operated in 
the Quebec Court of Appeal) that 
 
because of the duty of confidentiality, we put up a wall between the 
mediation system and the formal system. The files are kept apart in the office 
of the judge-mediator and will be eventually shredded at the end of the 
mediation. If the case is not settled at the closing of the mediation session, of 
course, the judge is excluded from the panel in charge of the hearing.145
Both of these requirements have been adopted in the NSW District Court. As to the 
first, Judge Margaret Sidis states that, all ‘notes taken by the judge are shredded at the 
conclusion of the mediation, and only ‘the signed agreement will remain on the court 
file as evidence of the commitment to confidentiality’.
  
 
146
                                                                                                                                            
mediation function. This separation is especially important for court annexed mediation programs or 
referrals from other decision-making bodies, because the referral links these functions more closely 
than when a privately mediated dispute is later litigated’. Above n 114, 83. 
145 Otis, ‘Judicial Mediation: Prospects and Issues’, above n 50. 
146 Sidis, above n 15. 
 Similar practices may be 
adopted in other Australian jurisdictions, although this is not made explicit in the 
enabling court rules or practice directions. In any event, it is debatable whether this 
requirement is truly necessary to ensure impartiality. Judges are already privy to 
confidential information in certain circumstances, without any need for paper 
shredding or the erection of metaphorical ‘walls’ within the court. This may occur, for 
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example, in instances of claimed public interest immunity.147
The second requirement, that a judge who has attempted to mediate a dispute should 
be excluded from adjudication,
 Nevertheless, it is the 
‘apprehension’ of bias that is important. With this is mind, and given that 
confidentiality is an important aspect of the mediation process and that mediators 
generally destroy notes after mediation in any event, it seems advisable to take all 
reasonable steps to apply this requirement in practice.  
 
148 is reflected in section 65(5) of the Supreme Court 
Act 1935 (SA). This requirement is also applied in the NSW District Court, where the 
‘judge will not hear the case if the mediation is not successful’, and the file will be 
marked; “Not to be Listed before Judge X.”149
The integrity of [the mediation] process is of critical importance. This 
requires that there should be no communication between the mediator on the 
one hand and the judge who either will be hearing, or is hearing, the action. If 
this requirement is not observed, confidence in the process of mediation is 
likely to be seriously compromised.
 Automatic disqualification does not 
appear to be a formal requirement in other jurisdictions, but would be consistent with 
Ruffles v Chilman, discussed above, in which Kennedy J stated that: 
 
150
The requirement that judge-mediators be disqualified from taking a matter to trial is 
also supported by Bidner v Queensland (discussed above), in which the Supreme 
Court of Queensland found it unnecessary to determine whether a reasonable 
  
 
                                                 
147 Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co. Limited [1942] AC 624, 641-2 (Viscount Simon LC); Sankey v 
Whitlam, (1979) 142 CLR 1, 44 (Gibbs ACJ);  
148 Tucker, above n 123, 85-86. 
149 Sidis, above n 15. 
150 Ruffles v Chilman (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Kennedy, Franklin and White 
JJ, 19 May 1996), 14. 
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apprehension of bias had arisen, by requiring simply that the trial judge be 
disqualified from hearing the parties at trial.151
The statutory obligation of confidentiality binding upon a mediator, and the 
withdrawal of the judge from the trial or an appeal, if the mediation fails, 
should enable a qualified judge to act as a mediator without detriment to 
public expectations of the judiciary.
 This requirement is also consistent 
with the ‘Guide to Judicial Conduct’ produced by the Council of Chief Justices of 
Australia, which states that: 
 
152
Despite the fact that automatic disqualification will effectively eradicate any danger 
of apprehended bias arising (because the rule against bias only applies to judicial 
decisions), an approach which leaves recusal to the discretion of individual judges is, 
in the current writer’s view, preferable. Historically, the mechanism employed to 
prevent and remedy the occurrence of apprehended bias in comparable circumstances 
has been to require disqualification only when necessary in the circumstances.
 
 
153
                                                 
151 Bidner v Queensland [2000] QCA 368 (Unreported, McPherson and Thomas JJA, Jones J, 7 
September 2000). 
152 Australia and New Zealand Council of Chief Justices, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2002), 17. This 
advice would appear to address the requirements of judicial integrity, as opposed to the rule against 
bias per se, and it may be that the Council of Chief Justices envisages no particular difficulties arising 
in the latter context. In Quebec, a strict separation is enforced between judge mediators and judge 
adjudicators, so that in a number of cases judge adjudicators are not even aware that mediation has 
been attempted (Otis, ‘Judicial Mediation: Prospects and Issues’, above n 50. Judicial mediation may 
be distinguished from the LAT process in this respect because, judges who have made a determination, 
finding or order in the course of a LAT hearing are not excluded from ultimately determining the 
dispute (Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006, s 697R (3)). David 
Spencer has also concluded that while, ‘there is no doubt that mediation requires mediators to breach 
the rules of procedural fairness by the conduct of separate sessions where one party to the dispute is 
excluded from discussions between the mediator and the other party, safeguards are generally put in 
place to ensure that that particular judicial officer has no communications with judicial officers 
conducting any subsequent trial’. Spencer, above n 31, 139. See also Justice Michael Moore ‘Judges as 
Mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition or Accommodation?’ (2003) 14 Australian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 188, 194. 
153 See, eg; Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 10 ER 301, 315 (Lord Campbell); 
Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750, 758; R v Judge 
Leckie (1977) 52 ALJR 155, 158. 
 In 
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Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration, Lord Esher MR 
distinguished between disqualification for pecuniary interest (which is automatic in 
England) and disqualification for what he termed ‘incompatibility’ (which is not 
automatic): 
 
The principle, then, is plain that if the Judge is disqualified he must not even 
be present during the hearing of the case ... If it is incompatible for the same 
man at once to be judge and to occupy some other position which he really 
has in the case, then he must not primá facie act as judge at all. He cannot be 
both accuser and judge. That is a fundamental and essential principle of 
justice ... Whether this incompatibility exists depends on the facts of the 
particular case.154
This passage has been approved on a number of occasions in Australia,
 
 
155 although 
following the High Court’s decision in Ebner v Official Trustee a distinction is no 
longer drawn in Australia between pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests.156 That the 
rule against bias can only be determined by reference to the unique circumstances at 
hand is consistent with the fact that certain factors (such as consent) will ordinarily 
remove the need for disqualification. Moreover, were judges to be automatically 
disqualified whenever a party claimed an apprehension of bias, this could ‘encourage 
parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their 
case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour’.157
                                                 
154 (1894) 1 QB 750, 758. 
155 See, for example, Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243, 258 (Isaacs J); R v Watson; Ex parte 
Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 260-61 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ). 
156 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 356-57 [54]-[55] (Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 366-67 [92]-[98] (Gaudron J), 381-90 [141]-[163] (Kirby J 
dissenting). 
  
157 In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 352, Mason J explained that, although ‘it is 
important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge 
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Rather than reflecting any inviolable principle of procedural fairness, therefore, the 
automatic disqualification of judge-mediators is simply a pragmatic response to 
general uncertainty regarding the limits of acceptable judicial conduct. A similar 
approach has been adopted in relation to the performance by judges of inherently 
executive functions (personae designata). In Grollo v Palmer, Brennan CJ, Deane, 
Dawson and Toohey J stated that: 
 
[A]s with the courts in the United States, the argument [that the issue of 
telecommunications intercept warrants undermines the appearance of 
impartiality] can be met by the adoption of an appropriate practice. A judge 
who has issued a warrant in a particular matter can ensure that he or she does 
not sit on any case to which the warrant relates. That is the practice followed 
when a judge has received information extra-curially which might prove 
embarrassing to the impartial hearing and determination of a case. Of course, 
the risk of such a situation arising and, in particular, of a judge discovering 
late in the day that he or she had issued a warrant on the basis of which 
evidence is to be tendered, is increased when there are but few judges 
appointed to a Court ... But that is a matter for individual judges. 158
This approach makes sense when the functions to be performed are closely connected 
to the executive, and where there is a real threat to the judiciary’s perceived 
independence from the government. However, judicial mediation does not raise any 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage 
parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by 
someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour’. See also Attorney General of 
New South Wales v Klewer [2003] NSWCA 295 (Unreported, Mason P Meagher JA, and Davies AJA, 
15 October 2003); Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 348 [19]-[23] 
(Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
158 (1995) 184 CLR 348, 366. 
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such concerns.159 Moreover, automatic disqualification seems to assume that judicial 
mediation will, in all instances, undermine the rule against bias. Once it is accepted 
that rigid distinctions between judicial mediation and other prehearing processes are 
untenable, the argument that judge-mediators should automatically recuse themselves 
dissolves. Judges are not ipso facto disqualified from hearing a matter at trial if they 
participate in other prehearing events, and there is no compelling reason why judicial 
mediation should be treated any differently. The discretionary approach has proven 
sufficient to date, and is consistent with principles of proportionality and good case-
management practice. 160  The raison d’être of the Individual Docket System – 
operated by the Federal Court and favoured by the ALRC – is that cases should be 
managed by the same judge from commencement to disposition,161
                                                 
159 See above Chapter 5 nn 115-18. 
160 Proportionality simply refers to the striking of ‘an appropriate balance or relationship between key 
factors in the legal process’. Susan Campbell, ‘Proportionality in Australian civil procedures: a 
preliminary review’ 14 (3) Journal of Judicial Administration (2005) 144, 144.  In this sense, 
proportionality has its roots in the writings of jurists such as John Rawls (John Rawls, A theory of 
justice, 1971) and Ronald Dworkin (Ronald Dworkin, A matter of principle, 1985). This concept was 
central to Lord Woolf’s Final Report in England and Wales, and has since been adopted in England and 
Wales by the Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales), s 1.1. According to Adrian Zuckerman, 
an overall effect of the English and Welsh Civil Procedure Rules is that ‘judges must ensure that the 
resources given to individual disputes are proportionate to the complexity and importance of each 
dispute. In so doing judges must take into account not only the interests of the litigants before the court, 
but also the interests of all others waiting in the queue’. Adrian Zuckerman, `Justice in crisis: 
Comparative dimensions of civil procedure' in Adrian Zuckerman (ed) Civil justice in crisis: 
Comparative perspectives of civil procedure (1999). The proportionality principle as set out in the 
English and Welsh Civil Procedure Rules has also been criticised, however, ‘for permitting a broad and 
unguided discretion in the judiciary and for lacking practical means for ascertaining, for example, the 
importance of a case or the financial position of the parties’. Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western Australia, Project No 92 (1999) 
46. 
161 The ALRC has provided tacit support for the adoption of a proportionality principle in Australian 
federal courts, noting that ‘the task [of courts] is to strike an effective balance between the concerns for 
individualised justice and for efficient use of limited public resources across the system’, but has 
stopped short of positively advocating the adoption of a proportionality principle on the basis that the 
determination of court procedures is the constitutional preserve of the judiciary. Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A review of the federal civil justice system, ALRC Report No 
89 (2000), [1.95].  
 and (as explained 
at length in Chapter 7) in most Australian jurisdictions: 
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The obligations of judges, and of courts as institutions, are not limited in their 
content to the way in which the individual litigants whose cases are currently 
under consideration are treated. Courts also have obligations to other litigants 
whose cases are in the lists awaiting hearing, and to the community. What 
may be a proper course when considered in the narrower context may take on 
a different aspect when considered in the wider context.162
It is not suggested that judge-mediators should, in all instances, adjudicate a dispute if 
mediation fails. If a judge-mediator has expressed a settled view on a matter, or 
communicated privately with the parties to an extent greater than the rule against bias 
will allow, then recusal will ordinarily be necessary in accordance with principles of 
general application.
 
 
163
It should also be borne in mind that appellate courts will not disturb an inferior 
court’s order/decision unless it is manifestly wrong.
 However, if a judge has neither said nor done anything that 
could raise a reasonable apprehension of bias and the parties have consented to his or 
her adjudication of the dispute, then why should the expeditious determination of the 
matter by the judge-mediator not be encouraged? 
 
164
                                                 
162 Australian National Industries v Spedley Securities (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 (Gleeson CJ). See also 
Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 258-63 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason 
JJ). Most Australian jurisdictions have now introduced ‘overriding objectives’ in their rules of civil 
procedure. See above Chapter 7 n 130. From a timeliness perspective this appears to have had a 
positive impact in Queensland at least. Bernard Cairns and Stephen Williams, ‘Pace of Civil Litigation 
in the Queensland Supreme Court’ (2005) 24 Civil Justice Quarterly, 337.  
163 Justice Michael Moore has reached a similar conclusion, observing that there is ‘always the risk that 
if mediation fails then, consistent wth what I believe ought to happen which is reflected in the Guide to 
Judicial Conduct, the judge will no longer have any involvement with the case. But the assessment of 
that risk would be for the judge to make aided by the submissions of the parties’. Moore, above n 152, 
197. 
164 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504 - 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). Norbis v Norbis 
(1986) 161 CLR 513, 518 – 519; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 
24, 47 - 48. Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625, (Toohey and Gaudron JJ). See also Bernard Cairns, 
Australian Civil Procedure, (7th ed, 2007), 542.  
 This is especially so in matters 
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of procedure, 165  ‘which, ordinarily, are best left to the court seized of the 
proceedings’.166 French J (as he then was) has suggested that the increasing use of 
case management systems means that appellate courts must apply this presumption 
ever more strictly so as to avoid undermining the authority and efficiency of inferior 
courts,167 and Sir Anthony Mason has explained that judges ‘enjoy having a judicial 
discretion and the more so because appeals from exercises of judicial discretion are 
problematic. Indeed, appellate courts are reluctant to intervene in an interlocutory 
matter and even more so when it is a matter of procedure’.168
For the most part, therefore, the extent to which judges can ‘mediate’ will be a matter 
for individual judges to determine for themselves. Only if a judge exercises a 
discretionary power to mediate in a manner which is manifestly unfair will an 
appellate court intervene. On the (very) rare occasion that this occurs, any decision or 
order tainted thereby will be invalid for ‘jurisdictional error’ 
  
 
169 (as a decision made 
in the absence of procedural fairness is not a decision made according to law).170
                                                 
165 Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170. 
166 Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625, 632 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
167 Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379, 391. 
168 Mason, above n 7. 
169 The distinction between ‘jurisdictional error’ and ‘error in the exercise of jurisdiction’ can be subtle. 
According to Kirby J, ‘the boundary between error regarded as “jurisdictional” and error viewed as 
“non-jurisdictional” is, to say the least, often extremely difficult to find’. Re Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 123 [211]. However, according to Hayne 
J in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 141 [163], there ‘is a 
jurisdictional error if the decision maker makes a decision outside the limits of the functions and 
powers conferred on her or him, or does something which he or she lacks power to do. By contrast, 
incorrectly deciding something which the decision maker is authorised to decide is an error within 
jurisdiction ...The former kind of error concerns departures from limits upon the exercise of power the 
latter does not’. Chief Justice James Spigelman provides a useful exploration of this issue in 
‘Jurisdiction and Integrity’ (Speech delivered at the 2004 National Lecture Series for the Australian 
Institute Of Administrative Law, Adelaide, 5 August 2004). 
170 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Re Minister for Immigration & 
Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 67 [26] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J). See also 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597. 
 A 
decision so affected will be remitted for retrial, thereby signalling to the lower courts 
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that the boundaries of judicial conduct have been exceeded, and providing guidance 
for judges in future mediations. 
 
One final point should be made. The fact that the rule against bias is an implied 
requirement of Ch III does not affect the operation of that rule in practice. All that can 
be said is that Ch III prohibits judicial mediation when it undermines the rule against 
bias at common law, and that lawmakers (federal, State or territory) cannot remove 
this requirement. Unless a statute were to require a court conducting judicial 
mediation to undermine the rule against bias, in language that incontrovertibly 
removed its capacity to act judicially, no systemic invalidity could be established in 
this context. This is so, despite the fact that the rule against bias invariably takes 
account of public perceptions. Herein lies the essential distinction between procedural 
fairness and the integrity principle; the former exists ‘to repair individual infractions 
in particular cases’,171 whereas the latter operates to remedy complaints that are more 
‘fundamental in character and concerned [with] the validity of institutional 
arrangements’. 172
Will judicial mediation undermine the integrity of the judiciary? 
 That being so, might the integrity principle hold additional and 
discrete consequences for the development of judicial mediation?  
 
 
This section considers whether judicial mediation might undermine the integrity of 
the Australian judiciary. In so doing, it draws together the conclusions reached in 
Chapter 4 regarding the integrity component of the judicial process implication 
                                                 
171 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 133 [225] (Kirby J). 
172 Ibid. 
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(which applies to Ch III courts),173 Chapter 5 in respect of the persona designata 
exception,174 and in Chapter 6 regarding the concept of institutional integrity central 
to the Kable doctrine (which applies to State and territory courts).175
A court that makes available a judge or registrar to conduct a true mediation 
is forsaking a fundamental precept upon which public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the court system is founded ... It is not enough 
for a court so to arrange internal working that the judge or registrar who has 
mediated will have no further connection with the case if it is not settled. The 
public sees a court as an integrated institution – indeed this is to be 
encouraged.
 It is concluded 
that judicial mediation is highly unlikely to undermine the integrity of the judiciary in 
any of these contexts. 
 
Sir Laurence Street has argued that:  
 
176
As noted above, Sir Laurence’s arguments assume that mediation will involve 
separate meetings, which may not be the case. However, the same rationale will apply 
regardless of the manner in which impartiality is undermined. The essence of Sir 
Laurence’s argument is that mediation is so fundamentally at odds with the basic 
requirements of impartiality that allowing judges to engage in the practice would 
undermine the ‘integrity’ of the judiciary.
  
 
177
                                                 
173 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173. 
174 See above Chapter 5 n 39-104 and accompanying text. 
175 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
176 Street, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’, above n 32, 795-96. 
 Sir Laurence suggests that the public 
177 Mason J lends support Sir Laurence’s view that private meetings could undermine integrity: ‘As 
McInerney J pointed out (in Lillydale), the receipt by a judge of a private communication seeking to 
influence the outcome of litigation before him places the integrity of the judicial process at risk. A 
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would be unable to distinguish between judges acting as mediators and judges acting 
as adjudicators, and that maintaining a wall between these functions would be 
insufficient to mitigate this danger. It is also implicit in Sir Laurence’s reasoning that 
the requirements of integrity will extend equally to federal, State, and perhaps even 
territory courts.  
 
Adopting a different constitutional approach, but drawing on substantially similar 
concerns, Phillip Tucker has argued that: 
 
A vast gulf exists between the courts’ traditional processes and mediation 
processes. This gulf stems from the basic premise that mediation is a private, 
flexible processes resulting (hopefully) in private agreement negotiated by 
the parties, whereas the court’s processes are almost always public, rigidly 
methodical, and result in court’s imposing resolution of the dispute upon the 
parties. Whilst the privacy of mediation is one of its inherently attractive 
features for a great many disputants, it is a two-edged sword because it leaves 
open to doubt that any agreement reached was free from unfair practices ... 
Judges’ conduct of mediations would, it is submitted, pose a very real threat 
to the “bubble of impartiality” that surrounds the judiciary and which is 
essential in maintaining the legitimacy of its decisions.178
As regards the rule against bias, these concerns were addressed in the preceding 
section. The crux of Phillip Tucker’s argument, however, is that there is ‘an 
impermissible incompatibility between a judge acting as a mediator and the judicial 
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
failure to disclose that communication will seriously compromise the integrity of that process’. Re JRL; 
Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 351. 
178 Tucker, above n 123, 94; citing Alexander Brown, ‘The Wig or the Sword? Separation of Powers 
and the Plight of the Australian judge’ (1992) 21 Federal Law Review 48, 68-70. 
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function’. 179 In Chapter 5, it was argued that this proposition is premised upon a 
misconception of the persona designata exception; which will only apply in respect of 
inherently executive functions (which mediation does not appear to be).180 Moreover, 
and as demonstrated consistently throughout this Chapter and the preceding Chapter, 
the judicial process is far from being ‘rigidly methodical’. Phillip Tucker’s arguments 
nevertheless reinforce the primary concern raised by Sir Laurence; that judicial 
mediation would involve a detrimental blurring of judicial and private dispute 
resolution roles and functions. He further suggests that judicial mediation could 
undermine the integrity of the judiciary if judge-mediators are required to appear as 
witnesses, or to reveal information gained in confidence during mediation.181
Before addressing these suggestions, it is important to re-emphasise the fact that law 
in this area is clouded by continuing uncertainty as to the relationship between the 
judicial process implication, the persona designata exception, and the Kable doctrine. 
While in all instances the rationale of the integrity concept would appear to lie in 
maintain the institutional or systemic legitimacy of the courts, the precise meaning of 
the term is not (necessarily) interchangeable between contexts. Not only do these 
doctrines rest on discrete constitutional foundations,
  
 
182 they serve subtly different 
purposes. The judicial process implication and the incompatibility condition affecting 
the persona designata exception seek, inter alia, to maintain the integrity of Ch III 
courts. 183
                                                 
179 Moore, above n 152, 189. 
180 See above Chapter 5 nn 105-18. 
181 Tucker, above n 123, 91-93. 
182 The judicial process implication is an implication of the separation doctrine. The Kable doctrine is 
an aspect of the incompatibility doctrine. 
183 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 [73] (Gaudron J), 222 [115] (McHugh J), 258 
[201], 265 [213] (Kirby J). 
 In contrast, institutional integrity operates to ensure the integrity of the 
federal judicial system, by imposing some (but not all) of the requirements of the 
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separation doctrine on State and territory courts.184
Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that judicial mediation will fall foul of the 
integrity requirements applicable to any Australian court or judge. There are three 
reasons for this conclusion. The first is that judicial mediation is unlikely to 
undermine the criterion of integrity (public confidence/impartiality).
 As such, the High Court may 
apply the principles of integrity differently in respect of Ch III courts and judges, on 
the one hand, and State and territory courts, on the other. 
 
185 The second is 
that the integrity concept has rarely been (and is unlikely to be) applied.186 The third 
is that judicial mediation would appear to be consistent with the overarching object of 
the separation doctrine and the Kable doctrine.187
Perceptions of impartiality 
  
 
 
It should be recognised that Sir Laurence and Phillip Tucker were both writing before 
the public confidence test had finally receded into a broader requirement of 
institutional independence and impartiality.188
                                                 
184 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107 (Gaudron J), 114-15 (McHugh J), 143 (Gummow J). 
185 See above Chapter 4 nn 187-211, Chapter 5 nn 107-119, Chapter 6 nn 137-219, and accompanying 
text. 
186 See above Chapter 4 nn 212-47, Chapter 6 nn 225-46, and accompanying text. 
187 See above Chapter 4 nn 10-46 and accompanying text, and Chapter 6 generally. 
188 The idea that public confidence represents a discrete test of constitutional validity was gradually 
eroded throughout a series of cases: Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 197 [37] (Brennan 
CJ), 275 [242] (Hayne J); Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 593 [23] (Gleeson 
CJ), 617-18 [102] (Gummow J), 629-30 [144] (Kirby J); Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 519 
[6] (Gleeson CJ), 542 [79] (Kirby J). 
 While public confidence is no longer 
to be considered a free-standing measure of integrity in either a federal or 
State/territory context, however, it is evident that public perceptions of the judiciary 
remain an indicator of institutional integrity, whatever language is used to express 
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this fact. 189  Strictly speaking the appropriate question is whether an ‘informed 
observer’ of judicial mediation would ‘reasonably conclude that the institution no 
longer is, and no longer appears to be, independent and impartial,’190
[I]t is not difficult to conceive of measures that can be put in place within a 
court, perhaps underpinned by legislative provisions and rules of court, to 
ensure that a judge who has acted as a mediator had no involvement with the 
further conduct of the litigation  if mediation was unsuccessful. For my part, I 
doubt that, in the face of such measures, there would be a public perception 
that the measures would not be effective. In any event it is difficult to 
conceive that a judge who had acted as a mediator might later hear the matter 
without violating established principles concerning the perception of bias 
(other than, perhaps, where there have been waiver by the parties).
 but in reality 
this question amounts to substantially the same thing as the public confidence test 
which it replaces. In Justice Michael Moore’s opinion, however: 
 
191
A court may indeed be viewed as an integrated structure for many purposes 
but it does not follow that a communication to a registrar can be seen to be a 
communication to the members of the court as a whole, or to all other 
 
 
It has already been argued that the automatic disqualification of judges may be 
unnecessary to prevent apprehended bias, for the very reason posited by Justice 
Moore. As to public perceptions of judicial mediation and judicial integrity, Chief 
Justice Black has similarly argued that: 
 
                                                 
189 Campbell, above n 66. Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 542 [79] (Kirby J); Rafael Cezan v 
The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 358, 380-81 [71]-[72] (French CJ); Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Seen 
to be Done: the Principle of Open Justice – Part II’ (2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 378, 380. 
190 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 86 [93]. 
191 Moore, above n 152, 194. 
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registrars, and especially is this so when it is known that the ethics of the 
court prohibit it. It is recognised that there are compartments in an integrated 
institution. In the same way, it is not said, and cannot be said, that when a 
judge declines to sit on a case because of a judge’s private knowledge of it or 
connection with one of the parties, the disqualifying element is within the 
court itself as an institution. Confidence is not then impaired when another 
judge sits on the case.192
There is simply no way to say for certain how the reasonable observer would view 
judicial mediation; or, perhaps more to the point, how appellate courts will view the 
practice. There are simply too many variables involved: the extent to which the 
mediation process is prescribed, the mediation techniques adopted, and the use or 
otherwise of mitigating strategies, to name but a few. For the reasons identified by 
Justice Moore and Chief Justice Black, however, and bearing in mind the (probable) 
lack of a formal mediation procedure, it is hard to conceive of a situation in which 
judicial mediation could lead to the conclusion that the judiciary as an institution ‘no 
longer is, and no longer appears to be, independent and impartial;’
 
 
193
The application of the integrity concept 
 as opposed to 
the conclusion that an individual judge has exceeded the limits of his/her discretionary 
power (undermining the rule against bias). 
 
 
The second reason that judicial mediation is unlikely to undermine the integrity 
concept is that the High Court has indicated a resolute unwillingness to invalidate 
                                                 
192 Black, above n 136, 942. 
193 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 86 [93]. 
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legislation on this basis.194 No legislative provision or rule of court vested in a Ch III 
courts has ever been held invalid on the basis that it undermines the integrity of the 
judiciary, and on only one occasion has legislation conferring powers on a federal 
judge been held invalid on the basis that it was incompatible with the co-exercise of 
judicial power.195 State legislation has twice been held invalid on the basis that it 
undermines ‘institutional integrity,’196 but only in respect of provisions affecting the 
criminal process. No civil function has ever been set aside on the basis that it 
undermines institutional integrity.197 Since ‘the guarantee involved in the vesting of 
judicial power ... is at its most important’ 198
In addition, the High Court will ordinarily read down an impugned provision so as to 
afford it a definition within the scope of legislative power.
 in criminal matters, and in matters 
involving close relations between the judiciary and the government, the likelihood of 
judicial mediation provisions undermining integrity in any context is extremely low. 
 
199  As explained in 
Chapters 4 and 6, the courts have repeatedly applied this principle in all matters of 
constitutional interpretation; even in respect of statutory provisions which have the 
effect, in substance, of directing the exercise of judicial power. 200
                                                 
194 See above Chapter 4 nn 212-47, Chapter 6 nn 225-46, and accompanying text. 
195 Wilson v Minster for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (1996) 189 CLR 1, 18-19 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
196 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd 
R 40. 
197 Indeed, the Kable doctrine has only ever been considered once in respect of a civil function, in K-
Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471 
198 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 581 (Deane J).  
199 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180 (Isaacs J); A-G (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 
267 (Dixon J). 
200 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173; Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513; Fardon v 
Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for 
Police (2008) 234 CLR 532. 
 In light of the 
conclusions drawn in the first half of this Chapter, it is doubtful that a provision or 
rule establishing judicial mediation could not be read down in accordance with this 
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presumption. Of course, it is always possible that concerns such as those voiced by 
Kirby J in Baker v The Queen (that, ‘constitutional doctrine ... requires the 
measurement of the challenged legislation as it could operate in fact; not a narrow 
approach befitting consideration of the validity of regulations made under a Dog 
Act’) 201
The object of the integrity concept 
 will influence the High Court’s application of the integration principle in 
future. Even if this were to occur, however, judicial mediation will still be valid 
provided (as argued in the preceding section) that it does not lead reasonable members 
of the public to conclude the court is no longer an independent and impartial tribunal.  
 
 
More importantly still, finding judicial mediation provisions to be invalid would be 
inconsistent with the object of the integrity concept and Ch III more generally. The 
rule of law ‘lies at the heart of the Judicature provided for in the Constitution,’202 and 
an essential condition in maintaining the rule of law is the High Court’s power to 
regulate and enforce the requirements of Ch III. The judicial process implication is an 
extension of the separation doctrine, which, in turn ‘draws decisive force from our 
inherited legal traditions and the need to promote the supremacy of law over 
Parliament’.203 The judicial process implication serves this purpose by securing ‘to 
the courts a guaranteed measure of control over their own procedures at the expense 
of Parliament’.204
                                                 
201 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 536 [56]. 
202 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (2006) 224 CLR 322, 440-41 (Kirby J, dissenting). See 
also: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193; Plaintiff 157/2002 v 
Minister for Immigration (2003) 211 CLR 476 [103]-[104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ). 
203 Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in 
Australia’, (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248, 253. See also; Suri Ratnapala, 
‘Australian Constitutional Law (2nd ed, 2007) 162. 
204 Fiona Wheeler, Ibid 253. 
 Likewise, it has been argued that the ultimate object of the Kable 
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doctrine is to secure the High Court at the apex of an integrated Australian judiciary. 
This overarching object was achieved in partnership with a series of cases that 
brought the courts of the territories under the umbrella of Ch III (collectively referred 
to in Chapter 6 as the ‘integration’ principle). 205
Thus, the integrity concept maintains the rule of law by safeguarding the judiciary’s 
inherent power to protect the integrity of its own processes.
 While the High Court has been 
reluctant to expand the incompatibility component of the Kable doctrine (by 
exercising its appellate jurisdiction to protect the inherent jurisdiction of inferior 
courts), this does not detract from the fact that it may do so. In all instances (federal, 
State and territory), it is the capacity of the High Court (and the judiciary more 
generally) to protect the integrity of judicial processes that is critical.  
 
206 This realisation is 
crucial in the current context, because judicial mediation does nothing to interfere 
with this power. In Nicholas v The Queen, it was the removal of the courts 
discretionary power to exclude certain evidence that (in McHugh and Kirby JJ’s view) 
threatened the integrity of the judiciary.207 In Kable and Re Criminal Proceeds, it was 
the limitation placed upon the power to ensure procedural fairness that was 
incompatible with the institutional integrity of the Australian judiciary.208
                                                 
205 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29; Lamshed v Lake (1958) 
99 CLR 132; Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361; Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 
CLR 226; Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591; Teori Tau v 
Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564; Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 
513; Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309; 
North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
206 Wendy Lacey, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power, and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of 
the Constitution’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57. 
207 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 222 [115] (McHugh J), 258 [201], 264 [210] (Kirby J). 
208 Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40, 45 [11]. 
 In contrast, 
the statutory provisions/court rules necessary to implement judicial mediation fall 
within that category of provision, identified in Chapter 4, which increase the 
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discretionary power of the court.209
 
 In such circumstances there is no threat to the 
judiciary’s power to ensure fairness in proceedings, and no reason not to interpret the 
implementing provision in accordance with the assumption that it will be performed 
judicially. Judicial mediation does not undermine the purpose of the judicial process 
implication or the Kable doctrine. Indeed, it may further the rule of law by improving 
access to independent and impartial tribunals. 
                                                 
209 Cominos v Cominos (1972) 127 CLR 588; Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 
617; Femcare Ltd v Albright (2000) 100 FCR 331; Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365; Crestin v 
Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The object of this thesis has been to determine whether Ch III of the Commonwealth 
Constitution limits the ability of Australian judges to engage in judicial mediation and, 
if so, whether those limits will affect the development of judicial mediation in practice. 
It is concluded that, although certain features of the common law judicial process, and 
conditions necessary for the exercise judicial power, are impliedly required by Ch III, 
this implication neither alters the operation of these features and conditions nor does it 
place any relevant restriction upon the prehearing functions that may vested in, or 
carried out by, Australian courts or judges. As such, Ch III will not prohibit the 
development of judicial mediation.  
 
Judicial mediation can be implemented consistently with Ch III 
 
The High Court has utilised the separation of powers doctrine (whether embodied in 
the strict ‘separation doctrine’ or the weaker ‘incompatibility’ concept) as a means of 
securing four jurisdictions which are essential to the rule of law. These jurisdictions 
reflect the need to ensure judicial impartiality and enable the judiciary to fulfil its 
constitutional obligations; they do not prevent the judiciary from adapting its 
processes in a manner conducive to the attainment of these obligations. Exclusive 
jurisdiction serves to isolate the judicial function from legislative interference or 
usurpation, thereby ensuring access to independent and impartial tribunals. This 
jurisdiction is perhaps the most conspicuous of the four jurisdictions identified, 
flowing as it does from the explicit terms of Ch III. Inherent jurisdiction further limits 
the ability of the government to interfere with the independence and impartiality of 
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the judiciary, by securing to the judiciary the ability to ensure procedural fairness and 
the integrity of its own processes. This jurisdiction derives from the separation 
doctrine and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in Ch III courts, and is transferred in 
a diluted form to State and territory courts by the Kable doctrine (adopting a less 
demanding test of incompatibility). Appellate jurisdiction ensures an avenue of appeal 
to the High Court from all Australian courts, thereby providing the High Court with a 
minimum level of substantive and procedural oversight in order to maintain a single 
and coherent Australian common law. This jurisdiction is prescribed by s 73 in 
respect of Ch III and State courts, and has been extended to territory courts by the 
Spratt stream. Supervisory jurisdiction safeguards judicial sovereignty in all spheres 
of Australian dispute resolution, thereby enabling the judiciary’s constitutional 
imperative to authoritatively determine the law. This jurisdiction is closely related to 
appellate jurisdiction, but derives not from s 73 but from the exclusive vesting of 
judicial power under s 71. This is because, were private dispute resolution 
practitioners (principally arbitrators) able to make authoritative declarations of law, or 
to pass binding decisions in circumstances abhorrent to all notions of procedural 
fairness, the object of s 71 would be jeopardised.   
 
Of these jurisdictions, only inherent jurisdiction has anything to say about judicial 
mediation, and it is within this jurisdiction that judicial mediation has so far developed. 
Whether, as seems likely, judicial mediation continues to develop at the judiciary’s 
own motion (in the form of court rules of practice directions), or whether 
governments encourage courts to mediate (in the form of primary legislation), the 
constitutional protection of inherent jurisdiction will only limit the development of 
judicial mediation to the extent that, in practice, it exceeds the boundaries of 
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acceptable judicial conduct. These boundaries cannot be determined prescriptively, 
and will fluctuate in accordance with contemporary mores.  
 
This point is critical, because judicial mediation does not ipso facto threaten 
procedural fairness or the integrity of the judicial process. Once judicial mediation is 
properly conceptualised as a variation on established prehearing processes, and the 
fallacies of rigid procedural distinctions between adjudication and mediation are 
dispelled, the argument that judicial mediation is somehow antithetical to notions of 
due process and judicial integrity collapses. Judicial mediation may well undermine 
the rule against bias in certain circumstances, but so could directions hearings, 
conciliation conferences, settlement conferences, interlocutory proceedings, less 
adversarial trials, and, for that matter, final hearings. The risk of apprehended bias is 
omnipresent in all aspects of judicial work, yet we do not claim that the mere presence 
of this risk is somehow cancerous to procedural fairness. Nor is there any evidence 
that public perceptions of the judiciary (however this might relate to notions of 
integrity) have been tarnished by an increase in judicial management or the 
integration of ADR and the formal court system. We countenance the possibility of 
apprehended bias or negative public perceptions arising because it is a practical 
necessity that we do so, and because it is the sanctity of the judiciary’s appellate 
jurisdiction (as opposed the activities of individual judges) that ultimately ensures 
procedural and institutional integrity (ergo impartiality). On the rare occasion that 
judicial mediation is held to breach procedural fairness or undermine judicial integrity, 
the judicial error leading to this finding could, would, and should be remedied through 
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 
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Critique of the High Court’s interpretive approach 
 
The conclusion that Ch III does not prohibit judicial mediation, and that this accords 
with the rule of law assumptions upon which the Constitution is founded, should not 
be taken as a whole-hearted endorsement of the High Court’s approach to Ch III. A 
number of criticisms have been noted throughout this thesis; including the superficial 
classification of all governmental powers as exclusively judicial, executive or 
legislative, the prohibition on advisory opinions, and the development of the persona 
designata exception. These criticisms are amply demonstrated and explored in the 
existing literature, and need not be restated here. One further criticism, however, less 
widely reported, relates to the interpretive approach adopted by the High Court in 
respect of legislative provisions encroaching upon judicial power. The High Court’s 
attachment to a presumption in favour of legislative validity is evident in its treatment 
of legislation affecting Ch III courts, judges acting persona designata, and State and 
territory courts. The inflexible application of this presumption, far from serving the 
separation of powers by avoiding the ‘confusion of public business’, is detrimental to 
the rule of law and threatens to undermine the constitutional protections carefully 
crafted during the Mason CJ and Brennan CJ eras. 
 
By reading down legislation in favour of validity the High Court has placed absolute 
responsibility for the maintenance of independence and impartiality on the judiciary. 
In accordance with this approach, it is for individual judges (and ultimately appellate 
courts) to determine what is, and is not, ‘judicial’. In respect of legislation that 
increases discretionary power this is entirely appropriate; it is unquestionably for the 
judiciary to determine the boundaries of acceptable judicial practice. And, insofar as 
this approach is receptive to the development of novel methods of judicial dispute 
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resolution which seek to improve access to justice (such as judicial mediation), it 
serves the rule of law. Moreover, by allowing legislatures to increase judicial 
discretion in certain instances (subject to the requirements of procedural fairness and 
inherent jurisdiction), this approach encourages a productive working relationship 
between governments and courts, without any perceptible danger to the separation of 
powers.  
 
In contrast, when a presumption in favour of validity is applied to sanction what are, 
in pith and substance, legislative directions adversely affecting individual rights and 
liberties (by effectively removing judicial discretion in relation to essential matters of 
procedure), it ‘makes a mockery’ of the separation of powers. Nicholas, Fardon, 
Baker, and Gypsy Jokers all show that, while legislation will ordinarily stop short of 
positively directing the exercise of judicial power, judges may be nevertheless 
compelled by an overriding objective to secure a specific governmental agenda – 
often targeted at achieving a particular outcome in individual cases. It is well 
established that statutory interpretation should focus on substance as well as form – 
especially in relation to legislation affecting individual rights and liberties – yet in 
recent years the High Court has been resolutely unwilling to do so. It was on this basis 
that Kirby J dissented in all bar one of the judgments noted above.  
 
It seems entirely appropriate that, generally speaking, a different interpretive approach 
should be adopted in respect of legislation that removes or limits the discretionary 
power of judges (securing a specific governmental agenda), on the one hand, and 
legislation that increases the procedural discretionary power of judges (such as would 
be necessary to implement judicial mediation), on the other. The latter poses no threat 
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to the separation of powers, as judges must still act ‘judicially’. The former poses a 
very real threat to the separation of powers, as it effectively allows the government to 
direct the outcome of judicial proceedings. This distinction is important, because 
unless the proper tools of construction are used to maintain the protections built upon 
Ch III, these protections risk being washed away in the first high tide.  
   
The Future of Judicial Mediation 
 
The future of judicial mediation is not guaranteed, of course, simply because it is 
constitutionally permissible. How far towards the mediation end of the ‘procedural 
continuum’ the judicial process travels, and the extent to which judicial mediation 
develops as an ostensibly discrete prehearing function, will depend upon myriad 
factors transcending strict legal theory. For example, will judges make good 
mediators, and will disputants want judges to mediate anyway? A limited amount of 
research exists in these areas,1
                                                 
1 See, for example, Harry Edwards, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea of Anathema’ (1986) 99 
Harvard Law Review 668; Richard Ingleby, In the Ball Park: Alternative Dispute Resolution and the 
Courts (Carlton: Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1991). 
 but more detailed data is required. The potential for 
judicial mediation to increase settlement rates and improve disputant satisfaction will 
also entail the implementation of appropriate referral criteria. A model that responds 
to research targeted specifically at the registry in question is likely to prove more 
successful than a ‘one size fits all’ solution. Success will also depend upon the quality 
of mediator training, and the internal administration of the courts (should courts 
assign certain judges to mediate in all matters, or will all judges have the option to 
mediate?) There is also an ongoing debate as to how mediators should be accredited, 
the standards that should be applied, and whether mediation should be mandated. 
These debates transcend the current context, but also have implications for it.  
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These questions are important, but they are administrative in nature, and have the 
potential to obfuscate the more important question of how we construct our civil 
justice system in the first place. In any event, the future of judicial mediation need not 
involve the development of discrete processes so defined. The significance of this 
thesis, it is hoped, lies not in the narrow conclusion that judicial mediation is 
constitutionally valid, but in the broader proposition that prehearing processes can 
expand into facilitative and evaluative models of dispute resolution without exceeding 
the boundaries of Ch III. These processes may amount to a form of judicial mediation 
in theory, but this classification, in and of itself, is of far less importance than what 
judges actually do in practice. Whatever names become fashionable for the next 
generation of prehearing process, Ch III remains the watchful parent; supervising 
from a distance, intervening only when real harm threatens.  
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APPENDIX 
Letter from Judge Margaret Sidis to Iain Field, 20th August 2009 
 
 
 
 
 DISTRICT COURT OF NSW 
 143 LIVERPOOL STREET SYDNEY 
 PO Box K1026, Haymarket NSW 1240 
 DX11518 
  www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au 
 
 
Her Honour Judge M Sidis 
 
 
 
Contact:          Annie Faizi-Sobby 
 Position:           Associate to Her Honour 
 Telephone Sydney JMT Chambers:         (02) 9377 5148  
 Telephone Newcastle Chambers:          (02) 4921 2321 
 Email:       annie_faizi-sobby@agd.nsw.gov.au  
 
 
Dear Mr Field,  
 
I write in reply to your email sent to my Associate on 12 August 2009 in relation to your 
questions on judicial mediation.  
 
1.       What the source of power for the conduct of judicial mediations is/was (for 
example, did the programme spring from any specific rule/practice direction, or simply 
the overriding objectives of the Civil Procedure Act?).  
 
There is no specific provision in the Civil Procedure Act or in the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules.   
 
Section 61 of the Civil Procedure Act makes general provision for the court to give such 
directions as it thinks fit for the speedy determination of the real issues between the parties.  
Section 26 empowers the court to refer matter for mediation. 
 
 
2.       How the process was conducted in practice (were there any specific guidelines, 
or was the process entirely discretionary?).  
 
For every mediation there are 5 specific rules, these are: 
 
1. All persons present, including the judge, lawyers, experts and parties must sign a 
Mediation Agreement that binds them to maintaining the confidentiality of everything 
said and done during the mediation. 
2. The judge does not give legal advice. 
3. The judge does not make any decisions or rulings.  The judge’s function is to assist 
the parties to come to their own resolution of their dispute.  
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4. All notes taken by the judge are shredded at the conclusion of the mediation.  Only 
the signed agreement will remain on the court file as evidence of the commitment to 
confidentiality. 
5. The judge will not hear the case if the mediation is not successful.  The file will be 
marked “Not to be Listed before Judge X” 
 
In addition the parties are required to have present at the mediation the persons who 
are responsible for the ultimate decision concerning the resolution of the dispute.  I 
regret to say that insurance companies do not always comply with this requirement.  
 
3.       Whether the trial project is now complete, and if so whether there are plans to 
introduce a more permanent program.  
 
The trial is now complete.  Registrars of the Court have now been trained and are mediating 
cases on a permanent basis.  However, judges still mediate in special cases.  
 
 
4.       Whether any statistical information was gathered as to the ‘success’ of the 
project. 
 
The statistics indicate a high success rate of about 95%.  Registrars are currently 
settling more than 50% of their matters.  
 
 
Best wishes with the PhD.  Please let me know if your paper is published, so that I can 
obtain a copy.  Please contact my Associate if you require any further information.  
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
M Sidis 
District Court Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
491 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Articles, Books, Reports 
 
 
Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice – An Action Plan (1994). 
 
Alexander, Nadja, ‘From common law to civil law jurisdictions: court ADR on the 
move in Germany’ (2001) 4(8) The ADR Bulletin 110. 
 
Alexander, Nadja, ‘Mediation on Trial: Ten Verdicts on Court-related ADR’, in 
Sourdin, Tania, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts (2004). 
 
Alexander, Nadja ‘Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave’ in Alexander, 
Nadja (ed), Global Trends in Mediation (2006). 
 
Alexander, Nadja, Gottwald, Walther and Trenczek, Thomas, ‘Mediation in Germany: 
The Long and Winding Road’, in Nadja Alexander (ed), Global Trends in Mediation 
(2006) 223. 
 
Allars, Margaret, ‘Procedural fairness: disqualification required by the bias rule’ 
(1999) 4 (3) Judicial Review 269. 
 
Alvey, John, ‘The Lack of Separation of Powers in Queensland’ (2006) 9 Public 
Administration Today 64. 
 
American Bar Association Judicial Administration Division, Standards Relating to 
Trial Courts, (1992). 
 
Andrews, Neil, English Civil Procedure: Three Aspects of the Long Revolution (2001) 
 
Anet, Peter, ‘Current Developments: Constitutional Law’ (Paper delivered at the 
Fourth Australian Drafting Conference, Sydney, 4 August 2005).  
 
Apple, James G and Dyling, Robert P, A Primer on the Civil Law System. 
<http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf.> at 14 
October 2009. 
 
Arnot, David, ‘Sentencing Circles Permit Community Healing’ (1994) National 
(Canadian Bar Association) 14. 
 
Astor, Hilary and Chinkin, Christine, Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd Ed 2002). 
 
Astor, Hilary and Chinkin, Christine, ‘Mediator Training and Ethics’ (1991) 2 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 205. 
 
Atiyah, Patrick, From Principles to Pragmatism, (1978). 
 
492 
 
 
Australia and New Zealand Council of Chief Justices, Position Paper and 
Declaration of Principle on Court-connected Mediation (1999). 
 
Australia and New Zealand Council of Chief Justices, Guide to Judicial Conduct 
(2002). 
 
Australasian Federal Convention, Official Report of the National Australasian 
Convention Debates, Adelaide, (1897). 
 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Michael Cass and Ronald Sackville), 
Legal Needs of the Poor, 1975. 
 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Ronald Sackville), Legal Aid in 
Australia, 1975.  
 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Ronald Sackville), Homeless People 
and the Law, 1975.  
 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Adrian Jakobowicz and Berenice 
Buckley), Migrants and the Legal System, 1975.  
 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Adrian Bradbrook), Poverty and the 
Residential Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 1975. 
 
Australian Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Second Main Report: Law and 
Poverty in Australia, 1975. 
 
Australian Judicial System Advisory Committee, Parliament of Australia, Report of 
the Advisory Committee on the Australian Judicial System (1987). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Federal jurisdiction, ALRC BP 1 (1996). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Alternative or assisted dispute resolution, 
ALRC BP 2 (1996). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Judicial and case management, ALRC BP 3 
(1996). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, The unrepresented party, ALRC BP 4 (1996). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Civil litigation practice and procedure, ALRC 
BP 5 (1996). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the adversarial system of litigation: 
Rethinking the federal litigation system, ALRC IP 20 (1997). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the adversarial system of litigation: 
Rethinking family law proceedings, ALRC IP 22 (1997). 
 
493 
 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Technology -- what it means for federal dispute 
resolution, ALRC IP 23 (1998). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the adversarial system of litigation: 
Federal tribunal proceedings, ALRC IP 24 (1998).  
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the adversarial system of litigation: 
ADR -- its role in federal dispute resolution, ALRC IP 25 (1998). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the federal civil justice system, 
ALRC DP 62 (1999). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Experts, ALRC BP 6 (1999). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the federal civil justice system, 
ALRC DP 62 (1999). 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal 
Civil Justice System, Report No 89 (1999). 
 
Australian National Mediator Standards, Approval Standards (2008). 
 
Baer, Harold, ‘History, process, and a role for judges in mediating their own cases’ 
(2001) 58 New York University Annual Survey of American Law 131. 
 
Badgery-Barker, Jeremy and Harrison, Joanne, ‘A short way down the track: 
differential case management in the Supreme Court’ (1995) 33(5) Law Society 
Journal 34. 
 
Beaumont, Justice Bryan, ‘U.S. Systems of Court-based ADR, Including Rent-a-
Judge’, 1 James Cook University Law Review, 103. 
 
Beaumont, Justice Bryan, ‘Managing litigation in the Federal Court’ in Opeskin, 
Brian and Wheeler, Fiona (eds) The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000), XX 
 
Behrens, Peter, ‘Arbitration as an Instrument of Conflict Resolution in International 
Trade: Its Basis and Limits’, in Friedman, Daniel and Mestmacker, Ernst-Joachim, 
Conflict Resolution in International Trade: A Symposium (eds) (1993). 
 
Ben-Yehuda, Eron, ‘Judging Judges’ (2001) Verdicts and Settlements. 
 
Bernstein, Ronald, Handbook on Arbitration Practice (1987). 
 
Black, Chief Justice Michael, ‘ALJ Forum: Mediation’ (1993) 67 Australian Law 
Journal 941. 
 
Black, Chief Justice Michael, ‘The Courts Tribunals and ADR’ (1996) 7 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 138. 
 
494 
 
 
Blackshield, Tony, Cooper, Michael and Williams, George, The Oxford Companion 
to the High Court of Australia (2001). 
 
Blackshield Tony and Williams George, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: 
Commentary and Materials, (3rd Ed 2002). 
 
Blackstone, Sir William, Commentaries on the Laws of England ([1765-60] 1884. 
 
Bloomfield, David, ‘Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management’ (1995) 32(2) 
Journal of Peace Research 151. 
 
Booker, Keven, Glass, Arthur, and Watt Robert, Federal Constitutional Law: An 
Introduction (2nd Ed 1998). 
 
Boulle, Laurence, Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2005). 
 
Boulle, Laurence, ‘In and out of the bramble bush: ADR in Queensland courts and 
legislation’ (2004) Law in Context 22(1) 93. 
 
Boulle, Laurence, ‘Law and Mediation: Conflict or Coalescence?’ (1996) 2 CDRJ 167. 
 
Boyle, Sandra and Eldred, Pamela, ‘Mediation in the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia: Is there therapeutic justice in action?’ (Paper presented at the Third 
International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Perth, 7-9 June 2006). 
 
Brazil, Wayne, ‘Professionalism and Misguided Negotiating’, in Schneider, Andrea 
and Honeyman, Christopher (eds), The Negotiator’s Fieldbook: The Desk Reference 
for the Experienced Negotiator (2006), 697. 
 
Brennan, Sir Gerard, ‘Key Issues in Judicial Administration’ (1996) 6 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 138.  
 
Brennan, Sir Gerard, ‘Key issues in judicial administration’ (Revised Version of a 
paper presented by Sir Gerard Brennan and Sir Thomas Eichelbaum at the Fifteenth 
Annual Conference Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, Wellington, 20-22 
September 1996). 
 
Brennan, Sir Gerard, ‘The State of the Judicature’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 
33. 
 
Brennan, Sir Gerard, Farewell to the Honourable Sir Gerard Brennan AC, KBE’ 
(1998) 5 Australian Bar Gazette 1. 
 
Bronitt, Simon and Mares, Henry, ‘The History and Theory of the Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Systems of Law’ (2004) 16(3) Legaldate 1. 
 
Brown, Alexander, ‘The Wig or the Sword? Separation of Powers and the Plight of 
the Australian Judge’ (1992) 21 Federal Law Review 48, 50 – 68. 
 
Brown, Henry and Marriot, Arthur, ADR Principles and Practice (2nd ed, 1999). 
495 
 
 
 
Brown, R Blake and Kimball, Bruce A, ‘When Holmes Borrowed from Langdell: The 
“Ultra Legal” Formalism and Public Policy of Northern Securities’ (2001) XLV The 
American Journal of Legal History 278. 
 
Brunet, Edward, ‘Perspectives on dispute resolution in the twenty-first century: 
judicial mediation and signaling’ (2002-2003) Nevada Law Journal 232.  
 
Buckley, Neil, ‘Gender and Power: Balancing Rhetoric and Reality in the Family 
Court’ (2001) QUTLJJ 13. 
 
Buckley-Carr, Alana, ‘State tests criminal mediation waters’ The Australian, (Sydney) 
13 July 2007. 
 
Buffington, Mary, ‘Separation of Powers and Independent Government Entity after 
Mistretta v United States’ (1989) 50 Louisiana Law Review 117 
 
Burmester, Henry, ‘Limitations on Federal Adjudication’, in Opeskin, Brian and 
Wheeler, Fiona (eds) The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000), 227. 
 
Bullier, Antoine J, ‘How the French Understand the Inquisitorial System’ (2001) 29 
AIAL Forum 40. 
 
Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (3rd ed 2004). 
 
Cairns, Bernard and Williams, Stephen, ‘Pace of Civil Litigation in the Queensland 
Supreme Court’ (2005) 24 Civil Justice Quarterly 337. 
 
Galligan, Brian, Politics of the High Court (1987) 
 
Callinan, Ian, ‘An Over-Mighty Court? (Paper presented at the Fourth Conference of 
the Samuel Griffith Society, Brisbane, 20-31 July 1994). 
 
Campbell, Colin, ‘An Examination of the Doctrine of Persona Designata in Australia 
Law’ (2000) 7 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 109. 
 
Campbell, Enid, ‘The accrued jurisdiction of the Federal Court in administrative law 
matters’ (1998) 17 Australian Bar Review 127. 
 
Campbell, Enid, ‘Waiver of Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias – 
A Constitutional Issue’ (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 41. 
 
Campbell, Enid, ‘Rules of Evidence and the Constitution’ (2000) 26(2) Monash 
University Law Review 312. 
 
Campbell, Enid and Lee, H.P, The Australian Judiciary (2001). 
 
Campbell, Susan, ‘Proportionality in Australian civil procedures: a preliminary 
review’, Journal of Judicial Administration 14 (3) (2005) 144. 
 
496 
 
 
Canadian Bar Association National Task force on Systems of Civil Justice, (Report of 
the Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice (Ottawa, August, 1996). 
 
Canadian Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice 
(Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association National Task force on Systems of Civil Justice, 
August, 1996). 
 
Cane, Peter and McDonald, Leighton, Cases and Materials for Principles of 
Administrative Law: Legal Regulation of Governance (2009).    
 
Cappelletti, Mario (ed), The Florence Access to Justice Project, Volumes I – IV 
(1978). 
 
Cappelletti, Mario (ed), Access to Justice and the Welfare State (1979). 
 
Cappelletti, Mario, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989). 
 
Cappelletti, M and Garth, B, ‘Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the World-Wide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective’ (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181. 
 
Cappelletti, M and Garth, B, ‘Introduction’, in Mauro Cappelletti (ed), Access to 
Justice and the Welfare State (1981). 
 
Cardozo, Benjamin ‘The Nature of the Judicial Process’ (The Storrs Lectures 
delivered at Yale University, 1921). 
 
Carney, Gerard, ‘Separation of powers in the Westminster system (Paper presented to 
Australasian Study of Parliament Group. Queensland Chapter, 13 Sept 1993) (1994) 
8(2) Legislative Studies 59. 
 
Gerard Carney, ‘Wilson & Kable: The Doctrine of Incompatibility – An Alternative 
to Separation of Powers? (Paper presented to Constitutional Law Interest Group, 
Brisbane, 21 May 1997) (1997) 13 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 
175. 
 
Carney, Gerard, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and territories 
(2006). 
 
Carrigan, Frank, ‘A Blast from the Past: The resurgence of legal formalism (2003) 
Melbourne University Law Review 163. 
 
Carroll, Eileen and Mackie, Karl, International Mediation – The Art of Business 
Diplomacy (2000) 5 
 
Carter, Robert L, ‘The Warren Court and Desegregation’ (1968) 67 Michigan Law 
Review 237. 
 
Charlton, Ruth, Dispute Resolution Guide Book (2000). 
 
497 
 
 
Charlton, Ruth, and Dewdney, Michelene, The Mediator’s Handbook: Skills and 
Strategies for Practitioners (2003). 
 
Chisholm, Richard, ‘Family Law and Perceptions of Unfairness’ (Opening address, 
Family Law Day, College of Law, 24 February 2001). 
 
Chisholm, Richard, ‘“Less adversarial proceedings in children’s cases’ (2007) 77 
Family Matters 28. 
 
Chodosh, H, ‘Judicial Mediation and Legal Culture’ (1999) 4(3) Issues of Democracy 
1. (Electronic Journal of the USA Department of State)  
<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/1299/ijde/ijde1299.htm> at 5 October 2006 
 
Clarke, Steven and Gordon, Elizabeth, 'Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: Court-
ordered Civil Case Mediation' (1997) 19(3) The Justice System Journal 311. 
 
Claude, Richard (ed), Comparative Human Rights (1976). 
 
Colbron, Stephen, Reinhardt, Greg, Spender, Peta, Jackson, Sheryl and Douglas, 
Roger, Civil Procedure: Commentaries and Materials (3rd Ed 2005). 
 
Commonwealth Attorney General Department’s Access to Justice Task Force, A 
Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Civil Justice System, (September 
2009), 12. 
 
Coombes Davies, Mair, ‘Mediation: Talking about a revolution’ Legal Week: Global 
Edition, (London), 30 May 2005. 
 
Corwin, Edward, The Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914). 
 
Cowen, Zelmen and Zines, Leslie, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (3rd ed, 2002). 
 
Craven, Greg, ‘The High Court of Australia: A Study in the Abuse of Power’ (1999) 
22 University of New South Wales Law Journal 216. 
 
Creighton, Alison, ‘An Adversarial System: A Constitutional Requirement?’ (1999) 
74 Reform 64. 
 
Crawshaw, Stephen, ‘The High Court of Australia and advisory opinions’ (1977) 51 
Australian Law Journal 112. 
 
Creyke, Robin and McMillan, John, Control of Government Action (2005). 
 
Culp Davis, Kenneth, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Enquiry (1969). 
 
Cull, Wendy, ‘Mediation in the Tribunal Context’ (Paper presented at the Fifth annual 
AIJA Tribunals Conference, Melbourne, 6-7 June 2002). 
 
Cumes, Guy, ‘Separation of powers, courts, tribunals and the state’ (2008) 19 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 10. 
498 
 
 
 
Damaška, Mirjan, ‘Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure’ 
(1975) 84 Yale Law Journal 480. 
 
Davies, Justice Geoffrey, and Sheldon, S, ‘Some Proposed Changes in Civil 
Procedure: Their Practical Benefits and Ethical Rationale’ (1993) 3 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 111. 
 
Davies, Justice Geoffrey, and Leiboff, JS. `Reforming the civil litigation system: 
Streamlining the adversarial framework' (1995) 25 Queensland Law Society Journal 
111. 
 
Davies, Justice Geoffrey, ‘Civil Justice Reform in Australia’, in Sergio Chiarloni, 
Peter Gottlwald, Adrian Zuckerman (ed) Civil justice in crisis: Comparative 
perspectives of civil procedure (1999). 
 
Davies, Justice Geoffrey, ‘The reality of civil justice reform: why we must abandon 
the essential elements of our system’ (Paper delivered at the 20th Australian Institute 
of Judicial Administration Annual Conference, Brisbane, 13 July 2002). 
 
De Jersey, Justice Paul, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’ (1985) 15 
Queensland Law Society Journal 325. 
 
De Meyrick, John, ‘Whatever happened to Boilermakers? Part 1’ (1995) 69(2) 
Australian Law Journal 106. 
 
De Meyrick, John, ‘Whatever happened to Boilermakers? [Series of two parts on the 
erosion of the doctrine of the separation of powers] Part 2’ (1995) 69(3) Australian 
Law Journal, 189. 
 
De Palo, Giuseppe, Bernadini, Paola, and Cominelli, Luigi, ‘Mediation in Italy: the 
legislative debate and the future’, (2003) 6(3) ADR Bulletin 51. 
 
Deason, Ellen, ‘The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish 
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?’ (2001-2002) 85 Marquette Law Review 79. 
 
DeGaris, Annesley, ‘The Role of Federal Court Judges in the Settlement of Disputes’ 
(1994) 13 University of Tasmania Law Review 217. 
 
Denham, Justice Susan, Working Group on a Courts Commission, First Report: 
Management and Financing of the Courts (1996).  
 
Denham, Justice Susan, Working Group on a Courts Commission, Second: Case 
Management and Court Management (1996).  
 
Denham, Justice Susan, Working Group on a Courts Commission, Third Report: 
Towards the Court Service (1996). 
 
Detmold, Michael, ‘The nature of judicial power’ (2001) 12(2) Public law Review 135. 
 
499 
 
 
Dicey, Albert Ven, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (1st ed 
1885, 10th ed 1959). 
 
Dickie, Anthony, Family law (4th Ed 2002). 
 
Dingwall, Robert and Eekelaar, John (eds), Divorce Mediation and the Legal Process 
(1988). 
 
District Court of Western Australia, ‘Background Paper: The WA District Court’s 
ADR Program’ (Submission in response to the NADRAC Issues Paper on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in the Civil Justice System, 15th May 2009). 
 
Dixon, Sir Owen, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 
590. 
 
Dixon, Sir Owen, ‘Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice’ (1952) 85 CLR xi. 
 
Dixon, Sir Owen, ‘Concerning Judicial Method’ (Paper presented on receiving the 
Henry E Howling Memorial Prize at Yale University, 1955). 
 
Dobinson, Jonathan, ‘Managing Tribunals: The ALRC review of the federal civil 
justice system’ (2004) 84 Reform 15. 
 
Douglas-Baker, Amy, ‘The constitutional validity of the interim control order regime: 
Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33’ (2008) 84 Precedent 43. 
 
Downs, Justice Garry, ‘Concurrent Expert Evidence in the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal : The New South Wales Experience’ (Paper presented at the Australasian 
Conference of Planning and Environment Courts and Tribunals, Hobart, 27 February 
2004). 
 
Doyle, John and Jacobi, Chad, ‘Judicial Independence and Public Sector 
Accountability’ (2002) 11 Journal of Judicial Administration 168. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald Taking Rights Seriously (1977). 
 
Dworkin, Ronald, A matter of principle (1985). 
 
Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire, (1986). 
 
Dziedzic, Anna, ‘Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission: The 
Kable Principle and the Constitutional Validity of Acting Judges’ (2007) 35 Federal 
Law Review 129. 
 
Edwards, Harry, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema’ (1986) 99 
Harvard Law Review 670. 
 
Fairall, Paul and Lacey, Wendy, ‘Preventative Detention and Control Orders Under 
Federal Law: The Case for a Bill of Rights’ (2008) 31 (3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1072. 
500 
 
 
 
Faulks, Justice John, ‘Judicial Accountability and the Separation of Powers: Judging 
the Judges’ (Paper presented to the National Judicial College of Australia Conference 
on Confidence in the Courts, Canberra, 9-11 February 2007). 
 
Field, David, Queensland Evidence Law (2008). 
 
Finnis, John, ‘Separation of Powers in the Australian Constitution’ (1968) 3 Adelaide 
Law Review 159. 
 
Fisher, Roger and Ury, William, Getting to Yes: negotiating an agreement without 
giving in (10th ed 1999 [1983]). 
 
Fix-Fierro, Héctor, Courts, Justice and Efficiency: A Socio-legal Study of Economic 
Rationality in Adjudication (2003). 
 
Flanders, Steven, ‘Blind Umpires – A Response to Professor Resnik’ (1984) 35 
Hastings Law Journal 505. 
 
Fleming, Don and Regan, Francis, ‘“Evatt’s Bastard Child”: The Commonwealth 
Legal Service Bureaux 1942-51’ (2003) Australian Journal of Legal History 15. 
 
Forbes, John, Forbes Law on Evidence (3rd ed 1999). 
 
Frank, Jerome, Law and the Modern Mind (1930). 
 
French, Justice Robert, ‘Hands-On Judges and User Friendly Justice’ (1992) 2 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 78. 
 
French, Justice Robert, ‘Managerial Judging in the Federal Court’ (2005) 32(8) 
BRIEF 5. 
 
Friedman, Daniel and Mestmacker, Ernst-Joachim, Conflict Resolution in 
International Trade: A Symposium (eds) (1993). 
 
Fruin, Richard, ‘Redefining the judicial role: integrating mediation into the resolution 
of civil disputes’ (2002) 41 Judges' Journal 27 
 
Fuller, Lon, ‘Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator’ (1963) Wisconsin Law Review 
3. 
 
Fry, Tim, ‘Costs of Litigation in the Family Court of Australia and in the Federal 
Court of Australia’ (Report to the ALRC, November 1999). 
 
Gallanter, Marc, ‘What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think We Know) about our 
Allegedly Contentious Society’ (1983) 31 UCLA Law Review 4. 
 
Gallanter, Marc, ‘The radiating effects of courts’ in Boyum, Keith and Mather, Lynn 
(eds) Empirical theories about courts, (1983).   
 
501 
 
 
Gallanter, Marc, ‘A settlement judge, not a trial judge: judicial mediation in the 
United States’ (1985) 12(1) Journal of Law and Society 1. 
 
Gallanter, Marc, ‘Adjudication, Litigation and Related Phenomena’, in Leon Lipson 
and Stanton Wheeler (eds), Law and Social Sciences (1986). 
 
Galanter, Marc, ‘The Day After the Litigation Explosion’ 46 Maryland Law Review 
(1986) 3. 
 
Galanter, Marc, ‘Real World Torts’ (1996) 55 Maryland Law Review 1093. 
 
Galanter, Marc, ‘The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Disputes’ (1986) 
69 Judicature 257. 
 
Galanter, Marc, ‘Beyond the Litigation Panic’ (1988) 37 (1) Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science 18. 
 
Galanter, Marc and Garth, Brian, ‘How to Improve Civil Justice Policy’ (1994) 77 
Judicature 185. 
 
Galanter, Marc and Cahill, Mia, ‘”Most Cases Settle” Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements’ (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1339. 
 
Galligan, D, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of official Discretion (1986). 
 
Gageler, Stephen, ‘Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial 
Review’ (1987) 17 Federal Law Review 162, 188 
 
Gava, John, ‘The Rise of the Hero Judge’ (2001) 24 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 747 
 
Gava, John, ‘Judicial Activism’ (2007) Bulletin (Law Society of South Australia) 6 
 
Gerangelos, Peter, ‘The Separation of Powers and Legislative Intervention in Pending 
Cases’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 61.  
 
Gerangelos, Peter, ‘Interpretational methodology in separation of powers 
jurisprudence ; the formalist/functionalist debate’ (2005) 8(1) Constitutional Law and 
Policy Review 1. 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, `Individualised justice -- The holy grail' (1995) 69 
Australian Law Journal 421. 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, ‘The Future of Civil Justice – Adjudication or Dispute 
Resolution?’ (1999) 9 (3) Otago Law Review 449. 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, ‘Judicial Legitimacy’ (2000) 20 Australian Bar 
Review 4. 
 
502 
 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’ (speech delivered at 
Melbourne University, 7 November 2001). 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, ‘Managing Justice in the Australian context’ (2000) 
77 Reform 62. 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, ‘The Centenary of the High Court’ (Paper delivered at 
the 13th AIJA Oration in Judicial Administration, Melbourne, 3rd October 2003). 
 
Gleeson, Chief Justice Murray, ‘Civil or Criminal – What is the Difference’ (2006) (2) 
The Judicial Review 1. 
 
Goetsch, Charles, ‘The Future of Formalism’ (1980) XXIV The American Journal of 
Legal History 221. 
 
Goh, Bee Chen, Law without Lawyers, Justice without Courts: On Traditional 
Chinese Mediation (2002). 
 
Golann, Dwight, ‘Variations in Mediation: How – and Why – Legal Mediators 
Change Styles in the Course of a Case’ (2000) (1) Journal of Dispute Resolution 40. 
 
Gottwald, Walther, ‘Inside an outsider’s mind: perspectives on Australian ADR’ 
(2002) 5(6) ADR Bulletin 104. 
 
Govey, Ian and Symes, David, ‘Developments in Commercial ADR: Attorney-
General’s Department Perspective’ (2001) 13 Bond Law Review 413. 
 
Gray, Anthony ‘Mockery and jury trial in Australia’, (2006) 6(1) Queensland 
University of Technology Law Journal 66. 
 
Hägerström, Axel, Philosophy and Religion, (1964). 
 
Hall, Alan, ‘Judicial Power, the Duality of Functions and the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal’ (1994) 22 Federal Law Review 13. 
 
Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James and Jay, John, The Federalist (1982 [1788]). 
 
Hamilton, Justice John, ‘Civil Procedure Reform: Gradualism or Revolution?’ (2005) 
17(7) Judicial Officers Bulletin 55. 
 
Hann, Robert and Baar, Carl, Evaluation of the Ontario Mandatory 
MediationProgram (Rule 24.1): Executive Summary and Recommendations Ontario 
(2001). 
 
Hand, Learned, ‘Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony’, 
(1901) 15 Harvard Law Review 40. 
 
Handsley, Elizabeth, ‘Do Hard Laws Make Bad Cases? The High Court’s Decision in 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 171. 
 
503 
 
 
Handsley, Elizabeth, ‘Public confidence in the judiciary: a red herring for the 
separation of judicial power’ (1998) 20(2) Sydney Law Review 183. 
 
Hanger, Ian, ‘Has mediation made the courts irrelevant’, (2002) 5(6) ADR Bulletin 
101. 
 
Hanks, Peter, Constitutional Law in Australia (2nd ed, 1996). 
 
Hanks, Peter, Keyzer, Patrick and Clarke, Jennifer, Australian Constitutional Law: 
Commentaries and Materials, (7th Ed 2004). 
 
Harrison, Margaret, ‘Finding a better way: A Bold Departure from the Traditional 
Common Law Approach to the Conduct of Legal Proceedings’ (April 2007). 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/resources/file/ebc70645b58cf92/Finding_
Better_Way_April2007.pdf> at 14 October 2009. 
 
Hart, HLA, The Concept of Law (1961). 
 
Harter, Phillip, ‘Neither Cop nor Collection Agent: encouraging administrative 
settlements by ensuring mediator confidentiality’ (1989) 41 Administrative Law 
Review 315. 
 
Hawkins, Keith (ed), The Uses of Discretion (1992). 
 
Hayne, Justice Kenneth, ‘Concerning Judicial Method – 50 Years On’ (Paper 
presented at the Fourteenth Lucinda Lecture, Monash University Law School, 17th 
October 2006). 
 
Hayne, Justice Kenneth, ‘“Concerning Judicial Method” – Fifty Years On’ (Paper 
presented at the Fourteenth Lucinda Lecture, Monash University Law School, 17 
October 2006). 
 
Hayne, Justice Kenneth, ‘The Vanishing Trial’ (Paper presented at the Supreme and 
Federal Court Judges Conference, 23 January 2008). 
 
Henry, Gregory, ‘Pinochet: In search of the Perfect Judge (case note)’ (1999) 21 
Sydney Law Review 667. 
 
Hensler, Deborah, ‘In Search of ''Good'' Mediation’ in Sanders, Joseph and Hamilton, 
V.Lee (eds), Handbook of Justice Research in Law New York, (2001). 
 
Herzog, Roman, ‘The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany’ (1983) 49 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 141. 
 
Heydon, Justice John, ‘Judicial activism and the death of the rule of law’ (2003) 22 
Australian Bar Review 110. 
 
Hayek, Freidrich, The Constitution of Liberty 1960. 
 
504 
 
 
Hill, Norma Jean’ Qualification Requirements of Mediators’ (1998) (1) Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 37. 
 
Howieson, Jill, ‘Procedural justice in mediation: an empirical study and a practical 
example’, (2002) 5(7) ADR Bulletin 109. 
 
Hulls, Rob, ‘Changing the Culture of Disputes’ (2005) The IAMA News 43. 
 
Hurst Floyd, Daisy, ‘Can the Judge do that?’ (1994) 26 Arizona State Law Journal 45. 
 
Hutchinson, Alan C and Monaghan, Patrick (eds) The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? 
(1987). 
 
Ingleby, Richard, In the Ball Park: Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts 
(Carlton: Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1991). 
 
Ingleby, Richard, ‘Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory 
Participation’, (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 441. 
 
Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators, The IAMA Rules Incorporating the IAMA Fast 
Track Rules (2007) 
 
Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, The Balfour Declaration on the Status of 
Dominions (London, November 15th, 1926). 
 
Ipp, Justice David, ‘Judicial Intervention in the Trial Process’ (1995) 69 Australian 
Law Journal 365. 
 
Ipp, Justice David, ‘Reforms to the Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation’, Pt I (1995) 
69 Australian Law Journal 705; Pt II 69 Australian Law Journal 790. 
 
Irving, Helen, ‘Advisory Opinions, The Rule of Law, and the Separation of Powers’ 
(2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 105. 
 
Irving, Helen, ‘The High Court Fails History in Thomas’ (2007) 45(8) Law Society 
Journal 54. 
 
Jacob, Sir Jack, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1970) 23 Current Legal 
Problems 23. 
 
Jaconelli, Joseph, Open Justice: A critique of the open trial (2002). 
 
Jennings, Ivor, The Law and the Constitution (first published 1933, 5th ed, 1965). 
 
Johnson, Graeme, ‘Natural Justice and Legitimate Expectation in Australia’ (1985) 15 
Federal Law Review 39. 
 
Johnston, Peter and Hardcastle, Rohan, ‘State Courts: The Limits of Kable’ (1998) 20 
Sydney Law Review 216. 
 
505 
 
 
Johnston, Peter, ‘State Courts and Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution” Is 
Kable’s Case Still Relevant?’ (2005) 32 University of Western Australia Law Review 
211. 
 
Jolson, H, ALRC Issues Paper No 25, C3; ‘The Role of Courts and Judges in Court 
Referred Mediation in Australia’, paper presented at the 13th Commonwealth Law 
Conference, Melbourne 2003. 
 
Judge, Sir Igor, ‘The Woolf reforms after nine years: is civil litigation quicker and 
cheaper in the High Court?’ (2007) 19(10) Judicial Officer’s Bulletin 89. 
 
Kakalik, James, An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral Evaluation Under the 
Civil Justice Reform Act (1996). 
 
Keilitz, Susan, ‘Court-Annexed Arbitration’ in Keilitz, Susan (ed), National 
Symposium on Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Research: A Report on Current 
Research Findings - Implications for Courts and Future Research State Justice 
Institute (1993). 
 
Kelsen, H, General Theory of Law and the State (1945). 
 
Kelly, Joan, ‘A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research’ (1996) 34(3) Family and 
Conciliation Courts Review 373. 
 
Kerr, Duncan, ‘News as entertainment and celebrity: The judge in an era of 
familiarity’ (Paper presented to the National Judicial College of Australia Conference 
on Confidence in the Courts, Canberra, 9-11 February 2007). 
 
Keynes, Edward, Liberty, Property, and Privacy: Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Substantive Due Process (1996). 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, ‘Pfeiffer, Lange, the common law of the Constitution and the 
Constitutional right to natural justice’ (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 87. 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, ‘The “Federal Compact”, The territories and Chapter III of the 
Constitution’. (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 124. 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, ‘Media Access to Transcripts and Pleadings in ‘Open Justice’: A 
Case Study (2002) 2(3) The Drawing Board 209. 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, ‘Judicial Independence in the Northern Territory: Are Undisclosed 
Remuneration Arrangements Repugnant to Ch III of the Constitution?’ (2004) 32 
University of Western Australia Law Review 30. 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, Constitutional Law (2nd Ed 2005). 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, ‘Open Constitutional Courts in Australia’ (PhD Thesis, the 
University of Sydney, 2008). 
 
506 
 
 
Keyzer, Patrick, ‘Preserving Due Process of Warehousing the Undesirables: To What 
End the Separation of Judicial Power of the Commonwealth?’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law 
Review 101. 
 
Kirby, Justice Michael, ‘The High Court and the creative role of the common law 
judge’ (1994) 6(1) Legaldate 1. 
 
Kirby, Justice Michael, ‘Stirring up the Constitution: Greg Craven’s Conversations 
with the Constitution’ (2005) Quadrant 58. 
 
Klarman, Michael, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality (2004). 
 
Kovach, Kimberlee and Love, Lela, ‘“Evaluative” Mediation is an Oxymoron’ (1996) 
14 Alternatives to High Cost Litigation 31. 
 
Kovach, Kimberlee and Love, Lela, ‘Mapping Mediation: the Risks of Riskin’s Grid’ 
(1998) 3 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 71.  
 
Kressel, Kenneth and Pruitt, Dean (eds) Mediation Research: The Process and 
Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention (1989). 
 
Kritzer, Herbert, ‘The judges’ role in pre-trial case process’ (1982) 66 Judicature 28. 
 
Lacabarats, Alain, ‘The role of mediation in French judicial practice’ (Paper presented 
at the inaugural meeting of the European Commercial Judges Forum: New 
Approaches to the Efficient Management by the Courts of Commercial Litigation, 
2003, Paris). 
 
Lacey, Wendy, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power, and Implied Guarantees under 
Chapter III of the Constitution’ (2003) Federal Law Review 31. 
 
Lacey, Wendy, ‘Judicial Discretion and Human Rights: Expanding the Role of 
International Law in the Domestic Sphere’ (2004) 5(1) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 108. 
 
Laflin, Maureen, ‘Preserving the Integrity of Mediation through the Adoption of 
Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators’ (2000) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & 
Public Policy 479. 
 
Landes, William M and Posner, Richard A, ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’ (1979) 8 
Journal of Legal Studies 235. 
 
Landerkin, H and Pirie, A, ‘Judges as Mediators: What’s the Problem with Judicial 
Dispute Resolution in Canada?’ (2003) 82(2) Canadian Bar Review 249. 
 
Landerkin, H, ‘Custody Dispute in the Provincial Court of Alberta: A New Judicial 
Dispute Resolution Model’ (1997) 35 Alberta Law Review 627. 
 
507 
 
 
Lane, Patrick H ‘The decline of the Boilermakers separation of powers doctrine’ 
(1981) 55(1) Australian Law Journal 6. 
 
Lane, Patrick, A Manual of Australian Constitutional Law (6th Ed 1995). 
 
Lane, Patrick, Lane’s Commentary on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed 1998). 
 
Langbein, John, ‘The German Advantage in Civil Procedure’ (1985) 52(4) University 
of Chicago Law Review 823. 
 
Langdell, Christopher, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contract (2nd Ed 1879). 
 
LaPrarie, C, ‘Altering Course: New Directions in Criminal Justice Sentencing Circles 
and Family Group Conferences’ Special Supplementary Issue (1995) The Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 78. 
 
Law Council of Australia, Erosion of Legal Representation in the Australian Justice 
System, (2004). 
 
Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Studies in Comparative Civil and 
Criminal Procedure: Volume 2 - Innovations in Civil and Criminal Procedure, 
Consultants Paper by John Bishop (1978). 
 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil 
Justice System in Western Australia, Project No 92 (1999). 
 
Letto-Vanamo, Pia, ‘Access to Justice: A Conceptual and Practical Analysis with 
Implications for Justice Reforms’ (2005) 2(1) Voice of Development Jurists, 1. 
 
Leubsdorf, John ‘The myth of civil procedure reform’ in Chiarloni, Sergio, Gottlwald, 
Peter, and Zuckerman, Adrian (ed), Civil justice in crisis: Comparative perspectives 
of civil procedure (1999). 
 
Levin, Leo and Wheeler, Russel (eds), The Pound Conference: Perspectives of Justice 
in the Future, (1979). 
 
Levy, Jerome and Prather, Robert, Texas Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (2005). 
 
Lewis, Julie, ‘McClellan puts his stamp on the Supreme Court’ (2007) Law Society 
Journal 24. 
 
Lindell, Geoffrey (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (1994) 
185 
 
Llewellyn, K, ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Division and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are To Be Constructed’ (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395. 
 
Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government: In the Former, The False Principles and 
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, And His Followers, are Detected and Overthrown. 
508 
 
 
The Latter is an Essay concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil-
Government (1689). 
 
Lucev, Toni, ‘The Federal Magistrates Court: jurisdiction, practice and procedure and 
cross-vesting applications’ (Materials presented to Western Australian Bar 
Associations Bar Readers Course, 21st May 2008) 
<http://www.fmc.gov.au/pubs/docs/cross-vesting.pdf.> at 13 October 2009. 
 
Mack, Kathy, Court Referral to ADR: Criteria and Research (2003). 
 
Malcolm, David, ‘ADR in Western Australian Courts’, (2002) 5(1) ADR Bulletin 69. 
 
Malcolm, Justice David, ‘The Judiciary Under the Constitution: The Future of 
Reform’ (2003) 31(2) Western Australian Law Review 129. 
 
Mansfield, Justice John, ‘Opportunities and Challenges: Evidence in Cases under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Paper presented at the Law Society of South Australia 
Trade Practices Conference, 22nd May 2008). 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘The Role of the Courts at the Turn of the Century’ (1993) 3 
Journal of Judicial Administration 156. 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘The Australian Judiciary in the 1990’s’ (Address to the Sydney 
Institute, Sydney, 15th March 1994). 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘Trends in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1995) 18 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 237. 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘A New Perspective on Separation of Powers’ (1996), No 82, 
Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 1. 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’ (Paper presented at the 17th 
AIJA Annual Conference, Adelaide, 7 August 1999). 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘High Court of Australia: A Personal Impression of its First 100 
Years’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 864. 
 
Mason, Sir Anthony, ‘Comment on Peter A Gerangelos, ‘Legislative Intervention in 
Pending Cases’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 95. 
 
Mason, Keith, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1983) 57 The Australian Law 
Journal 449. 
 
Mason, Keith, ‘What is Wrong with Top-Down Legal Reasoning?’ (2004) 7 The 
Judicial Review 9. 
 
Matruglio, Tania and McAllister, Gillian, Part one: Empirical information about the 
Family Court of Australia ALRC Sydney February 1999. 
 
509 
 
 
McDonald, Stephen, ‘Territory Courts and Federal Jurisdiction’ (2005) 33 Federal 
Law Review 57. 
 
McDonald, Stephen, ‘Involuntary Detention and the Separation of Judicial Power’ 
(2007) 35 Federal Law Review 25. 
 
McIntosh, Magdalena, ‘A step forward – mandatory mediations’ (2003) 14 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 280. 
 
McHugh, Justice Michael, ‘The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989 
– 2004 (Inaugural Sir Anthony Mason Lecture in Constitutional Law, Sydney, 26th 
November 2004). 
 
McHugh, Justice Michael, 'Does Chapter III of the Constitution Protect Substantive as 
Well as Procedural Rights?' (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235. 
 
McHugh, Justice Michael, ‘Tensions Between the Executive and Judiciary’ (2002) 6 
The Judicial Review 111. 
 
McHugh, Michael ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?' (Speech delivered at the 
New South Wales Bar Association, Sydney, 8 August 2007). 
 
McLachlan, Chief Justice Beverley, ‘Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence – 
To the Better Administration of Justice’ (2003) 8 Deakin Law Review 1. 
 
McLachlan, Chief Justice Beverley, ‘The Role of Judges in Modern Commonwealth 
Society’ (1994) 10 The Law Quarterly Review 260. 
 
McMurdo, Justice Margaret, ‘Journalists trying to make a quid, politicians seeking re-
election and tightrope-walking judges” three-ring circus or democracy in action?’ 
(Paper presented to the National Judicial College of Australia Conference on 
Confidence in the Courts, Canberra, 10 February 2007). 
 
Meagher, Dan, ‘Should the Victorian Constitution be reformed to strengthen the 
separation of judicial power?’ (2000) 2(4) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 63 
 
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, ‘For and against settlement: uses and abuses of the 
mandatory settlement conference’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 485 
 
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, ‘Pursuing Settlement in An Adversary Culture: A Tale Of 
Innovation Co-Opted Or “The Law Of ADR”’ (1991) 19 Florida State University 
Law Review 1. 
 
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, ‘The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of 
Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices’ (1995) 11 Negotiation Journal 217. 
 
Menkel-Meadow, C, ‘The Intellectual Founders of ADR’ (2000) 16 Ohio State 
Journal of Dispute Resolution 1. 
 
Merkin, Robert, Arbitration Act 1996: An Annotated Guide (1996). 
510 
 
 
 
Meyerson, Denise, ‘Extra-judicial service on the part of judges : constitutional 
impediments in Australia and South Africa’ (2003) 3(2) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Journal 181. 
 
Meyerson, Denise ‘The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers’ (2004) 4 
Macquarie Law Journal 1. 
 
Michalik, Paul, ‘Justice Crisis in England and Wales’ in Sergio Chiarloni, Peter 
Gottlwald, Adrian Zuckerman (ed), Civil justice in crisis: Comparative perspectives 
of civil procedure (1999), above n 101, 117. 
 
Mistelis, Loukas, ‘ADR in England and Wales: a successful case of public private 
partnership’ (2003) ADR Bulletin 53. 
 
Moens’, Gabriel and Trone, John, Lumb and Moens’ The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia: Annotated (6th Ed 2001). 
 
Moore, Justice Michael, ‘Judges and Mediators: A Chapter IIII prohibition or 
accommodation?’ (2003) 13 ADRJ 188. 
 
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, The Spirit of the Laws (1748). 
 
Morris, Allison and Maxwell, Gabrielle ‘Restorative Justice in New Zealand: Family 
Group Conferences as a Case Study (1998) 1 (1) Western Criminology Review 8. 
 
Morris, Allison and Maxwell, Gabrielle, Restorative Justice for Juveniles, 2001. 
 
Murray, John, Rau, Alan and Sherman, Edward, Arbitration (1996). 
 
Mustill, Michael and Boyd, Stewart, Commercial Arbitration (1989). 
 
Nagorcka, Felicity, Stanton, Michael and Wilson, Michael, ‘Stranded between 
Partisanship and the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of Legal Ethics in the 
Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice’ (2005) Melbourne University Law 
Review 14. 
 
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Definitions (1997). 
 
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute Resolution Terms 
(2003). 
 
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, ADR Statistics: Published 
Statistics on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia (2003). 
 
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, ADR Research: a 
resource paper (2004). 
 
511 
 
 
National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in the Civil Justice System, NADRAC IP (2009). 
 
Neier, Aryeh, Only Judgment: The Limits of Litigation in Social Change (1982). 
 
Nolan, Mark, ‘The Adversarial mentality versus the Inquisitorial mentality’ (2004) 
16(3) Legaldate 7. 
 
Nolan-Haley, Jacqueline M, ‘The Merger Of Law And Mediation: Lessons From 
Equity Jurisprudence And Roscoe Pound’ (2004) Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 57. 
         
Olsson, Justice Trevor, “Mediation and the Court – Inspiration or Desperation?’ (1996) 
5 Journal of Judicial Administration 236. 
 
Opeskin, Brian, ‘Law reform in a federal system’ (2001) 78 Reform 29. 
 
O’Mahony, Paul, Criminal Justice in Ireland (2002).  
 
Ontario Law Reform Commission Rethinking civil justice: Research studies for the 
civil justice review (1996): Vols 1 and 2. 
 
Orr, Robert, ‘Kable v DPP: Taking Judicial Protection Too Far?’ (1996) 11 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 1. 
 
Otis, Justice Louise ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Judicial Mediation’ (Paper 
prepared for the European Conference of Judges: Early Settlement of Disputes and the 
Role of Judges, 2003, Strasbourg). 
 
Otis, Justice Louise and Reiter, Eric H, ‘Judicial Mediation: A New Phenomenon in 
the Transformation of Justice’ (2005) (unpublished). 
 
Otis, Justice Louise and Reiter, Eric ‘Judicial Mediation in Quebec’ in Nadja 
Alexander (ed), Global Trends in Mediation, (2nd ed 2006) 107, 110. 
 
Otis, Justice Louise ‘Judicial Mediation: Prospects and Issues’ (Speech delivered to 
Seminar of the Victorian Bar, Thursday 14 May 2009, Melbourne). 
 
Paleker, Mohamed, ‘Court connected ADR in civil litigation: the key to access to 
justice in South Africa’, (2003) 6(3) ADR Bulletin 48. 
 
Parker, Christine, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional 
Principle' (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341. 
 
Parker, Stephen, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’, in Opeskin, Brian and Wheeler, 
Fiona (eds) The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000), 71 
 
Parkinson, Patrick, Tradition and Change in Australian Law (2nd ed, 2001). 
 
512 
 
 
Parry, David, ‘A Cultural Change – The use of Facilitative Dispute Resolution in the 
State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia’ (2007) BRIEF 23. 
 
Patapan, Haig, ‘Separation of Powers in Australia’ (1999) 34 Australian Journal of 
Political Science 391. 
 
Patapan, Haig, ‘High Court Review 2002: The Least Dangerous Branch’. (2003) 
Australian Journal of Political Science 38(2) 299. 
 
Patapan, Haig, Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court of Australia 
(2000). 
 
Pauling, Tom and Brownhill, Sonia, ‘The territories and Constitutional Change’ (2007) 
28 Adelaide Law Review 55. 
 
Pearce, Dennis and Argument, Stephen, Delegated Legislation in Australia (3rd ed 
2005). 
 
Pearson, Jessica, ‘Family Mediation’ in Keilitz, Susan (ed), National Symposium on 
Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Research: A Report on Current Research 
Findings - Implications for Courts and Future Research (1994), 63. 
 
Pearson, Jessica and Thoennes, Nancy, ‘Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade 
of Research’, in Kressel and Dean Pruitt, (eds) Mediation Research: The Process and 
Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention (1989), 9. 
 
Petterson, Scott, ‘To keep or not to keep – is that really the question?’ (2004) 6(9) 
ADR Bulletin 177. 
 
Phillips, Michael J, The Lochner Court, Myth and Reality: Substantive Due Process 
from the 1890s to the 1930s (2001).  
 
Pierce, Jason, Inside the Mason Court Revolution (2006). 
 
Pound, Dean Roscoe, ‘The Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice’ (1906) Rep. A.B.A 395 
 
Press, Sharon, 'Florida's Court-Connected State Mediation Program' in Bergman, 
Edward and Bickerman, John (eds) Court-Annexed Mediation: Critical Perspectives 
on Selected State and Federal Programs (1998). 
 
Prince, Peter and Bennett, David, ‘Kable Principle revisited: State law restricting 
disclosure of information in courts proceedings’ (2008) (16) Litigation Notes 16. 
 
Quick, Sir John and Garran, Sir Robert, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth (1901). 
 
Rack, Robert, ‘Thoughts of a Chief Circuit Mediator on Federal Court-connected 
Mediation’ (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 609. 
 
513 
 
 
Rares, Justice Steven, ‘Blind Justice: The pit-falls for administrative decision-making’ 
(2006) 50 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 14. 
 
Ratnapala, Suri, Australian Constitution Law: Foundations and Theory (2nd ed 2007). 
 
Rawls, John, A theory of justice (1971). 
 
Raz, Joseph, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195. 
 
Redish, M H, ‘Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority and the Scope of Article III: 
the Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta’ (1989) 39 DePaul Law Review 299. 
 
Renfrew, Judge Charles, ‘Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil 
and Criminal Anti Trust Cases’ (1975) 57 Chicago Bar Record 130. 
 
Resnik, Judith, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982-83) 96 Harvard Law Review 374. 
 
Resnik, Judith, ‘Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline’ (1986) 53 
University of Chicago Law Review 494. 
 
Resnik, Judith, Many doors? Closing doors? Alternative dispute resolution and 
adjudication’ (1995) 10(2) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 211. 
 
Resnik, Judith, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication: A Glimpse at 
Changes in the US’ (Paper prepared for the Litigation Reform Commission 
Conference Civil Justice, Reform: Streamlining the Process, Brisbane, 1996). 
 
Riskin, Leonard, ‘Understanding Mediator’s Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: 
A Grid for the Perplexed’ (1996) 1 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 7. 
 
Robert, Michel, ‘Judges as Mediators in Criminal Matters’ (Paper presented to the 
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law’s 20th International Conference, 
Brisbane 2nd – 6th July 2006). 
 
Roberts, Simon, ‘Mediation in Family Disputes’ (1986) 46 Modern Law Review 537. 
 
Roberts, Simon, ‘Toward a Minimal Form of Alternative Intervention’ (1986) 11 
Mediation Quarterly 25. 
 
Roberts, Simon, ‘Three Models of Family Mediation’ in Robert Dingwall and John 
Eeekelaar (eds), Divorce Mediation and the Legal Process, 1998, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988, 148. 
 
Roberts, Simon, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice: An Unresolved 
Relationship’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 452. 
 
Robinson, Mark ‘Practical Justice and Procedural Fairness’ (Paper presented at the 
PAVE Peace Group, Sydney, 23 December 2003). 
 
514 
 
 
Robinson, Peter, ‘Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate about Judges Attempting 
to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial’ (2006) Journal of Dispute Resolution 335. 
 
Roebuck, Derek, Early English Arbitration (2008). 
 
Rogers, Justice Andrew, ‘Judges in Search of Justice’ (1987) 10 University of NSW 
Law Journal 93, 104. 
 
Rogers, Justice Andrew, ‘The managerial or interventionist judge’ (1993) 3 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 97. 
 
Rogers, Bernadette, ‘Multiple Roles in ADR’ (1999) 2 (1) ADR Bulletin 1. 
 
Roos, Oscar, ‘Baker v The Queen & Fardon v Attorney General for the State of 
Queensland’ (2005) 10(1) Deakin Law Review 271. 
 
Rosenberg, Gerald, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(1991). 
 
Royal Commission on the Constitution, Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution (1929). 
 
Rubin, Peter J, ‘Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural 
Due Process, and the Bill of Rights’. (2003) 103(4) Columbia Law Review 833. 
 
Ryan, John Paul, Ashman, Allan, Sales, Bruce D and Shane-Dubow, Sandra, The 
American Trial Judge (1980). 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘The civil justice system - the process of change’ (Paper 
presented to the Beyond the Adversarial System Conference, Brisbane 10-11 July 
1997). 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘Reframing the Civil Justice System: The Case for a 
Considered Approach’, in Stacey, Helen and Lavarch, Michael, Beyond the 
Adversarial System, (1999), 40. 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘From Access to Justice to Managing Justice: The 
Transformation of the Judicial Role’ (Paper Presented Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Annual Conference, ‘Access to Justice – The Way Forward’, Brisbane, 
12 – 14 July 2002). 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘Access to Justice: Assumptions and Reality Checks’ 
(Paper presented to the Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales Access to 
Justice Workshop, Sydney, 10th July 2002). 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘Some Thoughts on Access to Justice’ (Paper presented to 
the First Annual Conference on the Primary Functions of Government, Wellington, 
November 2003). 
 
515 
 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘Courts in Transit: An Australian View’ (Paper presented at 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal/High Court Judges and Masters Conference, Mt 
Ruapehu, 20 – 23 March 2003). 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘Refugee Law: The Shifting Balance’ (2004) 26 Sydney 
Law Review 37. 
 
Sackville, R, ‘Courts and Social Change’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 373. 
 
Sackville, Justice Ronald, ‘Expert evidence in the managerial age’ (Paper presented to 
the Forensic Accounting Conference, Sydney, 14th March 2008). 
 
Sallmann, Peter, ‘Change in the Adversarial System of Civil Dispute Resolution: 
Implications for the Judiciary’ in C Sampford, S Blencove and S Condllln (eds), 
Educating Lawyers for a Less Adversarial System (1999) 14. 
 
Sallmann, Peter and Wright, Richard, ‘Going to Court: A Discussion Paper on Civil 
Justice in Victoria (Civil Justice Review Project (1999)). 
 
Samuel, Elaine, Supporting Court Users: the In-court, (2002). 
 
Sanders, Frank, ‘Varieties of Dispute Processing’ (1976) 70 Federal Rules Decisions 
111. 
 
Sanders, Frank, ‘Varieties of Dispute Processing’ (Address Delivered at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice April 7 – 9 1976). 
 
Sanders, Frank, ‘Some Concluding Thoughts’ (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 705. 
 
Saunders, Cheryl, ‘The Separation of Powers’, in Fiona Wheeler and Brian Opeskin, 
The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 3. 
 
Sawer, Geoffrey, ‘The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism’ (1961) 35 
Australian Law Journal 177. 
 
Scalia, Antonin, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1175. 
 
Schuck, P H, ‘The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange 
Example’ (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 337. 
 
Schuck, P H, Book Review: Public Law Litigation and Social Reform’ (1993) 102 
Yale Law Review 1763. 
 
Schmidt, Folke, ‘Law and Industrial Peace: The Scandinavian Approach’ (1973) 17 
Scandinavian Studies in Law 253. 
 
516 
 
 
Schmidt, Monika, ‘A Successful Experiment in Judicial Mediation’, (2006) 18(9) 
Judicial Officers Bulletin 71. 
 
Selway, Bradley, ‘The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High 
Court of Australia’ (2002) 20(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 129. 
 
Shapiro, Martin, Courts: A Comparative and political analysis (1986). 
 
Shklar, Judith, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (1964). 
 
Shand, Michael, ‘The Civil Justice Review’ (2007) 141 Victorian Bar News, 6. 
 
Sharkey, John and Dorter, John, Commercial Arbitration (1986). 
 
Shirley, Melinda and Harris, Wendy, ‘Confidentiality in Court-Annexed Mediation – 
Fact or Fallacy?’ (1992) 13 The Queensland Lawyer 221. 
 
Shone, Margaret, ‘Law Reform and ADR: Pulling Strands in the Civil Justice Web’ 
(Paper presented at the Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference, Wellington, 
April 13-16 2004). 
 
Sidis, Judge Margaret, ‘Judicial Mediation in the District Court’ (2006) 18(9) Judicial 
Officers Bulletin 74. 
 
Simmons, Valerie, ‘Differentiated Case Management and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution - The Western District’s Plan to Reduce Costs and Delay in Civil 
Litigation’ (1993) 72 Michigan Bar Journal 1010. 
 
Smiljanich, Terrance, ‘Advisory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in 
Intergovernmental Co-operation’ (1971–1972) 24 University of Florida Law Review 
328. 
 
Solomon, Maureen and Somerlot, Douglas, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court: 
Now and for the Future (1987). 
 
Sourdin, Tania, ‘Judicial Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Process 
Trends’ (1996) 14 Australian Bar Review 185. 
 
Sourdin, Tania, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2002). 
 
Sourdin, Tania, ‘ADR: a glass half full or a glass half empty? A contribution to the 
issues raised by David Bryson’, (2002) 5(1) ADR 1. 
 
Sourdin, Tania, ‘ADR in the Australian court and tribunal system’, (2003) 6(3) ADR 
55. 
 
Sourdin, Tania, ‘Facilitative judging’, (2004) Law in Context 22(1) 64. 
 
Sourdin, Tania, Australian National Mediator Standards: Commentary on Approval 
Standards (2007). 
517 
 
 
 
Sourdin, Tania, Mediation in the Supreme and County Courts of Victoria (2009). 
 
Spencer, David, ‘Judicial Mediators: Are they Constitutionally Valid?’ (2006) 9(4) 
ADR Bulletin 1.  
 
Spencer, David, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 1’ (2006) 17 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 130. 
 
Spencer, David, ‘Judicial Mediators: Is the time right? – Part 2’ (2006) 17(4) 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 189. 
 
Spencer, David and Brogan, Michael, Mediation Law and Practice (2006). 
 
Spigelman, Chief Justice James, (An untitled speech delivered to the Compensation 
Court Annual Conference Friday 7th May 1999). 
 
Spigelman, Chief Justice James, ‘Seen to be Done: the Principle of Open Justice – 
Part II’ (2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 378. 
 
Spigelman, Chief Justice James, ‘Mediation and the Court’ (2001) 39(2) Law Society 
Journal 62. 
 
Spigelman, Chief Justice James, ‘Jurisdiction and Integrity’ (The Second Lecture in 
the 2004 National Lecture Series for The Australian Institute Of Administrative Law, 
Adelaide, 5 August 2004). 
 
Spigelman, Chief Justice James, ‘The Rule of Law and challenges to it’ (2008) Law 
Society Journal 57. 
  
Spiller, Peter ‘Reflections on best judicial practice’ (2009) 19 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 22. 
 
Stempel, Jeffrey, ‘Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multidoor Courthouse at 
Twenty: Fait Accumpli; Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood’ (1996) 11 Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 297. 
 
Stewart, Iain, ‘Men of Class: Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on ‘Separation and 
Powers’ and ‘The Rule of Law’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 187. 
 
Stern, Kristina, ‘Procedural Fairness – its scope and practical application’ (2008) 56 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 2. 
 
Street, Sir Laurence, ‘Mediation and the Judicial Institution’ (1997) 71 Australian 
Law Journal 794. 
 
Street, Sir Laurence, ‘The Courts and Mediation – A Warning’ (1991) 2 Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 203. 
 
518 
 
 
Sykes, Andrew, ‘The “Rule of Law” as an Australian Constitutionalist Promise’ 
(2002) 9(1) Murdoch University Electronic Law Journal: available at 
www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n1/sykes91_text.html  
 
Taylor, Veronica and Pryles, Michael, ‘The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia’ in 
Michael Pryles (ed), Dispute Resolution in Asia (1997). 
 
Thirgood, Russell, ‘Mediator Intervention to Ensure Fair and Just Outcomes (1999) 
10 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 142. 
 
Trittmann, Rolf, ‘Alternative dispute resolution in Germany’, (2002) 5(4) ADR 58. 
 
Tucker, Phillip, ‘Judges as Mediators: A Chapter III Prohibition?’ (2000) 11 ADRJ 84. 
 
Twist, Peter, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of Masters’ (1996) New Zealand Law Journal 
351. 
 
Twomey, Anne, ‘Federal Limitations on the Legislative Power of the States and the  
Commonwealth to Bind One Another’ 31 Federal Law Review 507. 
 
Twomey, Anne, The Constitution of New South Wales (2004). 
 
Unger, Roberto, Law in Modern Society (1976). 
 
Unger, Roberto, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law 
Review 561. 
 
Van Epps, Douglas, ‘The Impact of Mediation on State Courts’ (2002) 17 Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution 627 
 
Von Doussa, John, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism – A Crucial 
Challenge’ (2006) 13 James Cook University Law Review 104. 
 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Reform: Report, Report No 98 
(2008) 
 
Wade, John, ‘Mediation  – The Terminological Debate’ (1994) 5 Australian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 204. 
 
Wade, John, “Current Trends and Models in Dispute Resolution, Part II”, (1998) 9 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 59, 61. 
 
Wade, John, ‘What skills and attributes do experienced mediators possess?’ (1999) 5 
Australian Dispute Resolution Bulletin 50. 
 
Wade, John, ‘Mediation – Seven Fundamental Questions’ (2001) 86 Svensk Jurist 
Tidning 571. 
 
519 
 
 
Wade, John, ‘Duelling Experts’, in in Schneider, Andrea and Honeyman, Christopher 
(eds), The Negotiator’s Fieldbook: The Desk Reference for the Experienced 
Negotiator (2006), 524. 
 
Walker, Kristen, ‘Persona Designata, Incompatibility and the Separation of Powers’ 
(1997) 8 Public Law Review 153. 
 
Wall, James A and Schiller, Lawrence F, ‘Judicial Settlement Techniques’ (1981) 5 
American Journal of Trial Advocacy 39. 
 
Wall, James A and Schiller, Lawrence F, ‘Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial 
Settlement: A Judge is Not a Bump on a Log’ (1982) 6 American Journal of Trial 
Advocacy 27 
 
Wall, James A, Schiller, Lawrence F and Ebert, Ronald J, ‘Should Judges Grease the 
Slow Wheels of Justice? A Survey on the Effectiveness of Judicial Mediation 
Techniques’ (1984) 8 American Journal of Trial Advocacy 83. 
 
Wallace, J Clifford, ‘Judicial Reform and Pound Conference of 1976’ (1982) 80 (4) 
Michigan Law Review 592. 
 
Weckstein, Donald, ‘In Praise of Party Empowerment – and of Mediator Activism’ 33 
(1997) Williamette Law Review 501. 
 
Welsh, Nancy, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in Minnesota - An Update on Rule 
114’ in Bergman, Edward and Bickerman, John (eds) Court-Annexed Mediation: 
Critical Perspectives on Selected State and Federal Programs (1998). 
 
Weisbrot, David, ‘Reform of the Civil Justice System and Economic Growth: 
Australian Experience’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 235 
 
Wendell Holmes, Oliver, The Common Law (1881).  
 
Wendell Holmes, Oliver, ‘The Path of Law (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457. 
 
Whiting, Raymond, ‘Family Disputes, Non-Family Disputes and Mediation Success’ 
(1994) 11 Mediation Quarterly 247. 
 
Willoughby, Westel Wood-bury, Constitutional Law of the United States (2nd Ed 
1929). 
 
Wheeler, Fiona, ‘The use of federal judges to discharge executive functions: the 
Justice Mathews case [Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs’ (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 10. 
 
Wheeler, Fiona, ‘The doctrine of separation of powers and constitutionally entrenched 
due process in Australia’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 248. 
 
Wheeler, Fiona, ‘Federal Judges as Holders of Non-judicial Office’, in Opeskin, Brian 
and Wheeler, Fiona (eds) The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000), 442.  
520 
 
 
 
Wheeler, Fiona, ‘The Boilermakers Case’, in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), 
Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003), 166. 
 
Wheeler, Fiona, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the High Court’ 
(2004) Federal Law Review 9. 
 
Wheeler, Fiona, ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State Courts’ 
(2005) Australasian Parliamentary Review 15. 
 
White, Morton, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism (1949) 
 
Williams, Daryl, ‘Judicial power and good government’ (2000) 11(2) Public law 
Review 133. 
 
Williams, John, ‘Re-thinking Advisory Opinions’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 205. 
 
Williams, George, ‘Implied Rights under the Gleeson Court’ (1999) 2(3) 
Constitutional Law and Policy Review 44. 
 
Williams, George, ‘Due Process’, in Blackshield, Tony, Coper, Michael and Williams, 
George, The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (2001), 226. 
 
Winterton, George, ‘The Communist Party Case’, in Lee, HP and Winterton, George 
(eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003). 
 
Wissler, Roselle, ‘Court Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We 
Know from Empirical Research’ (2002) 17 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 
641. 
 
Wolski, Bobette, ‘Voluntariness and Consensuality: Defining Characteristics of 
Mediation?’ (1997) 15(3) Australian Bar Review 213. 
 
Wood, Justice James, ‘Litigation Through the 1900s: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
and Case Management’ (Paper delivered at the International Legal Conference, 
Whistler, Canada, January 1993). 
 
Wood, Justice James, ‘The changing face of case management: the New South Wales 
experience’ (1995) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 121. 
 
Woods, Judge Greg, ‘Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some historical 
observations, and a proposal’ (Paper presented to the National Judicial College of 
Australia Conference on Confidence in the Courts, Canberra, 9-11 February 2007). 
 
Woolf, Lord Harry, Access to Justice: Final Report, (1996). 
 
Wright Nelson, Judge Dorothy, ‘ADR in the Federal Courts - One Judge's Perspective: 
Issues and Challenges Facing Judges, Lawyers, Court Administrators, and the Public’ 
(2001) 17(1) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 1. 
 
521 
 
 
Wynes, W Anstey, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (1976). 
 
Yeazel, Stephen, ‘The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process’ (1994) 
Wisconsin Law Review 631. 
 
Zalar, A, ‘Managing judicial change through mediation’ (2004), Part 1 - 6(8) ADR 
156; Part II – 6(9) ADR 178 
 
Zander, Michael, ‘Why Lord Woolf’s Reforms of Civil Litigation Should Be 
Rejected’ in Adrian Zuckerman and Ross Cranston (eds) Reform of Civil Procedure: 
Essays on Access to Justice (1995), 81. 
 
Zdenkowski, George, ‘Magistrates’ courts and public confidence’ (Paper presented to 
the National Judicial College of Australia Conference on Confidence in the Courts, 
Canberra, 9-11 February 2007). 
 
Zhu, Jia-Wei, ‘The Constitutionality of Anti-terrorism Legislations – A Critique’ 
(2007) III Cross-sections 165. 
 
Zines, Leslie, ‘Laws for the Government of any Territory” Section 122 of the 
Constitution’ (1966) 2 Federal Law Review 72. 
 
Zines, Leslie, ‘The Nature of the Commonwealth’ (1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 83. 
 
Zines, Leslie, 'Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional Law' (2002) 
5 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 21. 
 
Zines, Leslie, The High Court and the Constitution (5th ed, 2008). 
 
Zuckerman, Adrian, ‘Civil Justice in Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil 
Procedure’, in Sergio Chiarloni, Peter Gottlwald, Adrian Zuckerman (ed) Civil justice 
in crisis: Comparative perspectives of civil procedure (1999). 
 
Personal correspondence with Norman Einarsson (confidential case note of a 
settlement conference, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 6th April 2009), received 
29th April 2009. Available on request and approval. 
 
 
522 
 
 
 Case Law 
 
 
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 
 
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 
 
Airservices Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 200 
 
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 
 
Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750 
  
Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415 
 
Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (2006) 65 NSWLR 400 
 
APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (2006) 224 CLR 322 
 
Attorney General (Commonwealth); Ex rel McKinley v Commonwealth (1975) 135 
CLR 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Attorney General of New South Wales v Lucy Klewer [2003] NSWCA 295 
(Unreported, Mason P Meagher JA Davies AJA, 15 October 2003) 
 
Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia 
(1957) 95 CLR 529 
 
Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529 
 
Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361  
 
Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees’ Union (NSW) (1908) 6 CLR 469 
 
Attorney-General (Victoria) v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237 
 
Austin v The Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185 
 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Alan Bond & Ors (1990) 170 CLR 321 
 
Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation v 
Commonwealth (1986) 161 CLR 88 
 
Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 
 
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 
 
Australian National Industries v Spedley Securities (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 
 
AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 ASCR 752 
523 
 
 
 
Bachrach v The State of Queensland (1998) 195 CLR 547 
 
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 
 
Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 
 
Barton v Taylor [1886] AC 197 
 
Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 
 
Bidner v Queensland [2000] QCA 368 (Unreported, McPherson and Thomas JJA, 
Jones J, 7 September 2000) 
 
Black & Decker (Australasia) Pty Ltd v GMCA Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1623 (Unreported, 
Finkelstein J, 26 October 2007). 
 
Blackburn, Low & Co v Vigors (1887) 12 QBD 531 
 
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 
651 
 
Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379 
 
Bond v George A Bond & Co Ltd (1930) 44 CLR 11 
 
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245 
 
Brewer v Castles (1984) 52 ALR 571 
 
Bristol Corporation v John Aird & Co [1913] AC 241 
 
Brown v Board of Education, 47 US 583 (1954)  
 
Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195  
 
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 
 
Buchanan v Commonwealth (1913) 16 CLR 315 
 
Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South 
Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372 
 
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 
 
Burnett v Director of Public Prosecutions (2007) 21 NTLR 39 
 
Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311  
 
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 
524 
 
 
 
Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 
 
Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591 
 
Cassar v Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1386 (Unreported, 
Rothman J, 23 December 2008) 
 
Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 
 
Chameleon Mining NL v Murchison Metals Ltd [2009] FCA 137 (Unreported, 
Jacobson J, 5 February 2009) 
 
Cheng v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248 
 
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 
 
Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 
 
Clyne v East (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 385 
 
Collingwood v Victoria (No 2) [1994] 1 VR 652 
 
Cominos v Cominos (1972) 127 CLR 588  
 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v McConnell (1997) NSWSC (Unreported, Rolfe J, 
24 July 2007) 
 
Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund (1971) 122 CLR 114 
 
Crestin v Crestin (2008) 39 Fam LR 420 
 
Curtin v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 269 (Unreported, Hall J, 9 
April 2009) 
 
Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt and Co [1922] 2 KB 478 
 
Daubney v Cooper (1829) 109 ER 438 
 
Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243 
 
Dietrich v The Queen 1992 177 CLR 292 
 
Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 10 ER 301 
 
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 
 
Duke Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Alamain Investments Ltd [2003] SASC 272 
(Unreported, Debelle J, 8 August 2003) 
 
525 
 
 
Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co. Limited [1942] AC 624 
 
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 
 
Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 599 
 
Enfield City Corp v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 
 
Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 
 
Ex parte Jones; Re Jones v Bates (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 284 
 
Fagshall v Foster (1995) 50 Dispute Resolution Journal 86 
 
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342 
 
Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v Baya Pharma Pty Ltd (1959) 101 CLR 652 
 
Fardon v Attorney General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 
 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro; British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1926) 38 CLR 153 
 
Federated Sawmill, Timberyard and General Woodworkers’ Employees’ Association 
(Adelaide Branch) v Alexander (1912) 15 CLR 308 
 
Femcare Ltd v Albright (2000) 100 FCR 331 
 
Ffrost v Stevenson (1937) 58 CLR 528 
 
Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285 
 
Finerty v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1136 (Unreported, Spender J, 
23 July 2008) 
 
Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438  
 
Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45 
 
Gain v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) NSWLR 252. 
 
Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 
 
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)  
 
Gilbertson v South Australia (1976) 15 SASR 66 
 
Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925) 
 
Glenn v Delalite CC [2000] VCAT 505 
526 
 
 
 
Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346 
 
Grace Bible Church v Reedman (1984) 36 SASR 376 
 
Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 
 
Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 
 
Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 
 
Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311 
 
Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 361 
 
Hemmes Hermitage Pty Ltd v Abdurahmann (1991) NSWLR 343 
 
Hill v Norfolk and Western Railway Co, 814 F2d 1192 (7th Circuit 1987) 
 
Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57 
 
Hinton v Mill (1991) 57 SASR 97 
 
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 
 
Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorhead (1909) 8 CLR 330 
 
Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241 
 
In the Matter of the Arbitration between Silverman and Benmore Coats, Inc, 461 NE 
2d 1261, 1266 (NY 1984) 
  
INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1982) 
 
J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447 
 
JD & WG Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168 
 
Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 
 
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 
 
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 
 
Jones v Commonwealth (1987) 71 ALR 497 
 
Jones v National Cole Board [1957] 2 QB 55 
 
Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 
 
527 
 
 
Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322 
 
Kewside Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd [1990] ATPR 46-059 
 
K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 252 ALR 471 
 
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 
  
Knight v Knight (1971) 122 CLR 114 
 
Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69 
 
Kotzmann v Adult Parole Board Victoria [2008] VSC 356 (Unreported, Judd J, 15 
September 2008) 
 
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 
 
Lambert v Weichelt (1954) 28 ALJR 282 
 
Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132 
 
Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 123 (2003)  
 
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 
 
Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481 
 
Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 
 
Lend Lease Development Pty Ltd v Zemlicka (1985) 3 NSWLR 207 
 
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 
 
Liyanage v R [1967] 1 AC 259  
 
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) 
 
Lockyer v Ferryman (1877) LR 2 AC 519 
 
Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470 
 
Lukies v Ripley (no 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 
 
Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808  
 
Marsch v Williams, 28 Cal Rptr 2d 402 (Cal Ct App 1994) 
 
McPherson v McPherson [1936] AC 177 
 
Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 
528 
 
 
 
Mellifont v A-G (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289 
 
Mijac Investments Pty Ltd v Graham [2009] FCA 303 (Unreported, Gordon J, 1 April 
2009) 
 
Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617 
 
Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307  
 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 
 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 
 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518 
 
Minister for Works (WA) v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 273 
 
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)  
 
Mistretta v United States 488 US 361, 407 (1989) 
 
Mitchell v Barker (1918) 24 CLR 365 
 
National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation (1984) 156 
CLR 296 
 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 
 
New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54 
 
Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 
 
Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 
 
Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336 
 
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 
 
North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146 
 
North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595 
 
Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 
 
O’Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 599 
 
Orient Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Gleeson (1931) 44 CLR 254 
 
Ousley v R (1997) 192 CLR 69 
529 
 
 
 
Pearce v Cocchiaro (1977) 137 CLR 600 
  
Plaintiff 157/2002 v Minister for Immigration (2003) 211 CLR 476 
 
Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177  
 
Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia (1991) 172 CLR 501 
 
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 
 
Porter v The King; Ex Parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 
 
Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167 
 
Prentis v Atlantic Coast Line Co, 211 US 210 (1908) 
 
Priestley v Godwin (2008) 172 FCR 139 
 
Putland v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 174 
 
Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v Thornton (1953) 87 CLR 144 
 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) 
[1999] 1 All ER 577 
 
R v Commonwealth Industrial Court; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
Australia Section (1960) 103 CLR 368 
 
R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353 
 
R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556 
 
R v Foster; Ex parte Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Assurances Ltd (1952) 85 
CLR 138  
 
R v Gough [1993] AC 646 
 
R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builder’s 
Labourers’ Federation (1974) 130 CLR 87 
 
R v Joske; Ex parte Shop Distributive & Allied Employees Association (1976) 135 
CLR 194 
 
R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 
 
R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24  
 
R v Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574 
 
530 
 
 
R v Moffatt (1997) 91 A Crim R 557 
 
R v Murphy (1985) 158 CLR 596 
 
R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods Ltd (1977) 138 CLR 1 
 
R v Rand (1866) LR 1 QB 230 
 
R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne (1955) 92 CLR 157 
 
R v Sawyer (1980) 71 Cr. App. R. 283  
 
R v Spencer [1987] AC 128 
 
R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (1957) 100 CLR 312 
 
R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256  
 
R v Taylor; Ex parte Roach (1951) 82 CLR 587 
 
R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 
CLR 361 
 
R v Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia (1955) 93 CLR 528 
 
R v Judge Leckie (1977) 52 ALJR 155 
 
R v Lilydale Magistrates Court; Ex parte Ciccone [1973] VR 122 
 
Rafael Cezan v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 258 
 
Rann v Olson (2000) 76 SASR 450 
 
Ray Fitzpatrick Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning (No 4) [2008] NSWLEC 161 
(Unreported, Sheahan J and Sheehan AC, 29 April 2008) 
 
Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1955) 184 CLR 188  
 
Re Baird; Ex parte Aitco Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 244 
 
Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 [2004] 1 Qd R 40 
 
Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (‘Eastman’) (1999) 
200 CLR 322  
 
Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322 
 
Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 
 
Re Judge Leckie; Ex parte Felman (1977) 52 ALJR 155  
531 
 
 
 
Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257 
 
Re Justice Lusink; Ex parte Shaw (1980) 55 ALJR 12 
 
Re Ludeke; Ex parte Customs Officers Association of Australia (1985) 155 CLR 513  
 
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 
57 
 
Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460 
 
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391  
 
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82  
 
Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518 
 
Re Wakim Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 
 
Re Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 
 
Robertson v Baldwin, 165 US 275 (1897) 
 
Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515 
  
Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) 
 
Ruffles v Chilman (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Kennedy, 
Franklin and White JJ, FUL120 of 1996, Library No: 9702461A) 
 
Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] 1 AC 1280 
 
Salemi v MacKellar [No 2] (1977) 137 CLR 396 
 
Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625 
 
Sankey v Whitlam, (1979) 142 CLR 1 
 
Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 
 
Seaman’s Union of Australia v Matthews (1957) 96 CLR 529 
 
Sherman v United States, (1958) 356 US 369 
 
Shrimpton v Comonwealth (1945) 69 CLR 613 
 
Siddons v New South Wales Shale & Oil Co Ltd (1874) 12 SCR (NSW) 364 
 
Silk Brothers Ltd v The State Electricity Commission of Victoria (1943) 67 CLR 1 
532 
 
 
 
Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] Qd R 65 
 
Smith v Mann (1932) 47 CLR 426 
 
Smolle v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2008] FCA 1065 
(Unreported, Jessup J, 18 July 2008) 
 
Sorrells v United States , (1932) 287 US 435 
 
Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 
 
State Bank of South Australia v Hellaby (1992) 59 SASR 304 
 
State of Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146 
 
State Rail Authority of NSW v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (In liq) (1999) 73 
ALJR 306 
 
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 
 
Steele v Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board (1955) 92 CLR 177  
 
Steelworkers v American Manufacturing Co, 363 US 564 (1960) 
 
Swiss Aluminium Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 163 CLR 
421 
 
Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564 
 
R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629 
 
The Queen v Local Government Board (1902) 2 IR 349 
 
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 
 
Thoo v Kelly (2008) 169 FCR 470 
 
Totani v South Australia [2009] SASC 301 
 
Truman v Truman (2008) 216 FLR 365 
 
Tuta Products Pty Ltd v Hutcherson Bros Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 253 
 
Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 
 
United Paperworkers v Misco, Inc., 484 US 29 (1987) 
 
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 
 
533 
 
 
Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656  
 
Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614 
 
Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders labourers' 
Federation [No 2] (1982) 152 CLR 179 
 
Vynior's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 80 
 
Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander (1918) 25 CLR 434 
 
Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 
 
Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 239 
 
Williams v Calivil Park Holsteins Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 31 (Unreported, Schmidt 
AJ, 12 February 2009) 
 
Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95 
 
Wilson v Minster for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (1996) 189 CLR 1 
 
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 
 
Woodlands, Bass & Conca v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (HomeFund case) 
(1996) 68 FCR 213 
 
Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 252 ALR 232 (2009) 237 CLR 309 
 
XYZ v The Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532  
 
Yule v Junek (1978) 139 CLR 1 
 
 
 
Primary and Delegated Legislation 
 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) 
  
ACT Supreme Court (Transfer) Act 1992 (Cth) 
 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) 
 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) 
 
Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court Act 1933 – 1968 (Cth)  
 
Australian Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth) 
 
534 
 
 
Bankruptcy Act 1924 – 1933 (Cth) 
 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) 
 
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) 
 
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)  
 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) 
 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA)  
 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
 
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)  
 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW)  
 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic)  
 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (NT) 
  
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA)  
 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT)  
 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (Tas)  
 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld) 
 
Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA)  
 
Community Justice Centres (Pilot Projects) Act 1980 (NSW) 
 
Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) 
 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) 
 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1926 (Cth) 
 
Conservation Act 1975 (Cth) 
 
Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA)  
 
Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) 
 
Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) 
 
535 
 
 
Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT)  
 
Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT)  
 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)  
 
Criminal Code Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)  
 
Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld) 
 
Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) 
 
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) 
 
District Court Rules 2005 (WA) 
 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) 
 
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) 
 
Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) 
 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
 
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) 
 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) 
  
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) 
 
Federal Court Rules 2004 (Cth) 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938 (Cth) 
 
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth)  
 
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) 
 
Financial Services Act 1987 (NSW) 
 
High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) 
 
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) 
 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) 
 
Inter-State Commission Act 1912 (Cth) 
 
536 
 
 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) 
 
Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) 
 
Magistrates Act (NT) 
 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) 
 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1966 (Cth) 
 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
 
Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth) 
 
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) 
 
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) 
 
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) 
 
Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW) 
 
Sentencing Legislation Further Amendment Act 1997 (NSW) 
 
Statutes Amendment (Mediation, Arbitration and Referral) Act 1996 (SA) 
 
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure Rules 1996 (Vic)  
 
Supreme Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA)  
 
Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2008 (Vic) 
  
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 
 
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)  
 
Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) 
 
Supreme Court Act 1989 (Vic) 
  
Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas)  
 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA)  
 
Supreme Court General Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (Vic) 
 
Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld) 
 
Supreme Court Rules (NT) 
 
537 
 
 
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) 
 
Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) 
 
Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) 
 
Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) 
 
Telecommunications (Interception) Ammendment Act 1987 (Cth) 
  
Trade Practices Act 1965 (Cth) 
 
Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth) 
 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW)  
 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) 
 
War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) 
 
Wrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002 (SA) 
 
Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) 
  
 
 
UK Primary and Delegated Legislation 
 
Arbitration Act 1697 (England and Wales) 
 
Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (England and Wales) 
 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) 
 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 
 
Queen’s Bench (Mediation) Amendment Act 1994 (England and Wales) 
 
Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK) 
 
 
 
Miscellaneous International Materials 
 
Domstolloven 1915 (Norway) 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1983 (US) 
 
538 
 
 
Forordning om Forligelses-Commissioners Stiftelse overalt i Danmark, samt i 
kjøbstæderne i Norge 1795 (Denmark/Norway)  
 
Forordning om Forligelses-Indretninger paa Landet i Norge 1795 (Norway) 
 
Lov om mægling i arbejdsstridigheder1910 (Denmark) 
 
 
Mediation Rules of the Provincial Court, Civil Division for Alberta, 1997 (Canada) 
 
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990 (Canada) 
 
Tvisteloven 2008 (Norway) 
 
Quebec Civil Code of Civil Procedure (Canada) 
 
 
 
Other Sources 
 
Australian Constitutional Convention (Minutes and Proceedings and Official Record 
of Debates of the Australian Constitutional Convention, Perth, 26 July 1978). 
 
Commonwealth, Evidence to House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Commonwealth Parliament, Canberra, 4 July 2005, 26 - 29 (Mr Kym Duggan, 
Assistant Secretary, Family Law Branch, Attorney-General’s Department). 
 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 March 1902. 
10971, 10981 (Alfred Deakin). 
 
Commonwealth, Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs: 
Advisory Opinions by the High Court, Parliamentary Paper No 222 (1977). 
 
United Kingdom Department of Constitutional Affairs, Further Findings: A 
Continuing Evaluation of Civil Justice Reforms, (2002). 
<http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/reform/ffreform.htm#part7> at 12 October 2009. 
 
United Kingdom Lord Chancellor’s Department, Civil Justice Reform Evaluation – 
Further Findings (2002). 
 
Wade, John, Boulle, Laurence and Cavanagh, Pat The Mediation Process 
[videorecording]: Fletcher’s partnership dispute (1992). 
 
 
 
